Action

[Daktoria]

Answer the poll and discuss.

[dilettante]

Answer the poll and discuss.

I might need slightly more elaboration. For example, what's the difference between my 'acting based on facts' and acting based on what I 'believe the facts to be'?

[Daktoria]

That's part of the discussion really. I'd rather not say anything until your own opinion is established. For example, there's an argument that "facts" are simply reflections of reality, and it's our real structures that determines how we behave.

[Michael]

I voted "Beliefs" (I'm surprised you didn't make this poll a public one where people can see who voted what).

Note: This means I think most people act this way, not that I act this way or counsel this.

Things tend to get complicated because many people define facts according to their belief systems.

Other people tend to define their belief system according to the facts that they believe.

All a big self-referential circle in most cases.

[Daktoria]

Heh, I'm kinda tired and been on and off procrastinating with some presentation review assignment for the past several hours. Otherwise, I probably would have paid attention to make it public. :erm:

Anyway, I thought this would be an abbreviated way to get to the point I was making in the "Proof" thread, and I'm going to do a copypasta from philosophy forums of another thread (http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/discipline-37847.html) I believe bridges the gap:Not obedience or punishment, but discipline. Is it ever really worth it do commit ourselves towards endeavors that require determination? I feel that discipline is built to be an iron clad wall that always gets cut through by diamond blades of innovation. Innovative people need some fundamental disciplines in order to prepare their own strategies and methods, but is it ever really worth it either way?

I mean sure, innovative people could never become fundamentally disciplined but instead disciplined on an advanced level because they could never afford to make a mistake themselves else they lose their reputation and have their houses of cards blown down, but that's still a form of discipline in itself that still seems destined to be vain because creative destruction will always evolve the goals, rules, and strategies of the games that discipline is involved with.

Maybe that's what discipline is about though - simplifying reality and eliminating smaller games so larger games can be played? I guess that could make sense regarding cognitive dissonance since no mind is boundless and we all need to simplify reality in order to get as much as possible out of it....

...but why do we want as much as possible? Why is utility optimization preferable? Why are survival, existence, reflection, expansion, and legacy, preferable? What's wrong with saying "no" to playing games in general?
Not only do participants need to develop discipline in order to overcome unseen obstacles, but observers need to develop discipline in order to identify how much, at what price, and along what language information should be disclosed to participants.

Give a man a fish, he'll live for a day. Teach a man to fish, he'll live for a lifetime.

Well in the experiment, giving a fish would be like helping the observers cheat by granting them the knowledge required to only overcome the obstacles they failed to overcome. Teaching how to fish would be like helping the observers learn by showing them how to appreciate intuition and behave proactively ahead of the curve rather than simply reacting to situations that have already partially developed and have a time limit to be responded to.

The problem for both observers and participants though is in appreciating how many obstacles they want to overcome, and these obstacles exist in "games" that require "discipline" in order to optimize experience according to the game dynamics, but if discipline "commitment" is always vain because it's only a matter of time before creative destruction makes games meaningless, why should anyone ever bother?

In other words, where does self-interest come from(?); if it's an endogenous existential characteristic, how can free will exist(?); if free will doesn't exist, how can observers or participants even exist(?); and if observers and participants don't exist, how can experiments or games even exist?

[Michael]

Heh, I'm kinda tired and been on and off procrastinating with some presentation review assignment for the past several hours. Otherwise, I probably would have paid attention to make it public. :erm:
I checked it out - I can't change it for you. :o

[dilettante]

That's part of the discussion really. I'd rather not say anything until your own opinion is established. For example, there's an argument that "facts" are simply reflections of reality, and it's our real structures that determines how we behave.

Well, then, I'm gonna go with "Beliefs" (or "Yes" in the poll). I don't think "belief" and "facts" make a terribly good dichotomy, though, since what really matters is what one believes the facts to be.

E.g. What really matters in determining whether or not I will sit on a chair isn't whether the chair is solid or flimsy, but whether I believe it to be solid or flimsy.

On the other hand, one could always argue that facts always influence our beliefs. However, the question asked which we "primarily" act on; I'd argue that our beliefs are more immediately connected to our voluntary actions than are the facts.

[Michael]

Well, then, I'm gonna go with "Beliefs" (or "Yes" in the poll). I don't think "belief" and "facts" make a terribly good dichotomy, though, since what really matters is what one believes the facts to be.

E.g. What really matters in determining whether or not I will sit on a chair isn't whether the chair is solid or flimsy, but whether I believe it to be solid or flimsy.

On the other hand, one could always argue that facts always influence our beliefs. However, the question asked which we "primarily" act on; I'd argue that our beliefs are more immediately connected to our voluntary actions than are the facts.
Agreed. Most people make decisions based on their 'gut' or 'feelings' and then appeal to facts to justify that decision after the fact.

This can be demonstrated by proving every fact asserted as justification is false, but the person will usually still hold to their original choice regardless.

[Daktoria]

Well, then, I'm gonna go with "Beliefs" (or "Yes" in the poll). I don't think "belief" and "facts" make a terribly good dichotomy, though, since what really matters is what one believes the facts to be.

E.g. What really matters in determining whether or not I will sit on a chair isn't whether the chair is solid or flimsy, but whether I believe it to be solid or flimsy.

On the other hand, one could always argue that facts always influence our beliefs. However, the question asked which we "primarily" act on; I'd argue that our beliefs are more immediately connected to our voluntary actions than are the facts.
I like how you said "immediately connected" at the end as a description of "primarily".

The argument I referred to before though considers that external, not internal, facts determine how we behave. For example, the facts about the chair wouldn't determine whether or not you sit in it, but rather the facts about your DNA, your memories, your environment, etc.

[Daktoria]

I checked it out - I can't change it for you. :o

Can't or can?

If you can, could you change it after interpreting how the three threads come together? :popcorn:

[Michael]

I like how you said "immediately connected" at the end as a description of "primarily".

The argument I referred to before considers that external, not internal, facts determine how we behave. For example, the facts about the chair wouldn't determine whether or not you sit in it, but rather the facts about your DNA, your memories, your environment, etc.

The fact that the chair is falling apart might cause one to hesitate.

The facts of the chair are not irrelevant to the decision to sit.

[Daktoria]

Right, they're not irrelevant. However, the question of how the chair's facts are appreciated might be answered in accordance with the facts about the person. For example, a person who weighs a lot won't sit in a weak chair as likely as a person who weighs less. Similarly, a person who's had a recent accident with a chair will more likely investigate a chair's structural integrity more than someone who has not.

[Non Sequitur]

I answered yes for the same problems other people had with the dichotomy of facts and beliefs. Also I know that I act on several things that cannot be counted as facts under any definition.

[Daktoria]

The argument about facts isn't about knowledge. Again:
The argument I referred to before though considers that external, not internal, facts determine how we behave. For example, the facts about the chair wouldn't determine whether or not you sit in it, but rather the facts about your DNA, your memories, your environment, etc....

...Right, they're not irrelevant. However, the question of how the chair's facts are appreciated might be answered in accordance with the facts about the person. For example, a person who weighs a lot won't sit in a weak chair as likely as a person who weighs less. Similarly, a person who's had a recent accident with a chair will more likely investigate a chair's structural integrity more than someone who has not.

[Michael]

I don't think commentary on 'internal' decisions is meaningful - on account of the fact that it can never be known.

Looking strictly at the chair as an external object, it is easy to see that faith or belief (not facts) determine the decision to sit on the chair.

One can't know the chair is structurally sound without physically analyzing it. Most people don't actually do that, so they are taking it on faith that the chair is fully functional (and will not collapse when they sit on it).

The factual status of the chair being structurally sound is (usually) only determined after the fact, not before.

That is why I said "belief" is the operational decider regarding sitting.

Whatever internal issues may be present, they are always beside the point and entirely hidden (as they are subjective and unobservable).

[Daktoria]

Decisions aren't existentially grounded then?

[Michael]

Decisions aren't existentially grounded then?
Some are, some aren't. :shrug:

Just like people I guess.

[Daktoria]

How can we recognize which are and which are not?

[Michael]

How can we recognize which are and which are not?

I don't believe that there is any 'hard and fast' rule that you can apply here to tell the difference. A bit of wisdom, age and experience helps, but that's about it.

P.T. Barnum is also a good guide to keep in mind here. No one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American public. :shrug:

Or honest Abe Lincoln's assertion that you can fool some of the people some of the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time.

I think both statements are quite relevant, though they may appear rather 'folksy'.

Nevertheless, I'm always hung up on any issue that requires that people's internal state of mind to be known or undertsood or rationally predicted. That is a quagmire of subjectivity, bias, illusions, delusions and just plain lies. Expecting the average person to be able to rationally or honestly account for any or all of their subjective decisions is, in my opinion, a fool's game.

[Michael]

And since this topic is in philosophy section, and the dominant example being used in the discussion is the action of sitting on a chair, I can't help but to be reminded of dear old Plato. :D

Indeed, the 8:0 vote ratio given above makes it doubly interesting since the consensus is that Plato's theory of dualism might not be all that far off as many might suppose.

That is to say, the physical status of the chair (whether or not it is structurally sound and/or comfortable) is unknown in the moment prior to one's sitting upon it. That one would sit on the chair is clearly an action can be interpretated as one that is based on faith in the idea of a fully functional (or comfortable) chair, not a rational deduction that the present chair is structurally sound and fully appropriate (and safe) to sit on.

Or in Platonic terms, the 'idea of a chair as a form' exists in the mind independent of any given physical object that subsumes that form.

In this example, it is one's faith in the idea of the chair as form that leads one to 'assume' the functionality (and safety) of any chair-like object - rather than any rational deduction (or examination) about the physical qualities of that particular chair.

@Daktoria: Btw, the example or analogy of 'sitting on a chair' is EXACTLY the kind of 'thought experiment' I like to work with. Plain, simple and brutally obvious - those are good qualities in an analogy!

[dilettante]

And since this topic is in philosophy section, and the dominant example being used in the discussion is the action of sitting on a chair, I can't help but to be reminded of dear old Plato. :D

Indeed, the 8:0 vote ratio given above makes it doubly interesting since the consensus is that Plato's theory of dualism might not be all that far off as many might suppose.

That is to say, the physical status of the chair (whether or not it is structurally sound and/or comfortable) is unknown in the moment prior to one's sitting upon it. That one would sit on the chair is clearly an action can be interpretated as one that is based on faith in the idea of a fully functional (or comfortable) chair, not a rational deduction that the present chair is structurally sound and fully appropriate (and safe) to sit on.

Or in Platonic terms, the 'idea of a chair as a form' exists in the mind independent of any given physical object that subsumes that form.

In this example, it is one's faith in the idea of the chair as form that leads one to 'assume' the functionality (and safety) of any chair-like object - rather than any rational deduction (or examination) about the physical qualities of that particular chair.


I don't know. This seems to go too far in separating one's faith in the status of the chair from the actual physical status, as if the two were entirely disconnected.
Obviously there is some level of examination and analysis involved. If the chair is obviously missing a leg and swaying in the breeze, most people won't sit in it. It's just that our examination and analysis is merely cursory, unless we have reason to make it more in depth.

I'm inclined to suggest the following model:

Facts --> Beliefs --> Actions --> Facts --> ...etc.

That is to say, the actual status of things influences our beliefs (e.g. the appearance of the chair and our past experiences with similar chairs leads us to believe that the chair is sound); our beliefs influence our actions (e.g. because we believe the chair to be sound, we sit in it); and our actions alter the facts (e.g. it is now a fact that we seated in the chair...or on the ground if our belief about the chair's soundness was in error).
It's not a perfect model, since things other than our intentional actions also influence the facts and things other than the facts also influence our beliefs, but I think it gives a rough notion of how our beliefs are inserted between the facts and our actions.

[Michael]

I don't know. This seems to go too far in separating one's faith in the status of the chair from the actual physical status, as if the two were entirely disconnected.
I don't agree with the accuracy of this description. The two (chair and idea of chair) are clearly connected to one another in Plato's view.

I'm pointing out that one can place one's faith in the idea of a chair being a safe/comfortable place to sit, or one can place one's faith in one's own sensory analysis of the physical properties/condition of the actual chair itself. One can also perhaps do a combination of both. :shrug:

But I am pointing out that it sure does seem as if human beings do tend to prefer the first method rather than the latter as being far more common.

I'm inclined to suggest the following model:

Facts --> Beliefs --> Actions --> Facts --> ...etc.

Sure. But what if facts aren't actually factual? What if all facts are relative?

According to the principle of relativism, all statements of fact are [ultimately] statements of defacto belief (that may be conditional or not).

That is to say, the actual status of things influences our beliefs (e.g. the appearance of the chair and our past experiences with similar chairs leads us to believe that the chair is sound); our beliefs influence our actions (e.g. because we believe the chair to be sound, we sit in it); and our actions alter the facts (e.g. it is now a fact that we seated in the chair...or on the ground if our belief about the chair's soundness was in error). It's not a perfect model, since things other than our intentional actions also influence the facts and things other than the facts also influence our beliefs, but I think it gives a rough notion of how our beliefs are inserted between the facts and our actions.
From the point of view of epistemology, you are skipping the first stages where facts and/or perceptions are justified/defined as 'knowledge'.

If we skip over that part, then your point seems much more reasonable.

[Daktoria]

I don't believe that there is any 'hard and fast' rule that you can apply here to tell the difference. A bit of wisdom, age and experience helps, but that's about it.

P.T. Barnum is also a good guide to keep in mind here. No one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American public. :shrug:

Or honest Abe Lincoln's assertion that you can fool some of the people some of the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time.

I think both statements are quite relevant, though they may appear rather 'folksy'.

Nevertheless, I'm always hung up on any issue that requires that people's internal state of mind to be known or undertsood or rationally predicted. That is a quagmire of subjectivity, bias, illusions, delusions and just plain lies. Expecting the average person to be able to rationally or honestly account for any or all of their subjective decisions is, in my opinion, a fool's game.

How does trust pertain to whether or not decisions are existentially grounded?

And since this topic is in philosophy section, and the dominant example being used in the discussion is the action of sitting on a chair, I can't help but to be reminded of dear old Plato. :D

Indeed, the 8:0 vote ratio given above makes it doubly interesting since the consensus is that Plato's theory of dualism might not be all that far off as many might suppose.

That is to say, the physical status of the chair (whether or not it is structurally sound and/or comfortable) is unknown in the moment prior to one's sitting upon it. That one would sit on the chair is clearly an action can be interpretated as one that is based on faith in the idea of a fully functional (or comfortable) chair, not a rational deduction that the present chair is structurally sound and fully appropriate (and safe) to sit on.

Or in Platonic terms, the 'idea of a chair as a form' exists in the mind independent of any given physical object that subsumes that form.

In this example, it is one's faith in the idea of the chair as form that leads one to 'assume' the functionality (and safety) of any chair-like object - rather than any rational deduction (or examination) about the physical qualities of that particular chair.

@Daktoria: Btw, the example or analogy of 'sitting on a chair' is EXACTLY the kind of 'thought experiment' I like to work with. Plain, simple and brutally obvious - those are good qualities in an analogy!It's not the chair's characteristics that are important, but the facts about the sitter's structure (regardless of if he deduces rationally). For example, genetic composition, neurological structure, hormones in his blood, etc., the question being, "Where does the non-existential part of decision making exist?" Maybe it exists, maybe it doesn't, but where would it be?

Perhaps we can never know (either because no such essence exists or because such an essence would be axiomatically undetectable), but if we "believe" that it "exists", doesn't that imply a soul?

[Michael]

How does trust pertain to whether or not decisions are existentially grounded?
Beats me.

As always, I consider it nonsense to speculate on the internal decision process of human beings.

Nothing that you assert on this issue can be proven. Everything is hidden here and covered up with lies, subjectivity and vanity. People tend to act quite irrationally and/or entirely selfishly. They like to pretend that this is all very rational and altruistic. I don't trust any person's assertions about their interior decision process.

It's not the chair's characteristics that are important, but the facts about the sitter's structure (regardless of if he deduces rationally).
Really? So that chair with all the loose bolts barely holding it together is irrelevant?

I'll grant that some facts about the sitter are quite relevant, but the physical properties of the chair most certainly are not irrelevant.

Is there a point to this querry?

[Daktoria]

Beats me.

As always, I consider it nonsense to speculate on the internal decision process of human beings.

Nothing that you assert on this issue can be proven. Everything is hidden here and covered up with lies, subjectivity and vanity. People tend to act quite irrationally and/or entirely selfishly. They like to pretend that this is all very rational and altruistic. I don't trust any person's assertions about their interior decision process.

Why did you bring up Lincoln's folksy saying on fooling people then? I'm having a problem getting the gist of your point.


Really? So that chair with all the loose bolts barely holding it together is irrelevant?

I'll grant that some facts about the sitter are quite relevant, but the physical properties of the chair most certainly are not irrelevant.

Is there a point to this querry?

There are all sorts of chairs in the world, and there are all sorts of potentials for all sorts of chairs. The question is about what kinds of people will sit in certain chairs, not what kinds of chairs will be sat in by certain people nor a general equilibrium that describes the correlation between people and chairs.

For example, what are the characteristics of the fool that sits in the loose bolts barely held together chair; how does the fool make its decision to sit in that certain chair?

[Michael]

Why did you bring up Lincoln's folksy saying on fooling people then? I'm having a problem getting the gist of your point.
Because it seems to describe what's going on with people's reporting of their own subjective state. People will try to fool you. Pollsters know all about a phenomena whereby respondants have a certain statistical tendency to want to please the questioner by providing the desired answer. They are fooling themselves (or trying to fool the questioner).

And I like Abe Lincoln's folksy saying because it cuts both ways. You can fool some people sometimes (because people are easy to fool). But other times, it doesn't work and people see through it.

That seems like an accurate way of looking at human veracity.

There are all sorts of chairs in the world, and there are all sorts of potentials for all sorts of chairs. The question is about what kinds of people will sit in certain chairs, not what kinds of chairs will be sat in by certain people nor a general equilibrium that describes the correlation between people and chairs.
I don't think one can draw such sharp distinctions. I would say that the type of chair one prefers to sit in may be based upon experience with particular types of chairs just as much as it might be based upon fanciful imaginings of what the perfect chair ought to be.

One cannot separate the idea of chairs from the physicality of chairs. They are intimately connected.

Are you taking the Platonic-dualist approach here?

For example, what are the characteristics of the fool that sits in the loose bolts barely held together chair; how does the fool make its decision to sit in that certain chair?
The fool makes the decision in exactly the same way the clever (but lazy) engineer does. He just doesn't bother to think about the issue and (defacto) assumes that the chair is okay.

[Daktoria]

Because it seems to describe what's going on with people's reporting of their own subjective state. People will try to fool you. Pollsters know all about a phenomena whereby respondants have a certain statistical tendency to want to please the questioner by providing the desired answer. They are fooling themselves (or trying to fool the questioner).

And I like Abe Lincoln's folksy saying because it cuts both ways. You can fool some people sometimes (because people are easy to fool). But other times, it doesn't work and people see through it.

That seems like an accurate way of looking at human veracity.

Reporting and cognitive bias weren't the topics of the question at hand though. Existentially speaking, we wouldn't even ask the people what they care about, but rather only examine their DNA, brain, blood, etc. and correlate anatomy with actions. Perhaps there is some uncertainty involved, but if uncertainty takes place regardless of similar anatomical structures, then existentialism can't fully explain human behavior...

I don't think one can draw such sharp distinctions. I would say that the type of chair one prefers to sit in may be based upon experience with particular types of chairs just as much as it might be based upon fanciful imaginings of what the perfect chair ought to be.

One cannot separate the idea of chairs from the physicality of chairs. They are intimately connected.

Are you taking the Platonic-dualist approach here?

...which begs the question of an other worldly essence (such as a soul). However, this isn't Platonic dualism per se because no such realm of Forms is being proscribed. Heck, it wouldn't be possible for such a realm to exist for souls anyway because then the souls would still "exist".

Going back to the chairs, the focus is on how different individuals interpret and appreciate details by making decisions and acting on them. Yes, chair details exist, but the goal is to figure out how decisions are made yet chairs don't make decisions. Individuals have facts in our decision making processes, and it is those facts that are being considered. For example, a quality control manager might make a decision about whether or not a chair is sturdy based on its color after the chair's been manufactured since the wood it's built from is supposed to be treated a certain way, but let's say the manager becomes color blind after suffering an accident and his judgment becomes affected. That color blindness is a fact, and it is that fact which alters how he behaves.

I don't think one can draw such sharp distinctions. I would say that the type of chair one prefers to sit in may be based upon experience with particular types of chairs just as much as it might be based upon fanciful imaginings of what the perfect chair ought to be.

One cannot separate the idea of chairs from the physicality of chairs. They are intimately connected.

Are you taking the Platonic-dualist approach here?

What about novelty? No two experiences are exactly the same, and there are always new circumstances that have to be dealt with. Perhaps a person has had all the experience in the world or no experience at all, either way, new situations will arise in the future as events resolve. How can't adaptation ultimately rely upon "fanciful imaginings"?

[Michael]

Reporting and cognitive bias weren't the topics of the question at hand though. Existentially speaking, we wouldn't even ask the people what they care about, but rather only examine their DNA, brain, blood, etc. and correlate anatomy with actions. Perhaps there is some uncertainty involved, but if uncertainty takes place regardless of similar anatomical structures, then existentialism can't fully explain human behavior...

Huh?

Where did these points about existentialism, DNA and correlating anatomy with actions come from? :eek:

I haven't a clue what point you are trying to say there.

I'm asserting that you can't trust people's reporting of their own motives. The thread question asks about the nature people's motives in decision-making. I say that abstractly assigning thoughts to people's heads in a way that can never be proven or demonstrated is non-functional theorizing.

...which begs the question of an other worldly essence (such as a soul).
This doesn't beg the question, it seeks to dodge it entirely! :lol:

I repeat, on what basis can you make the claim that all thought processes involved with the decision to sit on any given chair can be assigned to idea of belief not rationalism?

And I must ask here since you seem to be jumping around quite a bit, are you arguing for or against the majority opinion here? We have what looks like unanimous agreement here that people act primarily on beliefs, not facts.

I'm just trying to making sure that the word "primarily" doesn't get substituted with "always" in your conclusions. ;)

Going back to the chairs, the focus is on how different individuals interpret and appreciate details by making decisions and acting on them. Yes, chair details exist, but the goal is to figure out how decisions are made yet chairs don't make decisions. Individuals have facts in our decision making processes, and it is those facts that are being considered. For example, a quality control manager might make a decision about whether or not a chair is sturdy based on its color after the chair's been manufactured since the wood it's built from is supposed to be treated a certain way, but let's say the manager becomes color blind after suffering an accident and his judgment becomes affected. That color blindness is a fact, and it is that fact which alters how he behaves.
Well, it looks like we are getting somewhere here...

You state that your 'goal' in this discussion is to figure out the decision-making process.

Secondly, I must point out, as always, that the word "fact" does not mean what you think it means. I've repeatedly argued that there is no such thing as a "fact". All facts are just relative and subjective approximations of factual accuracy, which is in itself, a relative approximation (cf. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle). The term of "fact" is nothing more than a popular conception.

My argument here is entirely epistemological (first principles, not semantics).

What about novelty? No two experiences are exactly the same, and there are always new circumstances that have to be dealt with. Perhaps a person has had all the experience in the world or no experience at all, either way, new situations will arise in the future as events resolve. How can't adaptation ultimately rely upon "fanciful imaginings"?
Please re-read the passage replied to here.

I said: "I would say that the type of chair one prefers to sit in may be based upon experience with particular types of chairs just as much as it might be based upon fanciful imaginings of what the perfect chair ought to be."

This clearly offers learned experience (reason) and fanciful imaginings (faith) as equal possibilities for human behavior/decision-making.

Yet you accuse me of asserting that "fanciful imagings" are non-functional? I'm missing something here. :ummm:

[Daktoria]

Huh?

Where did these points about existentialism, DNA and correlating anatomy with actions come from?

I haven't a clue what point you are trying to say there.

I'm asserting that you can't trust people's reporting of their own motives. The thread question asks about the nature people's motives in decision-making. I say that abstractly assigning thoughts to people's heads in a way that can never be proven or demonstrated is non-functional theorizing.

We don't need to know what the thoughts are to realize the influences on decision making, and if the same physical structures result in the same actions happening over and over, then it doesn't even matter what those specific thoughts are...

This doesn't beg the question, it seeks to dodge it entirely!

I repeat, on what basis can you make the claim that all thought processes involved with the decision to sit on any given chair can be assigned to idea of belief not rationalism?

...but if actions vary, then there needs to be something else besides physical influences on decision making....

Well, it looks like we are getting somewhere here...

You state that your 'goal' in this discussion is to figure out the decision-making process.

Secondly, I must point out, as always, that the word "fact" does not mean what you think it means. I've repeatedly argued that there is no such thing as a "fact". All facts are just relative and subjective approximations of factual accuracy, which is in itself, a relative approximation (cf. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle). The term of "fact" is nothing more than a popular conception.

My argument here is entirely epistemological (first principles, not semantics).

...Perhaps randomness does have influences as well, but if that's the case, then why and how do we care to investigate decision making in the first place? Even if it's an instinct, that instinct would be driven by physical inputs which means that free will, human rights, happiness, transcendence, or what else have you are all illusions since there's no self-control.

Please re-read the passage replied to here.

I said: "I would say that the type of chair one prefers to sit in may be based upon experience with particular types of chairs just as much as it might be based upon fanciful imaginings of what the perfect chair ought to be."

This clearly offers learned experience (reason) and fanciful imaginings (faith) as equal possibilities for human behavior/decision-making.

Yet you accuse me of asserting that "fanciful imagings" are non-functional? I'm missing something here.

Hume's is-ought problem. Just because we have experiences doesn't mean we know what ought to be since experiences require interpretation to be valuable. Positivism by itself doesn't tell us what should be or what could be since positivism doesn't let us assign a set of possibilities to pigeon hole reality within.

[Daktoria]

Here's a picture illustrating the problem with describing free will as being a positive mixture of materials and randomness (with the starting premise of the world existing):

http://img26.imageshack.us/img26/2489/fwc.png

Materials are neither free nor willing, and randomness is uncontrolled, so again, why or how can respect happen? The bottomline of decision making influences would be (not political, but physical) power, yet there would be no way to defy it since behaviors would be absent of self-control from perpetual subdivision between materials and randomness.

Seems like a fatalist paradigm, no?

[Michael]

We don't need to know what the thoughts are to realize the influences on decision making, and if the same physical structures result in the same actions happening over and over, then it doesn't even matter what those specific thoughts are...
So the government makes a tax cut, hoping for an increase in spending.

I'm blissfully unaware of the government's action, but I just got a big bonus from my employer (or an inheritance) and so I go on a spending binge.

According to your analysis, the government can assume that my spending binge is due to their tax cut. My own actions are apparently irrelevant to that deduction.

That's bullshit and spurious.

Indeed, that does look like lots of what passes for economic theory these days - bullshit and spurious.

...but if actions vary, then there needs to be something else besides physical influences on decision making....
I'll call that "dodge #2".

You are evading the question - again.

That's not surprising since any honest answer will likely give your game away - thus you have no choice but to obfusicate the issue. I however, have no interest in obfusication on the issue. I've asked a simple question - I'm waiting for the honest reply.

...Perhaps randomness does have influences as well, but if that's the case, then why and how do we care to investigate decision making in the first place? Even if it's an instinct, that instinct would be driven by physical inputs which means that free will, human rights, happiness, transcendence, or what else have you are all illusions since there's no self-control.
Lets see if I understand your point correctly.

1. A bunch of theories about human nature are arbitarily asserted.
2. Data that may contradict these theories is rejected because to accept the data would entail contradictions with the arbitrarily constructed theories about human nature.
3. Arbitary theories about human nature are held to be correct and the proper basis of public policy analysis.

You are essentially assuming your theory is correct in order to defend your theory as correct. That's called circular reasoning in my books.

Hume's is-ought problem. Just because we have experiences doesn't mean we know what ought to be since experiences require interpretation to be valuable. Positivism by itself doesn't tell us what should be or what could be since positivism doesn't let us assign a set of possibilities to pigeon hole reality within.
You don't need any arguments from me to denigrate the principle of positivism (or as it is more correctly known, 'logical positivism').

That's a strawman argument since I most certainly have not used any logical positivist arguments here - indeed, I began my intellectual career by attacking the idiocy (and authoritarianism) of logical positivism. My opinion of that theory has never changed.