The Future of War

[Michael]

Pentagon warns US arms may be obsolete

America's traditional means of projecting power abroad is growing “increasingly obsolete” and its billion-dollar military hardware could be as ineffectual against future threats as the heavily fortified Maginot line was in defending France against the Nazis, a senior Pentagon adviser has warned.

In a wake-up call to US military chiefs, Andrew Krepinevich, a leading architect of the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, argues that the Pentagon is ill-equipped to counter rising powers such as China, hostile states such as Iran, the threat from irregular forces such as Hezbollah, and terrorists such as Al-Qaeda. It is also wasting billions on weaponry that could be outdated before it rolls off the production line.

In an interview, Krepinevich said the military, like many bureaucracies, was in danger of “drinking its own bathwater” and discounting new challenges, including the proliferation of precision-guided weapons and threats from space and cyberspace. Last week Robert Gates, the defence secretary, rewarded him for his prescience with a seat on the influential defence policy board at the Pentagon.

Aircraft carriers, navy destroyers, short-range fighter aircraft and forward bases such as Guam and Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean are becoming increasingly vulnerable to technology and tactics being developed by America’s rivals, Krepinevich argues in the July issue of Foreign Affairs journal.


Source-TimesUK (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6638694.ece)

I've been reading more and more about these military issues lately. Seems like we are at a juncture where technology is making older weapons systems obsolete. And as in the past, that has always signaled the beginning of arms races. In naval affairs, that's exactly what appears to be happening already with Russia, China, India, Brazil, Turkey and Indonesia (to name the biggest builders) all launching dozens of brand new small-fast warships over the last few years (or in construction).

Seems to me the US is the one that is caught in the crossroads here facing some really big, really serious long term strategic defense choices. And a cursory review of the issue suggests that the US is going to 'double-down' on big high-technology platforms and all that entails.

Personally, I think the whole concept of the Carrier Group is now dead in the water (or any future planning scenarios need to assume this). Assymetrical warfare is the biggest major threat and the US is notably unprepared to deal with that eventuality.

[Michael]

Here's the core problem - strictly in terms of the US Navy budget as an example. The same idea appears to apply to most of the Pentagon budget. Status quo is massively expensive and getting more so.

Once you strip away all the funding of operations, payroll, maintenance and administration, the US Navy has about $12 billion per year to spend on building new ships (2010-2020 period). This amount will probably rise with the inflation rate, but that's about all the Navy can actually count on for funding new ships over the next decade.

Strategic priority number one for the US Navy are the submarines. These are the 'Boomers' and attack-boats that comprise a primary component of US nuclear defense and thus are politically untouchable. US Navy needs to build 1.5 new subs each year over the next ten years just to maintain present numbers of subs due to the age of the present fleet and scheduled equipment retirements. This level of sub construction will absorb 50% of all available construction funding.

At the same time, in order to maintain the present (11 or 12) operational Carrier Groups, due to a similar cycle of replacing aging ships, this will require slightly more than half the remaining construction budget funds.

That leaves about $2 billion per year to purchase just about every other category of ship the US Navy might want to build. And it ignores potential cost over-runs on the above named projects.

And that amount of money is, insufficient to pay for any other new generation warship which the Navy may be considered to be in particular need of.

That's not enough money to pay for one DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer or enough to build the Littoral Combat Ship program.

As such, the US Navy may maintain the most massive and powerful strategic weaponry on the planet for decades to come, but it may be increasingly challenged when dealing with low-level, assymetrical and/or coastal conflicts, lacking the kind of hardware needed to deal with this type of potential threat.

The key point being that it is this latter category of threat that is most likely to arise in the near future as so many nations are presently engaged in building a Naval building-boom right now. Lots of small warships are presently coming on line from China, India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia and Australia. This is not about 'blue-water' fleets - this is all about 'litoral' regions (coastal).

This is the budget math that forces a deep consideration of the US commitment to the Carrier Groups as the primary US Naval asset. Doing so may preclude US leadership in the litoral category of operations. I don't see any massive increase in the Navy/Pentagon budget coming along either.

So the question is, should the US Navy cut back on the Carrier Groups (cut the replacement cycle in half which would cut the number of Carrier Groups in half) in order to fund the new generation destroyers and litoral combat ships the Navy may need? Or should the Navy stick to the status quo and just keep pouring everything into the Carrier Groups and subs?

I'm certainly of the opinion that the day of the Carrier Group is passing now. It is still a massively powerful weapon and still very useful, but over the next 10-20 years, I just don't see it being quite as powerful and useful as it has been in the past. I see a much greater US Navy need for smaller ships like the DDG1000 and the LSC program. As the budget numbers stand, the Navy won't be building either of these ships in any numbers beyond a half dozen in total, which is no where near what is needed. As the budget numbers stand, the best the Navy can do is buy more DDG51's which are a 25 year old design just to fill the gap.

And that last option isn't a bad one. While I'm impressed with US high tech weapon systems, I must say that networked technology is only as good as the network and 21st century warfare is almost certain to target networks. As such, I think it is good to have weapon-technologies that are not dependent on network connections - and a 25 year old destroyer is exactly that.

(I guess I'm just arguing with myself here about the DDG1000 vs DDG51)