Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire

[Michael]

Words And Swords

After Rome fell, Byzantium lasted another 1,000 years. How?

In A.D. 395, Roman Emperor Theodosius I split his realm between his two sons, giving the Western empire—with Rome at its heart—to Honorius, and the eastern half—Byzantium—to his brother, Arkadios. Honorius seemed to get the better deal. Byzantium was a disjointed empire made up of regions scattered across eastern Europe, Asia and northern Africa, and it was vulnerable to attack. Invaders came from all directions—Huns from the steppes, Avars from the Caucasus, the mighty armies of the Sasanian Persians, followed by the Arabs and the Turks and, most disastrous of all, Crusaders from the West.

And yet the Roman Empire, and Rome itself, fell in the fifth century A.D., while Byzantium endured for almost a millennium longer. How was this possible? That question drives Edward N. Luttwak's "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire." Mr. Luttwak, an inveterate provocateur and the author of several earlier studies of strategy, including the audacious "Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook" (1979), has been pondering this Byzantine puzzle for two decades.

Book Review (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703932904574510561662553166.html)

Better historians please!

This is an ugly development I've been expecting to show up. As the study of history gets compartmentalized and chopped up into small period specialties, these 'experts' display brutal ignorance of the larger themes of history.

The opening paragraph of this book review is a classic example. Clearly the author (and the reviewer) are ignorant of the larger themes of Roman History - no surprise if they spent all their time as Byzantine specialists.

Fact is, and it was obvious under the late Republic and early Empire periods, that the eastern half of the Roman Empire (i.e. Byzantinium) supplied the vast majority of tax revenue of the Roman State and a majority of the recruits for the Roman Army. However, it was the western half of the empire where two-thirds of these troops were based.

That is to say, the eastern half was the more prosperous and more populous and more civilized half of the Roman empire. The western half of the empire was the one that was under constant and non-stop assault.

But apparently neither the author of the book nor the reviewer is aware of this basic fact of Roman history.

That kind of stupid ignorance makes this book utterly useless to one such as myself - and who but people like me are ever going to buy books on Byzantine history in the first place?

But the bottom line is that 'specialization' in historical periods tends to produce ignorant historians. And one can't be a historican in modern academia without specialization.

(Full disclosure: I began my academic career in history and felt the need to bailout of that department due to the walls of specialization that I was required to bow to - I objected to it then and I object to it even stronger now. Specialization may be good for the study of physics or chemistry - it is dangerously short-sighted for the study of history.)

[Non Sequitur]

While I agree that specialization is sometimes a problem, I kind of wonder if this person is just a bad historian. Specialization is kind of necessary if you want to study history in any in depth way.

Maybe though I'm just defending myself because my the specialty of my history major is American history.

[Michael]

While I agree that specialization is sometimes a problem, I kind of wonder if this person is just a bad historian. Specialization is kind of necessary if you want to study history in any in depth way.
I strongly disagree. According to the rules of specialization, these Byzantine specialists who are ignorant of actual Roman history are brillant scholars.

And that is precisely why I expected this problem to appear and it will only get worse. I've met all kinds of "historians" in the last dozen years whom I consider to be essentially ignorant of history (except that tiny slice they specialize in).

Maybe though I'm just defending myself because my the specialty of my history major is American history.
Specialization in a particular field is perfectly reasonable - but only after a general education in the field. This is where modern academia falls down - they just skip the "general education in the field" part and go straight to specialization. That's the flaw.

How can one be called a historian if one only knows one tiny little specialized segment of history and is ignorant of everything else that falls under the topic of history?

[The Drunk Guy]

I strongly disagree. According to the rules of specialization, these Byzantine specialists who are ignorant of actual Roman history are brillant scholars.

And that is precisely why I expected this problem to appear and it will only get worse. I've met all kinds of "historians" in the last dozen years whom I consider to be essentially ignorant of history (except that tiny slice they specialize in).


Specialization in a particular field is perfectly reasonable - but only after a general education in the field. This is where modern academia falls down - they just skip the "general education in the field" part and go straight to specialization. That's the flaw.

How can one be called a historian if one only knows one tiny little specialized segment of history and is ignorant of everything else that falls under the topic of history?A major contributing factor to this decline is the ridiculous requirements for degrees. I researched returning to school as a history education major and I found that in only needed 15 hours of history courses (on top of my 12 existing) to finish that aspect of the requirement. The other 45 or so hours were more genero-culture courses and the education courses. Even a straight-up history degree only requires 33-36 history courses, most of which focus on American History alone.

[Zarquon]

And these falling standards are on top of insane tuition costs, might I add.

[Americano]

And these falling standards are on top of insane tuition costs, might I add.

Welcome to wage inflation in an industry with high service product demand. In 1960 US college tuition was roughly equal to room and board costs. In 2008 tuition costs were two to four times the cost of room and board, dependent on school ranking.

It's really not much different than say US auto industry unions when their products were still in demand where janitors were making $100k/yr.

[Michael]

A major contributing factor to this decline is the ridiculous requirements for degrees. I researched returning to school as a history education major and I found that in only needed 15 hours of history courses (on top of my 12 existing) to finish that aspect of the requirement. The other 45 or so hours were more genero-culture courses and the education courses. Even a straight-up history degree only requires 33-36 history courses, most of which focus on American History alone.

Doctors and Lawyers notoriously use ridiculously high standards to keep out the riffraff and maintain their professions with limited numbers for maximum income potentials.

Seems like universities in the USA play the same game. They jack up the cost and difficulty of getting a degree because they can.

A policy that attracts fewer but richer students does serve their short term financial interests and no one ever thinks about anything but that, so this is what they do.

Given that high schools are going in the opposite direction (making graduating high school easier and easier than ever before, with less and less actual education), I'm thinking the US education system is well on track to support the Brazilification of the USA (with two classes: super rich people and poor people and no such thing as anything in between).

Alas, Byzantium is so much more interesting than watching the US progress towards building the education system it needs to support a fascist totalitarian society.

[Michael]

So no one wants to discuss Byzantine history? :sad:

[Non Sequitur]

So no one wants to discuss Byzantine history? :sad:

I know this thread has been dead, but I revived my interest in Byzantine history recently and so I am going to take two issues with this book (or at least what the review says about this book).

1. In A.D. 395, Roman Emperor Theodosius I split his realm between his two sons, giving the Western empire—with Rome at its heart—to Honorius, and the eastern half—Byzantium—to his brother, Arkadios. Honorius seemed to get the better deal. Byzantium was a disjointed empire made up of regions scattered across eastern Europe, Asia and northern Africa, and it was vulnerable to attack
This just seems like blatantly bad history. From Diocletian onward Emperors consistently preferred the Eastern half of the Empire. Economically the Eastern Half was stronger and more prosperous. It was united by very strong orthodox Christian belief (hence why heresies were such a big deal). The Eastern capital (New Rome, Constantinople, or whatever you want to call it) was in such a good position that it was almost impregnable. By almost every conceivable measure the Eastern Half of the Empire was the stronger half.

2. They also understood that military success doesn't lie solely in improved weapons or novel techniques of combat. Diplomacy is as crucial as force. It was this combination—words and swords—that ensured their survival against often overwhelming odds. They were skillful negotiators but even more skillful manipulators, adept at pitting opponents against one another.
Byzantine diplomacy was a necessity, not a conscious choice. The Byzantines fought only when they had to because that is all they could afford to do much of the time. Diplomacy and intrigue was necessary because in many situations the Byzantines could not out right defeat their enemies on the field.

[Michael]

I know this thread has been dead, but I revived my interest in Byzantine history recently and so I am going to take two issues with this book (or at least what the review says about this book).

1.
This just seems like blatantly bad history. From Diocletian onward Emperors consistently preferred the Eastern half of the Empire. Economically the Eastern Half was stronger and more prosperous. It was united by very strong orthodox Christian belief (hence why heresies were such a big deal). The Eastern capital (New Rome, Constantinople, or whatever you want to call it) was in such a good position that it was almost impregnable. By almost every conceivable measure the Eastern Half of the Empire was the stronger half.
Excellent point and I agree completely. It was already known in the time of Julius Caesar that some two-thirds of the revenue of the Empire was coming from the eastern half and two-thirds of the military expense of defense was based in the western half. No question about which half was the 'better' half.


2.
Byzantine diplomacy was a necessity, not a conscious choice. The Byzantines fought only when they had to because that is all they could afford to do much of the time. Diplomacy and intrigue was necessary because in many situations the Byzantines could not out right defeat their enemies on the field.

Another good point that I agree with. Byzantium was never in a position of strength vis-a-vis her neighbors anytime after the 7th century - making diplomacy a strategic necessity, not a choice.