Yet Another Morality Thread [Archive] - Discussion World Forum

Michael

Sep 10th 2009, 10:16 PM

First and foremost a well developed social awareness, resulting in strong and perdurable social groups. That requires both consistent and persistent codes of behavior.

Yes, I'm inclined to agree that this is a characteristic of humans that appears to be very much related to morality. Good example. :)

Interestingly enough, your answer appears to be similar to JJ Rousseau's assertion that "pity" is the key human trait that defines us as intelligent or thinking creatures. Pity, as Rousseau asserted, requires a considerable level of empathy and/or imagination involving other beings - thus the similarity to your example.

Actions that animals take that, if taken by a human, would be seen as the "right" thing to do. Sharing food, protecting the weak, etc.

The difference is the conception of morality. Once a species develops a conception of morality, the moralizing of their behaviour commences. It's the difference between "this is how we do" and "this is how we ought to do."

With regard to the first point, animals sharing food and protecting the weak isn't all that common beyond bloodkin.

With regard to your second point, I'll agree that such conceptualizations would appear to be a necessary precondition for morality to exist. Thus, it would follow that language is a necessary precondion for morality to exist.

I don't quite agree. I would say "man is a potentially moral animal."

I forget who said that first. Maybe Pinker.
That's just a witty quip.

I'm very much with Aristotle, Nietzsche and Marx here. Man is a political, moral and productive animal. These are the key concepts that define the human species.

Though, I'm not entirely sure about the distinction between "political" and "moral". ;)

If you care to argue against Nietzsche, I'd be delighted to play the foil. Separate thread of course. Speaking of which, I've been meaning to create a general purpose Nietzsche Thread just for such issues if/when they pop up. :D

If how it ought to be done resulted in the opposite behavior of how to do it then there would be a difference. However, the behaviors are essentially identical. What we ought to do is just a way to rationalize our behavior and, thus, I consider it irrelevant to the code of behavior itself.
Technically true, but the very fact of acknowledging the ability to rationalize behavior indicates the presence of the ability to manipulate behavior - which does mark an notable distinction or difference.

I'm not sure what to make of your search for examples of "universality". It would seem to imply that anything that is not merely the result of human caprice must be universally accepted, and/or that anything which is not universally accepted much have no existence outside of human caprice.
Neither of those make sense. Though perhaps I've misinterpreted your purpose.
If the impetus or content of morality comes from some source other than human artifice, then it rationally follows that there should be some examples of this sourced application in some manner that may be reasonably asserted as non-human artifice in origin - or at least something that doesn't have clear and obvious human cultural roots.

Even if every human on earth agreed to precisely the same moral code, that wouldn't prove that such a code was anything more than a human invention anymore than everyone believing the earth is flat would make it so.
Similarly, the fact that people don't agree on a moral code doesn't mean that morality is merely a human artifice. People regularly disagree on the health effects of eating eggs, the most efficient response to poverty, the validity of evolutionary theory, the the correct answers to calculus problems, and whether my car is actually blue, gray, or green.
With regard to your first point, yes, that's true. Majority vote does not equal truth.

However, if morality is perhaps derived from some supernatural source, then it is equally plausible that morality is derived from multiple supernatural sources. How can anyone possibly know which supernatural source is the correct one? Or are all of them viable/correct sources? There is no rational way to make any choice here at all - only faith - and that means inheriting the one from your parents and/or local society - and that's just arbitrary.

But, for the heck of it, I'd say that respect for one's parents (and/or elders more generally) is a moral imperative widely (if not necessarily universally) accepted by human cultures.
And what possible reason could you have for asserting that disrespect for elders would be the natural and rational result of human evolutionary development?

I think it is very easy to assert that 'respect for elders' is a concept that produces an evolutionary advantage for humans and thus is most likely to be considered as human artifice in origin. Human breeding patterns and survival rates have obvious reasons to favor those humans with the inclination towards respecting parents/elders.

Michael

Sep 10th 2009, 10:18 PM

As a sidenote, I'm curious if people prefer if I put a bunch of replies in one post (as above) or reply to each person's post in separate posts (as I often do)?

I'm just curious what people prefer. I don't want to make things difficult for others to reply. This is of course totally off-topic here, but highly relevant. :)

Michael

Sep 10th 2009, 10:21 PM

I feel one of the most fundamental morals is, "Be consistent," since without consistency, nothing can exist.

If pre-humans were to truly favor consistency, we'd still be acting like apes.

Donkey

Sep 10th 2009, 11:56 PM

Consistency is antithetical to any evolution.

dilettante

Sep 11th 2009, 12:22 AM

If the impetus or content of morality comes from some source other than human artifice, then it rationally follows that there should be some examples of this sourced application in some manner that may be reasonably asserted as non-human artifice in origin - or at least something that doesn't have clear and obvious human cultural roots.

I'm not sure what you're after here (though that could just be because I'm sleepy). Could you give me an example of what such a "sourced application" would look like? How would you know it when you saw it?

With regard to your first point, yes, that's true. Majority vote does not equal truth.

Indeed. That was my main point: universality or lack thereof doesn't prove anything either way.

However, if morality is perhaps derived from some supernatural source, then it is equally plausible that morality is derived from multiple supernatural sources. How can anyone possibly know which supernatural source is the correct one? Or are all of them viable/correct sources? There is no rational way to make any choice here at all - only faith - and that means inheriting the one from your parents and/or local society - and that's just arbitrary.

I'm assuming that "derived from some supernatural source" means something akin to "handed down from heaven ala 10 Commandments style". That would, of course, take care of the 'human artifice' question right from the get-go.

I'm not sure how common the belief is in multiple super-natural forces with competing moralities. To the best of my knowledge, none of the major monotheistic faiths have that worldview. All the super-natural forces they recognize share the same morality, even the evil ones; that is to say, Satan isn't just 'mistaken', he's intentionally, and knowingly evil.
Some strands of Hinduism (and its derivatives) might be closer to the mark here, but I really can't speak to that.

But your main point seems to be 'on what basis do we decide to accept or reject a divinely sourced morality', and that question could apply equally well whether we have many sources or just one. At the most fundemental level "God said so" is a declarative, not an imperative, statement and there's no way to move logically from the strictly declarative to the imperative.

However, IMO, this all kind of misses the mark since it's entirely conceivable that morality could be derived neither from human artifice nor directly from a divine source. Moral reality could just be there, much as many people physical reality is just there.

As an aside, I wouldn't call morality inherited from one's culture or parents 'arbitrary'. Even if they're entirely human constructs passed from generation to generation, their content is almost certainly determined by more than just random chance or passing fancy.

And what possible reason could you have for asserting that disrespect for elders would be the natural and rational result of human evolutionary development?

I think it is very easy to assert that 'respect for elders' is a concept that produces an evolutionary advantage for humans and thus is most likely to be considered as human artifice in origin. Human breeding patterns and survival rates have obvious reasons to favor those humans with the inclination towards respecting parents/elders.

:ummm: Does it matter? This remark seems to imply that morality must be somehow detrimental in order to count. You asked for a universal, and I think this one is relatively close (though, as I said before, I don't think universality necessarily proves anything).

As a sidenote, I'm curious if people prefer if I put a bunch of replies in one post (as above) or reply to each person's post in separate posts (as I often do)?

I'm just curious what people prefer. I don't want to make things difficult for others to reply. This is of course totally off-topic here, but highly relevant. :)

I does make it a little more complicated to quote-reply to you.

phungus420

Sep 11th 2009, 01:38 AM

I'm very much with Aristotle, Nietzsche and Marx here. Man is a political, moral and productive animal. These are the key concepts that define the human species.
I don't fully agree. What defines the human species is our ingrained Language Development phisiology, which is most definately a genetic trait inharented at birth. This language system causes the mind of a human to compartmentalize ideas and stimula into discrete concepts, which can then be rearanged to conjure new overreaching concepts outside of the realm of the individual's experience. This language and novel spontanious conceptual creations it leads to are what defines us as human, it's the reason we dominate the Earth, and why all other hominids were wiped out by us.

Now Language leads to the creation of morals. Behavioral norms intrinsic to animals due to instinct or conditioning are taken to a moral level in the human conciousness due to the effects of the compartmentalized conceptual nature of language. This creates the notion that these behaviours ought to be done, rather then just being a behavior caused by learning or biology. So while morality is part of humanity, it does not define humanity, rather it is an outcome of biological drive to form language and hence compartmentalize concepts, which is what defines humans.

Also Politics most definetely is not a definitive part of humanity, or at least humans are in no way special in this regard. Watch an episode of Meerkat Manor if you want to see politics being played by other animals.

Lily

Sep 11th 2009, 07:16 AM

I'm always curious about how so many people can profess a belief that morals do have an origin/purpose/definition other than pure human artifice (or expediency, whim or caprice).

Based on the number of people at this forum who routinely state their disagreement with the thesis that all morality is human artifice, I can only conclude that the belief in universal morality is almost a majority (here and everywhere else).

In order for me to understand this concept, can anyone point to a single moral rule that has even a small measure of universality? Anyone? Anything?

If morality has any possible existence other than as pure human artifice, there ought to be LOTS of examples out there...

If I'm asking the question incorrectly, please feel free to re-state the question any way you like. I'm just curious about this concept that seems so incredibly common yet is always so mysteriously undefined.

I hadn't really thought about it in those terms. By universal morality, I assume you mean something along the lines of the Golden rule, or respecting life or telling the truth, etc., yes?

Non Sequitur

Sep 11th 2009, 09:39 AM

In order for me to understand this concept, can anyone point to a single moral rule that has even a small measure of universality? Anyone? Anything?

I can point to morals that I think everyone is responsible for, but people don't really follow morals, that's why they are sinful.

If morality has any possible existence other than as pure human artifice, there ought to be LOTS of examples out there...?

not necessarily. First, context would play a huge role in morality. As the Old Testament shows, the morality of one age does not always carry through. Second, people are sinful, morals are often not followed.

If I'm asking the question incorrectly, please feel free to re-state the question any way you like. I'm just curious about this concept that seems so incredibly common yet is always so mysteriously undefined.

Well, I guess i would say that the whether humanity follows universal morality or not is irrelevant to a universal morality actually existing.

SMadsen

Sep 11th 2009, 11:50 AM

I'm very much with Aristotle, Nietzsche and Marx here. Man is a political, moral and productive animal. These are the key concepts that define the human species.
I don't agree with that, either. But, then, I don't agree with Phungus420, either, since neither language nor morality nor conceptual creations are exclusive to humans. They seem infinitely stronger and more present but that could be because we only truly understand those concepts in the context of our own species. And to state it in such a simple manner that would make everyone in Ockham proud, that's really what I think defines us as a species: We only understand the context of our own species.

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 02:27 PM

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 02:30 PM

I hadn't really thought about it in those terms. By universal morality, I assume you mean something along the lines of the Golden rule, or respecting life or telling the truth, etc., yes?

Sure - anything at all. My point is that if morality comes from some supernatural source beyond humans, then it rationally follows that there should be some examples of such morality out there.

The extreme paucity of examples of any kind of supernatural morality makes me highly suspicious of its existence. Man-made morality, which apparently everyone rejects apparently has LOTS of evidence and examples.

That's why I find this topic so odd (and mysterious and bizarre). :ummm:

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 02:47 PM

I'm not sure what you're after here (though that could just be because I'm sleepy). Could you give me an example of what such a "sourced application" would look like? How would you know it when you saw it?
I'm looking for an example of a moral rule or moral system that does not have clear and obvious human-artifice or human self-interest as its origin.

It is not necessary to supply/prove the origin-source - just enough to suggest that the origin-source is clearly non-human.

Indeed. That was my main point: universality or lack thereof doesn't prove anything either way.
But if there is only one god, then it does rationally follow that any morality created/defined/commanded by that god would be universal in character.

If there are multiple gods, then there may perhaps be multiple sources of morality creation/defining/commanding going on - which is why I'm not too hung up on universality.

I use the term "universal" because the religious folks are overwhelmingly drawn from the "monotheist" camp. If their monotheism is correct (and they by definition believe it so) then it naturally follows that God-driven morality would be equally universal (or mono).

Indeed, I should think that it would be the religiously inclined people who reject "morality as artifice" who would be most adamant that morality would be universal by definition (as that is most compatible with their religious viewpoint).

It is curious to see religiously inclined people who reject "morality as artifice" questioning the universal element. It doesn't matter to me, just that it seems odd and contradictory.

I'm assuming that "derived from some supernatural source" means something akin to "handed down from heaven ala 10 Commandments style". That would, of course, take care of the 'human artifice' question right from the get-go.
Yes, that would do, but isn't necessary as I've noted above. I'm not demanding that you "prove" your non-human source.

I'm just asking for an example of some morality that can be rationally construed as non-human in origin. For example, if a given morality serves an obvious human evolutionary benefit, I'm assuming that's human artifice for origin.

I'm not sure how common the belief is in multiple super-natural forces with competing moralities. To the best of my knowledge, none of the major monotheistic faiths have that worldview.
No kidding. Monotheists are by definition going to favor a monotheist interpretation.

And polytheists are (statistically speaking) even more rare than atheists.

I'm just trying to keep an open mind here by inviting all possibilities.

All the super-natural forces they recognize share the same morality, even the evil ones; that is to say, Satan isn't just 'mistaken', he's intentionally, and knowingly evil.
Yes, monotheism is inclined to monotheist morality.

Some strands of Hinduism (and its derivatives) might be closer to the mark here, but I really can't speak to that.
Nor can I - Hinduism is the one religion I know the least about. But I'd strongly suspect that because it is polytheist, it would favor multiple origins for morality - though the close association beteen morality and religion itself is essentially a monotheist concept not usually found in polytheist systems.

But your main point seems to be 'on what basis do we decide to accept or reject a divinely sourced morality', and that question could apply equally well whether we have many sources or just one. At the most fundemental level "God said so" is a declarative, not an imperative, statement and there's no way to move logically from the strictly declarative to the imperative.
That most certainly is NOT my point here at all.

I'm curious as to why an apparent majority believes something when all material evidence points in the opposite direction.

However, IMO, this all kind of misses the mark since it's entirely conceivable that morality could be derived neither from human artifice nor directly from a divine source. Moral reality could just be there, much as many people physical reality is just there.

So morality just spontaneously creates itself?

That's just too far out there for me to address. I don't see any basis for even considering that possibility. We have strong evidence that morality is human-origins. We have strong beliefs that morality is God-derived. There is zero assertions from anyone that morality is spontaneously self-created.

On top of that, we have no evidence or theory of anything else occuring "spontaneously" at all, so this property of origin would be unique for morality (which is highly suspicious).

As an aside, I wouldn't call morality inherited from one's culture or parents 'arbitrary'. Even if they're entirely human constructs passed from generation to generation, their content is almost certainly determined by more than just random chance or passing fancy.
You are apparently reading more into the word "arbitrary" than is justified.

If you are born to one set of parents in one place at one time, you have a given morality. If you are born to a different set of parents, or a different place, or a different time, you get a different morality. That difference of morality is entirely independent of the subject. Ergo, from the subject's perspective, the distinction is entirely arbitrary - none can be perceived as better or superior to another. Thus, the difference is nothing more than the arbitrary chances of birth.

:ummm: Does it matter? This remark seems to imply that morality must be somehow detrimental in order to count. You asked for a universal, and I think this one is relatively close (though, as I said before, I don't think universality necessarily proves anything).
I think it matters a lot if something has obviously self-serving human origins.

If one has a reasonable and sufficient explanation for something, it is irrational to seek out or to prefer some supernatural explanation instead.

I does make it a little more complicated to quote-reply to you.
Far enough. I'll stick to my old method of reply to individual posts in turn. :)

Daktoria

Sep 11th 2009, 04:21 PM

If pre-humans were to truly favor consistency, we'd still be acting like apes.

Why is consistency dependent upon stagnation?

Donkey

Sep 11th 2009, 05:00 PM

Why is consistency dependent upon stagnation?
Well, unless you're talking about a consistent rate of change...

Daktoria

Sep 11th 2009, 05:57 PM

Maybe, or maybe a consistent rate of acceleration or expansion of dimensions or the other way around.

Dynamic equilibrium doesn't have to fit a limited paradigm such as the human perspective.

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 06:30 PM

Why is consistency dependent upon stagnation?
I didn't say that.

I said if our pre-human ancestors valued consistency as highly as you do, we would never have evolved into humans.

Living in trees would be consistent with our ape-like past. Walking around on two legs was a very radical thing to do. Our human evolutionary past is filled with countless examples of the inconstancy of humans being one of our greatest assets.

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 06:31 PM

Dynamic equilibrium doesn't have to fit a limited paradigm such as the human perspective.
It most certainly does.

Human perspective is the very definition of the paradigm. No human perspective, means no paradigm at all. This is the same epistemological argument I've raised previously. All knowledge is human perspective knowledge. You can't take the humans out of the equation at all or there is nothing left. Knowledge can not exist without human perspective.

phungus420

Sep 11th 2009, 06:47 PM

I don't agree with that, either. But, then, I don't agree with Phungus420, either, since neither language nor morality nor conceptual creations are exclusive to humans. They seem infinitely stronger and more present but that could be because we only truly understand those concepts in the context of our own species. And to state it in such a simple manner that would make everyone in Ockham proud, that's really what I think defines us as a species: We only understand the context of our own species.

Well you can disagree with it all you want. It doesn't change the fact other animals do not have a built in coding system to label concepts which allows for later processing these labels into novel constructs outside the realm of the organism's original experience. This coding system of concepts is unique to humans. Yes other animals can learn, and reason at varying levels. However they cannot learn, categorize the concepts into code, and then reararange the code into a structure which gives them insight into something completely outside of their experience.

And as I said before this is what makes human morality unique, it is an offshoot of language. Without language and it's associative effects we as social animals would simply be inclined toward social behaviors, both those we were conditioned by the social setting to adheer to, or those we inherent from our biology. With language such social mores can be discussed and infered and allow the construction of new unique concepts outside of the social behavioral norms we are conditioned to adhere to or are biologically predisposed of to observe, ie our moral codes extend beyond directly learned or instictual behavior. This is a uniquely human quality.

phungus420

Sep 11th 2009, 06:52 PM

Daktoria

Sep 11th 2009, 07:03 PM

I didn't say that.

I said if our pre-human ancestors valued consistency as highly as you do, we would never have evolved into humans.

Living in trees would be consistent with our ape-like past. Walking around on two legs was a very radical thing to do. Our human evolutionary past is filled with countless examples of the inconstancy of humans being one of our greatest assets.

If evolution is change and stagnation is the lack thereof, how can a lack of evolution not equal stagnation?

I also don't see how creativity is automatically inconsistent. This sounds very inductive to me since it implies that consistency has to be linear; just because we have a particular foundation doesn't mean the rest of our choices and intelligence have to follow a particular course. Furthermore, if it did, then it would imply determinism.

Daktoria

Sep 11th 2009, 07:06 PM

It most certainly does.

Human perspective is the very definition of the paradigm. No human perspective, means no paradigm at all. This is the same epistemological argument I've raised previously. All knowledge is human perspective knowledge. You can't take the humans out of the equation at all or there is nothing left. Knowledge can not exist without human perspective.

How does human knowledge grow then? We don't just make up facts on a whim. Rather we investigate reality and come to conclusions that are compatible with our mental languages, languages which are never born, nor ever will be, omniscient.

Lily

Sep 11th 2009, 07:12 PM

Sure - anything at all. My point is that if morality comes from some supernatural source beyond humans, then it rationally follows that there should be some examples of such morality out there.

The extreme paucity of examples of any kind of supernatural morality makes me highly suspicious of its existence. Man-made morality, which apparently everyone rejects apparently has LOTS of evidence and examples.

That's why I find this topic so odd (and mysterious and bizarre). :ummm:

Supernatural force. Like Casper the Ghost? God? Nah. Morality is a human construct, I think. It's useful, probably even necessary, when building cohesive relationships, communities, societies, but of a supernatural origin? No, I'm not buying that.

Michael

Sep 11th 2009, 07:53 PM

Supernatural force. Like Casper the Ghost? God? Nah. Morality is a human construct, I think. It's useful, probably even necessary, when building cohesive relationships, communities, societies, but of a supernatural origin? No, I'm not buying that.
I've been arguing this philosophic position long and hard for many years. ;)

(boxing with shadows would be a more accurate description though)

Believe it or not, you are in a small minority position here in this forum and in the United States and probably the whole fucking planet. Please see Donkey's post#2 in this thread.

I might add that almost all of the discussions about the issue of morality that I've engaged in, all seem to flounder based on essential dissagreement over this key point. :shrug:

dilettante

Sep 11th 2009, 08:22 PM

I'm looking for an example of a moral rule or moral system that does not have clear and obvious human-artifice or human self-interest as its origin.

It is not necessary to supply/prove the origin-source - just enough to suggest that the origin-source is clearly non-human.

Non-human origins?
But we don't know the origins of ancient moral imperatives such as "You should respect your parents". If we did, we'd know for sure whether those were origins were purely human or otherwise. Isn't that the entire point of this thread?

But if there is only one god, then it does rationally follow that any morality created/defined/commanded by that god would be universal in character.

If there are multiple gods, then there may perhaps be multiple sources of morality creation/defining/commanding going on - which is why I'm not too hung up on universality.

I use the term "universal" because the religious folks are overwhelmingly drawn from the "monotheist" camp. If their monotheism is correct (and they by definition believe it so) then it naturally follows that God-driven morality would be equally universal (or mono).

Indeed, I should think that it would be the religiously inclined people who reject "morality as artifice" who would be most adamant that morality would be universal by definition (as that is most compatible with their religious viewpoint).

It is curious to see religiously inclined people who reject "morality as artifice" questioning the universal element. It doesn't matter to me, just that it seems odd and contradictory.

I think I can generally agree with that. If there is an objective morality, something beyond human caprice, then it would presumably be the same for everyone. Though, of course, that doesn't mean everyone will agree on it.

I'm just asking for an example of some morality that can be rationally construed as non-human in origin. For example, if a given morality serves an obvious human evolutionary benefit, I'm assuming that's human artifice for origin.

That seems like a bold assumption. Just because something is useful to us doesn't mean, ipso facto, that we just made it up. But perhaps I'm not working with the same definition of "human artifice" that you are. Does algebra, by your definition, have human-artifice as its origin?

So morality just spontaneously creates itself?

That's just too far out there for me to address. I don't see any basis for even considering that possibility. We have strong evidence that morality is human-origins. We have strong beliefs that morality is God-derived. There is zero assertions from anyone that morality is spontaneously self-created.

On top of that, we have no evidence or theory of anything else occuring "spontaneously" at all, so this property of origin would be unique for morality (which is highly suspicious).

You misunderstand. Not 'occurring spontaneously', but simply existing without origin, as some believe the physical universe and/or God simply exist without origins.
After all, morality aside, you've got to accept either self-existence or spontaneous origins to explain the physical universe and/or God.
...or I suppose it could just all be in our heads and not actually reflect anything.

Donkey

Sep 11th 2009, 09:44 PM

If evolution is change and stagnation is the lack thereof, how can a lack of evolution not equal stagnation?

I also don't see how creativity is automatically inconsistent. This sounds very inductive to me since it implies that consistency has to be linear; just because we have a particular foundation doesn't mean the rest of our choices and intelligence have to follow a particular course. Furthermore, if it did, then it would imply determinism.
What exactly do you mean by consistency?

Although I forget what it really has to do with the origin of morality.

Daktoria

Sep 11th 2009, 10:18 PM

What exactly do you mean by consistency?

Although I forget what it really has to do with the origin of morality.

My own specific meanings for consistency don't really matter here. It's more about self-definition since self-destruction is inevitable from hypocrisy. I could give examples or explain how it applies to your own, but it's not really something that can be justified externally since it's more about imploring character and resolving peace of mind. As the saying goes, "You can't legislate morality."

Donkey

Sep 11th 2009, 10:25 PM

My own specific meanings for consistency don't really matter here. It's more about self-definition since self-destruction is inevitable from hypocrisy. I could give examples or explain how it applies to your own, but it's not really something that can be justified externally since it's more about imploring character and resolving peace of mind. As the saying goes, "You can't legislate morality."
Perhaps it's because I'm lazy, but I really don't have any idea what you're talking about.

But I'm gonna go poop and take a shower.

SMadsen

Sep 11th 2009, 10:58 PM

Well you can disagree with it all you want. It doesn't change the fact other animals do not have a built in coding system to label concepts which allows for later processing these labels into novel constructs outside the realm of the organism's original experience. This coding system of concepts is unique to humans. Yes other animals can learn, and reason at varying levels. However they cannot learn, categorize the concepts into code, and then reararange the code into a structure which gives them insight into something completely outside of their experience.

And as I said before this is what makes human morality unique, it is an offshoot of language. Without language and it's associative effects we as social animals would simply be inclined toward social behaviors, both those we were conditioned by the social setting to adheer to, or those we inherent from our biology. With language such social mores can be discussed and infered and allow the construction of new unique concepts outside of the social behavioral norms we are conditioned to adhere to or are biologically predisposed of to observe, ie our moral codes extend beyond directly learned or instictual behavior. This is a uniquely human quality.
Excellently described. I buy that.

phungus420

Sep 12th 2009, 06:43 AM

Excellently described. I buy that.
Wow, I'm not accostomed to someone on an internet forum agreeing with a post based on a previous disagreement. Normally at this stage I'd expect you to take a devil's advocate stance if you had agreed with the thesis. I'm not sure how to react to this change in normally observed behavior.

phungus420

Sep 12th 2009, 06:47 AM

Lily

Sep 12th 2009, 07:06 AM

Daktoria

Sep 12th 2009, 10:28 AM

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 11:15 AM

In other words you want someone to demonstrate the existence of god. I find this opening to be pretty much a non starter.

Actually, I think I've been working hard to 'lower the bar' for any example.

As I noted in reply to dilettante, I'm not going to question any 'source' offered for some example of non-human derived morality - unless to argue the obvious human origin if applicable.

Secondly, I'm willing to accept something less than 'universality' for such a morality or moral rule.

I'm just looking for any evidence of any moral system that clearly has non-human purpose/functions. That is to say, it doesn't have an obvious self-serving human purpose.

(btw, I do know of such an example)

Well since I think our concepts of morality are an offshoot of inhereted social behaviors, and of those learned and built over the generations in a socially evolutionary context, I don't disagree. In fact I think it's just common sense that morals, on the whole, serve an evolutionary benifit, and are a product of human reasoning.

The rest of your argument is adressing the religious view. I don't find the religious view to be reasonable, so I suppose I'll just ignore it.

Well, I'd say that the Torah/Bible/Koran is the one good example that no one has yet offered. :)

And that is the real bottom line I think. If one does not accept the "morality is human artifice" argument, then one has only the "morality originates with God" argument to fall back on. :shrug:

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 11:24 AM

If evolution is change and stagnation is the lack thereof, how can a lack of evolution not equal stagnation?
Context.

If one's environment is stable, then stability or continuity of action would be a good thing (highly condusive to survival). This would not be described as stagnation - it would defined as evolutionary success.

If one's environment is unstable and changing, then stability or continuity of action could possibly be defined as stagnation, given the need for dynamic changes condusive for survival.

I also don't see how creativity is automatically inconsistent. This sounds very inductive to me since it implies that consistency has to be linear; just because we have a particular foundation doesn't mean the rest of our choices and intelligence have to follow a particular course. Furthermore, if it did, then it would imply determinism.
Creativity is by definition "new". That is inconsistent with what was before - it represents a potential change.

It of course depends on context. If a body is moving quickly, to be consistent, the body must continue moving quickly. If a body is at rest, to be consistent, the body must remain at rest. These are the rules of consistency - context matters.

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 11:29 AM

How does human knowledge grow then? We don't just make up facts on a whim. Rather we investigate reality and come to conclusions that are compatible with our mental languages, languages which are never born, nor ever will be, omniscient.
Yes, I believe that's generally correct (though perhaps backwards). ;) I also believe that I've addressed this point in the Epistemology thread and think that would be a better place for this discussion.

My "Karl Popper Fanboy" thread is also highly relevant to this precise point since Popper is the origin of the rules I'm applying there and here. :)

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 11:50 AM

Non-human origins?
But we don't know the origins of ancient moral imperatives such as "You should respect your parents". If we did, we'd know for sure whether those were origins were purely human or otherwise. Isn't that the entire point of this thread?
I don't expect to be able to accurately discern the precise origin of any moral rule. That would likely be impossible. All we can do is speculate here.

However, on that basis, I think it is reasonable to assert that concepts that are clearly 'necessary' in the process of the evolutionary development of human beings and human society ought to be assumed to be human artifice in response to environmental pressures or changes.

Thus, for the point of the thread, I'm looking for some moral rule or system that isn't a necessary and/or obvious condition of human evolutionary origins.

I think I can generally agree with that. If there is an objective morality, something beyond human caprice, then it would presumably be the same for everyone. Though, of course, that doesn't mean everyone will agree on it.
I'm not demanding universal agreement as a condition as that's probably impossible. Universal existence of a moral rule would be far more applicable here than universal agreement.

That seems like a bold assumption. Just because something is useful to us doesn't mean, ipso facto, that we just made it up. But perhaps I'm not working with the same definition of "human artifice" that you are. Does algebra, by your definition, have human-artifice as its origin?

Yes, algebra is certainly human artifice. Human artifice means "human act" or "human art". Don't get hung up on the word "artificial" - that's not the concept here, though the terms are related.

You misunderstand. Not 'occurring spontaneously', but simply existing without origin, as some believe the physical universe and/or God simply exist without origins.
After all, morality aside, you've got to accept either self-existence or spontaneous origins to explain the physical universe and/or God.
...or I suppose it could just all be in our heads and not actually reflect anything.
I can (theoretically) accept "simply exists without origin" for the physicality of the universe as it is a physical object and it is normal to speak of 'physical objects' existing.

However, when it comes to concepts and ideas that do not have 'physical form', I don't think it is equally reasonable to make the same kind of acceptance of "just is". Ideas and concepts are completely dependent upon human language to exist.

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 11:53 AM

Wow, I'm not accostomed to someone on an internet forum agreeing with a post based on a previous disagreement. Normally at this stage I'd expect you to take a devil's advocate stance if you had agreed with the thesis. I'm not sure how to react to this change in normally observed behavior.
Bemused giggles. :lol:

We are an odd and slightly unusual bunch of people here my phungoid phriend! ;)

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 12:07 PM

Micheal the problem is no one has really taken a concrete univeral moral position. All posts so far on the opposition side have been pendantic claims. It would seem to me, thus far, that the general concesus is that morals are human constructs, based on either evolutionary, or classically conditioned (or language infered derivatives).
Yes, I do generally agree, though the thread is still young. :D

But there is a strong current out there that rejects the idea that "morality is a human construct". You haven't been around this forum long enough to know the depth of the support that this ideas has here. I've been arguing this topic for many, many years now - often with many of the same people here in this forum.

I am still very interested in this topic despite or because of that. Many of my more speculative ideas about human society and morality are all predicated upon the conclusion that morality is human artifice entirely. I'd like to move on to those topics, but I don't feel that I can until this foundational issue is better established (or accepted).

I'd like to see a univeral moral argument made to deconstruct, but I see none. Perhaps you could take a devil's advocate stance in support of universal mores. Or Donkey could describe his moral origin's take more concretely. As of now, all I see is smoke and mirrors, and I'm not going to dive into debating smog.
Patience grasshopper! :D

A good discussion sometimes takes some time. I'm doing my best to try to draw the opposition out, but it is challenging. ;)

And I tend to only use a devil's advocate type position as an aggressive tactic to defeat an opponent in debate. Also, in the process, I end up using so much sophistry that it harms my own ultimate position on the issue by muddying up the intellectual integrity of the issue! I'm just too competitive in debates to use such competitive tactics for exploratory issues. And here in this thread, I'm really trying to 'explore' the issue of the opposition.

Perhaps you should consider this a scouting mission against the opposition rather than a battle at this point. :)

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 12:16 PM

My argument is simple. If one were to accept that a universal morality exists that is not of human construct, then one would have to accept the existence of some supernatural power, i.e. a god. Since there is no evidence supporting the existence of God or gods, that argument falls flat.
I love philosophic newbies! ;) (seriously, I really do!)

You might want to take note of the long established principle that the non-existence of proof can never be taken as proof of non-existence.

Ergo, your argument merely states your opinion that God doesn't exist.

I might add that non-human origins might include genetic behavior that is common to all mammals for example. Or it might be extra-terrestrial. :shrug:

Michael

Sep 12th 2009, 12:18 PM

The categorical imperative is one of the most universal moral positions around. :erm:

I don't think so. I'd say it isn't very popular or all that well known.

Rather, the categorical imperative is a construct created for the purpose of serving as a universal rule. It is clearly human artifice - we even have his name!

Daktoria

Sep 12th 2009, 12:23 PM

dilettante

Sep 12th 2009, 07:44 PM

Before directly replying to the quotes below, I still feel the need to try and pin down what exactly you're looking for. When you talk about "a belief that morals do have an origin/purpose/definition other than pure human artifice (or expediency, whim or caprice)," I can see of two possible meanings, and I think it would help me to have a better handle on which we're discussing.

Meaning A: A belief that some specific moral code/system (i.e. a specific set of moral rules) was originally formulated by a non-human source. Examples here might be the 10 Commandments being handed down from heaven, aliens landing and giving a lecture on their definitions of right and wrong, or super-intelligent chipmunks leaving moral dictates carved into trees.

Meaning B: The belief that there is some sort of universal moral reality; i.e. that some things really are right and some things really are wrong, independent of individual opinions or the content of any given list of moral regulations.

I would submit that while one can have both beliefs simultaneously, they are distinct and one could quite conceivably hold one without holding the other.

Which belief do you think is held by almost a majority of people here and which are you trying to better understand? Or is there a third meaning that hasn't occurred to me?

I don't expect to be able to accurately discern the precise origin of any moral rule. That would likely be impossible. All we can do is speculate here.

However, on that basis, I think it is reasonable to assert that concepts that are clearly 'necessary' in the process of the evolutionary development of human beings and human society ought to be assumed to be human artifice in response to environmental pressures or changes.

Thus, for the point of the thread, I'm looking for some moral rule or system that isn't a necessary and/or obvious condition of human evolutionary origins.

I don't think that's reasonable at all, not if the very thing one is supposed to be considering is the possibility of a non-human moral system (Meaning A, in this case). Consider the following scenario:

The Elbonian people are a small tribe raising pigs for food. They regularly suffer from what we would recognize as trichinosis, but don't know why. Then, one day, the Elobians are discovered by the Kneebonians. The Kneebonians believe that it is a moral abomination to eat the flesh of any creature unless it has been ritually purified by a prolonged exposure to fire. They impart this moral code to the Elbonians, and hence forth the Elobonians cook their pork thoroughly and no longer suffer from trichonosis. They're population increases faster than the neighboring tribes (who still eat raw pork), they extermine the Kneebonians in a war and become masters of the region. They go on to create a glorious and learned culture.

Looking at Elbonian culture, it would be entirely unwarrented to assume that, because a belief in the moral value of cooking their meat was crucial to the Elbonians development, it must therefore be of Elbonian-origin. We could only do so if we had already decided that there could be no non-Elbonian source. If we remain open to the possibility of a non-Elbonian source, then the 'usefulness' of the moral code tells us, at most, why the Elbonians retained it; it doesn't tell us whether they developed it or got it from someone else.

Yes, algebra is certainly human artifice. Human artifice means "human act" or "human art". Don't get hung up on the word "artificial" - that's not the concept here, though the terms are related.

That does clarify things for me somewhat. In that case, I'd submit that one could hold Belief B from above (in a universal moral reality), but still believe that any given, or all, moral codes were formulated by humans.

I can (theoretically) accept "simply exists without origin" for the physicality of the universe as it is a physical object and it is normal to speak of 'physical objects' existing.

However, when it comes to concepts and ideas that do not have 'physical form', I don't think it is equally reasonable to make the same kind of acceptance of "just is". Ideas and concepts are completely dependent upon human language to exist.

I can agree with that.
In this case I was referring to the belief that a universal moral reality (Meaning B) could be self-existing. The 'existence' (if that's even the right word) of a specific moral code would require the existence of someone/thing to conceive of it.

Lily

Sep 12th 2009, 08:15 PM

I love philosophic newbies! ;) (seriously, I really do!)

You might want to take note of the long established principle that the non-existence of proof can never be taken as proof of non-existence.

Ergo, your argument merely states your opinion that God doesn't exist.

I might add that non-human origins might include genetic behavior that is common to all mammals for example. Or it might be extra-terrestrial. :shrug:

Isn't religion based on faith? Isn't the existence of God based on faith? Isn't faith defined as belief without evidence? If believers and those who proclaim faith in God set the parameters, then why can't I use them for my argument?

Michael

Sep 13th 2009, 10:43 AM

Isn't religion based on faith? Isn't the existence of God based on faith? Isn't faith defined as belief without evidence? If believers and those who proclaim faith in God set the parameters, then why can't I use them for my argument?

You can, but you end up with an argument that has the same [non] validity as their argument. Faith in God vs faith in not-God. Neither position is rationally supported.

Michael

Sep 13th 2009, 11:31 AM

Before directly replying to the quotes below, I still feel the need to try and pin down what exactly you're looking for. When you talk about "a belief that morals do have an origin/purpose/definition other than pure human artifice (or expediency, whim or caprice)," I can see of two possible meanings, and I think it would help me to have a better handle on which we're discussing.

Meaning A: A belief that some specific moral code/system (i.e. a specific set of moral rules) was originally formulated by a non-human source. Examples here might be the 10 Commandments being handed down from heaven, aliens landing and giving a lecture on their definitions of right and wrong, or super-intelligent chipmunks leaving moral dictates carved into trees.

Meaning B: The belief that there is some sort of universal moral reality; i.e. that some things really are right and some things really are wrong, independent of individual opinions or the content of any given list of moral regulations.

I would submit that while one can have both beliefs simultaneously, they are distinct and one could quite conceivably hold one without holding the other.

Which belief do you think is held by almost a majority of people here and which are you trying to better understand? Or is there a third meaning that hasn't occurred to me?
I think 'meaning A & B' are good statements of the two most common forms of the 'opposition' here.

I think meaning A is by far the more expected and respected position of opposition (to the idea that morality is human artifice).

I think meaning B is by far the most common one in general and at this forum. It is also the most irrational and most mysterious. ;)

As for similtaneously holding meaning A and B, that's common and means nothing. If one accepts A (monotheism and Ten Commandments from God) then B naturally follows.

And since both assertions are simply assertions of faith, there's no claim of rationality being made for either one and thus, no reason the two can't be held separately or together. Humans do have an inclination to hold irrational ideas and/or beliefs sometimes.

I don't think that's reasonable at all, not if the very thing one is supposed to be considering is the possibility of a non-human moral system (Meaning A, in this case). Consider the following scenario:

The Elbonian people are a small tribe raising pigs for food. They regularly suffer from what we would recognize as trichinosis, but don't know why. Then, one day, the Elobians are discovered by the Kneebonians. The Kneebonians believe that it is a moral abomination to eat the flesh of any creature unless it has been ritually purified by a prolonged exposure to fire. They impart this moral code to the Elbonians, and hence forth the Elobonians cook their pork thoroughly and no longer suffer from trichonosis. They're population increases faster than the neighboring tribes (who still eat raw pork), they extermine the Kneebonians in a war and become masters of the region. They go on to create a glorious and learned culture.

Looking at Elbonian culture, it would be entirely unwarrented to assume that, because a belief in the moral value of cooking their meat was crucial to the Elbonians development, it must therefore be of Elbonian-origin. We could only do so if we had already decided that there could be no non-Elbonian source. If we remain open to the possibility of a non-Elbonian source, then the 'usefulness' of the moral code tells us, at most, why the Elbonians retained it; it doesn't tell us whether they developed it or got it from someone else.
No, it doesn't tell us whether they developed it or got it from someone else. But it doesn't really matter which set of humans created the idea, what matters is that it was obviously some humans creating the idea, not some supernatural source.

I'm generally following with William of Oakham here on the issue of rationality - asserting that it is irrational to assume a supernatural source when an obvious human source is readily available and reasonably explicable (even if we can't always prove it with physical evidence).

I would say that dietary rules that do serve a rational purpose (don't eat uncooked pork because it may actually harm you) are rules that are highly likely to have been derived by human observation and experience since they represent a rational principle. There is no need for a supernatural source to provide that rule.

That does clarify things for me somewhat. In that case, I'd submit that one could hold Belief B from above (in a universal moral reality), but still believe that any given, or all, moral codes were formulated by humans.
First of all, I've long argued that humans are in some cases inherently inclined towards irrational beliefs, so anything of the sort is not surprising. ;)

Rationalism generally requires determined conscious effort - it is not the default option inside the human brain.

If one sticks to rationalism here, then I don't think that one can justify a belief in B. That assertion appears to rest upon faith alone.

I can agree with that.
In this case I was referring to the belief that a universal moral reality (Meaning B) could be self-existing. The 'existence' (if that's even the right word) of a specific moral code would require the existence of someone/thing to conceive of it.
This is confusing.

If human language/thought is necessary for ideas/concepts to have existence, then how could such ideas/concepts become self-existing? :ummm:

I think the rules of rationalism preclude 'Meaning B' from standing with 'morality as human artifice'. Humans aren't Borg.

Unless of course you are claiming some Platonic Forms type argument of dualism, which I strongly doubt you are doing here, but it sure does look like you that's what you are doing here. ;)

Btw, I might add that would be the only way I think you could base a claim of rationality with the kind of ideas you are talking about here (combining Meaning B with the assertion of human artifice). But that would open your argument to all the arguments against the Platonic Theory of Forms. :D

Michael

Sep 13th 2009, 11:43 AM

Eh, there's a difference between being universally accepted and universal, and what Kant discovered is the basis for any possible sense of morality. Hypothetical imperatives, in contrast, (split between rules of skill and councils of prudence) are practical maxims used for particular human scenarios.
I'd say that what Kant asserted was a concept that could theoretically stand as a universal. I don't believe he "discovered" a concept that had any essential existence prior to, or outside of, Kant formulating it.

I might add that it is highly debateable that anything is either categorical or imperative. :D

I reject Kant's baseline faith in God's Creation that is a necessary precondition of Kant's categorical imperative.

Remember solipsism? The only categorically necessary leap of faith is the one that is engaged to avoid solipsism. After that, all leaps of faith are not categorically necessary - they are just that, leaps of faith.

Daktoria

Sep 13th 2009, 12:17 PM

The role of God in deontology is different from that of teleology. Humans are supposed to believe in God because God represents perfect ideal goodness, and as imperfect creatures, it's impossible for us to completely encapsulate transcendental principles. It's not a matter of explaining the universe, but a matter of not becoming cynical such that amoral chaos is not abdicated to because we can't see what's beyond the horizon of our perspectives and lifetimes. Even if it's wrong, we still have to believe in it else we forsaken the ideal of justice altogether.

More or less, he's defending the rarely exercised instrument of intuition, something which is probably the most politically incorrect human characteristic around because it puts people in extremely awkward places that can be avoided through becoming a sheep that hides in the herd and makes appeals to popularity, misery, authority, force, etc. Alternatively in the case that a greater society with reputable traditions isn't around, we can hide from intuition by using psychological defense mechanisms to sweep cognitive dissonance under the rug rather than confronting it at a rational level. Empirical evidence matters, but the world doesn't matter from empirical evidence alone. If it did, then we'd be living in a materialistically determined random universe where nothing can ever be under control.

phungus420

Sep 13th 2009, 03:22 PM

Humans are supposed to believe in God because God represents perfect ideal goodness...

The Abrahamic God is extremely jealous, intolerant, insecure, chauvinisitic, and frequently engages in patricide. If we were to assume your hypothesis that "humans are supposed to believe in God because God represents perfect ideal goodness.." this would make jealousy, intolerance, insecurity, chauvinisim and patricide morally good. Since these qualities or actions in a person are considered to show weakness or evil, it seems the Abrahamic God's primary motivations and actions are antithetical to what most people would consider "good". Ergo, under your logic there is a strong argument to be made that God, at least the Abrahamic God is not the basis for a universal moral system, (assuming one exists in the first place, which I do not).

Daktoria

Sep 13th 2009, 04:24 PM

Religion is teleology, not deontology.

dilettante

Sep 13th 2009, 10:26 PM

I think 'meaning A & B' are good statements of the two most common forms of the 'opposition' here.

I think meaning A is by far the more expected and respected position of opposition (to the idea that morality is human artifice).

I think meaning B is by far the most common one in general and at this forum. It is also the most irrational and most mysterious. ;)

As for similtaneously holding meaning A and B, that's common and means nothing. If one accepts A (monotheism and Ten Commandments from God) then B naturally follows.

And since both assertions are simply assertions of faith, there's no claim of rationality being made for either one and thus, no reason the two can't be held separately or together. Humans do have an inclination to hold irrational ideas and/or beliefs sometimes.

You really think these reflect common or majority beliefs on this forum?
I'd have thought just the opposite. Just based on this thread so far, I'd say that count is 5 to 2 against (I don' know where to place Daktoria).

No, it doesn't tell us whether they developed it or got it from someone else. But it doesn't really matter which set of humans created the idea, what matters is that it was obviously some humans creating the idea, not some supernatural source.

I'm generally following with William of Oakham here on the issue of rationality - asserting that it is irrational to assume a supernatural source when an obvious human source is readily available and reasonably explicable (even if we can't always prove it with physical evidence).

I would say that dietary rules that do serve a rational purpose (don't eat uncooked pork because it may actually harm you) are rules that are highly likely to have been derived by human observation and experience since they represent a rational principle. There is no need for a supernatural source to provide that rule.

I would think the analogy would work just as well if one replaced "Kneebonians" with aliens from Pluto, inter-dimensional travelers, angelic messengers, or super-intelligent ground hogs. The point being that the utility or rationality of a principle doesn't indicate its origins.

Can you suggest a principle or belief would "need" a supernatural source? Or is that possibility foreclosed from the beginning, and hence the question answered before its even asked? I can imagine at least the possibility of circular reasoning here:

Any beneficial/useful trait/belief can be assumed to have evolved within the species/group
AND
Any trait/belief that has propagated throughout the group can be assumed on that basis to be/have-been of some benefit to it.
Ergo:
All common traits/beliefs must have originated within the species/group.

(I hasten to add that I don't raise this as an accusation, but as a potential pitfall)

If one sticks to rationalism here, then I don't think that one can justify a belief in B. That assertion appears to rest upon faith alone.

I agree completely.
However, it's worth pointing out that, if one sticks to rationalism entirely, one can't justify belief in anything.

To quote C.S. Lewis on a somewhat related point, "If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved. Similarly if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all." We can only rationally justify belief in indicative truths is we irrationally assume some basic givens. The same can be said of imperative truths.

One can either just accept 'on faith', if you will, certain indicative truths and use them to build one's knowledge of material reality, or one can simply reject all knowledge as irrational.
Similarly, one can either accept on faith some imperative truths and use them to build a moral system, or one can reject all imperatives as irrational. The former represents Belief B from above.

I hope that addresses the rest of your post. I'm not familiar enough with Platonic Forms to speak to that with any degree of intellectual comfort, so I won't try.

Daktoria

Sep 14th 2009, 01:21 AM

(I don' know where to place Daktoria).

The simple answer is "B". If you want details, send me a message. "A" is important also, but I don't bother with it given conventional assumptions (i.e. people don't live forever, the world is not one huge living connected system, life doesn't want to torture itself vainly forever over a meaningless question of self-discovery, etc). Hindus and Buddhists would probably sympathize with my perspective on A most easily. Many worlds theory, Pierre de Chardin, Max Weber, and Joseph Campbell are also significant influences on the motives (but not the structure) of my own beliefs.

Michael

Sep 14th 2009, 10:59 AM

You really think these reflect common or majority beliefs on this forum?
I'd have thought just the opposite. Just based on this thread so far, I'd say that count is 5 to 2 against (I don' know where to place Daktoria).

I know it is a majority based on my experiences in this forum. Everytime morality is discussed, I end up running round in circles shadow-boxing against the same non-argument that rejects morality as artifice (without any substantive argument beyond "I don't like it") and yet supplies no alternative to it.

You are certainly one I'd include in that majority. Donkey is certainly another. Daktoria is in that group too, though he's a newbie and hasn't beaten down this path a dozen times previously here.

I would think the analogy would work just as well if one replaced "Kneebonians" with aliens from Pluto, inter-dimensional travelers, angelic messengers, or super-intelligent ground hogs. The point being that the utility or rationality of a principle doesn't indicate its origins.
You seem to want to assert that origin is irrelevant and use this to justify the argument that origin is irrelevant.

That's fine if you want to say 'origin' is irrelevant because I think you are getting way too hung up on that non-issue. The issue of the thread is morality, not to prove the origin of morality.

I'm looking for an example of morality or moral purpose that doesn't have an obvious human-centered material/evolutionary purpose.

Can you suggest a principle or belief would "need" a supernatural source? Or is that possibility foreclosed from the beginning, and hence the question answered before its even asked?
Quite a few actually.

The whole notion of Christian religion actually - good moral behavior in return for the afterlife. That concept has no essential or obvious human-benefit. That concept could thus be human artifice, or it could originate from a supernatural source.

I expected that example on the first page of this thread.

(but it doesn't surprise me at all because as I said, opposition to the morality as artifice concept at this forum doesn't seem to come from the "Christian" perspective - it comes from some mysterious esoteric source of universality).

I can imagine at least the possibility of circular reasoning here:

Any beneficial/useful trait/belief can be assumed to have evolved within the species/group
AND
Any trait/belief that has propagated throughout the group can be assumed on that basis to be/have-been of some benefit to it.
Ergo:
All common traits/beliefs must have originated within the species/group.

(I hasten to add that I don't raise this as an accusation, but as a potential pitfall)
Sure.

I agree completely.
However, it's worth pointing out that, if one sticks to rationalism entirely, one can't justify belief in anything.
Not necessarily. I would argue, on epistemological grounds, that the original (and necessary) leap of faith in the rationality of the time-space continiuum is in fact rational.

To quote C.S. Lewis on a somewhat related point, "If nothing is self-evident, nothing can be proved. Similarly if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all." We can only rationally justify belief in indicative truths is we irrationally assume some basic givens. The same can be said of imperative truths.
I consider the concept of "truth" to be religious mumbo jumbo in the first place, and "imperative truths" are doubly so. ;)

I disagree with that quote from C.S. Lewis on so many grounds I don't know where to start. That's religious sophistry at its finest.

One can either just accept 'on faith', if you will, certain indicative truths and use them to build one's knowledge of material reality, or one can simply reject all knowledge as irrational.
Similarly, one can either accept on faith some imperative truths and use them to build a moral system, or one can reject all imperatives as irrational. The former represents Belief B from above.
It all sounds exactly the same to me - all driven by some faith in the idea of a supernatural creator of the universe who is the fountain of all morality.

I hope that addresses the rest of your post. I'm not familiar enough with Platonic Forms to speak to that with any degree of intellectual comfort, so I won't try.
Well, given that you are intelligent and a Christian, I can't recommend Plato highly enough - Christianity is often (cynically) described as Platonism for the masses. I don't disagree with this interpretation at all. Serious and intelligent Christians use Plato to defend their viewpoints or end up standing barefoot with faith alone. (Though, I can't vouch for God's opinion on Platonism!).

Daktoria

Sep 14th 2009, 11:41 AM

Daktoria is in that group too, though he's a newbie and hasn't beaten down this path a dozen times previously here.

That's not entirely true. My primary premise is that I assume it's sensible that everyone believes justice exists. If we concede that it doesn't, that's fine, but then liberalism, democracy, equality, etc. are just figments of manipulation and self-deception used to appease vanity and naivete.

For example, I've brought up Schopenhauer in the past and how he believes aesthetics are what keep people from going crazy, so it's still rational to appease romantic desires, but that doesn't make it a wise or intelligent thing to do (especially because if morality isn't a transcendental matter, then wisdom and intelligence are illusions as well).

As with the EMH discussion though, there are markets in everything, so it's possible that we continue to believe in justice only in order to avoid not liking the experience of existence. Similarly, some argue in favor of liberalism because it allows them to bear internal peace of mind or garnish a foothold on manipulating the masses (such that the masses drown while their manipulative leaders survive on top of them like a castaway on an island surrounded by neverending seas).

Rather than be as cynical as a libertine or nihilist though, I prefer to give justice the benefit of the doubt of existing and position myself on the side of deontology, goodwill, and the rest of that lot. It's possible that I'm wrong, but I do understand the circumstances required for that to be the case, and if those circumstances are reality, then I don't see how human action or experience even matter because free will must be either impossible (it can't exist) or irrelevant (it does exist but it's overcome by randomness, material or otherwise).

dilettante

Sep 14th 2009, 01:09 PM

You seem to want to assert that origin is irrelevant and use this to justify the argument that origin is irrelevant.

That's fine if you want to say 'origin' is irrelevant because I think you are getting way too hung up on that non-issue. The issue of the thread is morality, not to prove the origin of morality.

I'm looking for an example of morality or moral purpose that doesn't have an obvious human-centered material/evolutionary purpose.

Well, my intention was to assert that origin was independent of utility; that one can't assume that a group invented something merely on the basis of its utility to the group.
I brought it up because you asserted that "We have strong evidence that morality has human-origins", and seemed to base that on the utility of moral precepts to humans.

Anyway, I'd suggest that the (now very rare) Hindu belief in the sanctity of Sati (the immolation of a widow on her husband's pyre) is an example of a morality that has no obvious human-centered material/evolutionary purpose. The more bizarre laws of the Old Testament that so often get quoted would make up several other (and perhaps better) examples.

Quite a few actually.

The whole notion of Christian religion actually - good moral behavior in return for the afterlife. That concept has no essential or obvious human-benefit. That concept could thus be human artifice, or it could originate from a supernatural source.

I expected that example on the first page of this thread.

(but it doesn't surprise me at all because as I said, opposition to the morality as artifice concept at this forum doesn't seem to come from the "Christian" perspective - it comes from some mysterious esoteric source of universality).

Wait, is this answering your own question? If so, then what was the point?
I have to admit I remain somewhat confused as to what we're trying to accomplish here.
If we're trying to establish whether the origins of morality are human or otherwise, then one either accepts (religious) accounts of non-human origins of morality, assumes that no such other origins are possible and that morality must therefore be of human origin, or admits that human's moral beliefs pre-date history and thus we can't know where they came from.
If we're trying to discover moral beliefs without obvious evolutionary utility, then we seem to have done so and it appears you had examples in mind from the beginning.
If you're hoping to elicit an attempt to support a belief in morality (Meaning B) that doesn't rely, at least in the last resort, on a leap of faith then I doubt you'll find anyone here interested in that fool's errand. But surely you already knew that.

Not necessarily. I would argue, on epistemological grounds, that the original (and necessary) leap of faith in the rationality of the time-space continiuum is in fact rational.

I consider the concept of "truth" to be religious mumbo jumbo in the first place, and "imperative truths" are doubly so. ;)

I disagree with that quote from C.S. Lewis on so many grounds I don't know where to start. That's religious sophistry at its finest.

Well feel free to disregard it if it doesn't prove useful.
Anyway, the intended point was that we make a 'leap of faith' to believe in a material universe; the one required to believe in a moral universe is not dissimilar.

It all sounds exactly the same to me - all driven by some faith in the idea of a supernatural creator of the universe who is the fountain of all morality.

Actually, I hold the belief in a supernatural creator to be quite distinct from the belief in a moral reality. The former is essentially indicative ("God created the universe") and as such doesn't logically lead to any imperatives.
One could certainly imagine a potentially amoral creator-God that provided mankind with no moral law (an unmoved mover of sorts), or an atheist who firmly believed that some things were really right and others really wrong.

Donkey

Sep 14th 2009, 02:33 PM

Wait... which majority am I placed in?

dilettante

Sep 14th 2009, 07:09 PM

Wait... which majority am I placed in?

I'm kind of curious about that too. Truly you are an enigma... :)

Michael

Sep 18th 2009, 08:44 PM

That's not entirely true. My primary premise is that I assume it's sensible that everyone believes justice exists. If we concede that it doesn't, that's fine, but then liberalism, democracy, equality, etc. are just figments of manipulation and self-deception used to appease vanity and naivete.

For example, I've brought up Schopenhauer in the past and how he believes aesthetics are what keep people from going crazy, so it's still rational to appease romantic desires, but that doesn't make it a wise or intelligent thing to do (especially because if morality isn't a transcendental matter, then wisdom and intelligence are illusions as well).

As with the EMH discussion though, there are markets in everything, so it's possible that we continue to believe in justice only in order to avoid not liking the experience of existence. Similarly, some argue in favor of liberalism because it allows them to bear internal peace of mind or garnish a foothold on manipulating the masses (such that the masses drown while their manipulative leaders survive on top of them like a castaway on an island surrounded by neverending seas).

Rather than be as cynical as a libertine or nihilist though, I prefer to give justice the benefit of the doubt of existing and position myself on the side of deontology, goodwill, and the rest of that lot. It's possible that I'm wrong, but I do understand the circumstances required for that to be the case, and if those circumstances are reality, then I don't see how human action or experience even matter because free will must be either impossible (it can't exist) or irrelevant (it does exist but it's overcome by randomness, material or otherwise).
You are essentially saying that since justice ought to exist, we all ought to pretend that it exists.

That's very nice and a darn good idea. Unfortunately, I'm a cynical realist and I just can't accept that kind of rationale.

I don't have a problem with the fact that justice is a bit messy sometimes. That's okay - we're humans and not perfect machines. As such, I always perceive the desire for perfect justice to be an authoritarian mirage. And that road has already been proven to be very dangerous indeed.

Relativism may potentially be dangerous in the long run, but that is essentially just a theoretical construct. Utopianism, authoritarianism and/or absolutism all have a long and well documented history of human misery behind them.

Michael

Sep 18th 2009, 09:20 PM

Well, my intention was to assert that origin was independent of utility; that one can't assume that a group invented something merely on the basis of its utility to the group.
I brought it up because you asserted that "We have strong evidence that morality has human-origins", and seemed to base that on the utility of moral precepts to humans.
I think that it is relevant to draw a distinction between those things that we can rationally deduce from our known evolutionary past and those things that we cannot.

If there is a non-human source for morality, then some fragment should show up in the category noted above - those things that we can't rationally deduce from our known evolutionary past.

And yes, I'm using the term "known" in the common or popular sense of the term. ;)

Anyway, I'd suggest that the (now very rare) Hindu belief in the sanctity of Sati (the immolation of a widow on her husband's pyre) is an example of a morality that has no obvious human-centered material/evolutionary purpose. The more bizarre laws of the Old Testament that so often get quoted would make up several other (and perhaps better) examples.
I'm not so sure about the example of the burning widow. That does serve a very material point about the social status of the man.

I think Christianity alone supplies plenty enough examples of moral precepts that fail the 'human-evolution' argument. I'm sure Christianity isn't unique here - I'm certain that Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism all provide some examples.

Wait, is this answering your own question? If so, then what was the point? I have to admit I remain somewhat confused as to what we're trying to accomplish here.
If we're trying to establish whether the origins of morality are human or otherwise, then one either accepts (religious) accounts of non-human origins of morality, assumes that no such other origins are possible and that morality must therefore be of human origin, or admits that human's moral beliefs pre-date history and thus we can't know where they came from.
If we're trying to discover moral beliefs without obvious evolutionary utility, then we seem to have done so and it appears you had examples in mind from the beginning.
If you're hoping to elicit an attempt to support a belief in morality (Meaning B) that doesn't rely, at least in the last resort, on a leap of faith then I doubt you'll find anyone here interested in that fool's errand. But surely you already knew that.
I think we're getting somewhere. ;)

I'm just trying to put this mysterious non-human morality theory into proper perspective.

As you noted, either one believes in rational theories about the human source and evolution of human morality, or one may alternatively believe in some faith-based religious origin for human morality.

I think the choice is obvious. I'm curious where people stand on this since so many people seem to hold to the faith-based religious origin argument but don't seem to want to admit that. They seem to want to give that theory a rational pass (hold it on faith alone) and then turn around and assume that human-derived morality is not true on the basis of rational doubt.

Essentially, I guess I'm just fishing around for arguments that will undercut the endless doubt arguments raised everytime I address the morality is human artifice issue. :shrug:

Well feel free to disregard it if it doesn't prove useful.
Anyway, the intended point was that we make a 'leap of faith' to believe in a material universe; the one required to believe in a moral universe is not dissimilar.
No, it is not dissimilar, but it is entirely superfluous. Why make it? There is no demonstrable need to make that leap of faith - quite unlike the necessity of the original leap of faith in the material universe (ie. the rationality of the time-space continuum). One is necessary, the other is not. That's a notable distinction.

I suppose it is relevant to note that one could say that the rational assumption of the time-space continuum is not necessary if one instead places one's entire faith in God, but on that account, one can't subsequently make any argument based on rationality if one rejects it in the first instance.

Actually, I hold the belief in a supernatural creator to be quite distinct from the belief in a moral reality. The former is essentially indicative ("God created the universe") and as such doesn't logically lead to any imperatives.
One could certainly imagine a potentially amoral creator-God that provided mankind with no moral law (an unmoved mover of sorts), or an atheist who firmly believed that some things were really right and others really wrong.
Actually, it is those absolutist-atheists whom I'd consider to be the most dangerous on every account.

The deists are always vague or wishy-washy on every issue, always trying to keep both sides happy, so that I've never had much faith in that approach. It always seems too convenient. I get suspicious of convenient answers. ;)

So are we now able to put dilettante into the "morality is human artifice" camp or is he going to remain in the "I want it both ways" camp (where one side is subjected to endless rational doubt and the other side is entirely exempt from any need of doubt)?

Michael

Sep 18th 2009, 09:28 PM

Wait... which majority am I placed in?
I'd put you in with dilettante (the vague and wishy-washy deists who want to have it both ways - taking some idea of God on faith, but trying to use rational doubt to justify rejecting the idea that morality is human artifice). ;)

Donkey

Sep 18th 2009, 10:19 PM

I'd put you in with dilettante (the vague and wishy-washy deists who want to have it both ways - taking some idea of God on faith, but trying to use rational doubt to justify rejecting the idea that morality is human artifice). ;)
Mon dieu! you do me wrong sir! ;)

I am quite an atheist, so I take the lack of God on faith. I also believe that morality is a human artifice, in that, it doesn't exist without humanity.

My earlier posts (after my first one) are just an exploration of the origins of our morality. It's not like two homo sapiens were sitting around and said "Oh hey! let's make up something called morality!"

Many of the behaviours adhering to our moral existed prior to humanity, we just don't call it morality.

Daktoria

Sep 19th 2009, 11:28 AM

You are essentially saying that since justice ought to exist, we all ought to pretend that it exists.

That's very nice and a darn good idea. Unfortunately, I'm a cynical realist and I just can't accept that kind of rationale.

I don't have a problem with the fact that justice is a bit messy sometimes. That's okay - we're humans and not perfect machines. As such, I always perceive the desire for perfect justice to be an authoritarian mirage. And that road has already been proven to be very dangerous indeed.

Relativism may potentially be dangerous in the long run, but that is essentially just a theoretical construct. Utopianism, authoritarianism and/or absolutism all have a long and well documented history of human misery behind them.

Liberalism and realpolitik are incompatible though. :-\

I mean you could use liberalism as a method for pursuing realpolitik, but then... :eek:

Michael

Sep 19th 2009, 12:11 PM

Liberalism and realpolitik are incompatible though. :-\

I mean you could use liberalism as a method for pursuing realpolitik, but then... :eek:
I don't see any problem with pragmatic liberalism. I'm not one for ideological conformity for the sake of ideological conformity.

Realpolitique and liberalism are only incompatible if one is a hard-core/fanatic liberal ideologue.

Daktoria

Sep 19th 2009, 12:36 PM

Pragmatism isn't an ideology in itself? What about moderation? Isn't that an ideal as well?

It's not about conformity, but about purpose. Whether liberalism or realism is believed in, it's because a higher cognitive goal is at stake, the problem with pragmatism being how it dilutes these goals for the sake of survival, but what good is survival if it doesn't have a purpose; are we working to live or living to work?

Perhaps you should familiarize yourself with this?: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_school_of_international_relations_theory

Donkey

Sep 19th 2009, 01:40 PM

I wouldn't say that pragmatism is an ideology. I would say that it is an approach.

Michael

Sep 19th 2009, 08:30 PM

Mon dieu! you do me wrong sir! ;)

I am quite an atheist, so I take the lack of God on faith. I also believe that morality is a human artifice, in that, it doesn't exist without humanity.

My earlier posts (after my first one) are just an exploration of the origins of our morality. It's not like two homo sapiens were sitting around and said "Oh hey! let's make up something called morality!"

Many of the behaviours adhering to our moral existed prior to humanity, we just don't call it morality.
One down... few more to go. :D

And I don't mind apologizing for being wrong on this account. ;)

Michael

Sep 19th 2009, 08:31 PM

I wouldn't say that pragmatism is an ideology. I would say that it is an approach.

Indeed, I would say the same, though some have indeed asserted a particular ideology called pragmatism (and also pragmaticism), I still think it is just an approach.

Daktoria

Sep 19th 2009, 10:52 PM

A practice of practicality is circular though. There's no bottomline.

Donkey

Sep 19th 2009, 11:43 PM

A practice of practicality is circular though. There's no bottomline.
Pragmatism isn't the practice of practicality though. It's a practical approach to something.

I, for example, would consider myself a pragmatic (small d) democrat.

Michael

Sep 20th 2009, 11:01 AM

A practice of practicality is circular though. There's no bottomline.

I think not. The practice of 'pragmatism' is similar to the practice of 'extremism' or 'fanaticism' - it is characteristic of an approach that is independent of any given content.

One can be a pragmatic Marxist or a Marxist extremist or fanaticial Marxist.

Ideological purity may be all well and fine for ideological purists, but for most people, life isn't all that black and white. Some people are just wishy-washy in their commitments.

Daktoria

Sep 20th 2009, 11:55 AM

OK, but what does it mean to be practical in a categorical sense? For example, pragmatism in deontology means to always treat humanity as an end unto itself and never as the means to an end.

Extremism is the practice of going to extremes.

Fanaticism is the practice of being fanatic.

Calling pragmatism the approach of being pragmatic though doesn't make sense because being pragmatic requires having an approach already. It might as well be, "Get real," but what does that mean? Sure, it has valuable usage that reminds people to focus on existence, but ideologically speaking, it doesn't assign value to why existence matters and confuses physical emotion with intuition in the process.

Michael

Sep 20th 2009, 12:08 PM

OK, but what does it mean to be practical in a categorical sense? For example, pragmatism in deontology means to always treat humanity as an end unto itself and never as the means to an end.

If the rule is "always" then that's not pragmatism.

Pragmatism in deontology means to try to always treat humanity as an end unto itself - but don't do it if circumstances suggest that it would be stupid in that particular case.

Extremism is the practice of going to extremes.

Fanaticism is the practice of being fanatic.

Calling pragmatism the approach of being pragmatic though doesn't make sense because being pragmatic requires having an approach already. It might as well be, "Get real," but what does that mean? Sure, it has valuable usage that reminds people to focus on existence, but ideologically speaking, it doesn't assign value to why existence matters and confuses physical emotion with intuition in the process.
One can be pragmatic about anything.

I'm pragmatic about oatmeal cookies - I love them but if I eat too many I may get fat, so I'm pragmatic and only eat oatmeal cookies in moderation (despite the fact that I'd love to gorge myself on oatmeal cookies).

Daktoria

Sep 20th 2009, 12:19 PM

If the rule is "always" then that's not pragmatism.

Pragmatism in deontology means to try to always treat humanity as an end unto itself - but don't do it if circumstances suggest that it would be stupid in that particular case.

The practical imperative is dead on explicit about this. It's not about attempts because we never have all possible information, and even self-preservation can be subordinated if the dilemma is dangerous enough such that self-preservation is no longer valuable if something else is lost (i.e. martyrs, crusaders, berserkers, etc).

One can be pragmatic about anything.

I'm pragmatic about oatmeal cookies - I love them but if I eat too many I may get fat, so I'm pragmatic and only eat oatmeal cookies in moderation (despite the fact that I'd love to gorge myself on oatmeal cookies).

Ergo, pragmatism and moderation are about maintaining efficient physique? This still begs the question about why efficient physique matters (although there are some good moral reasons for it).

Donkey

Sep 20th 2009, 02:22 PM

OK, but what does it mean to be practical in a categorical sense? For example, pragmatism in deontology means to always treat humanity as an end unto itself and never as the means to an end.

Extremism is the practice of going to extremes.

Fanaticism is the practice of being fanatic.

Calling pragmatism the approach of being pragmatic though doesn't make sense because being pragmatic requires having an approach already. It might as well be, "Get real," but what does that mean? Sure, it has valuable usage that reminds people to focus on existence, but ideologically speaking, it doesn't assign value to why existence matters and confuses physical emotion with intuition in the process.
Pragmatism doesn't require an approach, it requires an end.

Daktoria

Sep 20th 2009, 02:58 PM

Should have included kamikazes in that list of self-sacrificers.

dilettante

Sep 21st 2009, 10:05 PM

My apologies for the delay here; I seem to have bitten off rather more than I can chew in commitments of late. :o

I think that it is relevant to draw a distinction between those things that we can rationally deduce from our known evolutionary past and those things that we cannot.

If there is a non-human source for morality, then some fragment should show up in the category noted above - those things that we can't rationally deduce from our known evolutionary past.

And yes, I'm using the term "known" in the common or popular sense of the term. ;)

I continue to hold that simply because something could have arisen as a result of evolution, it does not rationally follow that it did so.
Further, I've long suspect that if one tries hard enough one can think up a possible evolutionary advantage for all but the most extreme traits or beliefs (case-in-point, you found a possible advantage in burning the living widows of the deceased; yet one can certainly conceive of how NOT burning living widows could also be potentially advantageous).
And, as I mentioned wrt to possibly circular arguments before, evolutionary theory encourages one to assume that any trait which has propagated widely through a species must therefore offer some advantage.

All that to say, I find the requirement of "it must be a morality such that I can't think of any possible advantage from it" to be a standard both irrelevant and impossible for almost anything to meet.

I think we're getting somewhere. ;)

I'm just trying to put this mysterious non-human morality theory into proper perspective.

As you noted, either one believes in rational theories about the human source and evolution of human morality, or one may alternatively believe in some faith-based religious origin for human morality.

I think the choice is obvious. I'm curious where people stand on this since so many people seem to hold to the faith-based religious origin argument but don't seem to want to admit that. They seem to want to give that theory a rational pass (hold it on faith alone) and then turn around and assume that human-derived morality is not true on the basis of rational doubt.

Essentially, I guess I'm just fishing around for arguments that will undercut the endless doubt arguments raised everytime I address the morality is human artifice issue. :shrug:

I'm not aware of anyone here who who holds to a non-human origin for any morality without employing some degree of faith in doing so. And as best I can tell, your 'human artifice' camp is decidedly in the majority here.

No, it is not dissimilar, but it is entirely superfluous. Why make it? There is no demonstrable need to make that leap of faith - quite unlike the necessity of the original leap of faith in the material universe (ie. the rationality of the time-space continuum). One is necessary, the other is not. That's a notable distinction.

Could you give me a brief blurb on why the "leap of faith in the material universe" is necessary? (I don't want to presume here)

I find the term "necessary" itself interesting in two ways:
First, nothing is just "necessary", it is necessary for something else. E.G. "blueberries are necessary for making blueberry muffins"; "X is necessary for Y."
Second, as such, statements of necessity are essentially indicative; they state facts but do not command any action. No amount of stringing together "X is necessary for Y which is necessary for Z which is...etc" will ever logically get to "X should happen."

The only way to turn a statement of necessity into an imperative statement is if another imperative statement is already accepted:
("X is necessary for Y" = "X should happen") IFF ("Y should happen")

So are we now able to put dilettante into the "morality is human artifice" camp...

Me personally? Oh, heavens no. On this question I'm certainly in what I strongly suspect to be the minority camp in this forum. I operate under both beliefs A and B from before. :)

or is he going to remain in the "I want it both ways" camp (where one side is subjected to endless rational doubt and the other side is entirely exempt from any need of doubt)?

Surely you agree that anything that claims a basis of rationality should be subject to rational doubt? I'm not quite certain what 'the other side' entails here, but in my experience everything is at times subject to doubts, both rational and otherwise.

SMadsen

Sep 22nd 2009, 10:34 AM

Mon dieu! you do me wrong sir! ;)

I am quite an atheist, so I take the lack of God on faith. I also believe that morality is a human artifice, in that, it doesn't exist without humanity.

My earlier posts (after my first one) are just an exploration of the origins of our morality. It's not like two homo sapiens were sitting around and said "Oh hey! let's make up something called morality!"

Many of the behaviours adhering to our moral existed prior to humanity, we just don't call it morality.
Excellently put.

I have nothing to add, really, but just wanted to see it repeated in a highlighted state :)

dilettante

Sep 30th 2009, 10:50 AM

:::bump:::
:)

Michael

Oct 1st 2009, 10:06 PM

My apologies for the delay here; I seem to have bitten off rather more than I can chew in commitments of late. :o
No apologies necessary, good discussions are timeless. :)

I continue to hold that simply because something could have arisen as a result of evolution, it does not rationally follow that it did so.
That is certainly true. If your position here is purely rational skepticism, then I will certainly agree.

Further, I've long suspect that if one tries hard enough one can think up a possible evolutionary advantage for all but the most extreme traits or beliefs (case-in-point, you found a possible advantage in burning the living widows of the deceased; yet one can certainly conceive of how NOT burning living widows could also be potentially advantageous).
With respect to the ritual burning of widows on their husband's pyre, I only suggested a social advantage that may accrue from that social custom.

I can't really see any direct evolutionary advantage there in terms of human propagation other than the indirect 'familial status' one (which admittedly is a generally strong one in most cultures).

And, as I mentioned wrt to possibly circular arguments before, evolutionary theory encourages one to assume that any trait which has propagated widely through a species must therefore offer some advantage.
Yes, again, that's a very good point.

Though, proper skepticism still holds that one cannot truly 'believe it to be so' unless one can rationally identify a significant and obvious evolutionary advantage for it and offer relevant evidence of similarity from nature or human physiology as illustration or support for it. Without that kind of rationale, it cannot be said to be rationally justified.

All that to say, I find the requirement of "it must be a morality such that I can't think of any possible advantage from it" to be a standard both irrelevant and impossible for almost anything to meet.
I don't think it is sufficient to just think of some possible advantage. I think one ought to demonstrate a more substantive basis than that. My reply in the paragraph above seems reasonable. :shrug:

I'm not aware of anyone here who who holds to a non-human origin for any morality without employing some degree of faith in doing so. And as best I can tell, your 'human artifice' camp is decidedly in the majority here.
Well, perhaps I'm just trying to smoke out which ones are which. :sneaky:

And I'm also looking for new perspectives on this old debate. :shrug:

Could you give me a brief blurb on why the "leap of faith in the material universe" is necessary? (I don't want to presume here)
Short answer: it is necessary in order to resolve the solipsism 'problem' and also establishes ground (or measure) for rational thought.

Without a "leap of faith in the material universe", one would be stuck with the position of not knowing if anything except yourself exists at all (the universe might be an elaborate dream or illusion). The only alternative at this point could be faith in some supernatural God-like being to provide meaning to your existence.

Ergo, for rational thought to have meaning, faith in the material universe being 'real' is a necessary leap of faith.

Faith in God can work, but then you still need to make the other 'leap of faith' in the material universe anyways or you might fall off a cliff expecting your faith to prevent your fall (and that doesn't bode well for your safety).

I find the term "necessary" itself interesting in two ways:
First, nothing is just "necessary", it is necessary for something else. E.G. "blueberries are necessary for making blueberry muffins"; "X is necessary for Y."
Second, as such, statements of necessity are essentially indicative; they state facts but do not command any action. No amount of stringing together "X is necessary for Y which is necessary for Z which is...etc" will ever logically get to "X should happen."

The only way to turn a statement of necessity into an imperative statement is if another imperative statement is already accepted:
("X is necessary for Y" = "X should happen") IFF ("Y should happen")

As I noted above, the necessity I'm pointing at here originates with "I think, therefore I am". One cannot go back any further than that.

Me personally? Oh, heavens no. On this question I'm certainly in what I strongly suspect to be the minority camp in this forum. I operate under both beliefs A and B from before. :)
I can understand type A. I can't fathom type B. :shrug:

Type B just seems so self-centered and self-serving that I'm suspicious of it.

Surely you agree that anything that claims a basis of rationality should be subject to rational doubt? I'm not quite certain what 'the other side' entails here, but in my experience everything is at times subject to doubts, both rational and otherwise.

Yes, absolutely everything is subject to rational doubt. I can't imagine otherwise. That being said, rational doubt about everything can be used to stop anything. But more specifically, if rational doubt about everything is valid, then that same rational doubt must apply to faith in God.

I have no objection to that, I just find it an odd argument from a deist since to introduce it completely wipes out your own ground. God can withstand anything save radical doubt. :shrug:

dilettante

Oct 2nd 2009, 06:27 PM

Short answer: it is necessary in order to resolve the solipsism 'problem' and also establishes ground (or measure) for rational thought.

Without a "leap of faith in the material universe", one would be stuck with the position of not knowing if anything except yourself exists at all (the universe might be an elaborate dream or illusion). The only alternative at this point could be faith in some supernatural God-like being to provide meaning to your existence.

Ergo, for rational thought to have meaning, faith in the material universe being 'real' is a necessary leap of faith.

Faith in God can work, but then you still need to make the other 'leap of faith' in the material universe anyways or you might fall off a cliff expecting your faith to prevent your fall (and that doesn't bode well for your safety).

...

As I noted above, the necessity I'm pointing at here originates with "I think, therefore I am". One cannot go back any further than that.

So this 'leap of faith' is 'necessary' in order to believe that anything outside oneself exists. But so what? Mightn't one ask 'why is it necessary to believe that anything else exists?' I don't think there's any logical way to derive a necessity without some underlying system of objective value.

In practice, I think 99.9% of the population simply makes the 'leap of faith' necessary to believe in the material universe because they can't help it; it would take sustained, focused, mental effort not to believe in it.

And in the end I think my belief in a moral reality comes in the same way. I find that I can't, without sustained mental effort, believe in a universe with no objective values, i.e. a moral reality. The notion that (for example) 'love is not actually better than hatred, but just different' is one I find that I will reject the moment I do not consciously try to maintain it. I find statements of value, conceptions of how things should be, utterly inescapable.

I wouldn't presume to tell any individual what they believe, but I strongly suspect that the vast majority of humanity, 99.9% of the time, believes in both a physical and moral reality and that they do so because they cannot help it.
Of course they differ endlessly on what those realities entail, and on the best ways of understanding them...

I can understand type A. I can't fathom type B. :shrug:

Type B just seems so self-centered and self-serving that I'm suspicious of it.

How so?

Yes, absolutely everything is subject to rational doubt. I can't imagine otherwise. That being said, rational doubt about everything can be used to stop anything. But more specifically, if rational doubt about everything is valid, then that same rational doubt must apply to faith in God.

I don't think I understand this. If nothing else, this thread goes to show that it's possible to doubt anything, from God to external reality itself.

Michael

Oct 4th 2009, 11:51 AM

So this 'leap of faith' is 'necessary' in order to believe that anything outside oneself exists. But so what? Mightn't one ask 'why is it necessary to believe that anything else exists?' I don't think there's any logical way to derive a necessity without some underlying system of objective value.
As I noted in my explanation, the alternative is solipsism. The objective value is rationality. If you want to be rational, you must take a 'leap of faith' in the physical universe (time-space continuum).

If rationalism isn't of interest to you, you can reject it if you like. That's your subjective perogative. :shrug:

In practice, I think 99.9% of the population simply makes the 'leap of faith' necessary to believe in the material universe because they can't help it; it would take sustained, focused, mental effort not to believe in it.
Yes, this is probably true. Same goes for God/religion. Believing in God/religion appears to be the 'default' position for most humans. It takes a sustained and focused effort (reason) to reject it.

And in the end I think my belief in a moral reality comes in the same way. I find that I can't, without sustained mental effort, believe in a universe with no objective values, i.e. a moral reality. The notion that (for example) 'love is not actually better than hatred, but just different' is one I find that I will reject the moment I do not consciously try to maintain it. I find statements of value, conceptions of how things should be, utterly inescapable.
Love is identical to hate. Just flipsides of the same emotional coin. :shrug:

Imbuing one with supernatural power and not the either seems odd to me.

I wouldn't presume to tell any individual what they believe, but I strongly suspect that the vast majority of humanity, 99.9% of the time, believes in both a physical and moral reality and that they do so because they cannot help it.
Of course they differ endlessly on what those realities entail, and on the best ways of understanding them...
Yes, humans in general tend to be ignorant, trusting, unimaginative and rarely question the meaning of anything they are taught.

As the saying goes, 'the people are sheep'... :shrug:

How so?
To presume that your own subjective bias (or the moral code you learned as a child) is universal to all strikes me as arrogant and self-centered by definition.

I don't think I understand this. If nothing else, this thread goes to show that it's possible to doubt anything, from God to external reality itself.
It was a backhand shot at your argument. ;)

The argument of doubt that you raised to attack my assertion is far more deadly to the ground you stand on. If we accept your argument to use radical doubt to reject the supposition, your God goes out the window.

Like I said, I'm okay with that argument. I don't think you should be. :shrug:

dilettante

Oct 5th 2009, 12:11 PM

As I noted in my explanation, the alternative is solipsism. The objective value is rationality. If you want to be rational, you must take a 'leap of faith' in the physical universe (time-space continuum).

If rationalism isn't of interest to you, you can reject it if you like. That's your subjective perogative. :shrug:

This seems to boil down to "if you want to believe in a physical universe, you must believe in a physical universe," which I can certainly agree with. And since I do want to believe in a physical universe and, more importantly, since I can't help anyway, I do hold such a belief. But in no sense can I logically justify such a belief unless I begin with a foundational imperative premise stating that I should believe it (which may be what you meant by "the objective value is rationality").
If such a belief is a prerequisite to rationality, then the choice to believe cannot, itself, be rational.

Yes, this is probably true. Same goes for God/religion. Believing in God/religion appears to be the 'default' position for most humans. It takes a sustained and focused effort (reason) to reject it.

It does seem to be the case that humans 'default' to believing in the natural world, the super-natural world, and a moral reality (though the concept of breaking things down into those three categories may be a fairly recent development). In each case, it requires sustained mental effort to reject the default belief.

Love is identical to hate. Just flipsides of the same emotional coin. :shrug:

Imbuing one with supernatural power and not the either seems odd to me.

I'm not sure what "supernatural power" refers to here or which of my comments it relates to.

And I don't find it at all odd to accept a distinction in value, to recognize that there are somethings which are quite horrific, which should not be, and others which are inherently superior, which should be. Also everyone makes these distinctions constantly. In fact, anyone who steadfastly refused to do so would almost certainly be considered "odd". In the end, judgment of anything falls apart without some objective value system lying at the heart of it.

Originally Posted by dilettante
I wouldn't presume to tell any individual what they believe, but I strongly suspect that the vast majority of humanity, 99.9% of the time, believes in both a physical and moral reality and that they do so because they cannot help it.
Of course they differ endlessly on what those realities entail, and on the best ways of understanding them...
Yes, humans in general tend to be ignorant, trusting, unimaginative and rarely question the meaning of anything they are taught.

As the saying goes, 'the people are sheep'... :shrug:

I don't necessarily disagree with that characterization, but I'd point out that, at the moment, we aren't talking about what people are taught, we're talking about what people believe by "default", as you put it.

To presume that your own subjective bias (or the moral code you learned as a child) is universal to all strikes me as arrogant and self-centered by definition.

Here again, there's an important distinction between a specific moral code which one is taught and a belief in some sort of moral reality which is the 'default'.

And I'd note that the implication that one should not be arrogant and self-centered, and that pointing out the self-centeredness and arrogance of a position is therefore an argument against it, relies on a moral basis.

Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".

It was a backhand shot at your argument. ;)

The argument of doubt that you raised to attack my assertion is far more deadly to the ground you stand on. If we accept your argument to use radical doubt to reject the supposition, your God goes out the window.

Like I said, I'm okay with that argument. I don't think you should be. :shrug:

Ah. I merely meant to suggest that anything that claims to be founded wholly on rational argument is therefore wholly vulnerable to rational doubt. Not all beliefs are so founded.

But here it seems to me that God isn't necessarily part of the discussion.

Michael

Oct 18th 2009, 12:10 PM

This seems to boil down to "if you want to believe in a physical universe, you must believe in a physical universe," which I can certainly agree with.
Not quite. The correct statement would be... "if you want to use rationalism, you must first believe in the physical universe".

Slight difference, but I think a very important one. If rationalism is a goal, belief in the material universe is a necesary precondition.

I honestly don't care if you don't want to believe in a physical universe - it matters not to me. Similarly, you can reject rationalism as a goal here too. In both cases, you don't have to believe in a physical universe if you don't want to. But you can't make any claim of rationalism at all if you do so.

And since I do want to believe in a physical universe and, more importantly, since I can't help anyway, I do hold such a belief. But in no sense can I logically justify such a belief unless I begin with a foundational imperative premise stating that I should believe it (which may be what you meant by "the objective value is rationality").
If such a belief is a prerequisite to rationality, then the choice to believe cannot, itself, be rational.
This is what I stated above. Belief in the material universe is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for rationalism.

In such terms, 'rationalism as goal' is understood to be the reason or justification for holding the belief. Indeed it is true that one cannot invoke rationalism as the cause or origin of the belief, but it can be understood as a subjective justification for it.

This is what I meant when I (earlier) referred to "reasoned or rational faith" being slightly different from "faith alone". Some articles of faith are held for specifically rational reasons, while some articles of faith are not.

It does seem to be the case that humans 'default' to believing in the natural world, the super-natural world, and a moral reality (though the concept of breaking things down into those three categories may be a fairly recent development). In each case, it requires sustained mental effort to reject the default belief.
I don't agree with this at all.

I think all of those things were served up to you with your mother's milk and thus are very much culturally created.

The intimate and complete cultural immersion of parental society upon the newborn baby would be essentially impossible to reject or overcome - except without sustained mental effort - no matter what the content of that culture is. The very language of your most private thoughts is a language embedded within the context of a social-culture-belief system. You cannot escape the social effect unless you as a newborn were raised by wolves in the wild. And if that happens, you will not be human at all other than in physical form.

I'm not sure what "supernatural power" refers to here or which of my comments it relates to.
You said...
And in the end I think my belief in a moral reality comes in the same way. I find that I can't, without sustained mental effort, believe in a universe with no objective values, i.e. a moral reality. The notion that (for example) 'love is not actually better than hatred, but just different' is one I find that I will reject the moment I do not consciously try to maintain it. I find statements of value, conceptions of how things should be, utterly inescapable.
I noted that you were rejecting a theory just because you wanted to reject that theory. I can only assume that this is either pure subjective whim or due to some supernatural cause, since rational reasoning is not available to otherwise explain it.

In normative rational analysis (and/or brain chemistry arguments), love and hate are indeed very similar and highly related things.

And I don't find it at all odd to accept a distinction in value, to recognize that there are somethings which are quite horrific, which should not be, and others which are inherently superior, which should be. Also everyone makes these distinctions constantly. In fact, anyone who steadfastly refused to do so would almost certainly be considered "odd". In the end, judgment of anything falls apart without some objective value system lying at the heart of it.
Now we are getting somewhere! :D

You don't find it odd to do that because your whole socio-cultural training has been focused upon training you to do exactly that! And yes, people do tend to make these distinctions. I'd be quite surprised if they didn't, given all the socio-cultural training they've been immersed in since the day they were born. :shrug:

And yes, anyone who doesn't go along with socio-cultural 'norms' is always defined as "odd". That's one of the most potent social weapons for enforcing conformity!

As for the last bolded part of your quote, that's the key here I think. :)

I assert that it is our human need/want/desire for objective morality to exist that drives the creation/assertion of the reality of objective morality. Nothing more, nothing less. Humans are indeed a very creative species. But our need/want/desire for objective certainty doesn't make objective morality a reality.

So yes, I agree that making judgements and distinctions without having an objective basis for knowledge is really difficult and quite annoying to our human sensibilities. But I don't agree that we ought to pretend that some particular assertions ought be treated as if they were "objective knowledge" and use that as a basis for making moral rules claiming objective/scientific certainty.

The solution to a challenging or difficult problem is not to pretend it doesn't exist. All claims of objective knowledge are problematic. Ignoring the problems due to strong human need/want/desire is not a rationally viable solution.

I don't necessarily disagree with that characterization, but I'd point out that, at the moment, we aren't talking about what people are taught, we're talking about what people believe by "default", as you put it.

Because humans are social animals, 'what we are taught' and 'what be believe by default' are one and the same. They are supplied along with your mother's milk and your mother's tongue.

Here again, there's an important distinction between a specific moral code which one is taught and a belief in some sort of moral reality which is the 'default'.
I don't see much of a difference between the two here unless you are appealing to God or bio-genetics. :shrug:

Please define the 'mechanism of transmission' that you believe conveys this 'default' morality if it is not entirely a product of your mother's milk.

And I'd note that the implication that one should not be arrogant and self-centered, and that pointing out the self-centeredness and arrogance of a position is therefore an argument against it, relies on a moral basis.
No it doesn't. It is a rationally based observation.

To assume that one's own 'default' morality is, or ought to be, universal is the very definition of 'self-centeredness'. To act upon this assumption would be 'arrogant' by definition.

I'm not making any moral argument here. I'm observing the essential nature and the character of the statements themselves, independent of the subject. Indeed, it is you that is imbuing my analysis with a moral interpretation and thus characterizing it as an accusation upon your own subjectivity. That is essentially a projection of your universal/default moral argument being used to define my statement. :shrug:

You are quite free to be as self-centered or as arrogant as you want to be. Being the relativist that I am, I find those qualities are sometimes good and sometimes bad, depending upon the context. I don't believe that either one of them is an inherently good or bad thing.

Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".
I believe that the foundational belief of most religions and human-driven moral codes. Ultimately, I consider this to be an authoritarian-driven conceit.

Btw, I might add that it is pure 'capitalist ideology' to assert that 'selfishness is a virtue'. This lies at the core of Ayn Rand's thought as well as being the foundational principle of the 'protestant work ethic' theory espoused by Max Weber.

Ah. I merely meant to suggest that anything that claims to be founded wholly on rational argument is therefore wholly vulnerable to rational doubt. Not all beliefs are so founded.
All beliefs are vulnerable to rational doubt.

And all knowledge is predicated upon the foundational 'leap of faith' in the material universe.

But here it seems to me that God isn't necessarily part of the discussion.
God is always part of any discussion if people make arguments that are only possible because of the invisible hand of God, even if those people deny the invisible hand of God is their motive.

That is to say, you speak of 'default' or some mysteriously 'innate' morality yet do not offer any mechanism for it to exist. The only rational conclusion for your argument is God, and although you keep denying that conclusion, you offer no reasonable alternative to that implied conclusion. :shrug:

SMadsen

Oct 19th 2009, 07:22 AM

God is always part of any discussion if people make arguments that are only possible because of the invisible hand of God, even if those people deny the invisible hand of God is their motive.
I agree with this ...

That is to say, you speak of 'default' or some mysteriously 'innate' morality yet do not offer any mechanism for it to exist. The only rational conclusion for your argument is God, and although you keep denying that conclusion, you offer no reasonable alternative to that implied conclusion. :shrug:
.. but I do not agree with this. It matters not if Dilettante does not offer a mechanism for something to exist; no naturally occurring phenomenon has the invisible hand of God as the only possibility regardless of anyones capability to explain even a single possibility of its existence.

Regardless if we don't exactly know what the asserted innateness in question consists of, and regardless if we didn't even have the language to express the concept of innateness, it is not an impossibility that it is a perfectly natural phenomenon.

Michael

Oct 19th 2009, 09:42 PM

.. but I do not agree with this. It matters not if Dilettante does not offer a mechanism for something to exist; no naturally occurring phenomenon has the invisible hand of God as the only possibility regardless of anyones capability to explain even a single possibility of its existence.
I agree but only if the point is considered in the abstract. In pure logical terms, you are correct that inability or capability of anyone's explanation is no actual limitation upon an idea.

In context, my point was used to illustrate dilettante's failure to supply any example that is not suspiciously religious. I consider that point to be highly relevant to the discussion.

Regardless if we don't exactly know what the asserted innateness in question consists of, and regardless if we didn't even have the language to express the concept of innateness, it is not an impossibility that it is a perfectly natural phenomenon.

Random-mutation is a possible source for human behavior - particularly if we accept evolutionary theory.

That's possible - but not particularly useful for analysis. :shrug:

SMadsen

Oct 20th 2009, 08:09 AM

Random-mutation is a possible source for human behavior - particularly if we accept evolutionary theory.

That's possible - but not particularly useful for analysis. :shrug:
That's because random mutation is completely inadequate to explain any kind of purpose. What would be referred to in any discussion about innateness is the various processes of selection. Those are the directional mechanisms.

Anyhow, the point was merely to underline what you already replied to, that, like anything else, innateness is not an impossibility or a hands-of-God-only possibility regardless of our inability or capability to explain it.

dilettante

Oct 22nd 2009, 01:24 PM

This is what I stated above. Belief in the material universe is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for rationalism.

In such terms, 'rationalism as goal' is understood to be the reason or justification for holding the belief. Indeed it is true that one cannot invoke rationalism as the cause or origin of the belief, but it can be understood as a subjective justification for it.

This is what I meant when I (earlier) referred to "reasoned or rational faith" being slightly different from "faith alone". Some articles of faith are held for specifically rational reasons, while some articles of faith are not.

I'm glad we agree on the first bolded point, but it seems like you may to be hedging with the second bolded section. The reasons for having faith in the physical universe are not rational. I think it's important for this discussion that we don't lose sight of the irrationality of that belief.

Originally Posted by dilettante http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/images/buttons/green/viewpost.gif (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=16151#post16151)
It does seem to be the case that humans 'default' to believing in the natural world, the super-natural world, and a moral reality (though the concept of breaking things down into those three categories may be a fairly recent development). In each case, it requires sustained mental effort to reject the default belief.
I don't agree with this at all.

I think all of those things were served up to you with your mother's milk and thus are very much culturally created.
...

You think the belief in the natural world is "culturally created"? I expected that you'd acknowledge at least that one as being innate.

Anyway, I take the exact opposite tact: I think our innate beliefs in natural, supernatural and moral realities are fundamental to how we create our cultures, rather than the other way around.
However, I'd better make a firm distinction here since I think we may be dangerously close to talking past each other. I entirely agree that our beliefs about the content of natural, supernatural, and moral reality is shaped by our cultural inheritance. That is to say, we will innately believe that a material reality exists, but our understanding of the nature of that reality is to a great extent the result of culture. By the same token, we will innately assert and believe in some imperative reality, but the precise content (i.e. the actual moral codes of "Thou shalt [not]..." etc) is primarily a cultural inheritance.

Now we are getting somewhere! :D

You don't find it odd to do that because your whole socio-cultural training has been focused upon training you to do exactly that! And yes, people do tend to make these distinctions. I'd be quite surprised if they didn't, given all the socio-cultural training they've been immersed in since the day they were born. :shrug:

And yes, anyone who doesn't go along with socio-cultural 'norms' is always defined as "odd". That's one of the most potent social weapons for enforcing conformity!

As for the last bolded part of your quote, that's the key here I think. :)

I assert that it is our human need/want/desire for objective morality to exist that drives the creation/assertion of the reality of objective morality. Nothing more, nothing less. Humans are indeed a very creative species. But our need/want/desire for objective certainty doesn't make objective morality a reality.

So yes, I agree that making judgements and distinctions without having an objective basis for knowledge is really difficult and quite annoying to our human sensibilities. But I don't agree that we ought to pretend that some particular assertions ought be treated as if they were "objective knowledge" and use that as a basis for making moral rules claiming objective/scientific certainty.

We do indeed seem to be arriving closer to the heart of the issue here.

In the bolded section above, I suggest that you could replace every instance of "objective morality" with "material reality." Our 'need/want/desire' for there to be a material reality may be so strong that it drives us to believe that such a reality exists, even though we can have no logical basis for such a belief. We take that 'leap of faith' anyway.
I submit that a belief in moral reality has very much the same basis and is no more and no less logically defensible.

The solution to a challenging or difficult problem is not to pretend it doesn't exist. All claims of objective knowledge are problematic. Ignoring the problems due to strong human need/want/desire is not a rationally viable solution.

I agree 100%.
And I don't pretend a belief in a moral reality to be rational all the way down. Nor do I pretend that my belief in material reality can claim an entirely rational basis. Here we are dealing with beliefs that precede rationality altogether.

I don't see much of a difference between the two here unless you are appealing to God or bio-genetics. :shrug:

Please define the 'mechanism of transmission' that you believe conveys this 'default' morality if it is not entirely a product of your mother's milk.

Again, I'm wary of the phrase 'default' morality, as that implies some sort of sophisticated in-built code of rules, which is not what I'm talking about. I'm not saying that people are born knowing a set of precisely articulated moral laws any more than they are born knowing a set of physical laws. Rather, I'm saying that we have the inbuilt capacity to perceive both a moral and a physical reality external to ourselves and an inbuilt, and nigh-irresistible, inclination to believe that those perceptions reflect objective realities.
As such, I suppose that these capacities and inclinations are part of our wiring.

I believe that the foundational belief of most religions and human-driven moral codes. Ultimately, I consider this to be an authoritarian-driven conceit.

I don't understand this.
I think a crucial word or phrase might be missing from the first sentence. You "believe that the foundational belief of most religions and human-driven moral codes...." what?

God is always part of any discussion if people make arguments that are only possible because of the invisible hand of God, even if those people deny the invisible hand of God is their motive.

That is to say, you speak of 'default' or some mysteriously 'innate' morality yet do not offer any mechanism for it to exist. The only rational conclusion for your argument is God, and although you keep denying that conclusion, you offer no reasonable alternative to that implied conclusion. :shrug:

I think SMadsen cogently addresses this point.
IMO, the existence of a moral reality demands divine origins no more (and, I suppose, no less) than does the existence of a material reality.

Michael

Oct 22nd 2009, 01:52 PM

I just found this paper. I believe it is quite relevant to our topic. I've only scanned the document - I haven't read it entirely, but I thought I'd share it anyway.

I'll no doubt comment upon it later when I have had time to digest it. :)

Article (http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/keith.chen/papers/Final_JPE06.pdf)

Michael

Oct 28th 2009, 01:13 PM

Here is yet another paper that seems highly relevant to this topic...

Cleanliness is next to godliness: New research shows clean smells promote moral behavior

People are unconsciously fairer and more generous when they are in clean-smelling environments, according to a soon-to-be published study led by a Brigham Young University professor.

The research found a dramatic improvement in ethical behavior with just a few spritzes of citrus-scented Windex.

Article (http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2009-10/byu-cin102309.php#at)

Michael

Nov 8th 2009, 01:24 PM

I'm glad we agree on the first bolded point, but it seems like you may to be hedging with the second bolded section. The reasons for having faith in the physical universe are not rational. I think it's important for this discussion that we don't lose sight of the irrationality of that belief.
I have strong reservations to the way you keep saying that. You are rephrasing/reinterpreting my agreements and shifting the ground slightly each time you do that.

First of all, I have used the phrase "time-space continuum" whenever the issue of 'epistemological belief' is at hand and you have replaced that term with "belief in the physical universe". Those are conceptually two very different things from my philosophic perspective.

For example, many can believe that the physical universe is physically real, yet at the same time still hold that violations of the 'time-space continuum' are possible (anyone who believes in time-travel for example, or any kind of mysticism). The manifest reality of the physical universe is entirely a function of human sensory perceptions and human cultural definitions. As such, the "physical universe" is not a purely objective term - it is entirely subjective/relative. On the other hand, the time-space continuum is the assertion of a theoretically objective standard by which the physical universe may be rationally observed and understood.

Secondly, I have acknowledged that "rationalism" cannot be held to be the "cause or origin" of one's faith in the time-space continuum. This does not mean, in any way, shape or form, that faith in the time-space continuum is irrational.

The argument given and stated has been predicated entirely upon faith in the time-space continuum being justified by rational reasoning as logically necessary in order to avoid the dead-end trap of subjective sollipsism. And thus, it is incorrect to characterize this faith in the time-space continuum as "irrational".

As I've said many times, the original leap of faith in the reality and rationality of the time-space continuum ought to be considered a unique event. As such, all other leaps of faith (subsequent to the first one) ought to require a reasoned origin/cause (if you want to claim reason or rationalism).

You think the belief in the natural world is "culturally created"? I expected that you'd acknowledge at least that one as being innate.
That is correct. I hold that belief in the natural world is entirely "culturally created". Nothing innate about it at all.

In support, I offer the example of the 'wolf boy' - a human baby abandoned in the woods and suckled by wolves. That wolf-boy will grow up to be a wild animal, not a human being as we understand that term.

I believe that this issue is 'caused by' the substitution of the term "time-space continum" with "physical universe".

Anyway, I take the exact opposite tact: I think our innate beliefs in natural, supernatural and moral realities are fundamental to how we create our cultures, rather than the other way around.

However, I'd better make a firm distinction here since I think we may be dangerously close to talking past each other. I entirely agree that our beliefs about the content of natural, supernatural, and moral reality is shaped by our cultural inheritance. That is to say, we will innately believe that a material reality exists, but our understanding of the nature of that reality is to a great extent the result of culture. By the same token, we will innately assert and believe in some imperative reality, but the precise content (i.e. the actual moral codes of "Thou shalt [not]..." etc) is primarily a cultural inheritance.
I would say that what you are describing is recognition of one's own subjective reality.

I recognize your attempt to draw a distinction between some natural 'will to perceive reality' and the 'perception of a particular culturally defined reality' here, and that's an important point.

And if you hold to that point, are you not asserting Nietzsche's conclusion that 'man is a moral animal'? And if you agree that 'man is a moral animal' then I don't see where your are making your argument from. The will to morality is innate to humans. The content of that morality is entirely cultural, relative and/or subjective.

Asserting that a [content-free] 'will to morality' is innate to humans is ultimately a moot point - it proves nothing, but it does cause enormous problems for consistency with any assertion of theology.

We do indeed seem to be arriving closer to the heart of the issue here.

In the bolded section above, I suggest that you could replace every instance of "objective morality" with "material reality." Our 'need/want/desire' for there to be a material reality may be so strong that it drives us to believe that such a reality exists, even though we can have no logical basis for such a belief. We take that 'leap of faith' anyway.
I submit that a belief in moral reality has very much the same basis and is no more and no less logically defensible.

This is very confusing with this subtle shift of these terms. Your point starts off talking about "objective morality" and "material reality" as two different things then in the last sentence, the conclusion is all about "moral reality" - some hybrid of the first two terms that isn't explained or justified! :confused:

It took me a couple of tries to read and re-read this one through to make sure I understood what you are asserting there. Making the substitutions of your statement with my statement doesn't produce the conclusion that you infer.

I agree 100%.
And I don't pretend a belief in a moral reality to be rational all the way down. Nor do I pretend that my belief in material reality can claim an entirely rational basis. Here we are dealing with beliefs that precede rationality altogether.
Please define this 'new' term you have introduced to the discussion.

Again, I'm wary of the phrase 'default' morality, as that implies some sort of sophisticated in-built code of rules, which is not what I'm talking about. I'm not saying that people are born knowing a set of precisely articulated moral laws any more than they are born knowing a set of physical laws. Rather, I'm saying that we have the inbuilt capacity to perceive both a moral and a physical reality external to ourselves and an inbuilt, and nigh-irresistible, inclination to believe that those perceptions reflect objective realities. As such, I suppose that these capacities and inclinations are part of our wiring.
In other words, man is a moral animal?

And if you agree with Nietzsche (and myself) that man is a moral animal, that certainly would explain where all that god and religion stuff comes from now wouldn't it? ;)

It would even explain why some people are so hard-core about having their own culturally defined or subjective moralities to be enforced universally.

I don't understand this.
I think a crucial word or phrase might be missing from the first sentence. You "believe that the foundational belief of most religions and human-driven moral codes...." what?

The sentence in question is indeed missing a required verb. :o

Here is the sentence in context...

Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".
I believe that the foundational belief of most religions and human-driven moral codes. Ultimately, I consider this to be an authoritarian-driven conceit.

My reply should state: "I believe that IS the foundational belief of most human-driven moral codes." It is a direct reply to your statement.

IMO, the existence of a moral reality demands divine origins no more (and, I suppose, no less) than does the existence of a material reality.
There's that term again! Please define this term of "moral reality".

dilettante

Nov 12th 2009, 02:14 PM

I should probably address this first; no point in discussing if I'm using meaningless terms:

Please define this 'new' term you have introduced to the discussion.

...

There's that term again! Please define this term of "moral reality".

This confuses me a bit, since I've been using the term "moral reality" since post #16 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14541&postcount=16) (page 2), and have used it in half a dozen posts since then without apparent trouble. In post #53 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14650&postcount=53), I defined a "belief that there is some sort of universal moral reality" as the belief "that some things really are right and some things really are wrong, independent of individual opinions or the content of any given list of moral regulations."

For the sake of clarification, I'll try to throw out several definitions. Hopefully this make my meaning less ambiguous (these sorts of moral/philosophical discussions always seem to generate semantic miscommunication):

"reality" - (borrowed from a dictionary) "That which exists objectively and in fact."

"physical reality" - The indicative subset of reality. Statements regarding what is and is not, what does and does not occur, refer to physical reality. I suppose, upon reflection, a better term for this might be "indicative reality", since one can make indicative statements about things which are not physical.

"moral reality" - The moral and/or imperative subset of reality. Statements regarding what should or should not exist/occur, refer to "moral reality," as would statements about "good" and "evil".

Theoretically one could believe in either, both or neither of these subsets. The core element of each is the belief in some form of objectivity; that something exists outside of oneself and regardless of one's thoughts about (or awareness of) it.

To further clarify, I think it's important to recognize a distinction between believing in either (or both) of these subsets abstractly and believing in particular descriptions of them. For example, the man who believes the earth to be flat and the man who believes the earth to be round both believe in a physical/indicative reality: they both believe that there is something in existence beyond themselves, that indicative statements ("the earth is ___") can be objectively true. They disagree over precisely which indicative statements are in fact true.
They both differ from the man who believes that there is no objective reality, that nothing exists apart from his perception of it, and that all indicative statements reflect only on the self: the solipsist.

By the same token, the man who believes X is objectively good and Y is objectively evil and the man who believes just the opposite both believe in a moral reality. They both believe that moral and imperative statements can be objectively true or false. They disagree over precisely which statements are, in fact, true and false.
They both differ from the moral relativist who disbelieves in moral reality and holds that all moral statements are equally, and totally subjective and can be reflective only of those who make them.

I have strong reservations to the way you keep saying that. You are rephrasing/reinterpreting my agreements and shifting the ground slightly each time you do that.

First of all, I have used the phrase "time-space continuum" whenever the issue of 'epistemological belief' is at hand and you have replaced that term with "belief in the physical universe". Those are conceptually two very different things from my philosophic perspective.

For example, many can believe that the physical universe is physically real, yet at the same time still hold that violations of the 'time-space continuum' are possible (anyone who believes in time-travel for example, or any kind of mysticism). The manifest reality of the physical universe is entirely a function of human sensory perceptions and human cultural definitions. As such, the "physical universe" is not a purely objective term - it is entirely subjective/relative. On the other hand, the time-space continuum is the assertion of a theoretically objective standard by which the physical universe may be rationally observed and understood.

Secondly, I have acknowledged that "rationalism" cannot be held to be the "cause or origin" of one's faith in the time-space continuum. This does not mean, in any way, shape or form, that faith in the time-space continuum is irrational.

The argument given and stated has been predicated entirely upon faith in the time-space continuum being justified by rational reasoning as logically necessary in order to avoid the dead-end trap of subjective sollipsism. And thus, it is incorrect to characterize this faith in the time-space continuum as "irrational".

As I've said many times, the original leap of faith in the reality and rationality of the time-space continuum ought to be considered a unique event. As such, all other leaps of faith (subsequent to the first one) ought to require a reasoned origin/cause (if you want to claim reason or rationalism).

With regard to the "time-space continuum", I may need you to specify that further. To my mind our modern understanding of the time-space continuum would represent a specific belief in how "physical reality" exists and functions, involving a complex set of laws and descriptions (e.g. forbidding time-travel).

As such, it's well beyond any "original" leap of faith in objective reality: people were not solipsists until they believed in our current conception of the space-time continuum. One first has to accept that there is some sort of indicative reality external to oneself, AND that one's senses are capable of providing accurate information about it, before one formulates physical laws describing how that external reality works.

To put it another way, given the following three states of belief:
A) There is no external reality and/or if there is, I can't know anything about it.
B) There is an external reality, and it is possible to know things about it.
C) There is an external reality, and it operates thusly....
I identify (A) as a solipsism, (B) as a belief in physical/indicative reality, and (C) as containing a belief in the time-space continuum.

That is correct. I hold that belief in the natural world is entirely "culturally created". Nothing innate about it at all.

In support, I offer the example of the 'wolf boy' - a human baby abandoned in the woods and suckled by wolves. That wolf-boy will grow up to be a wild animal, not a human being as we understand that term.

I believe that this issue is 'caused by' the substitution of the term "time-space continum" with "physical universe".

Using the above definitions, I would assert that 'wolf-boy' innately believes in an external physical/indicative reality (B), but not in the time-space continuum (C). Further, I'd assert that it is the belief in the time-space continuum (along with most beliefs from group C) that are culturally determined for the vast majority of people; I learned about "space-time" in high school physics class.

I would say that what you are describing is recognition of one's own subjective reality.

I recognize your attempt to draw a distinction between some natural 'will to perceive reality' and the 'perception of a particular culturally defined reality' here, and that's an important point.

And if you hold to that point, are you not asserting Nietzsche's conclusion that 'man is a moral animal'? And if you agree that 'man is a moral animal' then I don't see where your are making your argument from. The will to morality is innate to humans. The content of that morality is entirely cultural, relative and/or subjective.

Asserting that a [content-free] 'will to morality' is innate to humans is ultimately a moot point - it proves nothing, but it does cause enormous problems for consistency with any assertion of theology.

...

In other words, man is a moral animal?

And if you agree with Nietzsche (and myself) that man is a moral animal, that certainly would explain where all that god and religion stuff comes from now wouldn't it? ;)

It would even explain why some people are so hard-core about having their own culturally defined or subjective moralities to be enforced universally.

Having read very little Nietzsche, and that quite a while back, I'm hesitant to comment on where I stand with his conclusions. And I'm not really trying to "prove" anything, just explain my perspective.

But I should clarify that I'm not suggesting that the content of all human moral beliefs are entirely the product of culture any more than the content of humanity's indicative beliefs are entirely the product of culture. In both cases, quite a lot of what I believe about reality is derived from what (and how) I'm taught about it. But in both cases, I can (to some extent) build my own understanding and test the things I'm taught against my own perceptions. To do that, however, I first have to assume that there is some reality out there to perceive and that my perceptions of it are, at least to some extent, accurate.

I hold those assumptions to constitute the "original leap of faith", whether one is talking about a moral or a physical/indicative world. And, in either the moral or the physical indicative case, there can be no logical justification for making the leap.

Quote:
Originally Posted by dilettante
Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".

I believe that IS the foundational belief of most human-driven moral codes." It is a direct reply to your statement.

Sorry, I'm still a little lost here. :o Which belief are you referring to?

Michael

Nov 28th 2009, 10:18 AM

I should probably address this first; no point in discussing if I'm using meaningless terms:

This confuses me a bit, since I've been using the term "moral reality" since post #16 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14541&postcount=16) (page 2), and have used it in half a dozen posts since then without apparent trouble. In post #53 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14650&postcount=53), I defined a "belief that there is some sort of universal moral reality" as the belief "that some things really are right and some things really are wrong, independent of individual opinions or the content of any given list of moral regulations."

For the sake of clarification, I'll try to throw out several definitions. Hopefully this make my meaning less ambiguous (these sorts of moral/philosophical discussions always seem to generate semantic miscommunication):

"reality" - (borrowed from a dictionary) "That which exists objectively and in fact."

"physical reality" - The indicative subset of reality. Statements regarding what is and is not, what does and does not occur, refer to physical reality. I suppose, upon reflection, a better term for this might be "indicative reality", since one can make indicative statements about things which are not physical.

"moral reality" - The moral and/or imperative subset of reality. Statements regarding what should or should not exist/occur, refer to "moral reality," as would statements about "good" and "evil".

Theoretically one could believe in either, both or neither of these subsets. The core element of each is the belief in some form of objectivity; that something exists outside of oneself and regardless of one's thoughts about (or awareness of) it.

To further clarify, I think it's important to recognize a distinction between believing in either (or both) of these subsets abstractly and believing in particular descriptions of them. For example, the man who believes the earth to be flat and the man who believes the earth to be round both believe in a physical/indicative reality: they both believe that there is something in existence beyond themselves, that indicative statements ("the earth is ___") can be objectively true. They disagree over precisely which indicative statements are in fact true.
They both differ from the man who believes that there is no objective reality, that nothing exists apart from his perception of it, and that all indicative statements reflect only on the self: the solipsist.

By the same token, the man who believes X is objectively good and Y is objectively evil and the man who believes just the opposite both believe in a moral reality. They both believe that moral and imperative statements can be objectively true or false. They disagree over precisely which statements are, in fact, true and false.
They both differ from the moral relativist who disbelieves in moral reality and holds that all moral statements are equally, and totally subjective and can be reflective only of those who make them.

My objection to the term comes not from the expression itself, but to its usage.

That's why I didn't object the first time you used the expression, but did object when you used it later - since the shift in context concealed a key point and makes an additional claim that I object to.

If you refer to your own believe in "moral reality", that's all well and fine. It is a statement of YOUR personal and subjective belief. I can accept that usage.

If you refer to "moral reality" as something that exists outside your own head, or outside your own personal and subjective belief, that's where I draw a strong objection because that kind of "moral reality" needs to be defined and its origin identified (and you can't really do that).

I also object to this argument:

By the same token, the man who believes X is objectively good and Y is objectively evil and the man who believes just the opposite both believe in a moral reality. They both believe that moral and imperative statements can be objectively true or false. They disagree over precisely which statements are, in fact, true and false.
They both differ from the moral relativist who disbelieves in moral reality and holds that all moral statements are equally, and totally subjective and can be reflective only of those who make them.

In all three cases, we have individuals believing in their own personal and subjective interpretation of morality and claiming it is their reality. There is no common 'moral reality' to the three given examples at all.

As such, the term "moral reality" is a purely relative and subjective term.

And that's why I object to your usage of this term in an objective manner. The term is not objective at all (indeed, the term is relative and subjective by definition).

With regard to the "time-space continuum", I may need you to specify that further. To my mind our modern understanding of the time-space continuum would represent a specific belief in how "physical reality" exists and functions, involving a complex set of laws and descriptions (e.g. forbidding time-travel).
That's too technical.

The key principle of the time-space continuum is that 'causes' preceed 'effects' and they are observable and follow rules that cannot be broken.

This is required for rationalism. It is not required of humans. Lots of humans don't actually accept the fundamental principle of the time-space continuum and insist that things outside the time-space can and do function.

As such, it's well beyond any "original" leap of faith in objective reality: people were not solipsists until they believed in our current conception of the space-time continuum. One first has to accept that there is some sort of indicative reality external to oneself, AND that one's senses are capable of providing accurate information about it, before one formulates physical laws describing how that external reality works.

To put it another way, given the following three states of belief:
A) There is no external reality and/or if there is, I can't know anything about it.
B) There is an external reality, and it is possible to know things about it.
C) There is an external reality, and it operates thusly....
I identify (A) as a solipsism, (B) as a belief in physical/indicative reality, and (C) as containing a belief in the time-space continuum.

You appear to be making a historical argument here.

If so, I will point out that God was the historical substitute for the time-space continuum.

Ultimately, God has been rejected (by many modern people) as the model of the universe because it isn't rational.

In place of God, the time-space continuum is used to define reality.

Solipsism comes in when one rejects God, one is left with nothing and no definition of reality except one's own pure subjectivity. Hence the adoption of the time-space continuum as an alternative to the God definition of the universe. Both serve a similar purpose/function (but not the same purpose/function).

Using the above definitions, I would assert that 'wolf-boy' innately believes in an external physical/indicative reality (B), but not in the time-space continuum (C). Further, I'd assert that it is the belief in the time-space continuum (along with most beliefs from group C) that are culturally determined for the vast majority of people; I learned about "space-time" in high school physics class.
Space-time is not the same as the time-space continuum.

You are correct that our 'wolf-boy' would [likely] not perceive the time-space continuum. He'd be far more likely to believe in supernatural spirits animating everything (must be nice to the tree or the tree won't give you its apples) and/or that thunder/lightning is an example of the anger of the spirits (if anything).

I respectfully submit that it would be unreasonable to assert that 'wolf-boy' could process any rationally based 'cause and effect' type reasonings. Wolf-boy has only his own subjective imagination to work with and no external culture to frame his thoughts.

I would further submit that it would be unreasonable to assert that 'wolf-boy' could have a rational belief in time-space continuity or even in the physicality of external stimulii. That makes no sense at all. To this 'wolf-boy', there could be no cultural constructs at all. Wolf-boy has no reason to believe that anything exists outside his own head. He would see the world as he sees it and that's that.

Having read very little Nietzsche, and that quite a while back, I'm hesitant to comment on where I stand with his conclusions. And I'm not really trying to "prove" anything, just explain my perspective.

But I should clarify that I'm not suggesting that the content of all human moral beliefs are entirely the product of culture any more than the content of humanity's indicative beliefs are entirely the product of culture. In both cases, quite a lot of what I believe about reality is derived from what (and how) I'm taught about it. But in both cases, I can (to some extent) build my own understanding and test the things I'm taught against my own perceptions. To do that, however, I first have to assume that there is some reality out there to perceive and that my perceptions of it are, at least to some extent, accurate.

I hold those assumptions to constitute the "original leap of faith", whether one is talking about a moral or a physical/indicative world. And, in either the moral or the physical indicative case, there can be no logical justification for making the leap.
The point about Nietzsche is that if you locate the 'seat' of morality within the individual, then you are sweeping away God and/or any other possible origin for moral objectivity.

Your arguments consistently assert that the locus of morality is inside the individual, hence my comment about Nietzsche and the assertion that 'man is a moral animal' (meaning that humans are naturally inclined to have moral opinions).

To state this point briefly: the urge to moralize is universally human, but the content of that morality is entirely culturally and/or socially and/or individually defined.

I don't see any way that your argument can possibly support the idea that the content of morality can ever be in any way universal.

Sorry, I'm still a little lost here. :o Which belief are you referring to?
The core of the issue. :)

You said: "Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".

I replied that "I believe that IS the foundational belief of most human-driven moral codes."

The idea that humans create morality and assert that it is non-human in origin is entirely predicated upon the idea that humans desperately want to turn their petty "I want" into "I should" in order to flatter their human subjectivity/ego.

Ego likes to be right. Pure subjectivity doesn't supply any objective determination of "right" so it is invented and claimed.

You are essentially admitting here that 'objective morality' exists because humans really want it to exist.

That's been my consistent argument in this thread.

phungus420

Nov 28th 2009, 11:24 PM

phungus420

Nov 28th 2009, 11:31 PM

This confuses me a bit, since I've been using the term "moral reality" since post #16 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14541&postcount=16) (page 2), and have used it in half a dozen posts since then without apparent trouble. In post #53 (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showpost.php?p=14650&postcount=53), I defined a "belief that there is some sort of universal moral reality" as the belief "that some things really are right and some things really are wrong, independent of individual opinions or the content of any given list of moral regulations."
If there is universal morality, What term would you use to describe the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society? I'm being a bit presumptuous, but I think it's safe to assume we can consider many of their behaviors immoral based on our worldview of morality. If their practice of killing inferior children and practicing chattel slavery and pederastry was not "moral" under their system, what term would a spartan use to another Spartan to describe their ethical codes, and social mores?

Actually, what is the "Universal moral reality"? Define it please.

dilettante

Nov 29th 2009, 10:22 AM

My objection to the term comes not from the expression itself, but to its usage.

That's why I didn't object the first time you used the expression, but did object when you used it later - since the shift in context concealed a key point and makes an additional claim that I object to.

If you refer to your own believe in "moral reality", that's all well and fine. It is a statement of YOUR personal and subjective belief. I can accept that usage.

If you refer to "moral reality" as something that exists outside your own head, or outside your own personal and subjective belief, that's where I draw a strong objection because that kind of "moral reality" needs to be defined and its origin identified (and you can't really do that).

Hmmm. My goal in using the term in the first place was to refer to "something that exists outside your own head." If it has only just taken on that meaning then clearly I earlier failed to communicate effectively. Sorry.

Anyway, why does it need to have its origin identified? The first time I used the term was to suggest that "Moral reality could just be there, much as many people physical reality is just there." In other words, perhaps it has no origin and has just always been around.

I also object to this argument:

In all three cases, we have individuals believing in their own personal and subjective interpretation of morality and claiming it is their reality. There is no common 'moral reality' to the three given examples at all.

As such, the term "moral reality" is a purely relative and subjective term.

And that's why I object to your usage of this term in an objective manner. The term is not objective at all (indeed, the term is relative and subjective by definition).

The difference lies in what is being argued about.

The first two individuals (who believe in opposing moral codes) are arguing about the same thing: the make-up of moral reality or, to put it another way, what it means to be 'good' and consequently what people 'should' and 'should not' do. In the course of their argument they may be able to find some sort of common ground on key fundamentals (e.g. they both agree that suffering is evil, or that family bonds should be respected, or some such...). If so, it's possible for these individuals to actually have a logical debate on whether their respective moral code's are grounded in these fundamentals (e.g. "We both respect family bonds, but don't you see how your method of child-enslavement can actually weaken those bonds while also causing suffering, which we both agree is evil?").

The third individual is arguing about something else. He isn't debating the content of moral reality but denying the very existence of such a thing. As such, he shares no common ground or key moral fundamentals with the other two. There can be no logical debate nor discussion about what is right and wrong between this individual and first two.

One might imagine two individuals debating over which is larger, China or India. If they can agree on some key terms and definitions and the validity of some sources, they would at least be able to hash it out logically, to actually debate the issue.
But neither could debate with a third individual who believes that China, India and all the world exist only in his own imagination.

In both instances there is, IMO, a significant difference between the position of the first two individuals and the third.

When you say "In all three cases, we have individuals believing in their own personal and subjective interpretation of morality and claiming it is their reality" you are adopting the position of the third individual.
By the same token, the one who believes that the world is all in his head would also say that they were all just believing in their own personal, subjective interpretations of 'China' and 'India'.

Space-time is not the same as the time-space continuum.

You are correct that our 'wolf-boy' would [likely] not perceive the time-space continuum. He'd be far more likely to believe in supernatural spirits animating everything (must be nice to the tree or the tree won't give you its apples) and/or that thunder/lightning is an example of the anger of the spirits (if anything).

I respectfully submit that it would be unreasonable to assert that 'wolf-boy' could process any rationally based 'cause and effect' type reasonings. Wolf-boy has only his own subjective imagination to work with and no external culture to frame his thoughts.

I would further submit that it would be unreasonable to assert that 'wolf-boy' could have a rational belief in time-space continuity or even in the physicality of external stimulii. That makes no sense at all. To this 'wolf-boy', there could be no cultural constructs at all. Wolf-boy has no reason to believe that anything exists outside his own head. He would see the world as he sees it and that's that.

I disagree with the bolded section. 'Wolf-boy' (who I'm rapidly coming to think of as some sort of existentialist super-hero :)) would have no less (and no more) reason to be believe in the physicality of external stimulii than anyone raised in a more traditional home. We don't have to be taught to believe that the world actually exists; we just assume that it does and act on that assumption when we're quite young. In fact, in my experience, students and children are often quite shocked and intrigued by the novelty of the notion that maybe the world doesn't exist and that it's all in their head.

To state this point briefly: the urge to moralize is universally human, but the content of that morality is entirely culturally and/or socially and/or individually defined.

I don't see any way that your argument can possibly support the idea that the content of morality can ever be in any way universal.

Hmmm. An "urge to moralize" isn't the way I'd put it. Rather, I'd say a (very weak) "perception of morality". The content of moral codes is based on those perceptions, interpreted and altered by culture and individual experience.

By the same token, I wouldn't say that man has an "urge" to believe in a universe outside his own head but that he perceives a universe outside his own head; how he perceives it is interpreted and altered by culture and individual experience.

The core of the issue.

You said: "Further, I'd suggest that the belief in some sort of moral reality is the only possible alternative to life completely driven by self-centeredness. After all, if "I should..." (and it's permutations) are removed from one's mental vocabulary, then the only remaining call to action is "I want...".

I replied that "I believe that IS the foundational belief of most human-driven moral codes."

The idea that humans create morality and assert that it is non-human in origin is entirely predicated upon the idea that humans desperately want to turn their petty "I want" into "I should" in order to flatter their human subjectivity/ego.

Ego likes to be right. Pure subjectivity doesn't supply any objective determination of "right" so it is invented and claimed.

Ah, that clears that up, then.

Perhaps so. But then, to go all the way back to where this started, if the only true motivation for all actions is "I want..." then we're all equally "self-centered".

You are essentially admitting here that 'objective morality' exists because humans really want it to exist.

That's been my consistent argument in this thread.

Not quite. I'm admitting that 'objective morality' exists because I can't help perceiving that it does. I don't pretend to have any logical basis for the assumption that such perceptions are, at least to some degree, valid.

By the same token, I also admit that an indicative or physical reality beyond myself exists because I can't help perceiving that it does. And again, I don't pretend to have any logical justification for the 'leap of faith' involved.

dilettante

Nov 29th 2009, 04:26 PM

If there is universal morality, What term would you use to describe the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society?

I'm not sure I understand the question. Why wouldn't I just describe the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society as "the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society"?

I'm being a bit presumptuous, but I think it's safe to assume we can consider many of their behaviors immoral based on our worldview of morality. If their practice of killing inferior children and practicing chattel slavery and pederastry was not "moral" under their system, what term would a spartan use to another Spartan to describe their ethical codes, and social mores?

Though not well versed in the cultural values of ancient Sparta, I think it's safe to say that the average Spartan and I would probably disagree on whether certain practices were 'right' or 'wrong'.

Does that address the question at all?

Actually, what is the "Universal moral reality"? Define it please.

To quote myself:
"moral reality" - The moral and/or imperative subset of reality. Statements regarding what should or should not exist/occur, refer to "moral reality," as would statements about "good" and "evil".

If your looking for a set of specific moral proscriptions, I don't intend to give one sense (A) I don't pretend to have it all figured out, and (B) even if I did, I'm not trying to get anyone here to agree with me.

phungus420

Nov 29th 2009, 11:34 PM

I'm not sure I understand the question. Why wouldn't I just describe the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society as "the ethical conventions and social mores of Spartan Society"?

Though not well versed in the cultural values of ancient Sparta, I think it's safe to say that the average Spartan and I would probably disagree on whether certain practices were 'right' or 'wrong'.

Does that address the question at all?
Right and Wrong, good and evil, aren't these the pertinent parts of what constitutes morality? If not, were the ancient Spartans Amoral like animals, instead of immoral and moral as modern persons may be?

To quote myself:
"moral reality" - The moral and/or imperative subset of reality. Statements regarding what should or should not exist/occur, refer to "moral reality," as would statements about "good" and "evil". If your looking for a set of specific moral proscriptions, I don't intend to give one sense (A) I don't pretend to have it all figured out, and (B) even if I did, I'm not trying to get anyone here to agree with me.
So your entire belief about what morality exists is based on circular reasoning? In other words, your agrument comes down to these simple statements:

Morality is divine, it must be universal.
Since morality is universal, it must be divine.

Is this the crux of your reasoning? If so, there isn't anywhere to go from here, other then for me to say that the argument as presented isn't logically coherent or reasonable.

dilettante

Nov 30th 2009, 08:43 AM

Right and Wrong, good and evil, aren't these the pertinent parts of what constitutes morality?

Yep.

If not, were the ancient Spartans Amoral like animals, instead of immoral and moral as modern persons may be?

What? I'm not sure where your getting this from.
Why would they be "Amoral like animals"? Spartan society certainly had a moral code (several, in all likelihood, since there are usually dissenters). If they held that killing physically weak children was a morally laudable practice, then I respectfully disagree with them.

So your entire belief about what morality exists is based on circular reasoning? In other words, your agrument comes down to these simple statements:

Morality is divine, it must be universal.
Since morality is universal, it must be divine.

Is this the crux of your reasoning? If so, there isn't anywhere to go from here, other then for me to say that the argument as presented isn't logically coherent or reasonable.

:ummm: I'm not sure whether your setting up strawmen here or simply making assumptions about what I believe.

I haven't once asserted that "morality is divine", either as a premise or a conclusion (in fact, I'm not even sure what that would mean). In fact, I've suggested that one could accept that reality has a moral content to it without any need to believe in any sort of God(s).

Michael

Nov 30th 2009, 07:41 PM

This origin of morality debate is nothing more then an extension the old Theistic vs Atheistic debate. Atheists, in general, demand that assertions be stated in a falisifiable manner. Without plausible falsifiability there is no merit to the assertion, as you can simply justify the assertion using circular logic. With falisifiability comes the ability to disprove the assertion through reason or evidence. If a person truly holds that morality is by definition imbued by God, there is no ammount of reason or logic that can effect this assertion, to sway the believer they are wrong requires emotional persuation and not sound reasoning, as the belief is not based on logic. This is an inherent property of Dogma.
One key issue in this thread is the assertion of a form of morality that is NOT god-derived in origin and it is not purely subjective.

I've been arguing against that position, as dilettante has been arguing for it.

This discussion comes from earlier discussions upon the topic where the god-derived origin for morality has been decisively reduced to nothing more than 'faith'.

That's the context of this thread discussion. Dilettante is trying not to make the God-origin argument that you are apparently accusing him of. That I sometimes leave him with no other position to take is a function of my argument, not his design. ;)

Non Sequitur

Nov 30th 2009, 08:23 PM

Michael

Nov 30th 2009, 09:24 PM

Hmmm. My goal in using the term in the first place was to refer to "something that exists outside your own head." If it has only just taken on that meaning then clearly I earlier failed to communicate effectively. Sorry.
If you state that you believe that your own "moral reality" has some origin outside your head, that is all entirely subjective - it is all predicated upon you (i.e. your reality, your belief). It is subjective and relative by definition. Ergo, I don't object to you using this formula as it doesn't contradict my thesis.

It is only when you emphatically assert that the "outside your own head" part exists in any way other than your own subjective faith that I have a problem with it as it then just assumes your argument is correct. The assertion becomes both premise and conclusion at the same time (just like most God-based faith statements) which is logically non-functional.

To put it simply, your statement about "moral reality" (used in an expansive context rather than a singularly subjective one) assumes the truth of the argument you are trying to defend with nothing more than your own faith to back it up. That's not a reasoned argument - that's a statement of faith.

Anyway, why does it need to have its origin identified? The first time I used the term was to suggest that "Moral reality could just be there, much as many people physical reality is just there." In other words, perhaps it has no origin and has just always been around.
Physical reality has an origin. We have whole university departments and massive astronomical apparatus devoted to exporing the details of the origin of our physical reality. We may not have a complete and thorough explanation supported with evidence, but we do have quite a bit of evidence and quite a bit of the explanation down pat (i.e. big bang theory).

If you reject that particular explanation for physical origin, there are countless mythological alternatives (such as the Genesis story in the Bible). But the fact is, most people really do have a very clear belief in this matter - either scientific study can account for the origins of our physical reality or some particular Holy Book can do so. Those who reject both and assert some other specifically undefined mysterious origin may be out there, but I respectfully submit that's exactly what they are - way out there.

Ergo, it is a long-standing demand of human society that the origins of our physical world be explained and understood (by whatever means necessary, be they primative witch-doctors, religious holy books or geeky dudes with Ph.D.'s in physics).

Secondly, if you assert that this mysterious 'moral reality' is just "out there" and is undefined in origin, then I respectfully submit that you are falling back on the God-argument again because that is identical to the essential argument in defense of God's existence - that God just "is" and this is a matter of faith, regardess of any physical evidence or arguments to the contrary.

If your argument is separate from the God-origin assertion, then it behooves you to explain what that origin is, otherwise it is reasonable to assume it is essentially identical to the God-origin argument (save perhaps some ambiguously mysterious agnostic deism instead of a specific theism).

The difference lies in what is being argued about.

The first two individuals (who believe in opposing moral codes) are arguing about the same thing: the make-up of moral reality or, to put it another way, what it means to be 'good' and consequently what people 'should' and 'should not' do. In the course of their argument they may be able to find some sort of common ground on key fundamentals (e.g. they both agree that suffering is evil, or that family bonds should be respected, or some such...). If so, it's possible for these individuals to actually have a logical debate on whether their respective moral code's are grounded in these fundamentals (e.g. "We both respect family bonds, but don't you see how your method of child-enslavement can actually weaken those bonds while also causing suffering, which we both agree is evil?").
You are assuming your argument again here and demonstrating how you imagine it would work if it were true.

If morality has some existence outside of your own subjectivity, then your own subjectivity becomes essentially irrelevant to the issue of morality. It would not be a matter of your agreement with this or that definition of morality, it would be all about your compliance with the moral reality as it is.

If morality comes from God, then your semantic arguments about God's rules become not-unlike the 'number of angels dancing on the head of a pin'. Either you follow the rules and please God or you break the rules and rot in hell. Very simple that.

It is only when morality is correctly understood to reside in the individual that the individual's own assessment of what is good and what is evil becomes meaningful on its own terms. Any other definition of morality means that your subjective opinion becomes irrelevant. If morality is dependent upon God, or the mysterious "moral reality" that is "out there", then it is meant to be followed, not discussed endlessly (though, I'm only speculating on the last point of course!).

The third individual is arguing about something else. He isn't debating the content of moral reality but denying the very existence of such a thing. As such, he shares no common ground or key moral fundamentals with the other two. There can be no logical debate nor discussion about what is right and wrong between this individual and first two.
This seems to be a case of reduction to the extremes.

Moral relativists do not necessarily hold that all moral systems are absurd and nonsensical that can only be rationally ignored.

Indeed, many moral relativists would argue that there is much to be considered good in the traditional 'Judeo-Christian' moral system. The point here is that they may consider some parts to be good on their own merits, not because they are part of the Judeo-Christian moral system. The Judeo-Christian moral system is given no credence on its own accord.

And I am reminded here of the fact that the question of "what is good?" is a notoriously atheistic one. Socrates was put to death for atheism specifically (that was the primary legal charge against him).

For a good Christian, the ONLY answer to the question is God or Jesus. If you look at the question without that answer first and foremost, I must question the quality of your religious conviction. :shrug:

If you can entertain the question, you are being blasphemous.

To question what is good and what is evil, is to live beyond God.

(My appologies to Nietzsche for playing with his most famous words, but this is what Nietzsche meant by using those words as the title of his most important work)

One might imagine two individuals debating over which is larger, China or India. If they can agree on some key terms and definitions and the validity of some sources, they would at least be able to hash it out logically, to actually debate the issue.
But neither could debate with a third individual who believes that China, India and all the world exist only in his own imagination.

In both instances there is, IMO, a significant difference between the position of the first two individuals and the third.
Yes and no.

They are all identical if it is all just a wall of words and no authoratively recognized external sources of physical evidence.

If rational falsifiability is acknowledged, such as in the second case (China vs India), then yes, there is a big difference between the first two and the third person's point.

But rational falsifiability isn't acknowedged with the example of the first case (morality), so therefore it is just a wall of words and therefore there is no essential difference in quality between the first two (who agreed on some terms between themselves) and the third who is off in left-field.

This is all notwithstanding my earlier disagreement with this 'three person' discussion example.

When you say "In all three cases, we have individuals believing in their own personal and subjective interpretation of morality and claiming it is their reality" you are adopting the position of the third individual.
By the same token, the one who believes that the world is all in his head would also say that they were all just believing in their own personal, subjective interpretations of 'China' and 'India'.
Huh? You are assigning to me the role of sollipsist?

That makes no sense at all since my position can't exist without the counter-argument against sollipsism that supports it.

I disagree with the bolded section. 'Wolf-boy' (who I'm rapidly coming to think of as some sort of existentialist super-hero :)) would have no less (and no more) reason to be believe in the physicality of external stimulii than anyone raised in a more traditional home. We don't have to be taught to believe that the world actually exists; we just assume that it does and act on that assumption when we're quite young. In fact, in my experience, students and children are often quite shocked and intrigued by the novelty of the notion that maybe the world doesn't exist and that it's all in their head.
Couple of points here.

1. Wolf-boy most certainly is not "some sort of existentialist super-hero" to me. I accepted the use of this analogy of the Wolf-boy (your example) specifically because it is a quasi-known phenomena. I'm no expert, but I've read a bit on the topic to know a little about what has been learned from observing the one or two examples that history has afforded us. The concept of the Wolf-boy is a reasonably good one for this reason. There is nothing supernatural about it.

2. You are granting to Wolf-boy the usage of reason which is very closely related to the usage of language - which Wolf-boy most certainly does not posses. One must have cultural language to develop the observation awareness to think in terms of abstract concepts such as one's environment.

Here is my statement that you bolded:

I would further submit that it would be unreasonable to assert that 'wolf-boy' could have a rational belief in time-space continuity or even in the physicality of external stimulii. That makes no sense at all. To this 'wolf-boy', there could be no cultural constructs at all. Wolf-boy has no reason to believe that anything exists outside his own head. He would see the world as he sees it and that's that.

The point here is that Wolf-boy doesn't think in abstract terms because he doesn't have human language-culture to construct those abstract terms. Wolf-boy lives in a world of pure sensory reaction and instinct. He believes the reports of his senses because he is incapable of conceiving otherwise.

Wolf-boy does not have a rational belief in the physicality of external stimulii. He has only his instincts and his physical senses and that's that.

Hmmm. An "urge to moralize" isn't the way I'd put it. Rather, I'd say a (very weak) "perception of morality". The content of moral codes is based on those perceptions, interpreted and altered by culture and individual experience.
To say "perceive" specifically defines morality as existing outside the individual.

Once again I must say, where is this morality that it can be perceived? Is it just floating in the air?

I've already offered you "culture" but you rightly rejected that as a logical trap (since different cultures tend to show different moralities).

You keep insisting (without any rational basis) that morality exists, of and in itself, without any known origin. Yet you've also rejected human subjectivity, God and human culture as possible explanations of this phenomenum.

Forgive me if I'm getting tired of running around in a circle asking the same question over and over. What is this moral reality that exists outside of human artifice and exists outside of God-artifice?

Answering "it is just out there" is all well and fine for your own subjective consideration. It is not sufficient for rational discussion or analysis.

By the same token, I wouldn't say that man has an "urge" to believe in a universe outside his own head but that he perceives a universe outside his own head; how he perceives it is interpreted and altered by culture and individual experience.
Sure. How any given human being choses to interpret or perceive the universe outside his own head is essentially irrelevant - and scary to contemplate. Most humans are idiots and pigs. Who cares what the plebes think about epistemology? Fact is, most people don't think about epistemology.

But when it comes to handing out Ph.D.'s for example, how you choose to interpret the universe outside your head becomes a significant issue.

For those people, we have a rules based system of rationality that is widely agreed to and applied. If you don't follow those rules, you don't get the Ph.D. For the dude in the pub, it doesn't really matter how he constructs his own subjectivity.

Perhaps so. But then, to go all the way back to where this started, if the only true motivation for all actions is "I want..." then we're all equally "self-centered".
I see nothing logically incorrect about that statement.

That is entirely compatible with my thesis that all morality begins and ends with human subjectivity. I believe that human culture is the primary repository of all morality, humans in social groups are the primary mechanism of judgement, and human social behavior is the goal, target, subject and object of all morality. And lastly, I believe that codified law represents a [defacto] formal attempt to codify morality.

Morality is the politics of the people.

Not quite. I'm admitting that 'objective morality' exists because I can't help perceiving that it does. I don't pretend to have any logical basis for the assumption that such perceptions are, at least to some degree, valid.

By the same token, I also admit that an indicative or physical reality beyond myself exists because I can't help perceiving that it does. And again, I don't pretend to have any logical justification for the 'leap of faith' involved.
If one cannot provide logical justification, that's because there probably isn't any.

And that's the point. If you are straying over into 'faith alone' to defend your point, you might as well adopt the God argument since it at least has the virtue of popularity rather than standing alone on your own subjectivity which can always be so easily dismissed on the grounds of pure subjectivity (which can never be observed, verified or confirmed by anything other than your own word).

Michael

Nov 30th 2009, 09:44 PM

This origin of morality debate is nothing more then an extension the old Theistic vs Atheistic debate. Atheists, in general, demand that assertions be stated in a falisifiable manner. Without plausible falsifiability there is no merit to the assertion, as you can simply justify the assertion using circular logic. With falisifiability comes the ability to disprove the assertion through reason or evidence. If a person truly holds that morality is by definition imbued by God, there is no ammount of reason or logic that can effect this assertion, to sway the believer they are wrong requires emotional persuation and not sound reasoning, as the belief is not based on logic. This is an inherent property of Dogma.
I should call you grasshopper! :D

I remember introducing the "falsifiability" argument back at Martin's forum - oh so long ago. It is a powerful argument indeed. You should know that Karl Popper is the true origin of it, not I. :)

And, to add to Michael's comment, if you want to get into the morality debate that involves God I'm the person to talk to :D.

Indeed! ;)

Though, I'm not above playing switch-hitter on that debate. I like to craft my positions very carefully to permit the religious realm its space. There are quite a few cross-over arguments between the religious view and my own. I won't defend God, but I will defend a place for God to exist. ;)

To be quite honest, Michael and Dilettante's superior reasoning skills went far over my head ages ago, but I still like to read the debate. I think this whole thread should be nominated for best posts of the week.
I hardly think that's true, though it is a pretty darn good argument, even if I do say so myself. ;)

Non Sequitur

Nov 30th 2009, 09:51 PM

Indeed! ;)

Though, I'm not above playing switch-hitter on that debate. I like to craft my positions very carefully to permit the religious realm its space. There are quite a few cross-over arguments between the religious view and my own. I won't defend God, but I will defend a place for God to exist. ;)

haha I'll take that. It's more than most people give me.

dilettante

Dec 3rd 2009, 10:12 AM

To be quite honest, Michael and Dilettante's superior reasoning skills went far over my head ages ago, but I still like to read the debate. I think this whole thread should be nominated for best posts of the week.

I had no idea we had an audience. I half-suspected that this thread was turning into a private conversation. Anyway, from what I've seen of your posts before, I doubts there's anything here beyond your reasoning abilities.

I can't help but wonder how this discussion over the nature of morality might have gone in an entirely different direction if I were having it with you instead of with Michael (or if it were Michael and you instead of me).

dilettante

Dec 3rd 2009, 10:22 AM

If you state that you believe that your own "moral reality" has some origin outside your head, that is all entirely subjective - it is all predicated upon you (i.e. your reality, your belief). It is subjective and relative by definition. Ergo, I don't object to you using this formula as it doesn't contradict my thesis.

It is only when you emphatically assert that the "outside your own head" part exists in any way other than your own subjective faith that I have a problem with it as it then just assumes your argument is correct. The assertion becomes both premise and conclusion at the same time (just like most God-based faith statements) which is logically non-functional.

To put it simply, your statement about "moral reality" (used in an expansive context rather than a singularly subjective one) assumes the truth of the argument you are trying to defend with nothing more than your own faith to back it up. That's not a reasoned argument - that's a statement of faith.

I’m not trying to present a “reasoned argument” one way or the other here, but to define my use of the term (since there seemed to be some confusion).

Physical reality has an origin. We have whole university departments and massive astronomical apparatus devoted to exporing the details of the origin of our physical reality. We may not have a complete and thorough explanation supported with evidence, but we do have quite a bit of evidence and quite a bit of the explanation down pat (i.e. big bang theory).

If you reject that particular explanation for physical origin, there are countless mythological alternatives (such as the Genesis story in the Bible). But the fact is, most people really do have a very clear belief in this matter - either scientific study can account for the origins of our physical reality or some particular Holy Book can do so. Those who reject both and assert some other specifically undefined mysterious origin may be out there, but I respectfully submit that's exactly what they are - way out there.

Ergo, it is a long-standing demand of human society that the origins of our physical world be explained and understood (by whatever means necessary, be they primative witch-doctors, religious holy books or geeky dudes with Ph.D.'s in physics).

This seems to be an argument that things must have origins because people really, really like for things to have origins and have worked very hard to think up origins for just about everything. Anyway, even big bang theory merely backs the universe up to the singularity; it doesn’t assert an ex nihilo creation of matter (if it did, it would violate “the key principle of the time-space continuum” you laid out in post #102).
I don’t see the logical necessity for something to have a definite origin, nor do I see how ignorance of its origin would be a logical argument against it.

But more importantly, this line of reasoning strays too close to treating morality as if it were some physical “thing” occupying a set quantity of space and time. I don’t think that’s a useful way of thinking about it, nor does it conform to the way people use moral terminology. But I see that it would make more sense to address this below where you ask “where is this morality…”

Secondly, if you assert that this mysterious 'moral reality' is just "out there" and is undefined in origin, then I respectfully submit that you are falling back on the God-argument again because that is identical to the essential argument in defense of God's existence - that God just "is" and this is a matter of faith, regardess of any physical evidence or arguments to the contrary.

If your argument is separate from the God-origin assertion, then it behooves you to explain what that origin is, otherwise it is reasonable to assume it is essentially identical to the God-origin argument (save perhaps some ambiguously mysterious agnostic deism instead of a specific theism).

I find it curious that the only people to introduce God into this discussion are atheists.

And as I’ve said before, no one is denying the necessity of a ‘leap of faith’ in believing in objective morality.

If morality has some existence outside of your own subjectivity, then your own subjectivity becomes essentially irrelevant to the issue of morality. It would not be a matter of your agreement with this or that definition of morality, it would be all about your compliance with the moral reality as it is.

Agreed.

If morality comes from God, then your semantic arguments about God's rules become not-unlike the 'number of angels dancing on the head of a pin'. Either you follow the rules and please God or you break the rules and rot in hell. Very simple that.

??? I don’t recall making any “semantic arguments about God’s rules” ???

It is only when morality is correctly understood to reside in the individual that the individual's own assessment of what is good and what is evil becomes meaningful on its own terms. Any other definition of morality means that your subjective opinion becomes irrelevant. If morality is dependent upon God, or the mysterious "moral reality" that is "out there", then it is meant to be followed, not discussed endlessly (though, I'm only speculating on the last point of course!).

Agreed (with the bolded bit).

This seems to be a case of reduction to the extremes.

Moral relativists do not necessarily hold that all moral systems are absurd and nonsensical that can only be rationally ignored.

Indeed, many moral relativists would argue that there is much to be considered good in the traditional 'Judeo-Christian' moral system. The point here is that they may consider some parts to be good on their own merits, not because they are part of the Judeo-Christian moral system. The Judeo-Christian moral system is given no credence on its own accord.

The line I was attempting to draw was between those who hold that moral statements primarily convey information about reality (external to the speaker) and those who hold that moral statements primarily convey information about the speaker.

E.G. “Vanilla ice cream is tastier than chocolate” is generally recognized to be a subjective opinion; it conveys information about the speaker (that they prefer vanilla to chocolate), but isn’t really intended to tell you anything about the ice cream apart from the speaker.
On the other hand, “This box is heavier than that one” is a statement about external reality; it is meant to convey information about something outside the speaker (i.e. the boxes).

Consequently, the question is whether an individual regards moral/imperative statements (e.g. “It’s wrong to rape and murder children for pleasure” or “Hitler was evil” or “Thou shalt worship only non-stick saucepans”) as being essentially about the speaker or about things external to the speaker (e.g. rape and murder, Hitler, or the worship of non-stick saucepans).

A consistent moral relativist, as I understand the term, holds such statements to be essentially about the speaker.

And I am reminded here of the fact that the question of "what is good?" is a notoriously atheistic one. Socrates was put to death for atheism specifically (that was the primary legal charge against him).

For a good Christian, the ONLY answer to the question is God or Jesus. If you look at the question without that answer first and foremost, I must question the quality of your religious conviction. file:///C:/Users/USER/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image001.gif

If you can entertain the question, you are being blasphemous.

To question what is good and what is evil, is to live beyond God.

(My appologies to Nietzsche for playing with his most famous words, but this is what Nietzsche meant by using those words as the title of his most important work)

The delicate question of whether “God is good” or “good=God” is an old one and might make a good thread, though I suspect for the vast majority of people here it would be purely academic.

Huh? You are assigning to me the role of sollipsist?

That makes no sense at all since my position can't exist without the counter-argument against sollipsism that supports it.

I’m suggesting that solipsism is to the external world what moral relativism is to external morality.

Clearly, you’re not a solipsist. It was not my intent to imply that you were.

To say "perceive" specifically defines morality as existing outside the individual.

Once again I must say, where is this morality that it can be perceived? Is it just floating in the air?

I've already offered you "culture" but you rightly rejected that as a logical trap (since different cultures tend to show different moralities).

You keep insisting (without any rational basis) that morality exists, of and in itself, without any known origin. Yet you've also rejected human subjectivity, God and human culture as possible explanations of this phenomenum.

Forgive me if I'm getting tired of running around in a circle asking the same question over and over. What is this moral reality that exists outside of human artifice and exists outside of God-artifice?

Answering "it is just out there" is all well and fine for your own subjective consideration. It is not sufficient for rational discussion or analysis.

Morality is an attribute, generally assigned to actions, thoughts, or motivations, but some people seem to believe physical objects can have moral attributes as well.

Earlier I used the example “It’s wrong to rape and murder children for pleasure.” One might list, among the attributes of murdering and raping a child, that it is violent and bloody. One might also add that it is immoral or, more simply, that it is evil. (forgive the extremity of the example – I wanted to pick something which wasn’t controversial)

To include “evil” as an attribute of the action itself (i.e. to assert that such an action is actually wrong, independent of what I or anyone else might think), is to assert an objective morality external to the self. Alternatively, one could merely say that it was evil “to me”, in a subjective sense. In which case one would be asserting that the act was not actually evil in itself, but only in relation to one’s subjective moral code.

This is, perhaps, why I don’t see the point in looking for an “origin” to morality. Looking for an origin to attributes seems silly.

If one cannot provide logical justification, that's because there probably isn't any.

And that's the point. If you are straying over into 'faith alone' to defend your point, you might as well adopt the God argument since it at least has the virtue of popularity rather than standing alone on your own subjectivity which can always be so easily dismissed on the grounds of pure subjectivity (which can never be observed, verified or confirmed by anything other than your own word).

The problem with dismissing anything which cannot provide logical justification is that one ends up back at solipsism, since believing in the external world itself cannot be logically justified.

I’ll repeat this analogy from above (because, to be perfectly honest, I’m rather pleased with it: Solipsism is to the external world what moral relativism is to external morality.

In either case, to go from the former to a belief in the latter requires a logically unjustifiable ‘leap of faith’.

Michael

Dec 6th 2009, 12:03 PM

I’m not trying to present a “reasoned argument” one way or the other here, but to define my use of the term (since there seemed to be some confusion).
But the way you are using this term makes a concrete assertion about the nature and definition of morality. It defines morality as existing "out there".

As a description of your personal opinion, that's fine, but as a potential definition of morality, it is lacks reason, material evidence and/or claim of rationality.

This seems to be an argument that things must have origins because people really, really like for things to have origins and have worked very hard to think up origins for just about everything.
Anyway, even big bang theory merely backs the universe up to the singularity; it doesn’t assert an ex nihilo creation of matter (if it did, it would violate “the key principle of the time-space continuum” you laid out in post #102).
I don’t see the logical necessity for something to have a definite origin, nor do I see how ignorance of its origin would be a logical argument against it.
No one is demanding physical evidence or objective proof of origin.

I'm just asking for some plausible suggestion that some origin might be possible or explicable for this mysterious force you say exists (its "out there").

I've offered several possible explanations (human subjectivity, God or human culture) and they've all be dismissed.

You aren't even trying to explain the nature of this phenomena that you claim is self-evident and obvious. You just say it is "out there" plain and simple. That looks to me exactly like a statement of subjective faith alone.

Thus, the key point about "origin" is not that one must be known or proven, but rather, something plausible must be available to suggest possible origin.

I'm not going to let this discussion turn into a challenge of me having to prove a negative. You are making a positive assertion that morality is "out there". You belief this to be so, yet you offer no reason or explanation of this phenomenum except your own faith that it is so.

And in particular, you offer this argument of the nature of morality in direct contradiction of asserted alternative definitions of morality that are supported with rational arguments, reasoned explanations of origin and even some circumstantial physical evidence.

The point here is that the onus is on you to support your argument, not on me to prove the negative.

But more importantly, this line of reasoning strays too close to treating morality as if it were some physical “thing” occupying a set quantity of space and time. I don’t think that’s a useful way of thinking about it, nor does it conform to the way people use moral terminology. But I see that it would make more sense to address this below where you ask “where is this morality…”
Culture is equally nebulous, yet we do speak rationally about origins and reasons for its various elements.

It is not necessary to define something absolutely and objectively (as that is impossible to do anyway). As I noted above, the lack of absolute precision in definition does not negate the utility or rationality of attempting a definition. Plausibility is sufficient when one is engaged in speculation.

I find it curious that the only people to introduce God into this discussion are atheists.
If your argument didn't keep appearing identical to the 'God exists' argument, I wouldn't mention it. ;)

"I believe God exists and you can't prove that God doesn't exist".

That's the 'God-argument' in my shorthand expression. It appears to be identical to the argument that you are advancing in defense of your assertion about the existence of "moral reality" being "out there".

Agreed (with the bolded bit).
So you agree that morality is meant to be followed, but you assert that it is just mysteriously out there? Who means for that morality to be followed?

And what is the mechanism of transmission of this 'moral reality' stuff? How does any individual become aware of it?

The line I was attempting to draw was between those who hold that moral statements primarily convey information about reality (external to the speaker) and those who hold that moral statements primarily convey information about the speaker.

E.G. “Vanilla ice cream is tastier than chocolate” is generally recognized to be a subjective opinion; it conveys information about the speaker (that they prefer vanilla to chocolate), but isn’t really intended to tell you anything about the ice cream apart from the speaker.
On the other hand, “This box is heavier than that one” is a statement about external reality; it is meant to convey information about something outside the speaker (i.e. the boxes).
Those are nice and neat categories that work fairly well with simple examples.

I respectfully submit that most of life's moral questions don't fit in such nice neat categories of exclusively 'internal' or 'external'.

Indeed, the assertion about vanilla ice cream is exactly the kind of statement that many do believe can be stated objectively on external facts. That one particular flavor of ice cream just is better than the other. Just like one particular skin color or one particular religion is by definition, better than the others. This is highly subjective internalism projected to exist as external physical absolutism (aka "objectivism").

Consequently, the question is whether an individual regards moral/imperative statements (e.g. “It’s wrong to rape and murder children for pleasure” or “Hitler was evil” or “Thou shalt worship only non-stick saucepans”) as being essentially about the speaker or about things external to the speaker (e.g. rape and murder, Hitler, or the worship of non-stick saucepans).

A consistent moral relativist, as I understand the term, holds such statements to be essentially about the speaker.
That strikes me as incorrect.

If its all about the speaker, then that's moral subjectivism, not relativism.

Questions about raping children for pleasure, when looked at from a perspective of moral relativism entertains the questions of "is this actually a real child?" or "is this actually rape?" or "is this actually harmful?". These questions seek to place the alleged act into the context of its actual reality and tends to disregard various abstract, mythological, religious or cultural assertions that "rape of children is evil" by some mysterious command.

That is to say, moral relativism is not all about you. Moral relativism is all about dismissing the authority of mythology and subjective faith and judging things on their own merit, without appeal to some external moral authority or subjective emotion. Moral relativism denies the implicit authority of external moral commands and subjective whim.

Moral relativism does not necessarily deny the utility of external moral commands (it only denies their absolute objective authority).

The delicate question of whether “God is good” or “good=God” is an old one and might make a good thread, though I suspect for the vast majority of people here it would be purely academic.
My point was only to assert that to ask the question is to deny/doubt God by definition.

If you admit the question, you are commiting blasphemy.

I’m suggesting that solipsism is to the external world what moral relativism is to external morality.
I think you are confusing 'moral relativism' with 'moral subjectivity'.

They are very different things, though I do admit that manny people do tend to blur them together for their own subjective moral convenience. Using the accepted principle of moral relativism to soothe their own consciences when they act in a way that is morally subjective.

To use your own 'external-internal' dichotomy, moral relativism is an externally directed concept (it applies to authority). Moral subjectivism is an entirely internal concept (it is inside your head).

Morality is an attribute, generally assigned to actions, thoughts, or motivations, but some people seem to believe physical objects can have moral attributes as well.

Earlier I used the example “It’s wrong to rape and murder children for pleasure.” One might list, among the attributes of murdering and raping a child, that it is violent and bloody. One might also add that it is immoral or, more simply, that it is evil. (forgive the extremity of the example – I wanted to pick something which wasn’t controversial)

To include “evil” as an attribute of the action itself (i.e. to assert that such an action is actually wrong, independent of what I or anyone else might think), is to assert an objective morality external to the self. Alternatively, one could merely say that it was evil “to me”, in a subjective sense. In which case one would be asserting that the act was not actually evil in itself, but only in relation to one’s subjective moral code.

This is, perhaps, why I don’t see the point in looking for an “origin” to morality. Looking for an origin to attributes seems silly.
Actually, I think you are demonstrating here precisely why questioning the origin of any given moral assertion is particularly relevant.

Understanding the context of the use of the term "evil" is very important information. In some contexts, the term might mean some absolute objective evil, in some other contexts, the term might be an emphatic statement of something you don't like. Knowing the difference is very important to understanding the context of the issue - the term of "evil" in itself tells you nothing. The 'origin' of the assertion of evil becomes the most important 'quality' to descern if one seeks understanding and not just judgement.

The problem with dismissing anything which cannot provide logical justification is that one ends up back at solipsism, since believing in the external world itself cannot be logically justified.

I’ll repeat this analogy from above (because, to be perfectly honest, I’m rather pleased with it: Solipsism is to the external world what moral relativism is to external morality.

In either case, to go from the former to a belief in the latter requires a logically unjustifiable ‘leap of faith’.

As I noted above, no one is demanding absolute proof of origin here. You are quite right that an absense of absolute proof of origin is not a good reason to dismiss something out of hand. But for those things where absolute proof of origin is not possible, it is sufficient to supply plausible or possible explanations of origin.

If you can't do that, you are left with "subjective faith alone" - which as I also previously noted, is perfectly well and fine for you to believe in. You just can't claim that it is rational or expect others to accept your word.

dilettante

Dec 21st 2009, 11:05 PM

Finally, a reply! The last couple weeks of the semester pretty much sucked my brain dry and it's been hard to find an hour or so of quality mental energy to spare. Sorry for the delay.

But the way you are using this term makes a concrete assertion about the nature and definition of morality. It defines morality as existing "out there".
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The point here is that the onus is on you to support your argument, not on me to prove the negative.

As I've said before, I'm not trying to present an argument or persuade anyone here; I'm just explaining my views. You began this thread because you said you were "curious" about people who believed morality represented something more than "pure human artifice (or expediency, whim or caprice)".

If your argument didn't keep appearing identical to the 'God exists' argument, I wouldn't mention it. file:///C:/Users/USER/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image001.gif

"I believe God exists and you can't prove that God doesn't exist".

That's the 'God-argument' in my shorthand expression. It appears to be identical to the argument that you are advancing in defense of your assertion about the existence of "moral reality" being "out there".

Again, not trying to make an argument or a defense (as both would imply an appeal to a rational basis which I think is out of place in this regard).

So you agree that morality is meant to be followed, but you assert that it is just mysteriously out there? Who means for that morality to be followed?

And what is the mechanism of transmission of this 'moral reality' stuff? How does any individual become aware of it?

"meant to be followed" is the definition of morality. Moral imperatives, by definition, are what should [not] be done. An objective morality would be what should [not] done regardless of anyone individual; that's the point about objectivity reality in any sense: it exists as it is regardless of any individuals subjective perspective.

Those are nice and neat categories that work fairly well with simple examples.

I respectfully submit that most of life's moral questions don't fit in such nice neat categories of exclusively 'internal' or 'external'.

Indeed, the assertion about vanilla ice cream is exactly the kind of statement that many do believe can be stated objectively on external facts. That one particular flavor of ice cream just is better than the other. Just like one particular skin color or one particular religion is by definition, better than the others. This is highly subjective internalism projected to exist as external physical absolutism (aka "objectivism").

Well, simple examples work best for illustration.
And sure, one could believe that their preference in ice cream was objective (and one could believe that boxes had different masses for different people). But since I doubted anyone here fell into category, it seemed like a fruitful analogy.

That strikes me as incorrect.

If its all about the speaker, then that's moral subjectivism, not relativism.

Questions about raping children for pleasure, when looked at from a perspective of moral relativism entertains the questions of "is this actually a real child?" or "is this actually rape?" or "is this actually harmful?". These questions seek to place the alleged act into the context of its actual reality and tends to disregard various abstract, mythological, religious or cultural assertions that "rape of children is evil" by some mysterious command.

That is to say, moral relativism is not all about you. Moral relativism is all about dismissing the authority of mythology and subjective faith and judging things on their own merit, without appeal to some external moral authority or subjective emotion. Moral relativism denies the implicit authority of external moral commands and subjective whim.

Moral relativism does not necessarily deny the utility of external moral commands (it only denies their absolute objective authority).

"judging things on their merits" is precisely the point.
Can one make a moral judgment of something based on its own merits (e.g. "raping and murdering a child is evil")? Can things merit moral responses? If the answer is yes, then that's acceptance of an objective morality.

And it seems to me that moral relativism and moral subjectivism still end up in the same place. Let's say that the moral relativist you mention succeeds in placing "the alleged act into the context of its actual reality" and finds that, yes it was actually a real child, yes it was actually a rape, yes it was actually harmful. Was it wrong/evil? At that point he can either give a definitive yes or no (in which cases he's a moral objectivist) or he can appeal to some subjective system or personal opinion (in which case he's the same as the subjectivist, basing all moral questions on subjective points of view).

My point was only to assert that to ask the question is to deny/doubt God by definition.

If you admit the question, you are commiting blasphemy.

I disagree on both counts, but especially the latter; doubt is not blasphemy.

I think you are confusing 'moral relativism' with 'moral subjectivity'.

They are very different things, though I do admit that manny people do tend to blur them together for their own subjective moral convenience. Using the accepted principle of moral relativism to soothe their own consciences when they act in a way that is morally subjective.

To use your own 'external-internal' dichotomy, moral relativism is an externally directed concept (it applies to authority). Moral subjectivism is an entirely internal concept (it is inside your head).

See above. It seems to me that moral relativism can only be "externally directed" when it ignores moral questions; that is to say, it makes externally directed indicative statements (“The 10 Commandments state that one should not murder”) but not externally directed imperative statements (“One should not murder”).

Actually, I think you are demonstrating here precisely why questioning the origin of any given moral assertion is particularly relevant.

Understanding the context of the use of the term "evil" is very important information. In some contexts, the term might mean some absolute objective evil, in some other contexts, the term might be an emphatic statement of something you don't like. Knowing the difference is very important to understanding the context of the issue - the term of "evil" in itself tells you nothing. The 'origin' of the assertion of evil becomes the most important 'quality' to descern if one seeks understanding and not just judgment.

I’d have to defer to an etymologist on the historical origins and use of that particular term. For clarity, I use it here to mean "objective evil" or 'that which should not be'.

As I noted above, no one is demanding absolute proof of origin here. You are quite right that an absense of absolute proof of origin is not a good reason to dismiss something out of hand. But for those things where absolute proof of origin is not possible, it is sufficient to supply plausible or possible explanations of origin.

If you can't do that, you are left with "subjective faith alone" - which as I also previously noted, is perfectly well and fine for you to believe in. You just can't claim that it is rational or expect others to accept your word.

And I’ll say yet again that I’ve never made any claim to complete rationality, nor have I been attempting to persuade anyone to take my word.

Here's a condensed rundown of where I'm at here:
I find a fully amoral world to be mentally unsustainable. And without some sort of objective moral core, without some bedrock of things that are objectively good/evil for their own sakes, there can be no morality of any kind. To put it another way, since you can never derive an imperative from the purely indicative, unless there is some imperative foundation then there can be no imperatives at all.
I find that I can't continue to believe that for any period of time, regardless of its rationality or lack there of. I can't (without effort) believe that raping and murdering a child for pleasure, to list one example, is not objectively wrong. And I find that most people seem to talk and act as if some things really were right and wrong, though that's just an observation not a justification for anything.
I find the mental unsustainability of belief in such an amoral world to be similar to that of belief in a purely subjective world (i.e. solipsism), so I use that as an analogy. In both cases, escaping complete subjectivism requires a 'leap-of-faith' which is both completely lacking in logical justification and, at least in my case, almost involuntary.

Michael

Jan 12th 2010, 08:55 PM

As I've said before, I'm not trying to present an argument or persuade anyone here; I'm just explaining my views. You began this thread because you said you were "curious" about people who believed morality represented something more than "pure human artifice (or expediency, whim or caprice)".
Fair enough. I'll drop the demand that your argument conform to rationality.

"meant to be followed" is the definition of morality. Moral imperatives, by definition, are what should [not] be done. An objective morality would be what should [not] done regardless of anyone individual; that's the point about objectivity reality in any sense: it exists as it is regardless of any individuals subjective perspective.
Please see below.

Well, simple examples work best for illustration.
And sure, one could believe that their preference in ice cream was objective (and one could believe that boxes had different masses for different people). But since I doubted anyone here fell into category, it seemed like a fruitful analogy.
It was an excellent analogy since I was able to turn it around and aim it right back at you to illustrate my argument! :D

As you ought to know well by now, I just love simple little analogies like that, though if you introduce them, I'm likely to use them in ways that you might not expect (and not let them go). I think preferences for 'the best' ice cream flavor is a perfect analogy for this topic for many reasons.

"judging things on their merits" is precisely the point. Can one make a moral judgment of something based on its own merits (e.g. "raping and murdering a child is evil")? Can things merit moral responses? If the answer is yes, then that's acceptance of an objective morality.
How do I square this statement with the one above where I stated "see below"?

Above you say morality exists independent of subjective preference. Yet here you say that morality can come from a subjective preference (judging on its own merits - which means in reality, the subjective interpretation of the issue).

This is why I keep poking at your statements with pointed questions. It isn't so much that I agree or disagree, it is that I don't understand the process you are describing.

And it seems to me that moral relativism and moral subjectivism still end up in the same place. Let's say that the moral relativist you mention succeeds in placing "the alleged act into the context of its actual reality" and finds that, yes it was actually a real child, yes it was actually a rape, yes it was actually harmful. Was it wrong/evil? At that point he can either give a definitive yes or no (in which cases he's a moral objectivist) or he can appeal to some subjective system or personal opinion (in which case he's the same as the subjectivist, basing all moral questions on subjective points of view).
Moral relativism and moral subjectivism will end up in the same place if you define them the same way. :shrug:

Using your example of 'raping a child', a moral subjectivist rapist might assert that your opposition to their action is just your self-serving jealousy (wanting to keep the child-sex-object for yourself). That's not morality, that's just self-interest. That is an example of moral subjectivity. It is all about you, your feelings and your perspective (or the rapist's).

Moral relativism is an entirely different thing. Moral relativism essentially only eliminates the infamous 'appeal to authority' argument for absolute justification. That's it, that's all. To follow the same example, our (admitted) moral-relativist child-rapist might say that you have no right to judge him based on the self-serving rules of a capitalist-fascist dictatorship.

I disagree on both counts, but especially the latter; doubt is not blasphemy.
Having a doubt, no, that's not blasphemy. But expressing it? That certainly is blasphemy to the orthodox and has always been punished as blasphemy (aka heresey) up until modern times.

See above. It seems to me that moral relativism can only be "externally directed" when it ignores moral questions; that is to say, it makes externally directed indicative statements (“The 10 Commandments state that one should not murder”) but not externally directed imperative statements (“One should not murder”).

Moral relativism does not necessarily preclude the statement "thou shalt not commit murder". Moral relativism merely asserts that the fact that Moses & God allegedly asserted this is essentially irrelevant to the fact that "thou shalt not commit murder". The statement "thou shalt not commit murder" can be asserted on its own essential merits without reference or relevance to any God or tablets.

Moral relativism merely holds that no particular moral authority is actually morally authorative. That does not mean that any given morality cannot be morally imperative.

And I’ll say yet again that I’ve never made any claim to complete rationality, nor have I been attempting to persuade anyone to take my word.
This protestation starts to wear thin when it follows immediately after your attempt to make a rationalist critique the moral relativist position. That issue ought have nothing to do with your description of your viewpoint in the context of making no claim of rationality. :shrug:

Bethatasitmay, all of this doesn't matter because it is your last paragraph where the action is! :D

(to follow in its own post - I accidentally 'posted' my reply before I was finished composing it)

Michael

Jan 12th 2010, 09:37 PM

Here's a condensed rundown of where I'm at here:
I find a fully amoral world to be mentally unsustainable. And without some sort of objective moral core, without some bedrock of things that are objectively good/evil for their own sakes, there can be no morality of any kind. To put it another way, since you can never derive an imperative from the purely indicative, unless there is some imperative foundation then there can be no imperatives at all.
I find that I can't continue to believe that for any period of time, regardless of its rationality or lack there of. I can't (without effort) believe that raping and murdering a child for pleasure, to list one example, is not objectively wrong. And I find that most people seem to talk and act as if some things really were right and wrong, though that's just an observation not a justification for anything.
I find the mental unsustainability of belief in such an amoral world to be similar to that of belief in a purely subjective world (i.e. solipsism), so I use that as an analogy. In both cases, escaping complete subjectivism requires a 'leap-of-faith' which is both completely lacking in logical justification and, at least in my case, almost involuntary.

Excellent! This gets to the heart of the matter.

You are apparently asserting that objective morality is necessary because it is necessary. Or to boil that down further, you are asserting that objective morality is necessary because it is supremely useful. Forgive me if I have reduced your thoughtful words into such simple and stark statements, but that's the esssential character of the position from my philosophic perspective. You are seeking to avoid nihilism and that's a valid and important goal common to many people.

And you will perhaps also forgive me for pointing out that we've arrived at Nietzsche's starting position here. Nietzsche observed that God was dead. Nietzsche mourned the passing of God because Nietzsche was a deeply spiritual and religious man. After his mourning, Nietzsche sought to resolve the problem of how a man should/could live in a world that was beyond good and evil. That is to say, a world stripped bare of all moral absolutes.

Since Nietzsche believed that man was a moral animal, Nietzsche concluded that a man, to be human, must be moral. But in a world without moral absolutes, what could define morality sufficiently to justify or support a man's need for morality? Nietzsche concluded that one's own subjectivity was ultimately the only possible method of achieving this.

Some do accuse Nietzsche of nihilism because of this and I'm not willing (or interested) to defend Nietzsche of that accusation.

What I'm essentially trying to point out here is that it is my personal philosophic or intellectual goal in life to provide a viable alternative to Nietzsche's ugly conclusion. To this end, I respectfully submit that real morality can be created by human collectivities or social groups. This does not resolve the moral relativism problem, but it does provide a route to reconcile radical subjectivity with morality, thus providing a rational basis for 'pseudo-objective' morality (the need for which is manifestly popular with so many people).

Anyway, that just explains my enduring interest in this particular topic and why I keep coming back to it, over and over again, in various forms. This is closely related to my arguments with respect to laws and morality as well as my interest in democracy (and religion). All of these issues intersect precisely here on this topic. :)

* * *

So where do we go from here? I feel that you have essentially satisfied my curiosity about your position on this issue. I have no need to push the point anymore, so we can move on from this discussion. The question is, where?

Does anyone have any suggestions on where to take this topic next? I think we've collectively covered quite a bit of ground here, but still there is much that I'm not satisfied with - but I'm afraid that my particular interest in the topic is not always shared by others. I find that these kinds of threads are excellent ways for me to refine my provisional theory (live testing), so I don't really care which direction we go, all directions are equally good for my purposes. :shrug:

dilettante

Jan 12th 2010, 10:49 PM

If it's alright with you, I'll limit my response to this post since it is, indeed, "where the action is".

Excellent! This gets to the heart of the matter.

You are apparently asserting that objective morality is necessary because it is necessary.

I'll have to stop you here though. My assertion isn't that it's necessary for morality to be objective, but merely that morality is objective. In a cosmic sense, I don't see any reason that it needs to be so; it merely is.

Or to boil that down further, you are asserting that objective morality is necessary because it is supremely useful. Forgive me if I have reduced your thoughtful words into such simple and stark statements, but that's the esssential character of the position from my philosophic perspective. You are seeking to avoid nihilism and that's a valid and important goal common to many people.

And you will perhaps also forgive me for pointing out that we've arrived at Nietzsche's starting position here. Nietzsche observed that God was dead. Nietzsche mourned the passing of God because Nietzsche was a deeply spiritual and religious man. After his mourning, Nietzsche sought to resolve the problem of how a man should/could live in a world that was beyond good and evil. That is to say, a world stripped bare of all moral absolutes.

Since Nietzsche believed that man was a moral animal, Nietzsche concluded that a man, to be human, must be moral. But in a world without moral absolutes, what could define morality sufficiently to justify or support a man's need for morality? Nietzsche concluded that one's own subjectivity was ultimately the only possible method of achieving this.

Some do accuse Nietzsche of nihilism because of this and I'm not willing (or interested) to defend Nietzsche of that accusation.

What I'm essentially trying to point out here is that it is my personal philosophic or intellectual goal in life to provide a viable alternative to Nietzsche's ugly conclusion. To this end, I respectfully submit that real morality can be created by human collectivities or social groups. This does not resolve the moral relativism problem, but it does provide a route to reconcile radical subjectivity with morality, thus providing a rational basis for 'pseudo-objective' morality (the need for which is manifestly popular with so many people).

It seems to me, at first glance, that this would run smack into the problem of moving from indicatives to imperatives.

So where do we go from here? I feel that you have essentially satisfied my curiosity about your position on this issue. I have no need to push the point anymore, so we can move on from this discussion. The question is, where?

Does anyone have any suggestions on where to take this topic next? I think we've collectively covered quite a bit of ground here, but still there is much that I'm not satisfied with - but I'm afraid that my particular interest in the topic is not always shared by others. I find that these kinds of threads are excellent ways for me to refine my provisional theory (live testing), so I don't really care which direction we go, all directions are equally good for my purposes. :shrug:

Well, I'm glad to have satisfied your curiosity, anyway,

Perhaps a thread on moral relativism and/or subjectivism?
I really don't see how the latter is anything more than a subset of the former (i.e. morality relative to the individual subject).