Proof

[Daktoria]

A thought experiment.

Note that this isn't about enforcement or administration, but just the traditional epistemological question of justified true beliefs.

Let's say a world is designed to test the honesty of its participants, and it doesn't matter if the participants come from internal or external sources. For this particular experiment, let's say that the test is about insight and seeing whether or not the people can overcome unseen obstacles by using resources efficiently even before it can be acknowledge that overcoming said obstacles is necessary for survival. Basically, a gettier problem except there's no deception taking place, but rather the obstacles are merely beyond natural horizons. Heck, for all intents and purposes, we can claim this to be a natural experiment where an observer simply acknowledges a certain event and wants to know what people are going to do.

After the experiment ends, the overwhelming majority of the participants die out, but some are lucky enough to survive because of random side effects. For example, a smaller explosion knocks some injured individuals out of the way of a larger explosion, a hidden blast proof door traps and locks some individuals away from being discovered by hostiles, a sterile chamber protects some individuals from an outbreak, etc. Point being that those who survived stumbled across windfalls that their intentions didn't anticipate or appreciate.

Note that whether anyone survives or not doesn't really matter because the only purpose of having survivors is for garnishing feedback, but it would be OK if the experiment exterminated every participant instead since communication is a different issue.

The observer then asks the (presumingly untraumatised) participants about what happened, and it turns out that the gluttony and hedonism were the values of the pervading culture such that entertainment was deemed the bottomline such that the ends of myopically enjoying life were worth the cost of dying to an unforeseeable obstacle. For simplicity's sake, let's also assume that the participants could have enjoyed life more if they lived beyond the obstacle than if they died to it. This way, utility isn't an issue, but rather marginal utilitarian rationality is.

By the end of the conversation, the participants ask the observer, "What were we supposed to do?", "What did you expect us to do?", and "What did you want us to do?"

----------

Three questions:

1) Let's say that the participants are going to be used again in a similar experiment where a second level of obstacles are going to be involved. This way, merely learning how to adapt with the first level of obstacles they already experienced won't save them. As such, does it matter if they are told about the observer's opinions and knowledge?

2) Do the survivors deserve to be told about the observer's opinions regardless of whether or not the observer is the one that informs them?

3) If someone else other than the observer informs them, what factors should influence how (every sort of) the information is priced?

In line with how communication is a separate issue, we can instead consider information being disclosed during the experiment rather than after the experiment, and we can also consider the observer having total information such that information would only be disclosed after it would be established and confirmed that marginal utilitarian rationality would be the methodology being employed.

[Daktoria]

If this seems too cumbersome, let me put it more simply:

If people are willing to behave dishonestly, naively, and gluttonously, why does it matter if people have proof of obstacles' existence?

Particularly so, why does this matter matter if proof can only be derived by respecting those who are capable of investigation, yet society prefers to subordinate those individuals beneath corrupt hierarchy?

For example, let's say society is dominated by narcissistic and histrionic attention whoring brats. Why does it matter if these people really know what's going on, why should the informed or the potentially informed cooperate with these brats, and at what price should cooperators sell their services to these brats?

Furthermore, if marginal utilitarian rationality is all there is, why should these cooperators not subvert, betray, and torture these brats instead to usurp the status quo totem pole? Perhaps the chance of being discovered and imprisoned is greater than the benefit, but the only alternative would be slavery by appeasing these brats instead. Ergo, the real question wouldn't be a matter of betrayal's cost benefit analysis, but rather whether or not (the possibility of) being caught is worse than (the guarantee of) being enslaved. Given that the cooperators have realized their conundrum, they should realize that the course of subversion is worthwhile, so the price of informing the brats should be the value of the amount of aesthetics required to distract the cooperators from remembering this conundrum.

[Michael]

A thought experiment.

Note that this isn't about enforcement or administration, but just the traditional epistemological question of justified true beliefs.

Let's say a world is designed to test the honesty of its participants, and it doesn't matter if the participants come from internal or external sources. For this particular experiment, let's say that the test is about insight and seeing whether or not the people can overcome unseen obstacles by using resources efficiently even before it can be acknowledge that overcoming said obstacles is necessary for survival. Basically, a gettier problem except there's no deception taking place, but rather the obstacles are merely beyond natural horizons. Heck, for all intents and purposes, we can claim this to be a natural experiment where an observer simply acknowledges a certain event and wants to know what people are going to do.

After the experiment ends, the overwhelming majority of the participants die out, but some are lucky enough to survive because of random side effects. For example, a smaller explosion knocks some injured individuals out of the way of a larger explosion, a hidden blast proof door traps and locks some individuals away from being discovered by hostiles, a sterile chamber protects some individuals from an outbreak, etc. Point being that those who survived stumbled across windfalls that their intentions didn't anticipate or appreciate.

Note that whether anyone survives or not doesn't really matter because the only purpose of having survivors is for garnishing feedback, but it would be OK if the experiment exterminated every participant instead since communication is a different issue.

The observer then asks the (presumingly untraumatised) participants about what happened, and it turns out that the gluttony and hedonism were the values of the pervading culture such that entertainment was deemed the bottomline such that the ends of myopically enjoying life were worth the cost of dying to an unforeseeable obstacle. For simplicity's sake, let's also assume that the participants could have enjoyed life more if they lived beyond the obstacle than if they died to it. This way, utility isn't an issue, but rather marginal utilitarian rationality is.

By the end of the conversation, the participants ask the observer, "What were we supposed to do?", "What did you expect us to do?", and "What did you want us to do?"

----------

Three questions:

1) Let's say that the participants are going to be used again in a similar experiment where a second level of obstacles are going to be involved. This way, merely learning how to adapt with the first level of obstacles they already experienced won't save them. As such, does it matter if they are told about the observer's opinions and knowledge?

2) Do the survivors deserve to be told about the observer's opinions regardless of whether or not the observer is the one that informs them?

3) If someone else other than the observer informs them, what factors should influence how (every sort of) the information is priced?

In line with how communication is a separate issue, we can instead consider information being disclosed during the experiment rather than after the experiment, and we can also consider the observer having total information such that information would only be disclosed after it would be established and confirmed that marginal utilitarian rationality would be the methodology being employed.

<begin rant about 'thought experiments' in general>

I find this "thought experiment" (and all such 'thought experiments') to be nonfunctional. Human beings don't actually exist in hypothetical realms where YOU (personally and subjectively) control ALL the variables.

Or to put it another way, 'hypothetical humans' in 'hypothetical situations' tend to act like 'hypothetical humans', not 'actual humans'. And of course, the real world is never anything like the hypothetical world created to test/judge these hypothetical humans.

Such is my problem with all 'thought experiments'. Thought experiments seem to serve only the purpose of self-reinforcement - they tend to fall apart as soon as anyone other than the person who created them looks at them. :shrug:
<end rant>

Furthermore, with respect to this particular 'thought experiement', I must say that I think it is immoral to test other human beings with life/death circumstances - for any reason - hypothetically or otherwise. This thought experiment can only demonstrate one's hypothetical bias of morality.

Or to put it another way, I just can't fathom any of your questions since the conditions are just too weird and/or inhuman for my mind to grasp. :ummm:

I'll try my hand with the second formulation as that seems like some straight forward questions. :)

[Michael]

If this seems too cumbersome, let me put it more simply:

If people are willing to behave dishonestly, naively, and gluttonously, why does it matter if people have proof of obstacles' existence?
Because it matters to you.

(That is my whole and complete answer to this question - the ground is pure Nietzsche here - one's own subjectivity or morality needs to be demonstrated by one's own acts to become real)

Alternatively, I'd like to point out that some people may choose to behave dishonestly in some (or all) circumstances is their own business. Some people may indeed be naive. And quite a few people really are gluttonous - and many more seem to wish for guilt/consequence free ways of being gluttonous. By the same token, some people really are profoundly honest in all their acts/deeds, some few are wise, while others demonstrate remarkable prudence or modesty. The world is filled with all kinds of different people. But ultimately, you are only morally responsible for yourself, so the acts of other people are mostly irrelevant to your own moral status (unless your own subjective morality requires your dominion over others, which is absurd, so I'm ignoring that).

I might also add that the 'proof' thing that you may assert is a highly subjective concept that cannot be actually, scientifically or philosophically determined in actual fact. In many cases, such 'proof' boils down to some article of faith and nothing more. In such cases, is it wise to demand respect for such proofs?

Prudence dictates that if the threat is real, then you are wise to heed the danger. Whether or not others choose to follow your call of danger (or your example in heeding the danger) does not impinge upon the morality of your own act. What does it matter if others choose to recognize/respect your proof of obstacles or not? All that should ultimately concern you is your own choice of heeding the dangers shown by the 'proof' of some obstacle.

Or to put my answer yet another way, Plato counsels that the wise man owes it to himself alone to participate in civil society and government, if only to avoid the fate of being ruled by a lesser man instead.

For example, let's say society is dominated by narcissistic and histrionic attention whoring brats. Why does it matter if these people really know what's going on, why should the informed or the potentially informed cooperate with these brats, and at what price should cooperators sell their services to these brats?
Notwithstanding my comments about hypothetical thought experiments, I just have to ask a question here:

Why is it assumed in this 'example' that the "narcissistic and histrionic attention whoring brats" who dominate society be at all interested in the rantings and ravings of a small minority of nerds? And why would you expect them to pay any price at all for anything? If the 'brats' are what you say they are, and they dominate society, then they likely just wouldn't agree that those services were worth anything at all (no matter how 'informed' or 'correct' you believe those nerdy experts to be).

So my answer to this 'example' is nothing at all. The 'brats' aren't likely to offer any price or negotiations in the first place. Either give them what they want or fuck you (is what I believe they'd say, given your definition).

Furthermore, if marginal utilitarian rationality is all there is, why should these cooperators not subvert, betray, and torture these brats instead to usurp the status quo totem pole? Perhaps the chance of being discovered and imprisoned is greater than the benefit, but the only alternative would be slavery by appeasing these brats instead. Ergo, the real question wouldn't be a matter of betrayal's cost benefit analysis, but rather whether or not (the possibility of) being caught is worse than (the guarantee of) being enslaved. Given that the cooperators have realized their conundrum, they should realize that the course of subversion is worthwhile, so the price of informing the brats should be the value of the amount of aesthetics required to distract the cooperators from remembering this conundrum.
Where did these "cooperators" come from? I though society was dominated by the 'brats'? And the 'brats' ain't cooperating with anyone because they are 'brats' by definition. Therefore, there isn't likely to be much of this 'cooperating for a price' business going on with the 'allegedly informed'.

Demanding 'respect' from these 'brats' is a waste of time. :shrug:

Or alternatively, one could choose to ignore the idiot 'brats' and secure in your own knowledge, you can live peacefully and enjoy the very human pleasure of being proven right and the 'idiot brats' wrong. Indeed, if the 'brats' dominate society, I don't see how one has any choice here anyway.

[Daktoria]

I find this "thought experiment" (and all such 'thought experiments') to be nonfunctional. Human beings don't actually exist in hypothetical realms where YOU (personally and subjectively) control ALL the variables....

...Or to put it another way, I just can't fathom any of your questions since the conditions are just too weird and/or inhuman for my mind to grasp. :ummm:


The thought experiment is more about drawing conclusions from observations rather than observing reality itself since observers, like participants, have to design life strategies as well. Reality is what it is, but strategies can only be designed around what we perceive, one of the questions I'm implicitly asking here being, "If the observer is in fact 'stubborn', what could motivate the observer to change his perspective and how should he be motivated?"

Flipped around, I'd expect those participants (who say "fuck you", heh) to claim that motivation should be changed towards being just a flexible nice guy. However, that phrase is a very vague, subjective, and normative phrase in itself that only serves the purpose of protecting exclusive, cliquey, lazy, and/or fearful behavior, so it effectively fails from projection bias and the "tu quoque" fallacy.

Because it matters to you.

(That is my whole and complete answer to this question - the ground is pure Nietzsche here - one's own subjectivity or morality needs to be demonstrated by one's own acts to become real)

Alternatively, I'd like to point out that some people may choose to behave dishonestly in some (or all) circumstances is their own business. Some people may indeed be naive. And quite a few people really are gluttonous - and many more seem to wish for guilt/consequence free ways of being gluttonous. By the same token, some people really are profoundly honest in all their acts/deeds, some few are wise, while others demonstrate remarkable prudence or modesty. The world is filled with all kinds of different people. But ultimately, you are only morally responsible for yourself, so the acts of other people are mostly irrelevant to your own moral status (unless your own subjective morality requires your dominion over others, which is absurd, so I'm ignoring that).

I might also add that the 'proof' thing that you may assert is a highly subjective concept that cannot be actually, scientifically or philosophically determined in actual fact. In many cases, such 'proof' boils down to some article of faith and nothing more. In such cases, is it wise to demand respect for such proofs?

Prudence dictates that if the threat is real, then you are wise to heed the danger. Whether or not others choose to follow your call of danger (or your example in heeding the danger) does not impinge upon the morality of your own act. What does it matter if others choose to recognize/respect your proof of obstacles or not? All that should ultimately concern you is your own choice of heeding the dangers shown by the 'proof' of some obstacle.

Or to put my answer yet another way, Plato counsels that the wise man owes it to himself alone to participate in civil society and government, if only to avoid the fate of being ruled by a lesser man instead.


Notwithstanding my comments about hypothetical thought experiments, I just have to ask a question here:

Why is it assumed in this 'example' that the "narcissistic and histrionic attention whoring brats" who dominate society be at all interested in the rantings and ravings of a small minority of nerds? And why would you expect them to pay any price at all for anything? If the 'brats' are what you say they are, and they dominate society, then they likely just wouldn't agree that those services were worth anything at all (no matter how 'informed' or 'correct' you believe those nerdy experts to be).

So my answer to this 'example' is nothing at all. The 'brats' aren't likely to offer any price or negotiations in the first place. Either give them what they want or fuck you (is what I believe they'd say, given your definition).


Where did these "cooperators" come from? I though society was dominated by the 'brats'? And the 'brats' ain't cooperating with anyone because they are 'brats' by definition. Therefore, there isn't likely to be much of this 'cooperating for a price' business going on with the 'allegedly informed'.

Demanding 'respect' from these 'brats' is a waste of time. :shrug:

Or alternatively, one could choose to ignore the idiot 'brats' and secure in your own knowledge, you can live peacefully and enjoy the very human pleasure of being proven right and the 'idiot brats' wrong. Indeed, if the 'brats' dominate society, I don't see how one has any choice here anyway.

FYI, I got a kick out of the bolded sections (in particular) because they really clarify the problems we had earlier on agreeing on the roots of fascism and how progressivism can turn into neoconservatism because of realpolitik national interests. Heck, they clarify the reasons I have trouble explaining the connection to most people even though I already understood these reasons and have talked about them with others (who agree with you that there isn't much that can be done).

To start anyway, I believe you answered your own question on why the world has to be filled with these brats because you admitted that morally responsible wisdom comes from self-interested prudence. Furthermore, you're assuming that society isn't horizontally partitioned whether along definite (black and white) or vague (gray) borders, something I found odd considering your approval of cultural and moral relativism.

You like practical examples though, so consider why parents have children and want those children to appreciate certain values (and humor me by acknowledging that people aren't viruses whose only purpose is to reproduce else we dismiss morality entirely). Eventually, children become adults and establish their own horizontally partitioned lineages, but even if they struggle, parents still love their children and want them to thrive.

In this case, the parent is the observer and the child is the participant, so while the parent isn't dependent upon the child either to exist or be happy, the parent would prefer that the child does well.

Let's also introduce three controls though. One, the parent has multiple children such that it would prefer to not invest its limited resources vainly in resistant children. In this way, the observer has multiple experiments taking place and cares about quality control. Two, the parent has other experiments (that don't follow the OP's structure) besides children taking place, so if worst comes to worst, the parent can afford to abandon all of its children and live with himself while enduring the emotional guilt.

Three, pricing isn't necessarily between the parent and child, but through intermediaries, and these intermediaries fall into three categories in this order of preference (and again, humor me for now by ignoring the complex scenarios with intermediaries that are mixed between categories):

Experts who can assist the parent in translating values into the child's mental language i.e. doctors, teachers, coaches, etc.
Peers who can mediate between the parent and child to find a compromise i.e. counselors, family friends, colleagues, etc.
Competitors who can arbitrage the parent-child dissonance and subvert the child away from the parent's investment and goals i.e. criminals, gangsters, cult leaders, sexual predators, etc.

When I talked about cooperation before, I was referring to the "potentially informed" observers who want to cooperate but can't necessarily do so; and when I was talking about information pricing, I was talking about what the intermediary prices would be to diffuse information as well as which category of intermediaries would win the information auction. Extended to here, the question is, "What sort of diplomatic strategy should the parent use in order to navigate the information market and optimally appreciate the children?"

[Donkey]

2) Do the survivors deserve to be told about the observer's opinions regardless of whether or not the observer is the one that informs them?

Dak, what do you mean by "deserve?"

[Daktoria]

It's a matter of self definition really, I'm asking about whether or not a participant could put itself in an observer's shoes and use the same justification for deserving (or not deserving) information both ways.

[Donkey]

It's a matter of self definition really, I'm asking about whether or not a participant could put itself in an observer's shoes and use the same justification for deserving (or not deserving) information both ways.
Self definition, i.e. relative?

[Daktoria]

I.E. a general justification that overarches all perspectives and describes the comparative relationship between participants and observers. Specific justifications will vary from one participant to the next, but the ultimate goal is to find a justification that all participants converge to.

It's not a compromise that demands different participants to sacrifice meaning, but a general justification that consists of the minimal amount of set restrictions that still includes every specific justification possible.

[Michael]

The thought experiment is more about drawing conclusions from observations rather than observing reality itself since observers, like participants, have to design life strategies as well. Reality is what it is, but strategies can only be designed around what we perceive, one of the questions I'm implicitly asking here being, "If the observer is in fact 'stubborn', what could motivate the observer to change his perspective and how should he be motivated?"
How can YOU make "observations" in hypotethical situtations that YOU create? One has the same kind of projections and biases that created the hypotethical situation in the first place?

Or in other words, the only thing you are going to 'observe' in your thought experiement is precisely that which you constructed the situation to produce. The premise and the conclusion are one and the same.

To my understanding, such 'thought experiements' can be used (sometimes successfully) to illustrate an idea or thought of the person who created the thought experiment. Thought experiments can't ever be used to ask questions or make inquiries since they are essentially non-functional for that purpose.

Flipped around, I'd expect those participants (who say "fuck you", heh) to claim that motivation should be changed towards being just a flexible nice guy. However, that phrase is a very vague, subjective, and normative phrase in itself that only serves the purpose of protecting exclusive, cliquey, lazy, and/or fearful behavior, so it effectively fails from projection bias and the "tu quoque" fallacy.
You've lost me here. :shrug:

Those who say "fuck you" just don't care. You defined them that way. They aren't going to turn around and act like they care about the issue at all, no matter how important you think they ought to. That's why they are idiots in the first place.

FYI, I got a kick out of the bolded sections (in particular) because they really clarify the problems we had earlier on agreeing on the roots of fascism and how progressivism can turn into neoconservatism because of realpolitik national interests. Heck, they clarify the reasons I have trouble explaining the connection to most people even though I already understood these reasons and have talked about them with others (who agree with you that there isn't much that can be done).
This is not good at all.

Please STOP assuming that you know about my personal viewpoints about politics or philosophy or any issue. Every time you do it, you are wrong.

I don't agree that "there isn't much that can be done". Just because I used that argument against your argument, that doesn't mean I personally agree with it!!!! (Indeed, I explicitly disagree with it). Please stop making this silly assumption.

For example:

You make a statement. I offer a rational critique your statement.

This does NOT mean that I personally support the ideologically opposite of your statement.

You make that assumption every single time. It is getting repetive.

For the record, I decided at the beginning to approach this thread from a very different theoretical perspective than all our previous discussions. I specifically chose to radically shift ground and base my arguments from a much more rightwing morality-authenticity-based perspective (hence my references to both Nietzsche and Plato).

I make lots of arguments and critiques of things. I can make arguments from the leftwing or the rightwing (and I often do). They are all the same to me. Call it sophistry if you will, I won't object.

To start anyway, I believe you answered your own question on why the world has to be filled with these brats because you admitted that morally responsible wisdom comes from self-interested prudence. Furthermore, you're assuming that society isn't horizontally partitioned whether along definite (black and white) or vague (gray) borders, something I found odd considering your approval of cultural and moral relativism.
Daktoria, I did not ask why the world has to be filled with these brats.

There are so many things wrong with that assertion of yours that I don't know where to start. You created a thought experiment that defined a hypothetical world dominated by brats. I made a critique of your hypothetical thought experiment and offered some whimsical answers to your questions.

How does that become my assertion about how the real world actually works? :ummm:

How did your hypothetical thought experiment morph into an accurate representation of all reality? I thought it was all hypothetical?

And any reply that I gave to the questions given in the hypothetical thought experiment are relative and specific only to the conditions of the thought experiment. I see no rational ground to transfer them anywhere.

Seriously - I did NOT "admit that morally responsible wisdom comes from self-interested prudence". I asserted that it was a generally agreed principle (and one I expected you to agree with). That doesn't mean I agree with it.

And I didn't "assume that society isn't horizontally partitioned whether along definite (black and white) or vague (gray) borders" because I have no clue what you are talking about here. Horizontal partitions of society is something I don't believe we've ever discussed (whatever they are).

And this is the worst - "I found odd considering your approval of cultural and moral relativism". I do NOT approve of cultural and moral relativism. My approval or disapproval of cultural and moral relativism requires that I hold to some objective standard judgement - a concept I've repeated rejected.

So let me repeat that last point again. I do not approve of cultural and moral relativism. And just to make the point perfectly clear, let me also state very clearly that I don't disapprove of cultural and moral relativism.

I consider my own approval or disapproval to be completely and utterly irrelevant to issues of philosophy or public policy. I occasionally may make a statement that originates from my own personal and subjective viewpoint, but for the most part, those are pretty damn rare.

Do you see why I'm getting frustrated here? Every single word you are writing asserts something about my own personal viewpoint that is essentially wrong, wrong and wrong.

I'm going to stop this post here because this point stands alone. I try to reply to the substantive portion of your post in the following post.

[Michael]

You like practical examples though, so consider why parents have children and want those children to appreciate certain values (and humor me by acknowledging that people aren't viruses whose only purpose is to reproduce else we dismiss morality entirely). Eventually, children become adults and establish their own horizontally partitioned lineages, but even if they struggle, parents still love their children and want them to thrive.
I like clear-cut and simple examples without jargon. This isn't one of those.

I will accept that MOST parents want their children to appreciate certain values. I insist that you acknowledge that some people definitely don't care or specifically desire NOT to force their value system upon their child.

I will accept that MOST parents still love their children and want them to thrive.

But what the heck are these horizontally partitioned lineages that are created?

In this case, the parent is the observer and the child is the participant, so while the parent isn't dependent upon the child either to exist or be happy, the parent would prefer that the child does well.

Problem. The parent is not some 'disinterested' or objective observer of the child. The parent-child relationship defines the parent as a critical and elemental part of the scene supposedly being observed. One might as well try to objectively observe one's self.

I don't see any rational basis for assigning 'observer-participant' roles to parents and children. This distinction is not rationally viable.

Let's also introduce three controls though.
Why just three and not four or ten or five million? Seriously, why just those three and no others?

Or what does this hypothetical situation look like without the control-thingies?

Can't we examine the hypothetical situation first before all these extra elements or special circumstances are introduced to make it all needlessly complicated?

One, the parent has multiple children such that it would prefer to not invest its limited resources vainly in resistant children. In this way, the observer has multiple experiments taking place and cares about quality control. Two, the parent has other experiments (that don't follow the OP's structure) besides children taking place, so if worst comes to worst, the parent can afford to abandon all of its children and live with himself while enduring the emotional guilt.
What kind of special extra condition is this? This requires waving a magic wand. How can a meaningful analysis be undertaken if a magic wand is an integral component? (i.e. making human emotional guilt simply vanish would require the use of a figurative 'magic wand').

It is exactly that kind of weird conditional situation that I find so confusing with these thought experiments. Can't we just have a 'thought experiment' with normal parents that doesn't require the parents to willingly and guilt-free abandon their own children as some scientific guinea-pigs?

Three, pricing isn't necessarily between the parent and child, but through intermediaries, and these intermediaries fall into three categories in this order of preference (and again, humor me for now by ignoring the complex scenarios with intermediaries that are mixed between categories):

Experts who can assist the parent in translating values into the child's mental language i.e. doctors, teachers, coaches, etc.
Peers who can mediate between the parent and child to find a compromise i.e. counselors, family friends, colleagues, etc.
Competitors who can arbitrage the parent-child dissonance and subvert the child away from the parent's investment and goals i.e. criminals, gangsters, cult leaders, sexual predators, etc.

When I talked about cooperation before, I was referring to the "potentially informed" observers who want to cooperate but can't necessarily do so; and when I was talking about information pricing, I was talking about what the intermediary prices would be to diffuse information as well as which category of intermediaries would win the information auction. Extended to here, the question is, "What sort of diplomatic strategy should the parent use in order to navigate the information market and optimally appreciate the children?"
Aren't you ignoring the child's peers here? They are 'experts, peers and competitors' all in one!

And let me say that your attempt to put human behavior into terms suitable for financial market analysis is disconcerting. The terms applied in this way seem so incongruous.

And I don't understand the concept of "optimally appreciate the children"? What's that all about? Children are not primarily objects of amusement or appreciation for parents and the thought of that seems very odd. Children are young human beings and ought not to be considered the property of their parents.

And why can't the "rationally informed observers" cooperate? And who can't they cooperate with? I'm really curious about this one. Does this have anything to do with the parent-child thing?

Seriously, Daktoria, can't you just simplify your question down to a question without some thought experiment involving all kinds of mysterious or unrealisitic elements and conditions?

And how does a parent have a diplomatic strategy for raising a child? Aren't you just assuming here that diplomacy is the proper definition of the parent-child role to begin with? That might be true, but it might not be true. (And where do the 'rationally informed observers' who are not allowed something fit in here?).

I'm honestly trying to figure out what the question is here. The thread asks about "proof". Proof of what?

[Daktoria]

I like clear-cut and simple examples without jargon. This isn't one of those.

I will accept that MOST parents want their children to appreciate certain values. I insist that you acknowledge that some people definitely don't care or specifically desire NOT to force their value system upon their child.

I will accept that MOST parents still love their children and want them to thrive.

But what the heck are these horizontally partitioned lineages that are created?

I dunno what jargon ur talking about here, and it doesn't matter how openminded or neglectful a parent is, there is still some value set that is deemed desirable for the child to learn.

Also, horizontal lineages are just how bloodlines get split up between siblings. In contrast, vertical partitions are between generations.

Problem. The parent is not some 'disinterested' or objective observer of the child. The parent-child relationship defines the parent as a critical and elemental part of the scene supposedly being observed. One might as well try to objectively observe one's self.

I don't see any rational basis for assigning 'observer-participant' roles to parents and children. This distinction is not rationally viable.

I didn't say parents are disinterested, and they are objective with respect to the children's perspective because parents aren't biased one way or another with regards to childrens' goals (although parents might be biased one way or another with regards to childrens' strategies for achieving such goals). For example, a healthy child wants to socialize, and a mentally healthy parent would agree with socialization as a viable goal, but the parent might disagree with the cultures, groups, and activities that a child believes to be appropriate.

Why just three and not four or ten or five million? Seriously, why just those three and no others?

Or what does this hypothetical situation look like without the control-thingies?

Can't we examine the hypothetical situation first before all these extra elements or special circumstances are introduced to make it all needlessly complicated?

The experiment's objective is to normatively figure out what the observer-parent should do given a set of circumstances, not to positively figure out what those circumstances are. I threw in the controls to make the parent role analogous to the observer role.

What kind of special extra condition is this? This requires waving a magic wand. How can a meaningful analysis be undertaken if a magic wand is an integral component? (i.e. making human emotional guilt simply vanish would require the use of a figurative 'magic wand').

It is exactly that kind of weird conditional situation that I find so confusing with these thought experiments. Can't we just have a 'thought experiment' with normal parents that doesn't require the parents to willingly and guilt-free abandon their own children as some scientific guinea-pigs?

Why would you want a "normal" scenario when you're not satisfied with this normative thought experiment?

Aren't you ignoring the child's peers here? They are 'experts, peers and competitors' all in one!

And let me say that your attempt to put human behavior into terms suitable for financial market analysis is disconcerting. The terms applied in this way seem so incongruous.

And I don't understand the concept of "optimally appreciate the children"? What's that all about? Children are not primarily objects of amusement or appreciation for parents and the thought of that seems very odd. Children are young human beings and ought not to be considered the property of their parents.

And why can't the "rationally informed observers" cooperate? And who can't they cooperate with? I'm really curious about this one. Does this have anything to do with the parent-child thing?

Seriously, Daktoria, can't you just simplify your question down to a question without some thought experiment involving all kinds of mysterious or unrealisitic elements and conditions?

And how does a parent have a diplomatic strategy for raising a child? Aren't you just assuming here that diplomacy is the proper definition of the parent-child role to begin with? That might be true, but it might not be true. (And where do the 'rationally informed observers' who are not allowed something fit in here?).

I'm honestly trying to figure out what the question is here. The thread asks about "proof". Proof of what?

The experiment isn't asking about a particular proof, but rather whether or not rational participants can be convinced to prepare for certain obstacles without proof.

First, yes, the child's peers are important, but they all fit in the three aforementioned categories. Can you come up with one possibility that doesn't fit in any of them, and if you can, how would you categorize it as an information market actor?

Second, appreciation isn't about treating the participant-children as property. It's about forging relationships and respecting the participants for their essence as human beings.

Last, the observers can cooperate whenever they like, but if they can't convince the participants to independently overcome certain obstacles, then the observers would be vain and it wouldn't be worth their time, energy, attention, etc.

[Michael]

I dunno what jargon ur talking about here, and it doesn't matter how openminded or neglectful a parent is, there is still some value set that is deemed desirable for the child to learn.

Also, horizontal lineages are just how bloodlines get split up between siblings. In contrast, vertical partitions are between generations.
Horizontal lineages and vertical partitions are a particular form of jargon.

And I think this seems backwards. Vertical partitions between generations seems odd. And I think siblings would share vertical lineage. Their age-cohort would represent a horizontal partition (as it were).

This seems very confusing. :ummm:

(hence my objection to the jargon - the use of those terms makes your statement unintelligible to others).

I didn't say parents are disinterested, and they are objective with respect to the children's perspective because parents aren't biased one way or another with regards to childrens' goals (although parents might be biased one way or another with regards to childrens' strategies for achieving such goals). For example, a healthy child wants to socialize, and a mentally healthy parent would agree with socialization as a viable goal, but the parent might disagree with the cultures, groups, and activities that a child believes to be appropriate.
I strongly disagree about parents aren't biased regarding their children's goals.

I see lots of ground for wide differentials in goals there. And parents are anything but objective when their children are involved.

For example, no kid in the world decides on their own that they want to learn to speak or have manners. This decision is made for them by their parents. Parental bias can never be distinguished when their children are involved.

The experiment's objective is to normatively figure out what the observer-parent should do given a set of circumstances, not to positively figure out what those circumstances are. I threw in the controls to make the parent role analogous to the observer role.
The controls are subsets of a situation that is not understood or accepted in the first place. Establishing various subset rules when the 'set' is as yet undefined strikes me as spurious and needlessly confusing. One has to agree that the original set is valid before the sub-sets can be even looked at.

Why would you want a "normal" scenario when you're not satisfied with this normative thought experiment?
Because your "normative though experiment" contains some selectively weird elements but ignores other selectively weird elements. When I see that, I just can't stop wondering why those particular elements are considered relevant yet other elements are not. It all seems so arbitary.

As for discussion of things, I prefer normal situations or normative examples that ordinary people can encounter (without magic wands being used). Not some hypothetical situation that is full of bizarre conditions that make it odd and unreal.

It is only with those kind of examples that I can offer a meaningful reply. To every 'thought experiment' with bizarre or oddly arbitrary and unreal conditions applied, you will only get static and critique from me because they make no sense.

The experiment isn't asking about a particular proof, but rather whether or not rational participants can be convinced to prepare for certain obstacles without proof.
Sure, some can and some can't. Depending upon what day of the week it is and whether or not the obstacle is really inconvenient or the goal is cherished enough. That's the way it is with humans.

If you are asking me if there is a method to force people to prepare for certain obstacles without proof being provided, I'll say yes, it is called propaganda - or as you like to call them, 'noble lies'.

First, yes, the child's peers are important, but they all fit in the three aforementioned categories. Can you come up with one possibility that doesn't fit in any of them, and if you can, how would you categorize it as an information market actor?
What is an information market actor why should I care?

I peddle information all the time. But I don't care about your kids. Some people value some information at zero. You can't make people care about something they don't care about.

Second, appreciation isn't about treating the participant-children as property. It's about forging relationships and respecting the participants for their essence as human beings.
As long as they do exactly what they are told to do right?

Why am I reminded of Henry Ford's dictum that 'you can have any color you want, as long as it is black'?

Parents love and support their children as long as the children do essentially what the parents want. The minute the child starts rejecting parental values is the minute the parent starts rejecting the child. That's human reality. Learning to accept this process is part of the wisdom that comes with age.

Last, the observers can cooperate whenever they like, but if they can't convince the participants to independently overcome certain obstacles, then the observers would be vain and it wouldn't be worth their time, energy, attention, etc.
So you are saying that certain people will only offer to help if (and only if) they are given proper recognition, adulation and guarenteed results?

Tell those people we don't need their help. They can keep it on those terms.

[Michael]

If this thread is about trust, then here's an interesting article:

Article (http://www.henryfarrell.net/trust/chapter_1.pdf)

Actually, its only the first paragraph of a new book on the topic by Henry Farrell.