Epistemology

[Michael]

I tend to toss this term around quite a bit, so I figured we ought to have a thread for discussions about this topic. If anyone has any questions, please feel free. This is one of those 'meta-topics' of philosophy where there is no such thing as a 'stupid question'. Indeed, most of the brilliant and sublime concepts of epistemology tend to look rather silly and simple.

Here's a couple of quick links. The second one is an excellent source for all kinds of articles in philosophy.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/

As you can see from even a brief glance at either link, this topic can be huge. However, my primary interest in the issue is the beginning stage - which I also consider to be the most important stage as it defines the whole enterprise thereafter. It is at the beginning point where the most critical concepts (faith and reason) meet up with the ultimate extreme (solipsism).

To put my view in a nutshell, I take the radical skeptic position originally introduced by Descartes and use Kant's first principle to get around the solipsism argument. I also take Kant's assertion that God is unknowable to put the issue of religious faith outside the realm of human knowledge. This combination permits science to make temporal claims of knowledge while still permitting religious faith to stand on its own merit, without contradiction.

I'll be happy to explain that further to anyone who is interested. :)

Comments, questions and/or including 'stupid questions' are indeed welcome.

[Daktoria]

OK, so you've been saying we should go at this for a while. :)

To be brief, I'm going to attack internalism and evidentalism on the grounds that reflection upon a mental state is a circular proof for the benchmarks of justification. Not only does it violate the noumenality of intuition to claim that a priori recognition has some sort of diagnostic gauge for saying when it's struck upon phenomenological evidence, but it is also impossible to check for post hoc fallacies when the same tool (the mind) is being used to identify and define important questions, valid methods, and justifiable answers on phenomenological grounds.

Basically, without some a priori synthetic NOUMENAL (reliabilist) benchmark, justification is impossible to find. Furthermore, if we don't recognize the legitimacy of noumenal intuition, then we might as well just all be a brain in a vat or manipulated by an evil demon where free will doesn't matter and justification is completely impossible. Such impossibility is not only due to unreliable measures (which would be self-controlled yet faulty), but also because our minds would be incapable of justification altogether since the vat or demon would control our "justifying" processes anyway.

[Michael]

OK, so you've been saying we should go at this for a while. :)

To be brief, I'm going to attack internalism and evidentalism on the grounds that reflection upon a mental state is a circular proof for the benchmarks of justification. Not only does it violate the noumenality of intuition to claim that a priori recognition has some sort of diagnostic gauge for saying when it's struck upon phenomenological evidence, but it is also impossible to check for post hoc fallacies when the same tool (the mind) is being used to identify and define important questions, valid methods, and justifiable answers on phenomenological grounds.

Basically, without some a priori synthetic NOUMENAL (reliabilist) benchmark, justification is impossible to find. Furthermore, if we don't recognize the legitimacy of noumenal intuition, then we might as well just all be a brain in a vat or manipulated by an evil demon where free will doesn't matter and justification is completely impossible. Such impossibility is not only due to unreliable measures (which would be self-controlled yet faulty), but also because our minds would be incapable of justification altogether since the vat or demon would control our "justifying" processes anyway.
I've read through your reply here a couple times and I'm not sure what context to place it in.

I would say that epistemology is a topic that is 20 chapters long (strictly a euphemism). The first chapter is the most critical one as it addresses the core issue of being and existence. After that, there 19 chapters of arguments about how knowledge can actually justified in practice.

I can't decide if your argument is directed to the 'first chapter' of being or the 'other 19 chapters' of practical justification.

I respectfully submit that there is no 'correct' answer to the 19 chapters of dispute over the 'best' way for knowledge to be justified. There is much room for discussion here, but this can get very technical and specialized.

However, it is the first chapter issues that I find tend to be forgotten along the way. It is this reason that I keep going back to the beginning with this topic and that's the only aspect of the topic that I'm primarily interested in addressing in this thread. Long disputations about the relative merits of different ways of justifying knowledge - after one assumes being and existence - are interesting and challenging - but not the reason I created this thread. This thread is all about the 'first chapter' decisions that have to be made prior to any consideration of phenomena.

[Daktoria]

My argument is dedicated to the internalist versus externalist and evidentalist versus reliabilist debates.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#IVE

[Daktoria]

Also, I think the matter of the first chapter is more accurately portrayed in the existentialist versus essentialist debate than in some epistemological discussion (of which I'm an essentialist heh, no surprise here :)).

[Michael]

Also, I think the matter of the first chapter is more accurately portrayed in the existentialist versus essentialist debate than in some epistemological discussion (of which I'm an essentialist heh, no surprise here :)).
I don't think so. The referenced discussion assumes a resolution of the solipsicsm question and thus is completely beyond 'chapter one'.

What I'm referring to as 'chapter one' is the ground floor of epistemology. It is the knowledge of being. Only after one has come to an understanding of being can one start to make arguments about which knowledge can be justified and which cannot be.

How can you know anything at all? How do you know you even exist? That's the level of 'chapter one' issues.

Arguing about the ways of justification of any given knowledge AFTER ONE ASSUMES KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE, is what I'm calling 'chapter 2-20'. Your argument is clearly 'chapter 2-20'. At 'chapter one' there is only "I think, therefore I am" kind of stuff.

I stress this because elements that require particular justifications at the first stage remain for all subsequent stages and I find that issue to be overlooked all too often.

[Daktoria]

I read your last response a couple of days ago and a couple of days before that, but even though I've read it a third time now, I still can't identify what you want to talk about. Cogito is a universally accepted premise in thought just as much as solipsism is a universally rejected one, so the only thing I can think of you wanting to talk about is rationalism versus empiricism.

Discussing semantics between say Descartes and Hume really isn't my cup to tea though, heh. Nevermind how I'm not a literary expert and how deconstruction really doesn't get anywhere, but I'm afraid that I'm either going to miss what you want to talk about or forgo epistemology altogether if I bring up a point.

In any case, I introduced the matter of essentialism versus existentialism to address what encapsulates the human experience and human being. This is something that is closely tied to the evidence versus reliable facility debate because emphasizing entities or emphasizing qualities as a foundation for JTB leads to drastically different results.

Could you just clarify and specify what you want to talk about?

[Michael]

Could you just clarify and specify what you want to talk about?

Roger that! :)

The best place to begin is always at the beginning...

Cogito ergo sum. I think, therefore I am. That's the ground floor of defining subjectivity and human awareness of being. It is a statement of subjective being. It is also a claim of knowledge.

Unfortunately, that's all it really is. Cogito ergo sum expresses the fact that "I" exist, but it doesn't prove that "you" or the rest of the planet actually exists. I may just be a figment of my own imagination. Or "I" might be real and the rest of what I perceive is just a big elaborate illusion created by some god-like being to test me. Or one's own perceptions of the outer world might just be mistaken or delusions of my own imagination, or perhaps distorted by some disease of the body affecting one's senses.

Thus, it is reasonable for a human being to claim to "know" their own subjective existence, but there is no way they can do the same for claims about what exists outside of their own subjective consciousness. This is the challenge of solipsism.

There are two principal methods of overcoming the challenge of solipsism. One can use faith in a supernatural deity, or one can use faith in the rationality of the time-space continuum. In either case, a leap of faith is required. True knowledge is limited only to the purely subjective. For all claims of knowledge of things outside of one's own subjectivity, this original 'leap of faith' is necessary.

My reason for raising this issue is to draw attention to the ultimate ground upon which all claims of knowledge must stand - and that is a point of faith. No claim of true knowledge can exist - other than one's own utterance of 'cogito ergo sum', without the use of faith.

That being said, once this original leap of faith is recognized as necessary to the definition of human knowledge, human beings can and do make referential claims of knowledge and this is meaningful as knowledge. But since all claims of knowledge are predicated upon human faith, we must be mindful of the potential for error at all times and the inherent limitations of human awareness.

Thus, when scientists make claims about scientific 'truths' they always do so by 'couching' their statements with all kinds of qualifiers, like "to the best of our knowledge" or "given the state of our knowledge at this time". These qualifying statements are necessary in order for the scientists to speak about 'truth' and 'facts'. All truth and all facts are ultimately subject to not only the interpretation of individual human subjectivity, but also to the test of time upon which the truth of any given fact may turn.

This is what I'd say constitutes the 'first chapter' aspect of the issue of epistemology. The whole issue of epistemology is of course much larger than this. There is much dispute about how any given assertion or claim of knowledge can be rationally deemed to be justified or not. This is where the majority of epistemological arguments are focused. But it is the 'first' part upon which all the rest must stand, and thus I'm call that the 'first chapter' section of epistemology.

[Daktoria]

OK.

First, let's consider the subjective grammatical structure of Cogito: (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#3) One effort at reply has it that introspection reveals more than what Russell allows—it reveals the subjective character of experience. On this view, there is more to the phenomenal story of being in pain than is expressed by saying that there is pain: in the former case, there is pain plus a point-of-view—a phenomenal surplus that's difficult to characterize except by adding that “I” am in pain, that the pain is mine. Importantly, my awareness of this subjective feature of experience does not depend on an awareness of the metaphysical nature of a thinking subject. If we take Descartes to be using ‘I’ to signify this subjective character, then he is not smuggling in something that's not already there: the “I”-ness of consciousness turns out to be (contra Russell) a primary datum of experience. And though, as Hume persuasively argues, introspection reveals no sense impressions suited to the role of a thinking subject, Descartes, unlike Hume, feels no pressure to reduce all of our concepts to sense impressions. Descartes' idea of the self does ultimately draw on innate conceptual resources.
In other words, in order for pain to be detected, a perspective has to be incorporated unless we want to admit that free will doesn't exist since our phenomenological a posteriori senses would be just a natural manifestation of the universe.

Second, let's consider Descartes' evil demon doubt. That is in order for a deceiver to exist, a deceived must exist as well.

So let's say that a person "meets" another individual but doesn't know if that individual really exists or not. What are the possibilities?

One, the individual actually exists.

Two, the individual is a manifestation of the evil demon.

Three, the individual (and his presentation) are natural manifests of the universe.

OK, so what are the consequences of each possibility?

For one, the person can relax because there's nothing suspicious.

For two, the person should relax because there's nothing he can do about overcoming the demon.

For three, the person has no choice but to relax, or at least it doesn't matter if he doesn't relax, because he doesn't have self-control in the first place.

Ergo, not only is it permissible to believe in others, but it's obligatory as well since the opposite would be self-defeating.

[Michael]

OK.

First, let's consider the subjective grammatical structure of Cogito: (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#3) One effort at reply has it that introspection reveals more than what Russell allows—it reveals the subjective character of experience. On this view, there is more to the phenomenal story of being in pain than is expressed by saying that there is pain: in the former case, there is pain plus a point-of-view—a phenomenal surplus that's difficult to characterize except by adding that “I” am in pain, that the pain is mine. Importantly, my awareness of this subjective feature of experience does not depend on an awareness of the metaphysical nature of a thinking subject. If we take Descartes to be using ‘I’ to signify this subjective character, then he is not smuggling in something that's not already there: the “I”-ness of consciousness turns out to be (contra Russell) a primary datum of experience. And though, as Hume persuasively argues, introspection reveals no sense impressions suited to the role of a thinking subject, Descartes, unlike Hume, feels no pressure to reduce all of our concepts to sense impressions. Descartes' idea of the self does ultimately draw on innate conceptual resources.
In other words, in order for pain to be detected, a perspective has to be incorporated unless we want to admit that free will doesn't exist since our phenomenological a posteriori senses would be just a natural manifestation of the universe.
Not necessarily.

The last line of your quotation says it all - Descartes' idea of the self assumes innate conceptual resources. That's an assertion of faith.

From the solipsist position, pain could be a delusion of the senses or a fantasy of the mind (or a variety of other explanations).

How can one truly know that the pain one 'senses' is in fact physically real if one can't even truly know that one's physical body is real? A supernatural deity could perhaps be causing the sensation of pain to occur in your mind. You can't tell the difference based on your own sensory perceptions alone. Anything is possible.

And I don't believe that Descartes was a very good interpreter of his own philosophic arguments. He was trying to prove God's existence through rationalism, and Descartes totally believed that he had done so - yet he failed miserably (indeed, he is the true origin of intellectual or philosophical atheism because of his 'proof of God' argument). That's an 'epic fail'.

Second, let's consider Descartes' evil demon doubt. That is in order for a deceiver to exist, a deceived must exist as well.

So let's say that a person "meets" another individual but doesn't know if that individual really exists or not. What are the possibilities?

One, the individual actually exists.

Two, the individual is a manifestation of the evil demon.

Three, the individual (and his presentation) are natural manifests of the universe.

OK, so what are the consequences of each possibility?

For one, the person can relax because there's nothing suspicious.

For two, the person should relax because there's nothing he can do about overcoming the demon.

For three, the person has no choice but to relax, or at least it doesn't matter if he doesn't relax, because he doesn't have self-control in the first place.

Ergo, not only is it permissible to believe in others, but it's obligatory as well since the opposite would be self-defeating.
You've just skipped past the solipsism point again.

The evil demon just might be a figment of one's imagination. Or the thought of it might be induced by some supernatural deity. Or it just might be one's own paranoia.

One can't just sweep away these possibilities as inconvenient or silly.

Cogito ergo sum only proves that "I" as a conscious entity exist. It doesn't prove that my body, my physical sensations or the world itself are absolutely real or true.

[Daktoria]

Not necessarily.

The last line of your quotation says it all - Descartes' idea of the self assumes innate conceptual resources. That's an assertion of faith.

From the solipsist position, pain could be a delusion of the senses or a fantasy of the mind (or a variety of other explanations).

How can one truly know that the pain one 'senses' is in fact physically real if one can't even truly know that one's physical body is real? A supernatural deity could perhaps be causing the sensation of pain to occur in your mind. You can't tell the difference based on your own sensory perceptions alone. Anything is possible.

And I don't believe that Descartes was a very good interpreter of his own philosophic arguments. He was trying to prove God's existence through rationalism, and Descartes totally believed that he had done so - yet he failed miserably (indeed, he is the true origin of intellectual or philosophical atheism because of his 'proof of God' argument). That's an 'epic fail'.

Eh, not only is this exactly what the evil demon (brain in a vat) doubt is all about, but it's also exactly what's Kant's consideration regarding transcendental logic is all about as well. We can't know reality in itself, but we have to trust our senses if we're going to appreciate any sense of empiricism; without the senses, physical reality wouldn't matter anyway with regards to reason.

You've just skipped past the solipsism point again.

The evil demon just might be a figment of one's imagination. Or the thought of it might be induced by some supernatural deity. Or it just might be one's own paranoia.

One can't just sweep away these possibilities as inconvenient or silly.

Cogito ergo sum only proves that "I" as a conscious entity exist. It doesn't prove that my body, my physical sensations or the world itself are absolutely real or true.Originally, I was going to include a fourth possibility, and I threw it out because of your dissatisfaction with de Chardin, but now it seems that's it's required.

Since you've ignored (no offense) the possibility of the imagination being a natural manifest of the universe, the only way the imagination could possibly be free willing yet paranoid is if the individual at hand is the creator of the universe who also happened to create the universe's rules. Such would imply that the only "thing" which does "exist" is the imagination itself.

This is a huge problem though because it in turn implies that the imagination is either currently or previously omnipotent, and we know that it is not currently omnipotent because we cannot do whatever we want.*

Similarly, if the imagination was previously omnipotent, then paranoia would only be a result of the imagination being the evil demon itself (such that the deceiver is also the deceived). Regardless of the motive for deception, this makes the pursuits of a priori (rational) understanding and a posteriori (empirical) organization meaningless.

*You could say (transcendentally and/or metaphysically speaking) that "we" don't "know" what we really want, we aren't honestly "trying" to execute what we want, that our discipline to execute has been corroded, that the universe itself is a thought experiment attempting to aggregately resolve the dynamic equilibrium of what we want, etc. However, this is contingent upon the belief that the entire world is a single living complex system which I don't think is a belief you're willing to embrace, so I won't expand along this path unless you change your mind.

[Michael]

Eh, not only is this exactly what the evil demon (brain in a vat) doubt is all about, but it's also exactly what's Kant's consideration regarding transcendental logic is all about as well. We can't know reality in itself, but we have to trust our senses if we're going to appreciate any sense of empiricism; without the senses, physical reality wouldn't matter anyway with regards to reason.

No. One's own sensory perceptions are limited and fallible by definition. They cannot supply 'true knowledge'.

What Kant is getting at there is the application of the 'first principle' of the time-space continuum. If and only if one's sensory perceptions are compatible with a rational interpretation of the time-space continuum, can such sensory perceptions be even assumed to be real.

The point is that it is the time-space continuum that is believed to be 'real' (a matter of faith I might add). One's own sensory perceptions can't entirely be trusted. The only time one's sensory perceptions can be assumed to be reasonable is when they are in accordance with the time-space continuum, but even then they are subject to subjective caprice.

As such, sensory perceptions alone can NEVER supply true knowledge of anything.

By the way, the "brain in a vat" example is merely a modern expression to illustrate the solipsism issue (which originates with Bishop Berkeley) in order to avoid the term "solipsism" which apparently tends to fluster religiously ignorant undergrads. ;)

Originally, I was going to include a fourth possibility, and I threw it out because of your dissatisfaction with de Chardin, but now it seems that's it's required.

Since you've ignored (no offense) the possibility of the imagination being a natural manifest of the universe, the only way the imagination could possibly be free willing yet paranoid is if the individual at hand is the creator of the universe who also happened to create the universe's rules. Such would imply that the only "thing" which does "exist" is the imagination itself.
If imagination was to be a natural manifest of the universe, I demand to know the mechanism of its transmission to human beings. Without that, it is a 'pure faith' assertion and I tend to reject those if any other possible explanations are available.

Secondly, I don't think 'freewill' discussions are all that meaningful. I think one can make pursuasive, valid and irreconcilable arguments on both sides and resolution seems impossible. Between 'faith in God' and 'bio-chemistry' that topic is a quagmire. Indeed, I think the issue is only addressed because of the Christian religious assertion of freewill (or lack thereof). I consider the issue to be ultimately a religious one.

This is a huge problem though because it in turn implies that the imagination is either currently or previously omnipotent, and we know that it is not currently omnipotent because we cannot do whatever we want.*

Similarly, if the imagination was previously omnipotent, then paranoia would only be a result of the imagination being the evil demon itself (such that the deceiver is also the deceived). Regardless of the motive for deception, this makes the pursuits of a priori (rational) understanding and a posteriori (empirical) organization meaningless.

*You could say (transcendentally and/or metaphysically speaking) that "we" don't "know" what we really want, we aren't honestly "trying" to execute what we want, that our discipline to execute has been corroded, that the universe itself is a thought experiment attempting to aggregately resolve the dynamic equilibrium of what we want, etc. However, this is contingent upon the belief that the entire world is a single living complex system which I don't think is a belief you're willing to embrace, so I won't expand along this path unless you change your mind.
You can be sure that I'm quite unlikely to accept the assertion that the universe is a unitary organism. :D

I have no problem with the idea that imagination is impotent. I'd have serious objections to any assertion of a change in status. If status changes, I'd demand to know the mechanism by which the change occurs. If no rational mechanism is available, then one is left with yet another 'faith-based assertion' that ought to be rejected out of hand.

Btw, I have no problem with perceiving humans as suffering delusions and/or a weak ability to actually know what they really want and may in fact be error-prone.

[Daktoria]

No. One's own sensory perceptions are limited and fallible by definition. They cannot supply 'true knowledge'.

What Kant is getting at there is the application of the 'first principle' of the time-space continuum. If and only if one's sensory perceptions are compatible with a rational interpretation of the time-space continuum, can such sensory perceptions be even assumed to be real.

Sounds like you're crossing wires between phenomenal sensibility and nominal understanding here.

Citations, citations.

Ugh, gimme a bit here. I'll find something to show what I'm talking about.

Oh by the way, the premise on intrinsic space and time understanding is controversial because of non-euclidean geometries and various theories of time such as presentism versus eternalism.

[Daktoria]

Wait a minute. Nevermind about the citation (if you want to read about transcendental aesthetic and logic, here it is (http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1442&chapter=97715&layout=html&Itemid=27)).

My reaction against you starting off by saying "no" was that you were interpreting sensibility and understanding differently, but that's not what really going on here.

What you're asking for is a positive proof against solipsism which doesn't make sense because the brain in a vat needs to be affirmed against naturally occurring experiences for the sake of falsifiability.

Say for example:

You look at a balloon.

You question the balloon's existence (or at least that your own senses are... broken).

The presentation of the balloon can only exist naturally, through some sort of... complex presentation machine, or through a self-deceiving imagination.

You have no evidence of such a machine existing.

YOUR imagination (which is self-controlled) has no ability to control things outside of your own body.

Nature, by definition, has to believed in then even though it's still possible that a machine (or untapped potential of the imagination) exists.

I don't know why you're disagreeing with me here because it sounds like what you just said mirrors what I said. The problem is that you have a problem with faith which seems to be personally tied with your problem against religion and Christianity in particular.

However you connected religion and Christianity into this, it beats me. :shrug:

[Daktoria]

If imagination was to be a natural manifest of the universe, I demand to know the mechanism of its transmission to human beings. Without that, it is a 'pure faith' assertion and I tend to reject those if any other possible explanations are available.

Secondly, I don't think 'freewill' discussions are all that meaningful. I think one can make pursuasive, valid and irreconcilable arguments on both sides and resolution seems impossible. Between 'faith in God' and 'bio-chemistry' that topic is a quagmire. Indeed, I think the issue is only addressed because of the Christian religious assertion of freewill (or lack thereof). I consider the issue to be ultimately a religious one.

Well the notion of nature is one where the universe is just a random coincidence where free will doesn't exist. There wouldn't be a mechanism (or a cause), but rather everything would just be spontaneous because that'd be the essence of existence.

Anyway, I'm not asserting a proof of free will here. What I'm saying is that we are obliged should be interested to believe in it considering all the possibilities:Free will exists and we believe in it.
- OK, so now we can appreciate humanity and develop a sense of justice (although we still might fail at what's possible).

Free will doesn't exist and we "believe" in it.
- Well it doesn't matter because it's impossible to "believe" any more than it's possible to "feel" pain anyway.

On the other hand:

Free will exists and we DON'T believe in it.
- Either nihilism or hedonism takes over since we become either too lazy to bother or indulge in marginal entertainment no matter the cost since we can't expect anything (i.e. responsibility, potential, evolution, etc) of humanity.

Free will doesn't exist and we DON'T "believe" in it.
- Well it doesn't matter because it's impossible to "believe" any more than it's possible to "feel" pain anyway.
...I have no problem with the idea that imagination is impotent....That doesn't make sense. An impotent imagination by definition couldn't have created the universe. Entropy is (globally) ever increasing, so the only way an omnipotent imagination could "follow" from an impotent one is if time flowed backwards.

[Michael]

What you're asking for is a positive proof against solipsism which doesn't make sense because the brain in a vat needs to be affirmed against naturally occurring experiences for the sake of falsifiability.

No, my point is that there is no such thing as a "positive proof against solipsism". That's the most important point here.

The only way out of the 'dead-end' of solipsism is some kind of faith.

I don't know why you're disagreeing with me here because it sounds like what you just said mirrors what I said. The problem is that you have a problem with faith which seems to be personally tied with your problem against religion and Christianity in particular.

However you connected religion and Christianity into this, it beats me. :shrug:
Actually, I'm the one pointing at the "faith" argument here.

All human knowledge is predicated on faith. That's the key reason I started this thread. I don't like the way many people tend to gloss over this and make claims about absolute truth based on perceptual knowledge which is inherently impossible.

I'm also skeptical about inate 'a priori' knowledge of any kind (as that smells like just another word for faith - if it is faith, call it faith).

[dannydesiliva]

Meterialists and objectivists can never answer the basic question of epistemology: “How can we know that what our senses tell us corresponds to an external reality?

[Michael]

Meterialists and objectivists can never answer the basic question of epistemology: “How can we know that what our senses tell us corresponds to an external reality?

That's because the question can never be truly answered. Humans can never truly claim to know anything at all - save their own conscious existence.

That's the key lesson of epistemology.

[Non Sequitur]

Originally Posted by Michael
To put my view in a nutshell, I take the radical skeptic position originally introduced by Descartes and use Kant's first principle to get around the solipsism argument. I also take Kant's assertion that God is unknowable to put the issue of religious faith outside the realm of human knowledge. This combination permits science to make temporal claims of knowledge while still permitting religious faith to stand on its own merit, without contradiction.

I'll be happy to explain that further to anyone who is interested. :)

Comments, questions and/or including 'stupid questions' are indeed welcome.

Kant? Yuck!! to quote a professor of mine: "Kant is the downfall of western civilization. You should read Aquinas."

My objections to him primarily focus on how he reduces religion to ethics.

[Michael]

Kant? Yuck!! to quote a professor of mine: "Kant is the downfall of western civilization. You should read Aquinas."

My objections to him primarily focus on how he reduces religion to ethics.
I'm no fan of Kant at all. I just use a couple of his arguments that are particularly useful for very specific purposes.

I think Kant's assertion that God is "unknowable" is critically important as it puts religion outside of scientific argument where it can't be touched by rational critique. This is apparently necessary for the survival of society.

[SMadsen]

Kant? Yuck!! to quote a professor of mine: "Kant is the downfall of western civilization. You should read Aquinas."

My objections to him primarily focus on how he reduces religion to ethics.

I'm no fan of Kant at all. I just use a couple of his arguments that are particularly useful for very specific purposes.

I think Kant's assertion that God is "unknowable" is critically important as it puts religion outside of scientific argument where it can't be touched by rational critique. This is apparently necessary for the survival of society.
Interesting posts when read in succession. One states that Kant is the downfall of a society and the other that his assertions are necessary for survival of society :D

[Zarquon]

I think Kant's assertion that God is "unknowable" is critically important as it puts religion outside of scientific argument where it can't be touched by rational critique. This is apparently necessary for the survival of society.
I regard God as the creation of the human mind and thus eminently open to scrutiny and a concept that we can be do without.
Its not only a comforting concept, but one most of us have a tendency (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20126941.700-born-believers-how-your-brain-creates-god.html) towards, due to our teleological mindset (http://www.amazon.com/Descartes-Baby-Science-Development-Explains/dp/046500783X).
Or read Phil Zuckerman's Society Without God (http://www.amazon.com/Society-without-God-Religious-Contentment/dp/0814797148/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255355332&sr=8-1), a study of religion in Scandinavian society.

[Michael]

Interesting posts when read in succession. One states that Kant is the downfall of a society and the other that his assertions are necessary for survival of society :D


But Non Sequitur asserts (on behalf of some professor) that Kant is "the downfall of western civilization" because he essentially rejects traditional religion.

In Non Sequitur's assertion, "western civilization" and "traditional religion" are held to be one and the same. I think that's nonsense. ;)

[SMadsen]

Or read Phil Zuckerman's Society Without God (http://www.amazon.com/Society-without-God-Religious-Contentment/dp/0814797148/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255355332&sr=8-1), a study of religion in Scandinavian society.
From the "2008 Foreword Magazine Book of the Year Award" text on Amazon:

"Instead of being bastions of sin and corruption, however, as the Christian Right has suggested a godless society would be, these countries are filled with residents who score at the very top of the 'happiness index' and enjoy their healthy societies, which boast some of the lowest rates of violent crime in the world (along with some of the lowest levels of corruption), excellent educational systems, strong economies, well-supported arts, free health care, egalitarian social policies, outstanding bike paths, and great beer."


Man, I'm glad they didn't forget about the beer :)

[Michael]

From the "2008 Foreword Magazine Book of the Year Award" text on Amazon:

"Instead of being bastions of sin and corruption, however, as the Christian Right has suggested a godless society would be, these countries are filled with residents who score at the very top of the 'happiness index' and enjoy their healthy societies, which boast some of the lowest rates of violent crime in the world (along with some of the lowest levels of corruption), excellent educational systems, strong economies, well-supported arts, free health care, egalitarian social policies, outstanding bike paths, and great beer."


Man, I'm glad they didn't forget about the beer :)
What would a godless utopia be without great beer? :cheers:

[SMadsen]

What would a godless utopia be without great beer? :cheers:
Indeed, the heathen potion :cheers:

[Non Sequitur]

But Non Sequitur asserts (on behalf of some professor) that Kant is "the downfall of western civilization" because he essentially rejects traditional religion.

In Non Sequitur's assertion, "western civilization" and "traditional religion" are held to be one and the same. I think that's nonsense. ;)

well, I just liked the quote from my theology prof to show the distaste for Kant. I actually have a lot of problems with Aquinas too. As i said, my problems with Kant stem from his views on religion (specifically organized religion, but i am biased since i want to be a member of the clergy:)).

Also, I agree that one cannot equate western civilization and traditional religion. We tried that once in the middle ages and, while I think it held society together when it was in need of help, it led to nasty things in the 15th and 16th centuries.