Free Will

[The Drunk Girl]

Five years ago or so is when I began to question (my) religion. I never had any real questions before. I took the Word to be true and believed everything that I heard and was taught.

My family would attend church regularly for a few years, then not attend for another few. This cycle continued on and on until I was old enough to leave home. It was at this point of leaving home that I started my downward spiral into a world I had never known or seen before. After hitting "rock-bottom" the pressures of religion were soon thrown in my face, (even though I knew the intentions were good), the pressure only seemed to push me further and further away. I kept hearing that I needed to get my life on the right track, to be saved, and that God gave us all something called "free will."

By this time the snowball had been pushed down the mountain, accumulating slowly over time, but when I heard those two words: "free will" the snowball took off out of control sending me in this "what-type-of-religion-am-I?!?!/questioning" phase.

My question is: How can there be free will if God is omnipotent and all knowing?

For example, let's say you come to a fork in the road having the choice of the road on the left or right. You "choose" the road on the left, and feel a sense of empowerment because you made a choice...you used the gift of free will. But is that really the case if a higher being already knew which road you would take?

To me there can be no free will for a path that is predestined.

[Michael]

My question is: How can there be free will if God is omnipotent and all knowing?
An always popular and challenging question. I shall also commend the brevity and precision of the wording too! :)

I'll wait for our Lutheran friend to see how far he's going to go on this issue before I comment - given that Martin Luther is the definitive proponent of predestination. ;)

Alternatively, one can also pose the same question as: "How can there be free will if genes and/or neuro-chemistry ultimately determines our actions?"

Both versions of the question are interesting!

[dilettante]

My question is: How can there be free will if God is omnipotent and all knowing?

For example, let's say you come to a fork in the road having the choice of the road on the left or right. You "choose" the road on the left, and feel a sense of empowerment because you made a choice...you used the gift of free will. But is that really the case if a higher being already knew which road you would take?

To me there can be no free will for a path that is predestined.

I think there are two questions wrapped together here, or at least two levels to the same question. One involves free will and (divine) omniscience, the other involves freewill and predestination (of any sort).

With regard to omniscience, I think its simply a matter of realizing that knowing whether or not something is going to happen doesn't have any effect on its happening.

The question of free will and predestination is a deeper one and, as Michael demonstrated, is relevant even if one doesn't bring God into the equation. In my experience, there isn't actually any logical conflict between free will and predestination, but it seems like there is because we use the term 'free will' without actually thinking about what it means.
Take, for example, your fork-in-the-road scenario. Let's say you choose of your own 'free will' to go left. Someone might ask, "Why did you choose to go left? What caused that choice?" There are two possible answers to this:
1) That there was some reason you chose left, some cause. In this case, your 'choice' was by definition predestined before you made it: it was the effect in a determinative cause-and-effect relationship.
or
2) There was no reason, no cause; it just happened. In this case, your 'choice' was simply random chance.

And those are really the only two options. Either you choice had a cause or it didn't: determinative causation or randomness. If "free will" means anything, it's meaning must fit in there somewhere. The problem is that when we say "free will" we often mean "something which isn't predetermined or random", and that's a null set.

[The Drunk Girl]

I think there are two questions wrapped together here, or at least two levels to the same question. One involves free will and (divine) omniscience, the other involves freewill and predestination (of any sort).

With regard to omniscience, I think its simply a matter of realizing that knowing whether or not something is going to happen doesn't have any effect on its happening.

The question of free will and predestination is a deeper one and, as Michael demonstrated, is relevant even if one doesn't bring God into the equation. In my experience, there isn't actually any logical conflict between free will and predestination, but it seems like there is because we use the term 'free will' without actually thinking about what it means.
Take, for example, your fork-in-the-road scenario. Let's say you choose of your own 'free will' to go left. Someone might ask, "Why did you choose to go left? What caused that choice?" There are two possible answers to this:
1) That there was some reason you chose left, some cause. In this case, your 'choice' was by definition predestined before you made it: it was the effect in a determinative cause-and-effect relationship.
or
2) There was no reason, no cause; it just happened. In this case, your 'choice' was simply random chance.

And those are really the only two options. Either you choice had a cause or it didn't: determinative causation or randomness. If "free will" means anything, it's meaning must fit in there somewhere. The problem is that when we say "free will" we often mean "something which isn't predetermined or random", and that's a null set.

The way I see it is, if there is this higher power that knows EVERYTHING that is going to happen, how can our lives/paths not be predestined? It just seems like you couldn't have one without the other.

And, yes I see the problem you presented with the term "free will." I have made this argument before only that in this situation there is no "free will" or "choice." I believe that these words are here to make people feel like that are in control of their lives when they're really not.

[dilettante]

The way I see it is, if there is this higher power that knows EVERYTHING that is going to happen, how can our lives/paths not be predestined? It just seems like you couldn't have one without the other.

I'm not sure. I mean, I know what did happen in the past, and yet I don't see how that knowledge means that what happened was pre-destined. If I could somehow see into the future and know what will happen then, why would that be different? In either case, it's the individual's choice that determines my knowledge, not my knowledge that determined their choice.


And, yes I see the problem you presented with the term "free will." I have made this argument before only that in this situation there is no "free will" or "choice." I believe that these words are here to make people feel like that are in control of their lives when they're really not.

It isn't a case of there not being any "free will"; that would require that "free will" refer to something that doesn't exist. The problem is that we tend to use the term "free will" in such a way that it doesn't actually refer to anything.
And I'd suggest you risk doing the same thing with the phrase "in control of their lives". What does it mean to be in control of one's life?

Personally, I resolve this conundrum with the notion that "we act of our own free will to the extent that our actions are determined by who we are, rather than by some external force". That is to say, I am making a free choice whenever my choices are primarily based on Dilettante's desires, priorities, values, knowledge and quirks. If I'm physically forced into taking some action, then those qualities are irrelevant to the action, and thus I'm acting without free will. It gets more complicated than that, of course, if one brings in the subconscious and such.
But the general principle is that your choices are free when you make them and unfree when you don't; whether or not you were somehow 'destined' to make them is irrelevant.

[Michael]

Pardon my interjection here...

Take, for example, your fork-in-the-road scenario. Let's say you choose of your own 'free will' to go left. Someone might ask, "Why did you choose to go left? What caused that choice?" There are two possible answers to this:
1) That there was some reason you chose left, some cause. In this case, your 'choice' was by definition predestined before you made it: it was the effect in a determinative cause-and-effect relationship.
or
2) There was no reason, no cause; it just happened. In this case, your 'choice' was simply random chance.

And those are really the only two options. Either you choice had a cause or it didn't: determinative causation or randomness.

I think you are omitting a third option here.

When one comes to a fork in the road, one might end up 'chosing' one road rather than the other because it just felt right. This is not a rational reason, and it is not 'flip a coin' style random. It might be some subconscious intuition or emotional influence, or nothing more than an irrational preference for "left" rather than "right" - or always choosing "right" because "left" is believed to be sinister.

I suppose a mentally ill person might choose 'left' over 'right' because the date ends in "y" today. :shrug:

Either way, this does suggest a third possibility exists that is neither rational nor random.

[dilettante]

Pardon my interjection here...

Your feed back is always appreciated. :)


I think you are omitting a third option here.

When one comes to a fork in the road, one might end up 'choosing' one road rather than the other because it just felt right. This is not a rational reason, and it is not 'flip a coin' style random. It might be some subconscious intuition or emotional influence, or nothing more than an irrational preference for "left" rather than "right" - or always choosing "right" because "left" is believed to be sinister.

I suppose a mentally ill person might choose 'left' over 'right' because the date ends in "y" today. :shrug:

Either way, this does suggest a third possibility exists that is neither rational nor random.

I may have been unclear. I didn't mean to set up a dichotomy between rational and random, but rather between determined and random. The question is whether or not there was any cause, not whether the cause was a rational one.
So, if you actually chose left because you just because 'it felt right' then your feelings were the determinative cause of which your choice was the effect.

The alternative isn't a coin toss (which would be also be determined, albeit by conditions difficult to calculate with precision) but a truly random choice, the outcome of which is based on no preconditions. A 'causeless effect', as it were.

The point is that these two alternatives are, I think, both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. An effect, such as a choice, either has a cause (or multiple causes) has it has no cause. If the former, than the causes by definition determine the effect; if the latter, then the effect is utterly random.
(Though perhaps there's a better word I could use here instead of 'random'? :ummm: )

The problem arises when we use "free will" to refer to some third option, neither determined nor cause-less. But since determined and causeless are exhaustive, there's nothing else left for "free will" to refer to. It becomes, at best, pure negation with no conceptual content or, perhaps the same thing, meaningless gibberish.

[Non Sequitur]

the Drunk Girl

Five years ago or so is when I began to question (my) religion. I never had any real questions before. I took the Word to be true and believed everything that I heard and was taught.

My family would attend church regularly for a few years, then not attend for another few. This cycle continued on and on until I was old enough to leave home. It was at this point of leaving home that I started my downward spiral into a world I had never known or seen before. After hitting "rock-bottom" the pressures of religion were soon thrown in my face, (even though I knew the intentions were good), the pressure only seemed to push me further and further away. I kept hearing that I needed to get my life on the right track, to be saved, and that God gave us all something called "free will."

By this time the snowball had been pushed down the mountain, accumulating slowly over time, but when I heard those two words: "free will" the snowball took off out of control sending me in this "what-type-of-religion-am-I?!?!/questioning" phase.

My question is: How can there be free will if God is omnipotent and all knowing?

For example, let's say you come to a fork in the road having the choice of the road on the left or right. You "choose" the road on the left, and feel a sense of empowerment because you made a choice...you used the gift of free will. But is that really the case if a higher being already knew which road you would take?

To me there can be no free will for a path that is predestined.

An always popular and challenging question. I shall also commend the brevity and precision of the wording too! :)

I'll wait for our Lutheran friend to see how far he's going to go on this issue before I comment - given that Martin Luther is the definitive proponent of predestination. ;)



Well I have a couple thoughts on the issue. First, I think Dil's response that Knowing something is going to happen doesn't necessarily effect it's happening is right on the money.

Second, in the history of Christianity theology, many traditions have upheld both free will and God's Omnipotence (or Sovereignty). The typical argument is that God gives us free will and chooses not to interfere because that make us less human. The ability to choose is what God finds so worthwhile in humanity and why it is worth being saved. While this argument is seductive, I can't buy into it completely because I find it causes more problems than it solves.

Third, as Michael pointed out, Luther did believe in predestination, but it is not as important to him as say John Calvin. Calvin's theology almost depends on predestination where as Luther does discuss it (most notably in his article On the Bondage of the Will) his theology does not hinge on it. I typically have two answers to the question "what's the deal with predestination and free will?" My first answer is for the people who are not going into seminary. I say that predestination is a Biblical concept, but no where is it really explained. The Bible mentions it in a couple places (explicitly in Romans 8), but does not really say "this is what it means." Also, This doctrine would make sense if we were all knowing and outside of time, but since human beings are limited in their knowledge and bound by time, the concept is something we cannot fathom. So, in conclusion, don't worry about it. Now, there are those who find this answer unsatisfactory (probably most that are on this forum) so my expanded answer starts with a quote from Luther. In response to the typical question about free will, Luther said in On the Bondage of the Will: "in respect to house, spouse, family, friends, and work we are free to choose these as we desire. But in respect to our salvation, we are powerless to choose the path of faith without the power of the Holy Spirit Guiding us." We are free to choose the people we love, the friends we drink with, and the cars we buy. Due to Original Sin, however, human beings are bent creatures who cannot make the choice toward truth without God's help. Now, in order to keep this from slipping into Calvinistic double predestination (aka God predestines some to heaven and some to Hell) Luther also says in his Hidelburg Disputation "the Man who looks upon the invisible things of God and calls them visible does not deserve to be a theologian." Predestination is at its root, a discussion about who "gets saved" (by the way, I hate that phrase). The problem is that the knowledge of salvation is a knowledge that only belongs to God in the end. The purpose of the doctrine of Predestination is to tell human beings: "you do not have all the answers and you are going to have to trust God"

Fourth, the reason why i agree with Luther is that if we have the freedom of the will, I think Christ's death becomes unnecessary. If we have the freedom of the will, than we have the ability to choose good. If we have that ability, than Christ need not have died because we can fulfill the Law of God without his help.

Fifth, while my answer above is the one I give in theological discussion, my real gut reaction and practical side of me agrees with a guy named Phillip Melanchthon. Melanchthon was Luther's right hand man and the guy who took over the Lutheran movement after Luther died. While I am often suspicious of Melanchthon, his predestination argument is very practical because he basically says "it's too confusing and has too little pay offs for discussing it, so don't worry about it."

[Michael]

I think there are two questions wrapped together here, or at least two levels to the same question. One involves free will and (divine) omniscience, the other involves freewill and predestination (of any sort).
I don't recognize this distinction as being a particularly valid one for the reason given below.

With regard to omniscience, I think its simply a matter of realizing that knowing whether or not something is going to happen doesn't have any effect on its happening.
This is true only for normal human beings. I don't believe it is true for any divine God.

If God is the creator of the universe then it follows that God is omnipotent. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then it follows that God very much possesses the power to effect anything and everything. God knows what is going to happen because God willed it to happen - or declines to prevent it.

Ergo, I must conclude that if God is part of the equation, then predestination must be considered relevant unless categorically denied by doctrine. :shrug:

The question of free will and predestination is a deeper one and, as Michael demonstrated, is relevant even if one doesn't bring God into the equation. In my experience, there isn't actually any logical conflict between free will and predestination, but it seems like there is because we use the term 'free will' without actually thinking about what it means.
Whose freewill are we talking about? Yours or God's?

And those are really the only two options. Either you choice had a cause or it didn't: determinative causation or randomness. If "free will" means anything, it's meaning must fit in there somewhere. The problem is that when we say "free will" we often mean "something which isn't predetermined or random", and that's a null set.
I disagree. When the term "free will" is invoked, I understand that to mean a relevant choice is available. It may be my "free will" to always choose the rightward path. As such, my choice appears to be 'predetermined', but ultimately, it is not since the choice is always offered. Having a predisposition to one of the choices, doesn't negate the choice. It is when the choice is limited to only one option (for whatever reason) that free will goes out the window.

[Michael]

I may have been unclear. I didn't mean to set up a dichotomy between rational and random, but rather between determined and random. The question is whether or not there was any cause, not whether the cause was a rational one.
So, if you actually chose left because you just because 'it felt right' then your feelings were the determinative cause of which your choice was the effect.
What if one chooses to go "left" on a whim? Is that understood to be determined?

The alternative isn't a coin toss (which would be also be determined, albeit by conditions difficult to calculate with precision) but a truly random choice, the outcome of which is based on no preconditions. A 'causeless effect', as it were.
Such as whim?

I respectfully submit that one's own genes or brain chemistry might be the operative determination here, yet 'whim' is how it may appear for all intents and purposes to the subject. How can one tell the difference?

The point is that these two alternatives are, I think, both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. An effect, such as a choice, either has a cause (or multiple causes) has it has no cause. If the former, than the causes by definition determine the effect; if the latter, then the effect is utterly random.
(Though perhaps there's a better word I could use here instead of 'random'? :ummm: )
I think that because of genes, brain-chemistry, cultural mores and/or God, the idea of "no cause" is too artificial to be substantive. How can the effects of these 'causes' be ruled out so arbitrarily merely because the subject denies conscious awareness of them?

As for the term, perhaps "causeless"?

The problem arises when we use "free will" to refer to some third option, neither determined nor cause-less. But since determined and causeless are exhaustive, there's nothing else left for "free will" to refer to. It becomes, at best, pure negation with no conceptual content or, perhaps the same thing, meaningless gibberish.
Unfortunately, I think all "free will" discussions do degenerate into meaningless gibberish eventually. I think it is as absurd to deny free will as it is to assert it. :shrug:

[dilettante]

I don't recognize this distinction as being a particularly valid one for the reason given below.

This is true only for normal human beings. I don't believe it is true for any divine God.

If God is the creator of the universe then it follows that God is omnipotent. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then it follows that God very much possesses the power to effect anything and everything. God knows what is going to happen because God willed it to happen - or declines to prevent it.

Ergo, I must conclude that if God is part of the equation, then predestination must be considered relevant unless categorically denied by doctrine. :shrug:

Combining omniscience and omnipotence undoubtedly changes things. I was merely pointing out the separation between knowing of an event and causing it.


Whose freewill are we talking about? Yours or God's?

I'm talking about mine, or rather, human 'free will', such as it is.


I disagree. When the term "free will" is invoked, I understand that to mean a relevant choice is available. It may be my "free will" to always choose the rightward path. As such, my choice appears to be 'predetermined', but ultimately, it is not since the choice is always offered. Having a predisposition to one of the choices, doesn't negate the choice. It is when the choice is limited to only one option (for whatever reason) that free will goes out the window.

I don't disagree with any of that, though I think 'choice' is a perilous term which is apt to become just a synonym of 'free will', in all it's potential vacuousness.

What if one chooses to go "left" on a whim? Is that understood to be determined?

Such as whim?

I respectfully submit that one's own genes or brain chemistry might be the operative determination here, yet 'whim' is how it may appear for all intents and purposes to the subject. How can one tell the difference?

In practice, we modern Westerners almost universally reject one half of the dichotomy I'm pointing to: we hold it to be a foundational truth that thing's don't 'just happen for no reason'. So yes, we'd almost certainly group a "whim" in with determined events, in this case determined by some complex combination of brain chemistry, digestion, various stimuli and who knows what else. And in most cases 'whims' can be traced to particular causes: e.g. "I was just feeling frisky today", "The red one caught my eye", "I was suddenly tired of always turning left"...etc. And those causes can likewise be investigated.

But really, the point isn't our ability to tell the difference but to note that, even if we aren't sure which box to put a given event into, there are only two boxes: either something caused it nothing caused it, determined or causeless. Yet we tend to imagine 'free will' as representing some third option, but that third option has no conceptual substance to it, no positive meaning.

For example, I might say "I chose X of my own free will." But if asked "Why did you choose X?" I must either give a reason (in which case I admit that my 'free choice' was determined by something) or declare that there was no reason at all (in which case I admit that my 'free will' was utterly causeless subject to nothing but chance).

I think that because of genes, brain-chemistry, cultural mores and/or God, the idea of "no cause" is too artificial to be substantive. How can the effects of these 'causes' be ruled out so arbitrarily merely because the subject denies conscious awareness of them?

I quite agree. As I said, these days we almost always reject the 'causeless' alternative out of hand; if we accepted it it would undermine our entire system of understanding the world.

In ruling out the 'causeless' option, however, we are left with only one conceptually substantive explanation for events: that they are caused by (i.e. determined by) something, even if we can't always deduce what the something is.

Unfortunately, I think all "free will" discussions do degenerate into meaningless gibberish eventually. I think it is as absurd to deny free will as it is to assert it. :shrug:

I can agree with that too, but I think the absurdity arises because we don't define 'free will' in the beginning. We begin with a meaningless phrase and attempt to investigate it: absurdity is the only possible result.

IMO, a useful discussion of free will would have to begin with the premise that 'free will' refers to some subset of causes in a determinative cause-and-effect universe. Then, by examining what sorts of choices we identify as "free", we might be able to explore the defining limits of that subset. Once we actually had some sort of positive definition of what 'free will' means, then it might be useful to introduce the question of whether the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent divinity conflicts with it.

[Michael]

Combining omniscience and omnipotence undoubtedly changes things. I was merely pointing out the separation between knowing of an event and causing it.
I think it is important to note that this applies only to humans.

And if humans are concerned, the assumed 'knowledge' of the future event is questionable to begin with, making that distinction mostly moot.

I'm talking about mine, or rather, human 'free will', such as it is.
That's a very important distinction here. That which applies to humans, cannot be rationally assumed to apply to Gods.

I don't disagree with any of that, though I think 'choice' is a perilous term which is apt to become just a synonym of 'free will', in all it's potential vacuousness.
This is very true. Although 'choices' must exist for free will to be 'real', it does not follow that the mere presense of 'choices' proves the 'will' is free.

Many choices are essentially meaningless. Our election vote choices are a good example - you do get to have choices, but the choices are very limited and arranged by other people for reasons of their own. They even 'define' rejection of the choice offered (i.e. not voting) as accepting the choice offered! There is no real freedom there at all. You have only the freedom to choose which elite ruling party you prefer. You don't get the option to reject the elite ruling parties or the choices offered. Ergo, the choice is not a real one, but an artificially constrained one.

In practice, we modern Westerners almost universally reject one half of the dichotomy I'm pointing to: we hold it to be a foundational truth that thing's don't 'just happen for no reason'. So yes, we'd almost certainly group a "whim" in with determined events, in this case determined by some complex combination of brain chemistry, digestion, various stimuli and who knows what else. And in most cases 'whims' can be traced to particular causes: e.g. "I was just feeling frisky today", "The red one caught my eye", "I was suddenly tired of always turning left"...etc. And those causes can likewise be investigated.
So "whim" is held to be determined, even though it is utterly incapable of being defined, observed, proven or rationally understood?

Just because it is a western tradition to reject non-determinism? I can't accept that as it is too trite.

Heck, if you are correct about western culture, then nothing is ever non-determined and thus your dichotomy doesn't exist. :ummm:

As for the chain of causation, that can be an infinitely long one. For example, my reason for robbing the bank is because I needed the money and had no other way to get money immediately. I wouldn't have robbed the bank if I didn't need the money and I wouldn't have needed the money if my wife didn't have cancer (I need cab-fare to take her to chemotherapy even though healthcare in my socialist paradise is free!). I can spin another few thousand words embellishing this causal chain all the way back to Adam and Eve. So long as the will can only be observed by the subject themself, there is no way any assertion can be independently verified. Subjective statements are by definition, non-falsifiable.

Your whole argument here is predicated upon the assumption of good faith statements from subjects about their own will. That's pretty shakey ground in my opinion.

But really, the point isn't our ability to tell the difference but to note that, even if we aren't sure which box to put a given event into, there are only two boxes: either something caused it nothing caused it, determined or causeless. Yet we tend to imagine 'free will' as representing some third option, but that third option has no conceptual substance to it, no positive meaning.

For example, I might say "I chose X of my own free will." But if asked "Why did you choose X?" I must either give a reason (in which case I admit that my 'free choice' was determined by something) or declare that there was no reason at all (in which case I admit that my 'free will' was utterly causeless subject to nothing but chance).
:thumbsup: You'd make a good philosophy student. ;)

Btw, you have reached the 'standard' conclusion for which you would earn an "A" on an undergraduate level philosophy paper on the question of free will. :)

And this is pretty much the reason why the question of 'free will' is not very popular in the halls of academic philosophy. It just isn't a particularly interesting question - once you really think about it and work through the logic of it. They are all dead ends or subjective circular references. :shrug:

Personally, I file the issue of 'freewill' under the label of 'amusing paradoxes'.

I quite agree. As I said, these days we almost always reject the 'causeless' alternative out of hand; if we accepted it it would undermine our entire system of understanding the world.
Just as an aside here, shouldn't one use a comma between "it it"? I accept that "it it" is perfectly reasonable usage in the context - just that a comma to denote the conditional clause? That would have the added advantage of dividing the "it it" problem. :)

Btw, being the writer that I am, I tend to just re-arrange my sentence around in order to avoid such cumbersome and questionable grammar rather than confront the fact that I don't know the correct answer! :D

In ruling out the 'causeless' option, however, we are left with only one conceptually substantive explanation for events: that they are caused by (i.e. determined by) something, even if we can't always deduce what the something is.
Yes. And although all our science may point to this conclusion, neither science nor logic can actually prove that it is actually true - only a probability of varying degrees of confidence.

And that means it is an assumption held on faith. :D

That's not "blind faith", but it is still "faith".

I can agree with that too...
I'm glad we have agreement on this precise point about free will. I think it is relevant to note also the commonality with statements about the existence of God (or the veracity of astrology for that matter!).

That is to say, it is as absurd to claim proof of God as it is to claim the non-existence of God. Same is true of free will and/or astrology. :shrug:

...but I think the absurdity arises because we don't define 'free will' in the beginning. We begin with a meaningless phrase and attempt to investigate it: absurdity is the only possible result.

IMO, a useful discussion of free will would have to begin with the premise that 'free will' refers to some subset of causes in a determinative cause-and-effect universe. Then, by examining what sorts of choices we identify as "free", we might be able to explore the defining limits of that subset. Once we actually had some sort of positive definition of what 'free will' means, then it might be useful to introduce the question of whether the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent divinity conflicts with it.
For the reasons given above, I don't think that will work either, but you are certainly welcome to try. I'll certainly participate (in good faith) if you want to give it a go. :)

P.S. I actually encountered a 10 smilie limit in this post! LOL I'm going to have to fix that!

[SMadsen]

Excellent opening post. I enjoyed the read.

My question is: How can there be free will if God is omnipotent and all knowing?
A god that is both omnipotent and omniscient can't even exist in the first place. If a deity knows what is going to happen, its own being is predetermined and thus it can't be omnipotent.

[dilettante]

This is very true. Although 'choices' must exist for free will to be 'real', it does not follow that the mere presense of 'choices' proves the 'will' is free.

Many choices are essentially meaningless. Our election vote choices are a good example - you do get to have choices, but the choices are very limited and arranged by other people for reasons of their own. They even 'define' rejection of the choice offered (i.e. not voting) as accepting the choice offered! There is no real freedom there at all. You have only the freedom to choose which elite ruling party you prefer. You don't get the option to reject the elite ruling parties or the choices offered. Ergo, the choice is not a real one, but an artificially constrained one.

Hmmm. I'm not sure where to go here.

What's the difference between a 'real' choice and an 'unreal'(?) choice? How does one tell the difference?

Also, I note that you've disregarded a whole array of electoral choices. Most notably, there's the 'write in', where you can vote for anyone you want. But more to the point, there's the option of running yourself, or of protesting outside the polling site, of burning down the voting booth, of leaving the country, of trying to orchestrate a coup...etc.

And finally, what does the "artificially" in "artificially constrained" mean? All choices are constrained in the sense that all conceivable options are not available to us. I suppose I'm curious what the voting system would look like if it had no "artificial constraints". :ummm:

Anyway, all or any of that may be wondering off topic...



Originally Posted by dilettante
In ruling out the 'causeless' option, however, we are left with only one conceptually substantive explanation for events: that they are caused by (i.e. determined by) something, even if we can't always deduce what the something is.
Yes. And although all our science may point to this conclusion, neither science nor logic can actually prove that it is actually true - only a probability of varying degrees of confidence.

And that means it is an assumption held on faith. :D

That's not "blind faith", but it is still "faith".

Everything is held on faith if one digs deep enough. It seems the two of us reach that point a lot. :D

On an unrelated note, I dislike the term "blind faith". There are few, if any, beliefs that people have "blind faith" in, though the foundational beliefs about existence might count...


I'm glad we have agreement on this precise point about free will. I think it is relevant to note also the commonality with statements about the existence of God (or the veracity of astrology for that matter!).

That is to say, it is as absurd to claim proof of God as it is to claim the non-existence of God. Same is true of free will and/or astrology. :shrug:

I think it all depends on what one means by "free will", "God" and "astrology". As I said, IMO the essential problem with debating "free will" that is that people start off using a phrase that has no positive meaning behind it. The same can certainly happen when people discuss God or astrology (though I can't say I've had many discussions wrt the latter), but it need not always be so.
"Begin by defining your terms" is always a good rule of thumb when it comes to such topics. :)


For the reasons given above, I don't think that will work either, but you are certainly welcome to try. I'll certainly participate (in good faith) if you want to give it a go. :)

Perhaps when things slow down a bit. I'll try to keep it in mind.