Morality & Moral Relativism

[Michael]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

[andrewl]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

Is it possible to have a morality that is objective but does not require any belief in God?

Andrew

[Michael]

Is it possible to have a morality that is objective but does not require any belief in God?
Ostensibly yes. Kant's moral system comes to mind, though many have pointed out that Kant's system is inherently problematic in application.

[Dominick]

Ostensibly yes. Kant's moral system comes to mind, though many have pointed out that Kant's system is inherently problematic in application.
That appears to be a monumental contradiction with your "everything is subjective" mantra ?

Incidentally, Kant's main ideas were scooped by over a thousand years by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya.

[Korimyr the Rat]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

Is it possible to justify any morality besides your own subjectivity in a world where it isn't? Your only real options are either your own subjectivity or someone else's; if you cannot demostrate that another person's moral values are objectively superior to your own, why would you ever prefer them to your own?

[Dominick]

Is it possible to justify any morality besides your own subjectivity in a world where it isn't? Your only real options are either your own subjectivity or someone else's; if you cannot demostrate that another person's moral values are objectively superior to your own, why would you ever prefer them to your own?
How could you objectively demonstrate that some moral system is superior to another ? The argument would always include either racial or nationalist or religious or political or any kind of axioms saying "Ours is best just because it is ours". Whatever criteria one would use in such an argument they would always contain circular reasoning whereby a system is evaluated against criteria that are already part of the objectives of that system.

[Donkey]

I would say there is no absolute justification of morality possible.

[Michael]

That appears to be a monumental contradiction with your "everything is subjective" mantra ?
Not really. I don't accept Kant's moral system as either viable or objective.

Incidentally, Kant's main ideas were scooped by over a thousand years by Ādi Śaṅkarācārya.
That's interesting, but hardly unique. The ideas of most famous philosophers can be found expressed in some way in some earlier or more obscure (or 'lost') writers.

[Leprechaun]

I hold the belief that morality is a construct of man and no objective morality, objective rights or anything of the sort exists and as such I often find myself arguing with the irrational 'objectivists' that seem to breed in internet forums.

[Donkey]

I hold the belief that morality is a construct of man and no objective morality, objective rights or anything of the sort exists and as such I often find myself arguing with the irrational 'objectivists' that seem to breed in internet forums.
How can you say that they are both constructed and do not exist?

They may not have existed prior to construction, it most certainly does now. I would also argue that while much of morality is constructed by man, many aspects of various moralities are derived by man from nature.

[andrewl]

Ostensibly yes. Kant's moral system comes to mind, though many have pointed out that Kant's system is inherently problematic in application.

As is the application of god.

I'm going to say no, but go even further and note that it is not even desirable to have a fixed objective moral system. I prefer moral systems that can change with our constantly changing situation.

Andrew

[Michael]

How can you say that they are both constructed and do not exist?

They may not have existed prior to construction, it most certainly does now. I would also argue that while much of morality is constructed by man, many aspects of various moralities are derived by man from nature.

Human morality may be constructed, yet "objective" morality doesn't exist. That's not a contradiction.

The key is the qualification of "objective".

[bug]

I think a prime example of people trying to construct a system of objective morality in the midst of changing issues is that horrific WWJD craze we had awhile back. It was a way to try to make an old set of basic morals instruct you also on how to live (and guide each specific decision) in a world where things exist that did not when your chosen code of morals were set. The problems and potential disagreements that could arise from this are self-evident. If morals have no room to adapt and change over time, they become extinct.

[partofme]

I hold the belief that morality is a construct of man and no objective morality, objective rights or anything of the sort exists and as such I often find myself arguing with the irrational 'objectivists' that seem to breed in internet forums.

This...

[dilettante]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

Is it possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity?

These sorts of questions always seem to devolve back to the fundamental axiom that an individual cannot possibly get outside their own subjectivity, which isn't really philosophically as significant as it sounds as it's something of a tautology.

So unless "justify" is defined and bounded with some set of assumed processes and givens, then the answer is categorically "No. It is not possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity."

[Daktoria]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

No, but in a world without absolutes, justice doesn't exist anyway.

Relativism's probably the most depressing idea anyone ever came up with. You can't establish anything as acceptable unless multiple parties are biased in the same way with aligned ulterior motives, and it basically reduces the world to extreme nihilism where nothing bears any meaning at all.

[Daktoria]

Ostensibly yes. Kant's moral system comes to mind, though many have pointed out that Kant's system is inherently problematic in application.

Nonononono. I'll bring up quotes later about this, but Kant recognized that we must believe in God despite how there isn't any proof of God's existence in order to maintain goodwill and motivation.

Ironically (and I'll bring up quotes on this too), Nietzsche similarly believed that if the death of God occurred inauspiciously, hastily, immaturely, or without comprehensive appreciation of morality that mankind would falter from achieving the ubermensch and decay into the last man.

[Korimyr the Rat]

How could you objectively demonstrate that some moral system is superior to another ? The argument would always include either racial or nationalist or religious or political or any kind of axioms saying "Ours is best just because it is ours".

Exactly so.

Ironically (and I'll bring up quotes on this too), Nietzsche similarly believed that if the death of God occurred inauspiciously, hastily, immaturely, or without comprehensive appreciation of morality that mankind would falter from achieving the ubermensch and decay into the last man.

And if you look at the modern world, I'd say his prediction was spot on.

[Margot]

Is it possible to justify any morality beyond one's own subjectivity in a world where moral relativism is dominant?

Yes.
I'm going to return to the sociopaths here for just a second, forgive me.

I can look at a sociopath and say "there is something fundamentally different here" and be absolutely right. I am a moral creature. Sociopaths are not. Where does that difference come from? What makes most people all over the whole wide world moral and that select few not? Sociopathy seems to be the natural state for some people. And if amorality is a natural state, then so is morality.

So maybe there is a genetic propensity towards morality. There are some physiological differences between sociopaths and the rest of us, including their "lower than average levels of adrenaline (epinephrine) and norepinephrine", and "extremely low levels of DBH" which are "associated with undersocialized conduct disorder and psychopathy" amongst other differences (which can all be found Here (http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.mealey.html) in the "2.3.3 The role of physiology" section).

Sociopaths act the way that they do because, well, they're simply missing some of the emotions the rest of us rock out on. Most of the people here (I say most because there are, what, about twenty five active members? That means one of us is likely to be a sociopath. Yeah, just chew on that fat) are capable of the love, empathy, guilt, compassion, etc. Not those sociopaths, no way Jose.

That's not to say that they're totally devoid of emotion, though. Psychologist Robert Plutchik has- besides a terrible last name- developed a list of eight primitive emotions: loathing, rage, vigilance, ecstasy, admiration, terror, amazement and grief, all of which seem to be covered by our very own vast range of smiley faces here on DWF. (Side: Click Here (http://www.fractal.org/Bewustzijns-Besturings-Model/Nature-of-emotions.htm) for a pretty visual representation of these emotions). These "primitive" emotions are the realm of the sociopath.

But return to the pretty picture cited above. It's not just the "primitive" emotions listed in it, right? Right. There are more complex emotions there, too. Emotions that have been achieved by people with that snazzy moral propensity. Say what? Yeah, it seems like we (those of us with that moral propensity) achieve those higher, nicer, sweeter, tertiary emotions through that part of us that says "get along with thine neighbor so as not to die".

Here's where I finally get onto the interstate that will take me to the point I've been aiming at. We may have the basic building blocks for morality, but we rely on society for the razzle dazzle bits. The basic tenants of morality are pretty universal ("thou shalt not throw rocks at thy neighbor lest they not help you find food in the winter, or, like, they can throw rocks better than you and stuff"). It's our subjectivity and the relativism in our societies today which allow us to build on that. We can develop our own particular brand of morality based on our own experiences and psychological factors, but in the end it's a little give, and a little more give, and then suddenly we've got something that most of us can more-or-less agree on. We can defend our personal moral criteria against and with the morality of our societies in that way.

Or, for my short answer response: Morality and a population of +1 are like love and marriage or a horse and carriage. You have to have a society to have morality.

[Margot]

Is it possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity?

These sorts of questions always seem to devolve back to the fundamental axiom that an individual cannot possibly get outside their own subjectivity, which isn't really philosophically as significant as it sounds as it's something of a tautology.

So unless "justify" is defined and bounded with some set of assumed processes and givens, then the answer is categorically "No. It is not possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity."

I assumed that "justify" applied to the societal aspect of it, as that's what morality is: a societal code. However, your point is absolutely right.

[Margot]

No, but in a world without absolutes, justice doesn't exist anyway.

Relativism's probably the most depressing idea anyone ever came up with. You can't establish anything as acceptable unless multiple parties are biased in the same way with aligned ulterior motives, and it basically reduces the world to extreme nihilism where nothing bears any meaning at all.

Why does that lead to a shit-hole and not utopia?

[Dominick]

Exactly so.
Which makes it subjective of course.

[Dominick]

No, but in a world without absolutes, justice doesn't exist anyway.

Relativism's probably the most depressing idea anyone ever came up with. You can't establish anything as acceptable unless multiple parties are biased in the same way with aligned ulterior motives, and it basically reduces the world to extreme nihilism where nothing bears any meaning at all.
Moral relativism is just an acceptance of a reality. If you know of a single society in the entire history of mankind where the perception of morality was entirely uniform, I'd be more than interested to hear which it was.
Moral relativism isn't nihilistic. In a secular democracy, that is acceptable which a majority of representatives agrees on that it is. That makes morality a fluid concept but there's nothing wrong with that an sich. Any absolutist morality will sooner or later diverge from the always evolving opinion of the general public and become authoritarian and thus anti-freedom.
Society evolves permanently, therefore morality also does.

[Leprechaun]

How can you say that they are both constructed and do not exist?

They may not have existed prior to construction, it most certainly does now. I would also argue that while much of morality is constructed by man, many aspects of various moralities are derived by man from nature.
I believe that subjective 'morality' (I would say individual preferences rather than morality) exists (in as much as a concept can exist) however objective morality does not

Human morality may be constructed, yet "objective" morality doesn't exist. That's not a contradiction.

The key is the qualification of "objective".
Ah, Michael bet me to it and answered much better than I did :lol:

I also noticed that someone said that people had a predisposition towards morality/amorality however I would say this is merely a predisposition towards certain types of behaviour. The real question is why do you consider the sociopaths behaviour amoral? If the entire world consisted of sociopaths then they might consider you amoral. The real question remains what is moral? and why?

[Daktoria]

Why does that lead to a shit-hole and not utopia?


What is a shit-hole?

What is utopia?

Bla bla bla, in a relativist world nothing exists absolutely, so no definite conditions can exist and all you end up with is a confusing world of chaos in the end where nothing really matters.

[drgoodtrips]

Is it possible to have a morality that is objective but does not require any belief in God?

Andrew

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_(Ayn_Rand)

:lol:

[Leprechaun]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_(Ayn_Rand (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_%28Ayn_Rand))

:lol:
Ah, the religion of objectivism....how wrong it is.

[Michael]

What is a shit-hole?

What is utopia?

Bla bla bla, in a relativist world nothing exists absolutely, so no definite conditions can exist and all you end up with is a confusing world of chaos in the end where nothing really matters.
:rofl:

That is [ostensibly] a valid point. :D

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_(Ayn_Rand)

:lol:
:whogives:

[drgoodtrips]

Ah, the religion of objectivism....how wrong it is.

The Ayn Rand disciples are some of the most amusing folks you'll ever happen across on the internet. It's like a cult that I never knew existed prior to participation in discussion forums.

Though, I do find the general concept of trying to deduce morality to be intriguing. Since you have to establish some axioms or tautologies in the first place, it's necessarily a theoretical exercise, but I think there is some use in prodding people to rationally or deductively justify tenets of their own morality.

[drgoodtrips]

Is it possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity?

These sorts of questions always seem to devolve back to the fundamental axiom that an individual cannot possibly get outside their own subjectivity, which isn't really philosophically as significant as it sounds as it's something of a tautology.

So unless "justify" is defined and bounded with some set of assumed processes and givens, then the answer is categorically "No. It is not possible to justify anything beyond one's own subjectivity."

This kind of makes me wonder. I tend to think of things mathematically because that is more or less the sum-total of my formal training in logical theorizing (I don't believe I've ever taken a philosophy course - mind had titles like "Propositional Logic 300" and things of that nature).

Let's say that we have a universe and that there are 100 sentient beings - call them humans for the sake of clarity. This necessarily means that there are at least 100 subjective realities and thus (bear with me on the deductive leap for the time being) 100 subjective moralities. If there are 101 or more realities in the universe, we have some 'objective' morality, by virtue of the fact that 101 does not correspond to any the humans and thus is not colored by them and non-objective. Of course, this assumes subjective/objective are mutually exclusive, which I take them to be.

But it also introduces the fact that there may theoretically be arbitrarily many realities - 102, 110, X. In this case, we might conceivably have multiple objective realities, which seems like a strange concept to me, but no stranger than my own subjective take, I reckon.

Now, if this is possible, and I refer to my earlier leap that reality=>morality, we could also conclude that there may be many objective moralities (or, at least, non-subjective moralities). They might all float around out there, and some of us might even stumble upon one, but so what?

It seems to me that all humans are really doing, when it comes to morality or even reality, is engaging in an unending set of negotiations with those around them to achieve common ground for whatever purpose the bargainer has in mind - self preservation, comfort, happiness, spite, anger, etc.

On the whole, I'm inclined to believe that objective morality can (and even does) exist, but I'm also inclined not to care about it one way or another.

[Leprechaun]

This kind of makes me wonder. I tend to think of things mathematically because that is more or less the sum-total of my formal training in logical theorizing (I don't believe I've ever taken a philosophy course - mind had titles like "Propositional Logic 300" and things of that nature).

Let's say that we have a universe and that there are 100 sentient beings - call them humans for the sake of clarity. This necessarily means that there are at least 100 subjective realities and thus (bear with me on the deductive leap for the time being) 100 subjective moralities. If there are 101 or more realities in the universe, we have some 'objective' morality, by virtue of the fact that 101 does not correspond to any the humans and thus is not colored by them and non-objective. Of course, this assumes subjective/objective are mutually exclusive, which I take them to be.

But it also introduces the fact that there may theoretically be arbitrarily many realities - 102, 110, X. In this case, we might conceivably have multiple objective realities, which seems like a strange concept to me, but no stranger than my own subjective take, I reckon.

Now, if this is possible, and I refer to my earlier leap that reality=>morality, we could also conclude that there may be many objective moralities (or, at least, non-subjective moralities). They might all float around out there, and some of us might even stumble upon one, but so what?

It seems to me that all humans are really doing, when it comes to morality or even reality, is engaging in an unending set of negotiations with those around them to achieve common ground for whatever purpose the bargainer has in mind - self preservation, comfort, happiness, spite, anger, etc.

On the whole, I'm inclined to believe that objective morality can (and even does) exist, but I'm also inclined not to care about it one way or another.
But the old question arises, do these objective realities/moralities exist if noone is there to perceive them?

[drgoodtrips]

But the old question arises, do these objective realities/moralities exist if noone is there to perceive them?

How would I know? :D

I'm a math guy. My answer would be "undecidable".

On a more intuitive level, I don't see why they couldn't/wouldn't. I'm not inclined to believe that sentience is required for matter or energy to exist.

[Leprechaun]

How would I know? :D

I'm a math guy. My answer would be "undecidable".

On a more intuitive level, I don't see why they couldn't/wouldn't. I'm not inclined to believe that sentience is required for matter or energy to exist.
Perhaps I should elaborate. Morality is based on what is right and wrong but presumably only sentient beings can be right or wrong as matter has no choice and non-sentient beings aren't aware of thier actions. Thus a morality independent of sentience is impossible.

[drgoodtrips]

Perhaps I should elaborate. Morality is based on what is right and wrong but presumably only sentient beings can be right or wrong as matter has no choice and non-sentient beings aren't aware of thier actions. Thus a morality independent of sentience is impossible.

Oh - I only read/noticed the "reality" part.

I don't see why some kind of morality also couldn't exist without sentience, though I have rather odd views on the matter. Morality, by my way of thinking, is an algorithm, and humans are what execute that algorithm. The algorithm can exist without being executed.

[Daktoria]

:rofl:

That is [ostensibly] a valid point. :D

TBH, I don't feel that it can be empirically or logically resolved. We just have to intuitively appreciate it, and if we don't, we suffer the consequence of demanding too much like a little kid who always asks "why?" but doesn't actually grant anyone the benefit of the doubt.

Call it a ticking time bomb if you will, such intuition is the root of mankind's rise and fall. On one hand, it allows us to behave goodwillingly because it convinces us that justice and morality exist beyond phenomenal, empirical, a posteriori proof, none of which CAN demonstrate a theory of justice as shown by Hume's is-ought problem (positives can't prove normatives).

On the other hand, it isolates us from each other because the successfully intuitive who have reached a higher level than the currently failing intuitive don't recognize that the failing intuitive bear a higher potential intuitive level of understanding despite how the expected cost-benefit of supporting them proves otherwise (even given perfect information and preferable opportunity costs for gambling).

Basically, mankind is doomed from its creation, and the only way we can escape such doom is if we have the ambition to discard all mechanical rules and institutions while engaging a pure sense of morality, something that can never happen because of mankind's imperfect nature leading us to corrode ambition of "natural" truths to ambition of selfish hedonism. We could overcome such imperfection if we completely wanted to, but nobody does because the odds of such mutual cooperation and auspicious discipline are the slimmest to none around.

Gotta love the negative utilitarian pinprick argument after all, heh.

[Michael]

How could you objectively demonstrate that some moral system is superior to another ? The argument would always include either racial or nationalist or religious or political or any kind of axioms saying "Ours is best just because it is ours". Whatever criteria one would use in such an argument they would always contain circular reasoning whereby a system is evaluated against criteria that are already part of the objectives of that system.
I think this is an excellent statement of the challenge of the OP. And that's precisely the reason that makes the question an interesting one to ask. :)

It is my contention here that there may in fact be a method of justifying a moral system that does transcend subjectivity as its justification.

[drgoodtrips]

It is my contention here that there may in fact be a method of justifying a moral system that does transcend subjectivity as its justification.

Sure, I think that's no problem. You might empirically measure some quantifiable benefit or detriment in two societies with two different moral systems. As an (oversimplistic) example, you might take village A and village B and calculate average life expectancy in each one. If village A's is higher, you could make a very narrow case that village A has a superior system of morality.

To be more complete, perhaps you measure a series of varied things like this, such as standard of living, rate of lawbreaking, production of goods, etc, and you then assign them value weights and compute some aggregated, weighted total.

[Leprechaun]

Sure, I think that's no problem. You might empirically measure some quantifiable benefit or detriment in two societies with two different moral systems. As an (oversimplistic) example, you might take village A and village B and calculate average life expectancy in each one. If village A's is higher, you could make a very narrow case that village A has a superior system of morality.
Ah but you're assuming that higher lifespans are caused by moral behaviour and even more erroneously you are assuming that increased lifespans are objectively desireable.

[partofme]

Sure, I think that's no problem. You might empirically measure some quantifiable benefit or detriment in two societies with two different moral systems. As an (oversimplistic) example, you might take village A and village B and calculate average life expectancy in each one. If village A's is higher, you could make a very narrow case that village A has a superior system of morality.

But is having a longer life good in and of itself?

[Michael]

I think a prime example of people trying to construct a system of objective morality in the midst of changing issues is that horrific WWJD craze we had awhile back. It was a way to try to make an old set of basic morals instruct you also on how to live (and guide each specific decision) in a world where things exist that did not when your chosen code of morals were set. The problems and potential disagreements that could arise from this are self-evident.
I think the problems and potentials of that particular 'moral system' application (WWJD) probably crashed on the rocks of the bankers in the Temple. :D

I just don't see how one can follow the words/ideals of Jesus and not interpret those words as that of an extremely anti-bourgeois socialist. :lol:

If morals have no room to adapt and change over time, they become extinct.
I'm not sure about this. I'm willing to accept this as a general rule, but not necessarily as an 'absolute 100%' kind of thing. I'm sure we've got some old morals lying around that have not adapted over time yet still function to some extent. Old morals don't die - they just get pushed off to the corner and ignored. ;)

[Donkey]

No, but in a world without absolutes, justice doesn't exist anyway.

Relativism's probably the most depressing idea anyone ever came up with. You can't establish anything as acceptable unless multiple parties are biased in the same way with aligned ulterior motives, and it basically reduces the world to extreme nihilism where nothing bears any meaning at all.That is a rather dramatic assumption.

Yes.
I'm going to return to the sociopaths here for just a second, forgive me.

I can look at a sociopath and say "there is something fundamentally different here" and be absolutely right. I am a moral creature. Sociopaths are not. Where does that difference come from? What makes most people all over the whole wide world moral and that select few not? Sociopathy seems to be the natural state for some people. And if amorality is a natural state, then so is morality.

So maybe there is a genetic propensity towards morality. There are some physiological differences between sociopaths and the rest of us, including their "lower than average levels of adrenaline (epinephrine) and norepinephrine", and "extremely low levels of DBH" which are "associated with undersocialized conduct disorder and psychopathy" amongst other differences (which can all be found Here (http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.mealey.html) in the "2.3.3 The role of physiology" section).

Sociopaths act the way that they do because, well, they're simply missing some of the emotions the rest of us rock out on. Most of the people here (I say most because there are, what, about twenty five active members? That means one of us is likely to be a sociopath. Yeah, just chew on that fat) are capable of the love, empathy, guilt, compassion, etc. Not those sociopaths, no way Jose.

That's not to say that they're totally devoid of emotion, though. Psychologist Robert Plutchik has- besides a terrible last name- developed a list of eight primitive emotions: loathing, rage, vigilance, ecstasy, admiration, terror, amazement and grief, all of which seem to be covered by our very own vast range of smiley faces here on DWF. (Side: Click Here (http://www.fractal.org/Bewustzijns-Besturings-Model/Nature-of-emotions.htm) for a pretty visual representation of these emotions). These "primitive" emotions are the realm of the sociopath.

But return to the pretty picture cited above. It's not just the "primitive" emotions listed in it, right? Right. There are more complex emotions there, too. Emotions that have been achieved by people with that snazzy moral propensity. Say what? Yeah, it seems like we (those of us with that moral propensity) achieve those higher, nicer, sweeter, tertiary emotions through that part of us that says "get along with thine neighbor so as not to die".

Here's where I finally get onto the interstate that will take me to the point I've been aiming at. We may have the basic building blocks for morality, but we rely on society for the razzle dazzle bits. The basic tenants of morality are pretty universal ("thou shalt not throw rocks at thy neighbor lest they not help you find food in the winter, or, like, they can throw rocks better than you and stuff"). It's our subjectivity and the relativism in our societies today which allow us to build on that. We can develop our own particular brand of morality based on our own experiences and psychological factors, but in the end it's a little give, and a little more give, and then suddenly we've got something that most of us can more-or-less agree on. We can defend our personal moral criteria against and with the morality of our societies in that way.

Or, for my short answer response: Morality and a population of +1 are like love and marriage or a horse and carriage. You have to have a society to have morality.If you have to have a society to have morality how can it be objective? It is only objective if you can argue that there is something sacred about the predilections of the majority of society. If this is derived from our evolutionary survival instincts (thou shalt not throw rocks lest they throw rocks back), if anything that removes true morality from the equation.

I would hazard that the definition of "objective morality" and "morality" are inherently incompatible, however, because an objective morality would have to exist independent of the context of the sentient species in question, but it is also accurate, in my estimation, to say that morality does not exist without a sentient being. Nobody expects or requires "lower" animals to have any morality whatsoever.

I had something else to say but I forget.

I believe that subjective 'morality' (I would say individual preferences rather than morality) exists (in as much as a concept can exist) however objective morality does not


Ah, Michael bet me to it and answered much better than I did :lol:
Yes, I misread your post. :)


I also noticed that someone said that people had a predisposition towards morality/amorality however I would say this is merely a predisposition towards certain types of behaviour. The real question is why do you consider the sociopaths behaviour amoral? If the entire world consisted of sociopaths then they might consider you amoral. The real question remains what is moral? and why?
Agreed.
What is a shit-hole?

What is utopia?

Bla bla bla, in a relativist world nothing exists absolutely, so no definite conditions can exist and all you end up with is a confusing world of chaos in the end where nothing really matters.

That is a rather bold prediction. It might look pretty on paper, but I don't think it holds up in reality. It is easy to say fear ye the wrath of moral relativism lest we descend into a reconstructed state of nature (or something along those lines, whatever). However, that makes a dramatic assumption that, upon the acceptance that there is no truly objective morality we immediately discard our society-based morality and become what Freya above describes as sociopaths.

However, there is little evidential basis for this assumption. Take a fair portion of the people in this thread as an example: we reject the idea that there is some objective morality, but we clearly maintain some form of moral adherence. Granted, these moralities differ, but so do those of persons who do claim some objective basis for their morality. Forgive my pretension in dubbing it "Euclidean morality," but I think it is a name that fits. Euclid does not justify the existence of the point or the line, he merely asserts it. You can discard all of the books of the elements if you reject the premise of the point and the line. Similarly, the foundations of most morality are fatally rocked if you reject the "Golden Rule."

For instance, some of the "postulates," if you will, of my morality could be "Equality is morally superior to inequality," or "Violence is morally repugnant and should be avoided." Korimyr might say "Family is sacred." Our morality is built upon these assumptions that we make. We can probably make arguments based on evolutionary predilection (see Freya's post), but we can't justify the objectivity of these moralities outside of our societal/biological context.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because it is empirically observable that moral relativists do not abandon morality.

On the other hand, if we do accept that upon the acceptance of moral relativism and the absence of objective morality, humans must therefore lose any moral sense, you still do not have the result of "confusing chaos" or "shithole." You assume that upon losing or rejecting morality, we immediately become sociopaths. A sociopath cannot survive in society, and a group of sociopaths is, by definition, not society.

However, evolutionarily speaking (and this is backed up by any number of varied and diverging sources), society is born not of moral necessity, but of a the need for survival. It is entirely reasonable that, upon the abandonment of morality, the primary objective of any person becomes the maintenance of his or her own survival. Thus, far from becoming a sociopath, that individual enters into the social contract a la Hobbes and Locke. Morality proceeds from society, rather than preceding it. Thus it is reasonable to assume that societal norms and morals exist prior to being labeled such. In order to survive, the moral-less individual adheres to the rules of society which, conveniently, everybody except the sociopaths are also adhering to in order to ensure their own survival. It is not necessarily a choice in the way that we traditionally think of them, given our evolutionary predilections, but if we can sufficiently examine two (or more) options, we do, in effect, make a choice, even if we are biologically predisposed toward one of them. In a world with no morality there is still society, with rules based in self interest.

We already have a name (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism) for this society-without-morals.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because an individual will enter into the social contract in order to ensure his or her own survival.

[drgoodtrips]

But is having a longer life good in and of itself?

Not necessarily, I don't think. You'd have to pick a varied enough degree of criteria.

Of course, you might have subjective rejections of the validity of the empirical measurement (i.e. I don't like living - so I reject the longevity metric), but this is at least a step away from "my morality is better because it's mine".

[drgoodtrips]

Ah but you're assuming that higher lifespans are caused by moral behaviour and even more erroneously you are assuming that increased lifespans are objectively desireable.

No, I'm assuming, in that case, that higher lifespans correlate with the village's behavior. Causation is irrelevant.

[Donkey]

Sure, I think that's no problem. You might empirically measure some quantifiable benefit or detriment in two societies with two different moral systems. As an (oversimplistic) example, you might take village A and village B and calculate average life expectancy in each one. If village A's is higher, you could make a very narrow case that village A has a superior system of morality.

To be more complete, perhaps you measure a series of varied things like this, such as standard of living, rate of lawbreaking, production of goods, etc, and you then assign them value weights and compute some aggregated, weighted total.
But you are skipping the point where you demonstrate that life expectancy, standard of living, adherence to law, production, etc. are morally desirable.

Now, I have no problem with such an assumption (see my rather long winded post above), but it is "merely" a subjective assertion, rather than an objective conclusion.

[drgoodtrips]

But you are skipping the point where you demonstrate that life expectancy, standard of living, adherence to law, production, etc. are morally desirable.

I don't think it matters. If you and I pair up and go into the woods and another two people pair up and go into the woods, and each pair sets about building a house, one pair is going to finish first. By nature of this activity, there will be some degree of social interaction/cooperation affected by morals. Perhaps you and I divvy up the work equally and we finish more quickly than the other pair who divides up into an arrangement where one guy sits around eating berries and telling the other guy what to do.

What this tells us, empirically (all other things being equal) is the cooperation correlates with efficient house building. Having a house to protect us from the elements is morally irrelevant but practically beneficial.

Therefore, I think you could make a stab at an objective argument that, vis a vis home building, cooperation is morally superior.

After all, what are morals but a cooperative framework for working toward various ends?

Now, I have no problem with such an assumption (see my rather long winded post above), but it is "merely" a subjective assertion, rather than an objective conclusion.

In my examples, whether building houses is "good" or not is a subjective assertion, but whether or not houses keep out the elements is not. So, while you and I sit next to the hearth and discuss the morality of housebuilding, we can make a non-subjective case that our moral framework correlated to our house being erected with more efficiency.

[drgoodtrips]

As a note, I'm playing a devil's advocate game here. My personal take on the subject at hand is that morality is inherently subjective.

[Dominick]

I will put out a challenge here that no one will find any criterion that is truly objectively beneficial.

Longer life span definitely isn't which is easily demonstrable by a reductio ad absurdum. Let's put 'a long life span' at 10,000 years. A society with such members, other things being equal, would go horribly wrong.

A house that's built faster doesn't equate to higher efficiency but simply to higher speed. That house may last a month while the one built more slowly may last a lifetime. Besides, any criterion that uses efficiency as a concept is already subjective because this is a specific Western objective.

[Daktoria]

That is a rather bold prediction. It might look pretty on paper, but I don't think it holds up in reality. It is easy to say fear ye the wrath of moral relativism lest we descend into a reconstructed state of nature (or something along those lines, whatever). However, that makes a dramatic assumption that, upon the acceptance that there is no truly objective morality we immediately discard our society-based morality and become what Freya above describes as sociopaths.

However, there is little evidential basis for this assumption. Take a fair portion of the people in this thread as an example: we reject the idea that there is some objective morality, but we clearly maintain some form of moral adherence. Granted, these moralities differ, but so do those of persons who do claim some objective basis for their morality. Forgive my pretension in dubbing it "Euclidean morality," but I think it is a name that fits. Euclid does not justify the existence of the point or the line, he merely asserts it. You can discard all of the books of the elements if you reject the premise of the point and the line. Similarly, the foundations of most morality are fatally rocked if you reject the "Golden Rule."

For instance, some of the "postulates," if you will, of my morality could be "Equality is morally superior to inequality," or "Violence is morally repugnant and should be avoided." Korimyr might say "Family is sacred." Our morality is built upon these assumptions that we make. We can probably make arguments based on evolutionary predilection (see Freya's post), but we can't justify the objectivity of these moralities outside of our societal/biological context.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because it is empirically observable that moral relativists do not abandon morality.

This isn't genuine because you're asserting an absolute definition of morality (that of ad hoc "morality" being a personally customizable consequence/reaction/understanding of individual perspectives of the world). For example, if I asserted that morality is (and has to be) a universally acceptable set of qualifiers irrespective of subjectivity and objectivity, I would be "wrong", but that would be inconsistent with a morally relativist world. The same goes for your qualifiers of sociopath, Euclidean, postulates, assumptions, and arguments which all bear absolute definitions for what you're proposing.

A note (which I think you're well aware of), subjectivity isn't correlated with relativism, and objectivity isn't correlated with absolutism; the perspectives that individuals bear are not necessarily determined by the nature of the world they live in. As such, just because individuals bear subjective perspectives doesn't mean they can't live in an absolute world. For example, if you think a rock is light and I think a rock is heavy, that doesn't mean the rock doesn't have a fixed weight.

On the other hand, if we do accept that upon the acceptance of moral relativism and the absence of objective morality, humans must therefore lose any moral sense, you still do not have the result of "confusing chaos" or "shithole." You assume that upon losing or rejecting morality, we immediately become sociopaths. A sociopath cannot survive in society, and a group of sociopaths is, by definition, not society.

However, evolutionarily speaking (and this is backed up by any number of varied and diverging sources), society is born not of moral necessity, but of a the need for survival. It is entirely reasonable that, upon the abandonment of morality, the primary objective of any person becomes the maintenance of his or her own survival. Thus, far from becoming a sociopath, that individual enters into the social contract a la Hobbes and Locke. Morality proceeds from society, rather than preceding it. Thus it is reasonable to assume that societal norms and morals exist prior to being labeled such. In order to survive, the moral-less individual adheres to the rules of society which, conveniently, everybody except the sociopaths are also adhering to in order to ensure their own survival. It is not necessarily a choice in the way that we traditionally think of them, given our evolutionary predilections, but if we can sufficiently examine two (or more) options, we do, in effect, make a choice, even if we are biologically predisposed toward one of them. In a world with no morality there is still society, with rules based in self interest.

We already have a name (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism) for this society-without-morals.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because an individual will enter into the social contract in order to ensure his or her own survival.OK, for starters, we don't need to become paranoid or narcissistic out of confusion. We could instead become delusional or histrionic or complacent or stoic, results which I feel are far more likely considering that people will eventually run out of gas and become both physically and mentally exhausted from sociopathy if not enlightened or petrified (take your pick) directly from the awe of relativism.

Second, under a morally relativist system, I could assert that "society" doesn't exist but rather we are all "individuals" and still be consistent. Actually, I could claim not only that individuals don't exist, but that nor do any other recognizable entities exist because everything can be subdivided ad infinitum.

Heck, I could say entities don't exist at all because without any universal qualifiers, there's no evidence that anything exists, not even the world we live in or ourselves.

Regarding the motives of the social contract (nevermind how I could claim social contracts don't exist or that you're absolutely defining them), I could then go onto saying that survival is not a necessity since nothing is needed at all, and that needs themselves don't exist (or at least that your depiction of needs is predicated upon humanity and/or livelihood being an absolute moral).

Forgetting semantics for a moment though, you then claim morality to be caused by society. As far as a code of conduct and cultural norms are concerned, yes, what you're describing here is morality. However, in order for a world to exist among moral relativism, morality still must exist irrespective of "society's" existence (even if morality is not the cause of society's formation). Ergo, if by "moral relativism" you're only referring to how experiences provide different justifiable subjective perspectives, then yes, your original assertion makes sense. However, moral relativism garnishes its legitimacy towards a theory of justice by rejecting the existence of a system of morality which exists irrespective of conscious and personal existence, something which can't be true because morality axiomatically must exist universally. Otherwise, all theories of justice are a sham (although it's possible for human theories of justice to be a sham even if we don't live in a morally relativist world). Such is true because "theories of justice" would only be a result of power distribution and layer politics where the fortunate, out of original position, forge "justice" out of might makes right...

...which is weird because that's the feeling I got from what you were saying in reference to Hobbes' social contract since those without morals would only adhere to society if society had enough power to control defiance.

Then there's the matter of predetermination (which I'll sway away from semantic criticism for now). You can't say that human beings have biological predispositions while claiming that rules are adhered to out of self-interest. Self-interest implies making a choice, choice making which isn't possible with predispositions. Here you could claim that animals make decisions, but animals live in a state of nature which isn't consistent with your claim of society's existence in the first place (which means that morality can't arrive from society).

What you've demonstrated here is not a system of moral relativism, but a system of subjective moral absolutism which conflicts with moral relativism's opposition to universal qualifiers. Hopefully you didn't find it annoying that I deconstructed the nature of the semantics you were using, but I find this to be the exception for deconstruction's illegitimacy because in order to show the hypocrisy of moral relativism, it has to be shown that semantics cannot bear a solid structure for moral relativism to exist; unfortunately, moral relativism can't get around this because the sheer existence of language and communication requires universal qualifiers which language and communication are based upon.

We already have a name (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalism) for this society-without-morals.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because an individual will enter into the social contract in order to ensure his or her own survival.

Another thread. I've had too many headaches on this forum already, heh.

[Dominick]

Another thread. I've had too many headaches on this forum already, heh.
:lol:
You don't have to reply instantly you know. Take your time, this isn't a race. All threads are always considered active. We consider necroposting to be a meaningless concept. I'll be resurrecting quite a few weeks-and-months-old threads in a few days too. :)

[Margot]

If you have to have a society to have morality how can it be objective? It is only objective if you can argue that there is something sacred about the predilections of the majority of society. If this is derived from our evolutionary survival instincts (thou shalt not throw rocks lest they throw rocks back), if anything that removes true morality from the equation.

I would hazard that the definition of "objective morality" and "morality" are inherently incompatible, however, because an objective morality would have to exist independent of the context of the sentient species in question, but it is also accurate, in my estimation, to say that morality does not exist without a sentient being. Nobody expects or requires "lower" animals to have any morality whatsoever.

I had something else to say but I forget.

Yes. Exactly. I didn't say anything about being objective. I just said that one could justify his or her own subjective moral inclinations against the relative moral code of society because, well, that's what society is. That's what we do.

Summary: moral relativism will not lead to a nihilistic distopia because an individual will enter into the social contract in order to ensure his or her own survival.

Apparently, you agree.

[JHC]

I think it not only possible but descriptive of reality.

[Michael]

Yes. Exactly. I didn't say anything about being objective. I just said that one could justify his or her own subjective moral inclinations against the relative moral code of society because, well, that's what society is. That's what we do.
The OP asks if one's morality can be justified beyond one's subjectivity.

You appear to be making the argument that one's one subjective morality can be justified subjectively. That's certainly true. Indeed, that's one of the problems with relativism that this thread is meant to address.

[Michael]

No, but in a world without absolutes, justice doesn't exist anyway.
Not entirely true. "True justice" doesn't exist, but relative justice certainly does exist under a relativist interpretation.

Relativism's probably the most depressing idea anyone ever came up with.
Actually, I think relativism is something that was 'discovered' to exist, not something that was 'invented'.

You can't establish anything as acceptable unless multiple parties are biased in the same way with aligned ulterior motives, and it basically reduces the world to extreme nihilism where nothing bears any meaning at all.
What's the matter with "multiple parties are biased in the same way"? Isn't that the definition of collective action - or democracy?

As for nihilism, I admit that relativism does tend to make collective meanings difficult, I don't think relativism makes it impossible. Relativism only prevents one's collective meaning impossible to justify absolutely.

Nihilism is the conclusion from a false dichotomy. Humans do like their absolutism, no doubt of that (probably because it makes things simple), but absolutism it is not necessary for human ideals to exist.

(my apologies for adding to your list of headaches here!) :D

[Michael]

I think it not only possible but descriptive of reality.
Could you be a bit more precise here JHC? I'm not sure what you are referring to. :ummm:

[Michael]

Forgive me Daktoria for using your posts to make some of my points. I'm violating Kant's moral rule by using your posts as a means for my ends. :)

What is a shit-hole?

What is utopia?

Bla bla bla, in a relativist world nothing exists absolutely, so no definite conditions can exist and all you end up with is a confusing world of chaos in the end where nothing really matters.
Nothing really matters except your own subjective choices. Relativism doesn't eliminate the individual's subjective choices.

I think that's a very important concept. Indeed, it is integral to my assertion that morality can in fact be justified beyond the subjective.

That is to say, humans can construct morality by choosing to do so. This can be justified by the collective human will to do it, or the collective will to adopt the collective construct - because it is a collective human construct.

In other words, the principle of democracy can be understood as a mechanism for creating and justifying a collective morality. This avoids the dichotomy that leads to the nihilist conclusion and creates a moral standard that stands outside or independent of one's own subjectivity.

Subjectivity and individuality still retain their premier positions of moral responsiblity because the choice to adopt the collective will is an individual and subjective one.

[Margot]

The OP asks if one's morality can be justified beyond one's subjectivity.

You appear to be making the argument that one's one subjective morality can be justified subjectively. That's certainly true. Indeed, that's one of the problems with relativism that this thread is meant to address.

But that is what morality is. It's a collective. It is the relative, subjective, big-scheme-of-things societal organization of do's and don'ts.

[Daktoria]

Not entirely true. "True justice" doesn't exist, but relative justice certainly does exist under a relativist interpretation.

"Relative justice" is an absolute concept (as is "relativist interpretation").

What's the matter with "multiple parties are biased in the same way"? Isn't that the definition of collective action - or democracy?

As for nihilism, I admit that relativism does tend to make collective meanings difficult, I don't think relativism makes it impossible. Relativism only prevents one's collective meaning impossible to justify absolutely.
Why are democracy and collective action self-justified? If anything, they encourage groupthink which oppresses individual autonomy, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem) a condition which is expanded through faith in collectivism since consciousness is exerted at none other than the individual level and commutative cohesion is a result of mutual self-interests coming together from honest gambling in each other's character.

Nihilism is the conclusion from a false dichotomy. Humans do like their absolutism, no doubt of that (probably because it makes things simple), but absolutism it is not necessary for human ideals to exist.Subjectivity =/= relativism, objectivity =/= absolutism. What humans like is the ability to extrapolate our personal experiences unto universal qualifiers such that we can hold faith in our experiences and intuitions as perfect models of reality. However faulty these models might be though, it doesn't deny that reality exists on an absolute level nonetheless.

Such is why I believe in subjective and dynamic absolutism rather than objective and static absolutism.

(my apologies for adding to your list of headaches here!) :DHeh, it's not you. It's that I'm engaged in a million discussions all over the place and my mind's stretched too thin to absorb and process everything in an efficient manner. No worries.

[Daktoria]

Nothing really matters except your own subjective choices. Relativism doesn't eliminate the individual's subjective choices.

I think that's a very important concept. Indeed, it is integral to my assertion that morality can in fact be justified beyond the subjective.

That is to say, humans can construct morality by choosing to do so. This can be justified by the collective human will to do it, or the collective will to adopt the collective construct - because it is a collective human construct.

In other words, the principle of democracy can be understood as a mechanism for creating and justifying a collective morality. This avoids the dichotomy that leads to the nihilist conclusion and creates a moral standard that stands outside or independent of one's own subjectivity.

Subjectivity and individuality still retain their premier positions of moral responsiblity because the choice to adopt the collective will is an individual and subjective one.

Sorry for the one liner, but I don't see how this justifies morality beyond "might makes right" since it's the strength of the collective which determines the legitimacy of morality in this system.

[drgoodtrips]

I will put out a challenge here that no one will find any criterion that is truly objectively beneficial.

Longer life span definitely isn't which is easily demonstrable by a reductio ad absurdum. Let's put 'a long life span' at 10,000 years. A society with such members, other things being equal, would go horribly wrong.

A house that's built faster doesn't equate to higher efficiency but simply to higher speed. That house may last a month while the one built more slowly may last a lifetime. Besides, any criterion that uses efficiency as a concept is already subjective because this is a specific Western objective.

Then make efficiency a ratio time in use to building time... :D

And, criteria will not be "objectively beneficial" ever. All you have to do in order to make that not the case is say "I don't like or want that" and thus it is is not universally beneficial.

My point was not that everyone agree that something is beneficial but rather that you pick out some metrics and observe how moralities correlate with them. Then, you might say "Morality X has a correlation with outcome Y".

[dilettante]

My point was not that everyone agree that something is beneficial but rather that you pick out some metrics and observe how moralities correlate with them. Then, you might say "Morality X has a correlation with outcome Y".

This is interesting. My first thought was "So what? Correlation does not imply justification." But then it struck me that "justification" is itself a moral term and thus one could ask "Is outcome Y a 'good' outcome according to morality X?"

In other words, given a morality system, one could theoretically determine whether or not the outcome of accepting that system was justified according to the system itself. One supposes that there could be systems which, when implemented, result in outcomes the systems themselves deem deplorable; "the road to hell is paved with good intentions" and whatnot.

So one could possibly empirically determine whether the results of a given moral system are consistent with its own precepts. Maybe we could call that the "moral efficiency" of the system. :D

[Michael]

Sorry for the one liner, but I don't see how this justifies morality beyond "might makes right" since it's the strength of the collective which determines the legitimacy of morality in this system.
No, the strength of the collective merely measures the strength of the collective.

The legitimacy of the morality comes from the individual choice to accept it. This is entirely independent of the size of the collective (per se).