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Michael
Apr 28th 2009, 09:35 PM
US NAVY - "Buy Ford, Not Ferrari"

There has been a fair bit of discussion going on about the future of US naval procurement. I find the whole issue of naval procurement to be particularly interesting because the issue is so longterm. It takes many years to design/test a new model, it takes many years to built the ship and the lifespan of the ship is about thirty years or so. That means decisions being made now will have the effect of defining US naval capacity through the mid-century mark.

As it stands, the US Navy is mostly comprised of about eleven (very powerful) Carrier Groups. Each Carrier Group is centered upon one 'supercarrier' plus a couple of smaller helicopter carriers, plus a couple of missile-cruisers, plus several destroyers to serve as escorts (and serve the "anti" role of anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-missile defense). These eleven carrier groups, in addition to a Marine Expeditionary force, constitute the majority of US naval power at the present time (not including submarines). There is a of course a replacement cycle for each of these Carrier Groups (the USS George H.W. Bush is on its way into service while the USS Enterprise is next to be retired).

For the last half century, this model of the US Navy has served its purpose very well. It is the next half century that we are looking at here, and I for one believe the US Navy has a bit of a 'hole' in its capabilities - and that 'hole' appears to be a significant one. That is the rise of 'assymetrical warfare' - of which 'terrorism' is a classic example, but would also include any US military operation against a much inferior military power (such as Iran for example). Carrier Groups may be the most impressively powerful displays of military force in the world, but they might not be all that useful for dealing with pirates and/or terrorists in speedboats. I respectfully submit that any reasonable assessment of the future of military conflict must include an increasingly likelihood of 'assymetrical' engagements, quasi-military actions by non-state actors, and/or rogue state elements.

At this point I'd like to reference an article that has been published entitled Buy Ford, Not Ferrari ( http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1838) written by Commander Henry J. Hendrix of the US Navy.

If the Navy rethinks the role of Carrier Strike Groups (Ferrari) and deploys new, scaled-down Influence Squadrons (Ford), the result will be 320 hulls in the water for three-quarters the price.

This is the kind of thinking I'm talking about. I personally think this would be a very good strategic idea to develop these "Influence Squadrons". Not as a replacement for the Carrier Groups, but as a supplement to balance the Navy for different types of threats.

Here's some excellent articles that discuss the idea of "Influence Squadrons" (complete with pretty pictures!)

Influence Squadrons Next Evolution (http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2009/04/influence-squadrons-next-evolution.html)

Littoral Strike Group Alternative (http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2008/12/littoral-strike-group-alternative-to.html)

For anyone curious, the term "littoral" refers to shallow water coastal areas and rivers. :)

I think the development and deployment of these types of squadrons would greatly enhance US naval power across the globe, while at the same time it would reduce the overall cost of operating the Navy.

Dominick
Apr 28th 2009, 11:10 PM
I wouldn't know about the actual topic but Mr. J. Hendrix (:cool:) has obviously never driven a Ferrari :angel:

Michael
Apr 29th 2009, 10:10 AM
I wouldn't know about the actual topic but Mr. J. Hendrix (:cool:) has obviously never driven a Ferrari :angel:
I doubt you've ever driven a Carrier Task Force Group... ;)

It is a rather powerful toy... able to make small countries tremble on sight...

That's some serious testosterone fueled ego-boosting to compare with the Ferrari. :lol:

Dominick
Apr 29th 2009, 04:11 PM
I doubt you've ever driven a Carrier Task Force Group... ;)
Not lately, no.


It is a rather powerful toy... able to make small countries tremble on sight...

That's some serious testosterone fueled ego-boosting to compare with the Ferrari. :lol:
Which is why a comparison with a US muscle car would be much more appropriate. His one-liner should read "Buy Ferrari not Dodge Challenger" since he's advocating the use of small but fast reaction forces.

Michael
Apr 29th 2009, 07:39 PM
Which is why a comparison with a US muscle car would be much more appropriate. His one-liner should read "Buy Ferrari not Dodge Challenger" since he's advocating the use of small but fast reaction forces.
A key element of Hendrix's thesis is the potential cost savings involved and that is what is represented by the expression - thus the comparison between 'super-expensive' Ferrari and an 'economical' Ford.

Btw, that's a reasonably common (informal) expression in North American English (using Ferrari and Ford) to characterize the "expensive" and the "practical" options of various things. The idea being that they are both cars that will get you from point A to point B.

Michael
Apr 30th 2009, 03:37 PM
One of the reasons I really, really like this idea is because I think it increases US military capability in a way that it is needed. Sure the cost savings is good, but overall, I think the US military can/should get a lot more bang for their bucks. As it stands, the US military spends a massive amount of money, yet it has several notable military weaknesses. Counter-insurgency and littoral combat are two notable examples of 'holes' in US military power.

The proposed plan for Influence Squadrons is more than just developing a new tactical ability to engage assymetrical opponents in the combat littoral - though that in itself is a highly desirable strategic initiative. What I really like about this policy is the 'influence' part of the name. This is a reference to the potential 'soft-power' role of this type of ship deployment.

Carrier groups don't integrate well with allies. They are useless for dealing with low-grade littoral threats (such as piracy or terrorists). These assets are just too big and too valuable (and too high-tech) for effective integration with allies or to help build/train local littoral forces when needed. Having a dozen of these types of squadrons based in the far reaches of the globe would help the US military to actually deliver some benefits to the local allied nations that often play host to the US Navy (and receive little in the way of direct military benefit from it). Such squadrons could integrate/partner with local allied forces and that's an ability that is increasingly needed in the 21st century.

Michael
May 19th 2009, 01:52 PM
Interesting... looks like a part of the 'mainstream' press (Boston Globe) has gotten into this same issue.

Source (http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/04/19/the_smaller_faster_cheaper_future_of_sea_power/)

This is a pretty good article, though like most defense topic articles in the mainstream press, it seems like this article was written by (or approved by) the defense contractor's PR department.

Sure would be nice to see some decent journalism on US military issues.

That being said, the article does come with a cool picture!