Britain in the Long Eighteenth Century

[dilettante]

As part of my history program, I have an exam field entitled 'Britain in the Long Eighteenth Century'. Having completed the reading for that field (~120 books & articles), I'm now trying to process my notes into a more usable and cohesive format.

I bring it up here because I'm trying to find a less mind-numbing way of going through all this data. On the off chance that anyone has an interest in 18th century Britain, I'm up for discussing it.

At the moment I'm trying to ponder out the general frameworks and 'grand narratives' that bring the whole era together. What are the major transitions over the period (agricultural or industrial revolution? Rise of the middle-class? Decline of 'divine right'?)? What are the key turning points (The Hanoverian Succession? The Union with Scotland? The Seven Years War? The American Revolution?)? How was British society structured (Anglican hegemony? Class struggle? Plutocracy?)?

[Michael]

I'm certainly interested in this topic. I'm fairly strong on British history, though admittedly, I've done more in-depth study of the 11th to 16th centuries than I have with the 17th/18th century period.

A few quick thoughts on the topics you mentioned...

1. Rise of middle class - it has been well argued that the reason Britain was able to defeat Louis XIV in the late 17th and early 18th century was due to the size/wealth of British mercantile class enabled Britain to better finance war than France could, despite France being much larger and more populus. My point here is that the real middle class revolution in Britain was 17th century, not 18th.

2. Decline of Divine Right? Charles Stuart lost his head in 1649 and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 puts paid to that. That's all 17th century, not 18th.

On the whole, I'd say the most salient feature of 18th century Britain would have to be the industrial revolution and the associated socio-economic class changes that occured along side it. Britain was strictly a 2nd-rank 'world power' in 1700, but by 1800 there was little doubt that Britain was a 'super-power' well on its way to becoming a hegemon (which it did after the defeat of Napoleon).

I'd also say that 'Turnip' Townsend deserves mention here for the agricultural revolution that also occured during the 18th century. This has had a huge impact on our modern lifestyles.

[Greendruid]

I would add to Michael's points, though already there in between the lines of what he has said, the notion of a national identity that so many of the western European nations engaged in as monarchy fell to parliament/republic and all the issues of social class and the industrial revolution came to the fore as the culmination of changing the way the common man thought about his lot in life. The rise of the national novel begins in the 18th century with Fielding and Smollett (sp?) and continues nicely into the 19th century with Dickens. This is what begins to tie Brits together as Brits. This what builds the national character. This is the birth period of Lady Britannia as national symbol united English, Scots and Welsh.

[Michael]

I would add to Michael's points, though already there in between the lines of what he has said, the notion of a national identity that so many of the western European nations engaged in as monarchy fell to parliament/republic and all the issues of social class and the industrial revolution came to the fore as the culmination of changing the way the common man thought about his lot in life. The rise of the national novel begins in the 18th century with Fielding and Smollett (sp?) and continues nicely into the 19th century with Dickens. This is what begins to tie Brits together as Brits. This what builds the national character. This is the birth period of Lady Britannia as national symbol united English, Scots and Welsh.

Agreed! I think this is a key theme of the 18th century. The Army that the Brits fought with against Louis XIV (seven years war) was way different than the army the Brits fought with against Napoleon - even though on the surface, they were using the same weapons, strategies and tactics.

And I do think Greendruid is correct to place the origin of "national identity" as the key characteristic of this period. 1700 Britain consisted of various class groups. 1800 Britain was a nation in the modern sense of the word.

[dilettante]

Well, the 'middle-class' is a notoriously slippery creature, and for just about any time period in the last half-millennium you can find a historian who will claim that that period marks the rise of the 'middle-class'.

Anyway, the 'long' 18th century incorporates the period from 1688 through the end of the 1600s, and so the development of the 'fiscal-military state' which allowed Britain to significantly out-finance (and this out-fight) a larger and wealthier France would fall into that. However, one could argue that the 18th century proper was more important on several fronts.

First, Britain's ability to out-fiance France hinged less on its wealthy mercantile class than on its ability to effectively extract money from them without either being forced to raise taxes beyond the breaking point, or taking on a ruinous rate of interest. Simply put, Britain was able to borrow money at interest rates fantastically lower than France could and for extraordinary long terms (eventually leading to a intentionally permanent national debt), all of which allowed it to spread the tax burden of war out of decades.
Britain could do so because it developed an effect and efficient means of actually collecting taxes without inspiring popular revolt and, as a result, reliably paid interest on its debt. The creation of this fiscal-military state did involve the creation of a whole new rank of middle-class professionals employed by the state (clerks, excise men,...etc), and that process continued, and really reached its fulfillment in the 18th century.

Second, there's the deference between what might be called the 'emergence' of a middle-class and its rise to power. There's almost always someone in society who fits the bill as a non-elite, non-laboring professional who could be called middle-class. But they do not always represent a unified or powerful segment of society. One could argue that it was in the 18th century that the middle-class, both professional and commercial, began to really act in a unified, class-conscious, way and to significantly influence policy.

Third, there's all the non-commercial, non-governmental segments of the middle-class who came to greater prominence and influence in the 18th century. Professionals (meaning people whose status, identity, and occupation is defined more by what they know then either the labor they perform, the land they own, or their relation to the monarchy/aristocracy/church) began to come together as unified and increasingly powerful segments of society in the 18th century. E.g. Lawyers had long existed in Britain and generally held some sway. But in the 18th century they began to organize as a profession, becoming an exclusive group that could control who was and was not acknowledged as a legitimate practitioner of law. They began to earn respect simply because of their knowledge of the law and the recognition of their profession, regardless of any title, land or wealth they possessed. Something similar could be said about doctors, who became more rigorous, methodological and professional, increasingly separating themselves socially from 'lesser' healers like midwives. They relied less on their long experience in treating illness and more on their education and knowledge in order to demand respect and to win over patients. They were able to move around the country, counting on their credentials to earn them the trust and respect that in the past would have been denied to a stranger.

In short, the 18th century may mark the period when the middle-classes (though perhaps already in existence) became more of a force to be reckoned with.

I'll try to respond to the other comments later (though I definately agree about the importance of nationalism). Thanks, by the way. This does help me think things through.

[Michael]

Second, there's the deference between what might be called the 'emergence' of a middle-class and its rise to power. There's almost always someone in society who fits the bill as a non-elite, non-laboring professional who could be called middle-class. But they do not always represent a unified or powerful segment of society. One could argue that it was in the 18th century that the middle-class, both professional and commercial, began to really act in a unified, class-conscious, way and to significantly influence policy.
English Civil War.

That was a victory of the 'middle-class' (merchant-gentry) over the aristocracy. Mid-17th century.

Indeed, who was Oliver Cromwell? Or rather, what social class did he come from?

[dilettante]

English Civil War.

That was a victory of the 'middle-class' (merchant-gentry) over the aristocracy. Mid-17th century.

Indeed, who was Oliver Cromwell? Or rather, what social class did he come from?

A quick response would be "Restoration"; if the Commonwealth represented the 'rise' of the middle-class, the return of the Stuarts and the Cavalier Parliament indicates that it subsequently declined.

But more broadly, as I suggested above, 'middle-class' can mean many things. By the mid 18th century it incorporated a far wider segment of society than just the wealthy merchants and the landed gentry.

[dilettante]

As to the 'divine right' of kings, I agree that the execution of Charles I and (esp) the Glorious Revolution were significant blows, but they were not fatal.

During the process of working out the Revolution Settlement, it was supremely important to a great many people that James II had abdicated the throne by fleeing the country. Likewise great credence was granted to the rumor and that his heir, James Edward, was a fraud and had been smuggled into the birthing chamber in a bedpan. They also demanded that the royal line pass first through Mary and Anne before moving on to any children William might have outside the Stuart line.

Historians who study the 18th century Anglican church have found that many of its clergy staunchly held to (and taught) the doctrine of 'divine right' well into the century (using the above excuses to explain why it applied to the Hanoverians). And of course Jacobitism persisted at least through 1745, especially in Scotland and Wales. Even as late the French Revolution, the regicide in France helped to turn many moderate and conservative Britons against the revolution there when before they had supported it in hopes of seeing the development of a limited monarchy like their own.

Agreed! I think this is a key theme of the 18th century. The Army that the Brits fought with against Louis XIV (seven years war) was way different than the army the Brits fought with against Napoleon - even though on the surface, they were using the same weapons, strategies and tactics.

Do you mean Louis XV in the Seven Years War or Louis XIV in the Nine Years War? Either way, I agree that the army and nation changed considerably by the Napoleonic Wars.

On an unrelated note, I've found it interesting the way people give wars different names to emphasize particular aspects of them. The most common example is that Americans call the 'Seven Years War' the 'French and Indian War' and at least a few history books call it 'The Great War for Empire'. I was especially pleased to find references to the 'Nine Years War' as 'The War of the English Succession'; something about that phrasing appeals to me. :)

[Michael]

As to the 'divine right' of kings, I agree that the execution of Charles I and (esp) the Glorious Revolution were significant blows, but they were not fatal.

During the process of working out the Revolution Settlement, it was supremely important to a great many people that James II had abdicated the throne by fleeing the country. Likewise great credence was granted to the rumor and that his heir, James Edward, was a fraud and had been smuggled into the birthing chamber in a bedpan. They also demanded that the royal line pass first through Mary and Anne before moving on to any children William might have outside the Stuart line.
Insisting on the proper rules of succession does not constitute support for the principle of divine right of kings at all.

Indeed, the whole of the 15th century War of the Roses was about 'proper rules of succession' and yet that period is famously known for its advances in the principle of 'constitutional monarchy' (aka the Lancastran Parliament).

Ergo, one must conclude that adherence to the rules of succession in no way shape or form can be taken as an endorsement of the divine right of kings.

Historians who study the 18th century Anglican church have found that many of its clergy staunchly held to (and taught) the doctrine of 'divine right' well into the century (using the above excuses to explain why it applied to the Hanoverians). And of course Jacobitism persisted at least through 1745, especially in Scotland and Wales. Even as late the French Revolution, the regicide in France helped to turn many moderate and conservative Britons against the revolution there when before they had supported it in hopes of seeing the development of a limited monarchy like their own.
That clerics would hold to the theory is not surprising at all given that the idea originates from medieval Christian ideals in the first place (Great Chain of Being).

There is NOTHING in the Germanic origin of medieval kingship that is even remotely related to 'divine rule'. That concept is completely foreign to the original principle of European kingship.

Do you mean Louis XV in the Seven Years War or Louis XIV in the Nine Years War? Either way, I agree that the army and nation changed considerably by the Napoleonic Wars.
Acutally, I meant to refer to the War of the Spanish Succession (marking the beginning of the 18th century).

On an unrelated note, I've found it interesting the way people give wars different names to emphasize particular aspects of them. The most common example is that Americans call the 'Seven Years War' the 'French and Indian War' and at least a few history books call it 'The Great War for Empire'. I was especially pleased to find references to the 'Nine Years War' as 'The War of the English Succession'; something about that phrasing appeals to me. :)
Yes, the names of the many wars of the 17th and 18th centuries all have multiple names - quite confusing.

Personally, I'd never heard of the "Great War for Empire" or the "Nine Years War" or the "War of the English Succession". All of those terms are unfamiliar to me and all seem quite odd.

Indeed, the last one seems like a joke actually since the pathetic Irish raids of James II against the Hanoverian succession can barely be called a 'war' as it was only a minor sideshow in a major European war. The defeat of James in Ireland was the elimination of a pretender, nothing more - hardly worthy of commemoration given the number of pretenders that had previously been deposed of in minor skirmishes over the centuries. The Protestant Irish seem to think it was a big deal, but that just caused a couple of centuries of misery in Ireland, so I'm not enamored of that cause.

Either way, it would be nice if European historians could agree on specific names for particular wars instead of different names depending on the nationality of the historian.

[dilettante]

Yes, the names of the many wars of the 17th and 18th centuries all have multiple names - quite confusing.

Personally, I'd never heard of the "Great War for Empire" or the "Nine Years War" or the "War of the English Succession". All of those terms are unfamiliar to me and all seem quite odd.

Indeed, the last one seems like a joke actually since the pathetic Irish raids of James II against the Hanoverian succession can barely be called a 'war' as it was only a minor sideshow in a major European war. The defeat of James in Ireland was the elimination of a pretender, nothing more - hardly worthy of commemoration given the number of pretenders that had previously been deposed of in minor skirmishes over the centuries. The Protestant Irish seem to think it was a big deal, but that just caused a couple of centuries of misery in Ireland, so I'm not enamored of that cause.

Either way, it would be nice if European historians could agree on specific names for particular wars instead of different names depending on the nationality of the historian.

Yes, the 'War of the English Succession' is an incredibly Anglo-centric way of describing the Nine Years War (aka 'War of the Grand Alliance' or 'War of the League of Augsburg', if you're more familiar with those names; 1688-'97) and interweaves the Glorious Revolution with William's larger struggle against Louis XIV.

The name 'Great War for Empire' comes from British historian Henry Lawrence Gipson who saw 'The French and Indian War' as far too American-centric and 'The Seven Years War' as more properly referring to a conflict in central Europe in which Britain and France were only distantly involved. His alternative name, meant to focus attention on the imperial struggles between Britain, France, and Spain never really caught on.

[dilettante]

Out of curiosity, how big a deal is the Seven Years War in Canada?

IIRC, in high school and college I just learned about it as 'another of those wars between Britain and France' before the Revolution, and I'd suspect most Americans don't know anything at all about it. Which is really all a shame since it had such a dramatic effect on the course of American history. It seems like it should be an even larger part of Canadian history.

[Michael]

Out of curiosity, how big a deal is the Seven Years War in Canada?

IIRC, in high school and college I just learned about it as 'another of those wars between Britain and France' before the Revolution, and I'd suspect most Americans don't know anything at all about it. Which is really all a shame since it had such a dramatic effect on the course of American history. It seems like it should be an even larger part of Canadian history.

It is huge in Canadian history.

That war contains the British conquest of French Canada - the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (Wolfe vs Montcalm) is the largest and most important battle ever fought on Canadian soil. The war eliminated the French sovereign nation (New France) in North America.

General Wolfe is of course the most famous Canadian military hero of all time. Only Billy Bishop (WW1 top fighter ace) comes close.

[Michael]

Yes, the 'War of the English Succession' is an incredibly Anglo-centric way of describing the Nine Years War (aka 'War of the Grand Alliance' or 'War of the League of Augsburg', if you're more familiar with those names; 1688-'97) and interweaves the Glorious Revolution with William's larger struggle against Louis XIV.
Both names are commonly used (Grand Alliance or League of Augsburg) and familiar to me.

Btw, I'd say a better name for that war is the war of Louis XIV's ego, since that's what the war was all about - France's [first] attempt to conquer all of Europe. (Napoleon was the 2nd attempt)

The name 'Great War for Empire' comes from British historian Henry Lawrence Gipson who saw 'The French and Indian War' as far too American-centric and 'The Seven Years War' as more properly referring to a conflict in central Europe in which Britain and France were only distantly involved. His alternative name, meant to focus attention on the imperial struggles between Britain, France, and Spain never really caught on.
Rightly so because the war in Europe had little to do with empires and everything to do with France's continuous attempts to dominate Europe.

To say that Britain and France were only "distantly involved" seems absurd. They were two of the principal players in the European conflict. Without Britain's alliance with Prussia, there would have been no war at all.

That the war 'spilled' over into the colonies was merely incidental to the fact that the combatants had colonial possessions at that time. I'd say that only the Canadian aspect had any real significance as a separate war since Britain and France were indeed locked in long war for control of Canada.

[dilettante]

Rightly so because the war in Europe had little to do with empires and everything to do with France's continuous attempts to dominate Europe.

To say that Britain and France were only "distantly involved" seems absurd. They were two of the principal players in the European conflict. Without Britain's alliance with Prussia, there would have been no war at all.

That the war 'spilled' over into the colonies was merely incidental to the fact that the combatants had colonial possessions at that time. I'd say that only the Canadian aspect had any real significance as a separate war since Britain and France were indeed locked in long war for control of Canada.

Well, I can't get behind the phrases "spilled over" and "merely incidental" when it comes to fighting in the colonies since open combat between Britain and France began in North America a year or two before war broke out in Europe. Britain and France were going to duke it out over North America regardless.

Furthermore, Gipson would argue that Britain's support of its allies in Europe were meant primarily to defend the King's Hanover Electore from France and, perhaps secondarily, to maintain the balance of power. That is to say, Britain never support Prussia's war aims and, consequently, never went to war with Russia or Sweden, steadfastly refused to send a fleet into the Baltic despite Prussia's frequent pleadings, and limited the role of its soldiers to defending the royal possessions in Hanover. In short, in Europe Britain's goals were limited to protecting its own territory and providing financial assistance; in the colonies, Britain sought vast territorial conquest.

It's also worth noting that Britain and France ended their war in the Treaty of Paris, not the Treaty of Hubertusburg. The war between Britain and France in the colonies forever altered North America and made Britain the world's premier imperial power. The war on the European continent ended with a return to the status quo antebellum.

[dilettante]

It is huge in Canadian history.

That war contains the British conquest of French Canada - the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (Wolfe vs Montcalm) is the largest and most important battle ever fought on Canadian soil. The war eliminated the French sovereign nation (New France) in North America.

General Wolfe is of course the most famous Canadian military hero of all time. Only Billy Bishop (WW1 top fighter ace) comes close.

Well, that makes sense, I suppose. If I teach the early American survey one day, I hope to give that conflict more attention than it got when I was a student.

[Michael]

Well, I can't get behind the phrases "spilled over" and "merely incidental" when it comes to fighting in the colonies since open combat between Britain and France began in North America a year or two before war broke out in Europe. Britain and France were going to duke it out over North America regardless.
Yes, as I noted, Britain and France had a fundamental conflict going in Canada that stands entirely separate from the European conflict.

Furthermore, Gipson would argue that Britain's support of its allies in Europe were meant primarily to defend the King's Hanover Electore from France and, perhaps secondarily, to maintain the balance of power. That is to say, Britain never support Prussia's war aims and, consequently, never went to war with Russia or Sweden, steadfastly refused to send a fleet into the Baltic despite Prussia's frequent pleadings, and limited the role of its soldiers to defending the royal possessions in Hanover. In short, in Europe Britain's goals were limited to protecting its own territory and providing financial assistance; in the colonies, Britain sought vast territorial conquest.
Nothing unusual there. Post-15th century, Britain NEVER sought to support any militarism in Europe and always sought to play 'balance of power' games where ever possible.

Certainly Britain wanted France to lose, but they didn't really want Prussia to win either. Seems like a normal situation for British foreign policy for many centuries. Britain always sought to play the spoiler role (16th to 18th century).

It's also worth noting that Britain and France ended their war in the Treaty of Paris, not the Treaty of Hubertusburg. The war between Britain and France in the colonies forever altered North America and made Britain the world's premier imperial power. The war on the European continent ended with a return to the status quo antebellum.
I'd dispute this interpretation.

1. 90% of wars in Europe in this period (16th to 18th century) ended with a return to the status quo. The defeat of Napoleon was an extraordinary rare 'complete' victory for a war in Europe. Most wars in Europe at that time ended in stalemates and/or minor exchanges without altering the balance of powers.

2. Britain's conquest of Canada made for impressive looking world empire map, but it certainly didn't make Britain the world's premier imperial power! Indeed, if you check out the negotiations, Britain was willing to give all of New France back to France in return for the sugar island of Guadaloupe.

Indeed, one can hardly say that Britain was an imperial great power in the 18th century given that contained one of the most significant defeats of British colonial empires ever (i.e. US War of Independence).

(speaking of double-named wars, that one is always the "US Revolutionary War" in British history books, while it is the "US War of Independence" in American history books)

The one event of the 18th century that did contribute to Britain's rise to imperial dominance was the 'accidental' conquest of India. That was hugely significant - far more so than the conquest of Canada.

I might add that the conquest of India also had enormous impact on British domestic politics with the arrival of the Nabobs (colonial adventurers returning to England as multi-millionaires and entering politics).

[dilettante]

I'd dispute this interpretation.

1. 90% of wars in Europe in this period (16th to 18th century) ended with a return to the status quo. The defeat of Napoleon was an extraordinary rare 'complete' victory for a war in Europe. Most wars in Europe at that time ended in stalemates and/or minor exchanges without altering the balance of powers.

2. Britain's conquest of Canada made for impressive looking world empire map, but it certainly didn't make Britain the world's premier imperial power! Indeed, if you check out the negotiations, Britain was willing to give all of New France back to France in return for the sugar island of Guadaloupe.

I disagree with the second point here. At the end of the war, Britain possessed both Canada and Guadaloupe by conquest. Returning one of them was part of ending the war, and Britain chose (after much internal debate) to retain Canada and return Guadaloupe to France.

And as to imperial status, by the end of the war Britain was certainly on top. Spain was in decline, the Dutch had no major power base in the Atlantic remotely comparable to Britain's, and France had been soundly trounced in every colonial theater of the war. If not Britain, than what nation was the premier imperial power in the Atlantic in the 1760s?


Indeed, one can hardly say that Britain was an imperial great power in the 18th century given that contained one of the most significant defeats of British colonial empires ever (i.e. US War of Independence).

Even great powers can be defeated. I'd say its notable that Britain's greatest imperial loss was to it's own colonies, and that Britain was, by the end of the war, fighting the combined strength of every other Atlantic naval power (the French, the Spanish and the Dutch).

Further, without the Seven Years War and the British acquisition of Canada, I sincerely doubt there would have been an American Revolution in the 1770s at all (though perhaps it would still have happened later).


(speaking of double-named wars, that one is always the "US Revolutionary War" in British history books, while it is the "US War of Independence" in American history books)

The one event of the 18th century that did contribute to Britain's rise to imperial dominance was the 'accidental' conquest of India. That was hugely significant - far more so than the conquest of Canada.

I might add that the conquest of India also had enormous impact on British domestic politics with the arrival of the Nabobs (colonial adventurers returning to England as multi-millionaires and entering politics).

But it was in the Seven Years War that Britain became the dominant European power in India, further adding weight to the claim that, at the end of it, they were the dominant imperial nation.

[Michael]

I disagree with the second point here. At the end of the war, Britain possessed both Canada and Guadaloupe by conquest. Returning one of them was part of ending the war, and Britain chose (after much internal debate) to retain Canada and return Guadaloupe to France.

And as to imperial status, by the end of the war Britain was certainly on top. Spain was in decline, the Dutch had no major power base in the Atlantic remotely comparable to Britain's, and France had been soundly trounced in every colonial theater of the war. If not Britain, than what nation was the premier imperial power in the Atlantic in the 1760s?
There wasn't one until after Napoleon. There was no dominant imperial power in the west between the fall of Rome and the rise of Britain. 16th century Spain and 17th century France certainly tried but never achieved anything close to dominance or a hegemon position.

Britain's colonial empire looked large in the 18th century but her European position was still 2nd tier. One can't be the world's imperial hegemon if one is playing second fiddle in Europe. With the defeat of Napoleon, Britain became the undisputed world dominant power, not before.

Even great powers can be defeated. I'd say its notable that Britain's greatest imperial loss was to it's own colonies, and that Britain was, by the end of the war, fighting the combined strength of every other Atlantic naval power (the French, the Spanish and the Dutch).
Which in the latter half of the 18th century amounted to something less than an impressive array.

I'd say that Britain's loss in the US Revolutionary War was a sign of pathetic incompetence (and arrogance) - nothing less.

Further, without the Seven Years War and the British acquisition of Canada, I sincerely doubt there would have been an American Revolution in the 1770s at all (though perhaps it would still have happened later).
I don't see that at all. US Revolutionary War was driven by US domestic issues.

And Britain's conquest of Canada was strictly a strategy of geo-strategic denial to France - not a targetted conquest at all.

Likewise Britain's position in India also owed a lot to French failure rather than British ambition or British ability.

Ergo, I don't see Britain as a imperial power in the 18th century. They acquired an imperial empire, but that was in many ways an 'accidental outcome' rather than any strategic plan.

But it was in the Seven Years War that Britain became the dominant European power in India, further adding weight to the claim that, at the end of it, they were the dominant imperial nation.
Britain becoming dominant in India was entirely due to the failure of the French who got there first.

I don't give much credit to those who benefit from other people's failures.

My key point here is that Britain may have acquired an empire in the 18th century, but that was more a function of chance and circumstance than a function of British strategy, planning or desire.

Once Britain had acquired an empire, then they started to act like an imperial hegemon, not before.

This is notable because both Spain in the 16th and France in the 17th sought to act like imperial hegemons without actually having the imperial power to back that up (both failed miserably at every military or imperial enterprise they tried). Britain didn't act like an imperial hegemon until AFTER they acquired the power to act on it, thus they were more successful - in the 19th century, not the 18th.

Indeed, during the 18th century, no one would bow to Britain's greatness at all. That had to wait until the 19th century (and the defeat of Napoleon).

[dilettante]

There wasn't one until after Napoleon. There was no dominant imperial power in the west between the fall of Rome and the rise of Britain. 16th century Spain and 17th century France certainly tried but never achieved anything close to dominance or a hegemon position.

Britain's colonial empire looked large in the 18th century but her European position was still 2nd tier. One can't be the world's imperial hegemon if one is playing second fiddle in Europe. With the defeat of Napoleon, Britain became the undisputed world dominant power, not before.

I'm content to agree to disagree here; Britain was not the dominant power and Europe, but by 1863 possessed the greatest empire in the Western world. I don't see those two claims as contradictory.


Which in the latter half of the 18th century amounted to something less than an impressive array.

I'd say that Britain's loss in the US Revolutionary War was a sign of pathetic incompetence (and arrogance) - nothing less.

Well, that itself is debatable, but perhaps a topic in and of itself.


I don't see that at all. US Revolutionary War was driven by US domestic issues.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'domestic' here. But I'm entirely convinced that the fallout from the Seven Years War provided the foundation for most (though not all) of the colonial disputes with the imperial metropolis.


And Britain's conquest of Canada was strictly a strategy of geo-strategic denial to France - not a targetted conquest at all.

Likewise Britain's position in India also owed a lot to French failure rather than British ambition or British ability.

Ergo, I don't see Britain as a imperial power in the 18th century. They acquired an imperial empire, but that was in many ways an 'accidental outcome' rather than any strategic plan.


Britain becoming dominant in India was entirely due to the failure of the French who got there first.

I don't give much credit to those who benefit from other people's failures.

My key point here is that Britain may have acquired an empire in the 18th century, but that was more a function of chance and circumstance than a function of British strategy, planning or desire.

Once Britain had acquired an empire, then they started to act like an imperial hegemon, not before.

This is notable because both Spain in the 16th and France in the 17th sought to act like imperial hegemons without actually having the imperial power to back that up (both failed miserably at every military or imperial enterprise they tried). Britain didn't act like an imperial hegemon until AFTER they acquired the power to act on it, thus they were more successful - in the 19th century, not the 18th.

Indeed, during the 18th century, no one would bow to Britain's greatness at all. That had to wait until the 19th century (and the defeat of Napoleon).

Oh, I don't disagree that Britain acquired their extensive empire rather 'absentmindedly', certainly compared to Spain's rather forthright imperial acquisitions. But they acquired it nonetheless, and I'd argue that it was in the wake of the Seven Years War that Britain first began (if only slowly) to think of itself as an imperial power and to seriously consider how to manage the global empire they had rather absentmindedly obtained.

I'm not concerned with whether they deserve 'credit' for taking advantage of France and Spain's imperial decline, just with the fact that France and Spain were decline and Britain was unquestionably rising in their place.

[Greendruid]

I would add to this discussion the importance of the battle of Louisbourg (1758) and its importance to both Canada and Great Britain before the Seven Years War. This was the foothold gained by the British in North America at the Fortress of Louisbourg and was in fact the second time that the Fortress fell to Great Britain (previously in 1745 during the War of the Austrian Succession). This battle was the decisive and defining moment that the young General Wolfe proved his abilities in the field so much so that he was given the advancement from Brigadier General to Major General and commanded the force at Québec the next year.

Louisbourg was the key French entry port to North America and stood as an emblem of the French position when approaching the coastline. It was extremely poorly run and expensive to maintain though. Louis (XV) insisted that the Fortress and fortified town be entirely supplied from France instead of local Aboriginal suppliers or trading with the American colonists. Everything including building supplies had to be brought in from France! The French navy was also completely out-gunned and out-numbered when the immense Royal Navy showed up. British naval tacticians cut their teeth on the French in the 18th century!

Indeed, this whole way of governing divided the French populations in Canada to the point that separate factions formed; those who were loyal (French) and those who were independent (Acadians). The British trusted neither of course. They had a much more practical way of running their colonies. I suppose that didn't help them much in America though.

[Michael]

I would add to this discussion the importance of the battle of Louisbourg (1758) and its importance to both Canada and Great Britain before the Seven Years War. This was the foothold gained by the British in North America at the Fortress of Louisbourg and was in fact the second time that the Fortress fell to Great Britain (previously in 1745 during the War of the Austrian Succession). This battle was the decisive and defining moment that the young General Wolfe proved his abilities in the field so much so that he was given the advancement from Brigadier General to Major General and commanded the force at Québec the next year.

Louisbourg was the key French entry port to North America and stood as an emblem of the French position when approaching the coastline. It was extremely poorly run and expensive to maintain though. Louis (XV) insisted that the Fortress and fortified town be entirely supplied from France instead of local Aboriginal suppliers or trading with the American colonists. Everything including building supplies had to be brought in from France! The French navy was also completely out-gunned and out-numbered when the immense Royal Navy showed up. British naval tacticians cut their teeth on the French in the 18th century!

Indeed, this whole way of governing divided the French populations in Canada to the point that separate factions formed; those who were loyal (French) and those who were independent (Acadians). The British trusted neither of course. They had a much more practical way of running their colonies. I suppose that didn't help them much in America though.

As I noted above, the British strategy in North America (18th century) was all about denying the French access/control.

Its not like there was anything intrinsically or strategically valuable about Louisbourg or Cape Breton! :lol:

[Greendruid]

As I noted above, the British strategy in North America (18th century) was all about denying the French access/control.

Its not like there was anything intrinsically or strategically valuable about Louisbourg or Cape Breton! :lol:

No, no, of course not. Just millions of tonnes of bituminous coal! Not to mention the largest sea port of its day with the closest proximity to England. Then there's the millions of pounds of cod sent over to Europe and the Caribbean annually. Cape Breton was once one of the most lucrative resources in the early days of the colonies. Fat lot of good any of that does us now.

[Michael]

No, no, of course not. Just millions of tonnes of bituminous coal! Not to mention the largest sea port of its day with the closest proximity to England. Then there's the millions of pounds of cod sent over to Europe and the Caribbean annually. Cape Breton was once one of the most lucrative resources in the early days of the colonies. Fat lot of good any of that does us now.
Yeah, its a nice port. But Halifax is also a very nice deepwater port and is strategically well situated to serve as a base for cross-ocean traffic to Britain and a base for operations in the strategically important US eastern seaboard.

And Halifax is way more defensible. The fact that the Brits took Louisbourg twice is a measure of the weakness of the site, not a point in its favor.

Besides, as far as I know, most of the cod fishing back then was being done directly from Bristol. Sure there were local fishing done on this side of the pond, but I suspect that was a smaller portion than the vast fishing fleets coming out from Bristol, Brest, Rochelle and Portugal at the time.

[dilettante]

On the off chance that anyone's interested, here are the British-field questions I got for the written portion of the comprehensive exam (now complete):


In a historiographical essay, assess whether the long eighteenth century is best considered primarily as a period of consensus and stability or as a period of conflict and change for British politics, culture, and society. Did class and class conflict play an important part in shaping British society in this period?
In a historiographical essay, evaluate the significance of Britain’s possession of a growing global empire for domestic British life in the long eighteenth century. You might consider empire in relation to some or all of the following areas: cultural history, political history, economic history, and social history.

[Michael]

On the off chance that anyone's interested, here are the British-field questions I got for the written portion of the comprehensive exam (now complete):


In a historiographical essay, assess whether the long eighteenth century is best considered primarily as a period of consensus and stability or as a period of conflict and change for British politics, culture, and society. Did class and class conflict play an important part in shaping British society in this period?
In a historiographical essay, evaluate the significance of Britain’s possession of a growing global empire for domestic British life in the long eighteenth century. You might consider empire in relation to some or all of the following areas: cultural history, political history, economic history, and social history.


Did you answer both or just one? And would you care to share a brief outline of your reply to either one? :)

And speaking of 'British social history'... I have a copy of G.M. Trevelyan's English Social History on my bookshelf - the copyright is 1942, my edition is not. What do you think of this work? I've found it an excellent read, very interesting and fairly impressive scholarship (though typically 'uncontroversial' with some of the more colorful issues).

[dilettante]

Did you answer both or just one? And would you care to share a brief outline of your reply to either one? :)

I answered the second, though I chose to focus almost entirely on issues of identity formation, since I only had 3500 words to work with and that seemed like the area with the richest historiography to interact with. Essentially, I did an overview of literature on the formation of British national, gendered, racial and class identities in the long eighteenth century. Here's the concluding paragraphs:

Was the empire absent from the minds of Britons as they struggled to (re)define themselves in the long-eighteenth century? Assuredly not. The expansion of the empire brought the British into sustained contact with an astonishing variety of people, forcing them to ever more rigorously question what it was that made them, as Britons, distinct. Imperial conflict in the Americas and elsewhere brought this process to a head. These same imperial encounters and conflicts encouraged ever greater rigidity in relationships between Britons as well, particularly in the recognition of gender as a fixed and inherent attribute. Attempts to expand the empire, by adding to it both territory and labor, and the need to visualize and order a world made ever larger by imperial pursuits, promoted the categorization of humanity by place of origin and physical appearance, laying the foundation for racial conceptions which would emerge more fully in the nineteenth century. Finally, the expansion of imperial commerce helped to establish the foundation of a new “middle class,” not only contributing to its material wealth but shaping its view of human progress, its understanding of morality, and its conception of itself as distinct from other classes of people.

Yet if the empire intruded into the minds of eighteenth century Britons, it did not dominate them. All the new conceptions of self explored here had roots outside of imperial influence. Based on the paragraphs above, it seems that the importance of the empire on British definitions of identity might be mapped on two axes. The first is chronological; in almost every case, the influence of the empire on British notions of the self was stronger in the latter half of the long eighteenth century than in former periods. The Seven Years War and the American Revolution mark moments in which British minds were suddenly drawn toward, and consequently influenced by, the empire as never before. The second axis is one of social rank or, later, class. Bernard Porter’s Absent-Minded Imperialist suggests that, in the nineteenth century, the elite were the most consciously and actively involved with the empire, the middling sort were less so and confined their involvement to commerce, and the lower classes only rarely allowed the empire into their conception of the world. A similar case might be made for the eighteenth century. The influence of the empire fell most heavily on the more literate portions of society who could regularly partake of stories of encounter, news of far off events, maps and atlases, natural histories, and reports of commercial opportunities overseas. It seems only logical, then, that the empire would have exercised a greater direct influence over the creation of the middle class than of the working class.

In conclusion, then, empire mattered. If its affect on how Britons came to conceive of themselves was not ubiquitous or determinative, neither was it marginal. Imperial history unquestionably has much to offer to social and cultural histories of British identity.


As for the second question, it came up during the oral exam this last week, and I essentially argued for separating "conflict" from "change". The long eighteenth-century was certainly a period of immense change for Britain (the 1830s were a world apart from the 1690s), but in many ways that change came without overt internal conflict (at least relative to that of the 17th century).
There's a vast array of so-called "revolutions" attributed to the long-18th century (financial, agricultural, demography, industrial, American...), not notably there was no major political revolution like unto that in America or France.
Anyway, I think I said something like that...those two hours are kind of a blur.


And speaking of 'British social history'... I have a copy of G.M. Trevelyan's English Social History on my bookshelf - the copyright is 1942, my edition is not. What do you think of this work? I've found it an excellent read, very interesting and fairly impressive scholarship (though typically 'uncontroversial' with some of the more colorful issues).

I can't claim to have read it as yet. He covers such a broad time-span there; my focus has been somewhat narrower.

[Michael]

I'll probably comment on the other part later, but I just wanted to point at this one statement...

There's a vast array of so-called "revolutions" attributed to the long-18th century (financial, agricultural, demography, industrial, American...), not notably there was no major political revolution like unto that in America or France.

It has long been my argument that Britain didn't need to have a political revolution in the 18th century because the essential principle of the absolute supremacy of parliamentary over the crown was established (defacto in 1648/49 with Charlie's head and officially in 1688 with the 'Glorious Revolution'). Both the American and French revolutions had their goal of establishing the supremacy of electoral rule as above the crown. The Brits fought for that in the 17th century already.

I can't claim to have read it as yet. He covers such a broad time-span there; my focus has been somewhat narrower.
Yes, it is a very broad survey. I think it is a good read just for the sweep of the topic - it does show some of the linkages of the changes in social, economic and political history across the time period.

[Daktoria]

It's a bit late to be useful, but I've viewed the 18th as an infection of British identity. Rather than trying to unify Europe a la Pax Romana, Pax Britannia depended upon maintaining the even keel by stirring the European pot while expanding the empire elsewhere. It's also during this century that British free trade shifted more and more towards mercantilism, and it was Protestantism, unlike Roman Catholicism, which gave birth to Britain's rise in the Glorious Revolution through William.

If anything, Britain got just as lucky as France in betraying the rest of Western Europe from the Ottomans' internal falters just like the Huns and Mongols of centuries past. It was the Hapsburgs/Germans who suffered the brunt of collateral damage from both the British's and French's pursuits. Starting with the War of Spanish Succession, we should note how Protestantism's greatest conflicts took place in Germany whether during the beginning of the Reformation or the end during the 30 Years War. British support of the Hapsburgs only went so far as to defend its territorial integrity despite how the prevailing theme of its European intervention was to preempt dominance. For example, while Churchill of Marlborough rescued Vienna in the Battle of Blenheim, the British still refused to support the Austrians in the War of Polish Succession after: one, the Spanish and French realigned in the Bourbon Compact, two, the French disregarded their previous alliance with the British in the Anglo-Spanish War, and three, the British recklessly signed the Treaty of Hanover. Walpole was a liberal, but a weak liberal. Despite his pursuit of an alliance with Austria, he was still a pacifist, but that pacifism wouldn't matter in concession to the public, Parliament, and King George to participate in the War of Austrian Succession (when Austria would lose Silesia) due to trade conflicts with Spain and customs problems with merchants which detracted from revenues and convinced Walpole to introduce other taxes. Ironically, his celebration of low taxes and royal favor while avoiding the Polish War (on the western and/or naval fronts most possibly in defending Austria from France) was a matter of good fortune nevermind how King George supported Austria through Hanover anyway. Lastly, had Britain not withdrawn from the war early, it wouldn't have been so pressured in negotiating for the Austrian Netherlands status quo; Britain's frustration with Austrian affairs is not exempt from Britain's own procrastination and apathy.

Furthermore, these early excise taxes could have been the seeds which planted American dissent in having to pay for British operations in the French and Indian Wars. This is even more ironic because it was after the War of Austrian Succession that Britain decided to not only abandon its alliance with the Austrians, but also abandon the Prussians to the whims of its overwhelming neighbors (in the 7 Years War), the French, Austrians, and Russians. Frederick's maintenance of Prussia's integrity was one of the biggest streaks of luck in all of military history. Yes, he was an incredible strategist and tactician, but politically speaking, the demoralization of his enemies back home was totally beyond his control. Yes, Britain paid for Frederick's expenses and Hanoverian and Danish expenses too, but Britain did not have to participate in this war beyond preserving its Hanoverian lineage, and its rather antithetical to Parliamentarian interests to fight for the mere sake of title. The Act of Settlement is not a reform, but a compromise since Britain could have instead become a republic; remember that the Act of Settlement was in 1701 while the 7 Years War was in the 1750s-60s and Anglo-French animosity was already an issue at the time of the Act of Settlement's signing. Establishing a republic under William would have been feasible, particularly with Dutch governing tradition and William's position of Stadholder.

It's getting late. I'll wrap up with Britain's neglect of Prussia's continued success (in the partition of Poland in light of Austria's innocence in the War of Polish Succession), European intervention in the American and French Revolutions, and Napoleon to the Belgian Revolution tomorrow or soon after when I get a chance

[Daktoria]

Just a quick note, the English Civil War had considerable Protestant and democratic parallels to the Zebrzydowski Rebellion and the 80 Years War. While these events didn't take place during the 18th, they're important because Britain's refusal to support the Dutch and Polish more loyally is a betrayal of the roots of Britain's own liberation from the House of Stuart.

The consequences of these stumbles seemed to becoming quite severe until Napoleon demanded strict adherence of Russia in the Continental System, Russia which methodically infiltrated Polish politics and Prussian-Austrian relations. Britain could have been left without a single friend on the continent to back it up.

[Daktoria]

The first partition of Poland exemplifies Britain's losses in refusing to participate more thoroughly in Eastern European affairs. Interestingly, Edmund Burke was among the few British who opposed it which shows how questionable liberalism really was in Britain. Again, Walpole was a pacifist in the previous War of Polish Succession, and more recently Sir Charles Hanbury Williams (Walpole's friend) improved relations with the Russians through Poland via the very king who appealed to Western European support - Stanisław August Poniatowski. This appeal was made despite his opposition to the Bar Confederacy which sought to release Poland from Russian domination. In fact, the King nearly gave in to the Confederacy until it kidnapped him shortly before he planned to give in. Russian manipulation of Poland also was not a plot without precedent. Most recently, Nicholas Repnin was sent to encourage the creation of confederations and spark religious minority resistance. Even before that though was the Lowenwolde Treaty where Russia sought to maintain weak leadership in Poland in order to sustain the anarchy and depression which plagued Poland since before the Great Northern War.

Most embarrassing is how the efforts of Johann Patkul would totally be in vain (beyond his execution for treason in Sweden). Patkul reigned together the Great Northern War alliance against Sweden in order to liberate and improve his homeland, Livonia, yet August the 3rd's successor's payment for Russian support and victory in the War of Polish Succession was sacrificing the Livonia which Poland obtained in the Great Northern War under his father, August the Strong. Now, Russia was advocating the dismantlement of Poland-Lithuania proper.

Had Britain cared more about the Great Northern War, it would have realized that fighting against Sweden was the wrong move because the replacement of August the Strong with Stanislaw Leszczynski was in Britain's best interests. True, the Swedes fought along with the French in the 30 Years War, but King Charles of Sweden told Churchill of Marlborough that he had no interest in French ascendancy. Even more so, the Swedes were thoroughly defeated in their invasion of Russia and weren't in any position to threaten western Europe. Instead what happened was the beginning of the end of Anglo-Austrian camaraderie.

Untying family ties and politics is a mess. I'll go over it in the next post.

[Daktoria]

OK. This is going to seem choppy, but organization is more important than flow right now. (New page, make sure to see the last few posts on the previous one.)

First, there's the Ostend Company which was an East India company based in the Austrian Netherlands. Unfortunately, I've seen sources say it was disbanded because of different reasons. Some say that it was part of gathering support for the Pragmatic Sanction while others say that it was disbanded in order to change Austria's stance in the Anglo-Spanish War; Austria was already allied to Spain and had a previous treaty which granted the Ostend Company equal treatment to its competitors in Spanish colonies. Either way, it stresses Anglo-Austrian relations because Britain either:

1) (as a matter of the Anglo-Spanish War) abandoned the Austrians in the War of Polish Succession after establishing an alliance at Austria's cost of commerce (curiously, PM Walpole was a friendly correspondent with Cardinal Fleury who pretty much set up the marriage and diplomacy in place to prepare France for war while wanting to avoid war with Britain), or

2) (as a matter of the Pragmatic Sanction) abandoned the Austrians in the War of Austrian Succession by letting Prussia have Silesia and evacuating the Austrian Netherlands early in response to the Jacobite Uprising; this was a tremendous overreaction because in his two battles, the pretender, Charles, didn't even field 10,000 men altogether, yet King George fielded 16,000 British and 16,000 Hanoverians in the Battle of Dettingen alone. It's disappointing that neither the British Navy nor previously successful General Wade could handle Charles' forces. It seems with good odds that the results would have been far more dire if the French actually pursued their invasion in 1744.

Second, there's the Swedish-Russian rivalry which should have held the Russians at bay on its own. The Ottomans were also important for Austrian security, but the Austrians didn't have to contest the Swedes in order for the Russians to reciprocate because the Ottomans were a thorn in Russia's side as well. Later on, Russia did engage the Swedes independently during the War of Austrian Succession and opposed Prussian supremacy. However, Alexey Bestuzhev-Ryumin was not influential enough in Elizabeth's court to instill greater reparations upon either country. Despite his early interaction with George the 1st as elector and king, Britain was still unwilling to collaborate with him to provide better circumstances. British subsidies would later be thrown away on the Prussian military in staving the Russians off in the 7 Years War (since Peter the 3rd was pro-Prussia). Also, while Napoleonic France may have followed a chaotic revolution, Russian allegiance in the coalition was as an enemy of an enemy, not an ideological ally. Of course by that time, Britain wasn't as liberal as it was at the century's beginning, but Russia was (still) a diametrically opposed flat out autocracy.

In other words, Britain should have done more to convince Austria that joining Russia's side in the Lowenwolde Treaty was not in Austria's best interests. Particularly at the time, Britain could have used the excuse that Russia offered Francis the 2nd of Hungary the throne of Poland when Hungary was revolting during the War of Spanish Succession and after Sweden installed Stanislaw Leszczynski.

Lastly, and most importantly, are the causes of the Wars of Polish and Austrian Succession.

Had Austria supported Stanislaw Leszczynski beforehand, the first war's cause likely would not have happened because his daughter Marie wouldn't have gotten the chance to marry Louis the 15th of France. Instead, Austria misguidedly supported Russia's call to restore Augustus the Strong, and its "victory" came at the cost of Lorraine and Naples to France and its allies. This is odd because when Augustus the Strong first rose to the throne, he bribed, fudged, and forced past the election results and overcame James Louis Sobieski, the Austrian endorsed son of previously passing king. Augustus was also a German (Saxon) while James Louis was a Pole and the Poles were deliberately skeptical of German motives. Britain (in conjunction with the Dutch, Southern Netherlands, and House of Hanover) also could have supported Austria in order to restrain French interests and expand influence over Lorraine, Bavaria, and Saxony (or even liberate Burgundy to restablish the Burgundian Circle in the HRE).

As for the second war to make matters worse, the countries Austria would go to war with backed out on their acknowledgment of the Pragmatic Sanction despite how a compromise was being made in letting Maria Theresa's husband, Francis, become Emperor of the HRE. Instead, Charles the 7th of Bavaria was supported and elected Emperor until the end of the war. Thankfully, Britain would work behind the scenes to restrain Prussia and Saxony would switch sides.

As a result of all this, Austria became quite skeptical of Britain's continental loyalty which showed more and more despite the efforts of the Duke of Newcastle to preserve Austrian prestige such as vying for Joseph the 2nd to become Emperor at the Congress of Hanover. Ultimately, Britain appeared to be more considerate of Prussian rather than Austrian interests, and the climax of the 7 Years War immediately followed the Diplomatic Revolution where Britain aligned with Prussia officially and Austria with France and Russia. Even then, Britain still wouldn't show much concern for continental affairs with Pitt's strategy being to harass and pillage French colonies and trade while Newcastle could only subsidize the Prussian army. The Prussians were ultimately completely used an betrayed with Newcastle even suggesting at one point that Silesia should be conceded upon which Frederick recaptured it and convinced the Austrians to make peace.

When the American colonies revolted, Britain had absolutely nobody left to turn to in Europe. The Dutch who remained neutral in the 7 Years War rejected British demands to stop supporting and supplying the revolutionaries so much that the British ended up declaring war on the Dutch to (successfully) make them stop; the Spanish who remained neutral until the very end (upon which the British seized their colonies too) declared war on the British; and the Danish who also remained neutral instead of attacking Hanover from the north joined the League of Armed Neutrality along with the Swedes and Russians. When the British appealed to the Austrians for help, they were outrightfully offended (but the Austrians were also offended when the French asked them for help because the French refused to honor their alliance in the War of Bavarian Succession despite how Joseph the 2nd was willing to exchange the Southern Netherlands in order to acquire Bavaria). Britain spent a lot of money to balance the powers of Europe, but the debt incurred had to be paid off. Taxing the American colonists to the point of revolt just went to show how ineffective its war subsidies and colonial raiding had been.

[Daktoria]

A few notes. In addition to taxation, the British also restricted American colonist privilieges towards Native Americans which was hypocritical because the one of the motives for invading New France was interior expansion, particularly into the Ohio Country.

Also, despite Britain's wavering position on Poland and it's neglect towards Prussia, Prussia picked up the opportunity to negotiate with Poland right away following the first partition, establishing an alliance with them in the process to contest Russia. The Prussians also sought out relations with the Swedes and Ottomans to keep pressure on Russia, and its loyalty to the coalition and high performance in the Napoleonic wars resulted in its acquisition of the Rhineland, Westphalia, Saxony, Swedish Pommerania, and the Posen.

Britain, in contrast, lost its, by then, age old Duchy of Hanover as it became an independent Kingdom.

French Revolution up to Belgian Revolution next post.

[Michael]

Just a quick note, the English Civil War had considerable Protestant and democratic parallels to the Zebrzydowski Rebellion and the 80 Years War. While these events didn't take place during the 18th, they're important because Britain's refusal to support the Dutch and Polish more loyally is a betrayal of the roots of Britain's own liberation from the House of Stuart.

How can you say Britain failed to support the Dutch? The Brits were remarkably steadfast in their several century-long support for the Dutch Protestants against the Habsburgs.

I say remarkable because the Dutch were a primary commercial competitor to the Brits, yet the Brits expended lots of blood and treasure to defend the Netherlands (from both Habsburgs and France).

[Michael]

OK. This is going to seem choppy, but organization is more important than flow right now. (New page, make sure to see the last few posts on the previous one.)

First, there's the Ostend Company which was an East India company based in the Austrian Netherlands. Unfortunately, I've seen sources say it was disbanded because of different reasons. Some say that it was part of gathering support for the Pragmatic Sanction while others say that it was disbanded in order to change Austria's stance in the Anglo-Spanish War; Austria was already allied to Spain and had a previous treaty which granted the Ostend Company equal treatment to its competitors in Spanish colonies. Either way, it stresses Anglo-Austrian relations because Britain either:

1) (as a matter of the Anglo-Spanish War) abandoned the Austrians in the War of Polish Succession after establishing an alliance at Austria's cost of commerce (curiously, PM Walpole was a friendly correspondent with Cardinal Fleury who pretty much set up the marriage and diplomacy in place to prepare France for war while wanting to avoid war with Britain), or

2) (as a matter of the Pragmatic Sanction) abandoned the Austrians in the War of Austrian Succession by letting Prussia have Silesia and evacuating the Austrian Netherlands early in response to the Jacobite Uprising; this was a tremendous overreaction because in his two battles, the pretender, Charles, didn't even field 10,000 men altogether, yet King George fielded 16,000 British and 16,000 Hanoverians in the Battle of Dettingen alone. It's disappointing that neither the British Navy nor previously successful General Wade could handle Charles' forces. It seems with good odds that the results would have been far more dire if the French actually pursued their invasion in 1744.

Second, there's the Swedish-Russian rivalry which should have held the Russians at bay on its own. The Ottomans were also important for Austrian security, but the Austrians didn't have to contest the Swedes in order for the Russians to reciprocate because the Ottomans were a thorn in Russia's side as well. Later on, Russia did engage the Swedes independently during the War of Austrian Succession and opposed Prussian supremacy. However, Alexey Bestuzhev-Ryumin was not influential enough in Elizabeth's court to instill greater reparations upon either country. Despite his early interaction with George the 1st as elector and king, Britain was still unwilling to collaborate with him to provide better circumstances. British subsidies would later be thrown away on the Prussian military in staving the Russians off in the 7 Years War (since Peter the 3rd was pro-Prussia). Also, while Napoleonic France may have followed a chaotic revolution, Russian allegiance in the coalition was as an enemy of an enemy, not an ideological ally. Of course by that time, Britain wasn't as liberal as it was at the century's beginning, but Russia was (still) a diametrically opposed flat out autocracy.

In other words, Britain should have done more to convince Austria that joining Russia's side in the Lowenwolde Treaty was not in Austria's best interests. Particularly at the time, Britain could have used the excuse that Russia offered Francis the 2nd of Hungary the throne of Poland when Hungary was revolting during the War of Spanish Succession and after Sweden installed Stanislaw Leszczynski.

Lastly, and most importantly, are the causes of the Wars of Polish and Austrian Succession.

Had Austria supported Stanislaw Leszczynski beforehand, the first war's cause likely would not have happened because his daughter Marie wouldn't have gotten the chance to marry Louis the 15th of France. Instead, Austria misguidedly supported Russia's call to restore Augustus the Strong, and its "victory" came at the cost of Lorraine and Naples to France and its allies. This is odd because when Augustus the Strong first rose to the throne, he bribed, fudged, and forced past the election results and overcame James Louis Sobieski, the Austrian endorsed son of previously passing king. Augustus was also a German (Saxon) while James Louis was a Pole and the Poles were deliberately skeptical of German motives. Britain (in conjunction with the Dutch, Southern Netherlands, and House of Hanover) also could have supported Austria in order to restrain French interests and expand influence over Lorraine, Bavaria, and Saxony (or even liberate Burgundy to restablish the Burgundian Circle in the HRE).

As for the second war to make matters worse, the countries Austria would go to war with backed out on their acknowledgment of the Pragmatic Sanction despite how a compromise was being made in letting Maria Theresa's husband, Francis, become Emperor of the HRE. Instead, Charles the 7th of Bavaria was supported and elected Emperor until the end of the war. Thankfully, Britain would work behind the scenes to restrain Prussia and Saxony would switch sides.

As a result of all this, Austria became quite skeptical of Britain's continental loyalty which showed more and more despite the efforts of the Duke of Newcastle to preserve Austrian prestige such as vying for Joseph the 2nd to become Emperor at the Congress of Hanover. Ultimately, Britain appeared to be more considerate of Prussian rather than Austrian interests, and the climax of the 7 Years War immediately followed the Diplomatic Revolution where Britain aligned with Prussia officially and Austria with France and Russia. Even then, Britain still wouldn't show much concern for continental affairs with Pitt's strategy being to harass and pillage French colonies and trade while Newcastle could only subsidize the Prussian army. The Prussians were ultimately completely used an betrayed with Newcastle even suggesting at one point that Silesia should be conceded upon which Frederick recaptured it and convinced the Austrians to make peace.

When the American colonies revolted, Britain had absolutely nobody left to turn to in Europe. The Dutch who remained neutral in the 7 Years War rejected British demands to stop supporting and supplying the revolutionaries so much that the British ended up declaring war on the Dutch to (successfully) make them stop; the Spanish who remained neutral until the very end (upon which the British seized their colonies too) declared war on the British; and the Danish who also remained neutral instead of attacking Hanover from the north joined the League of Armed Neutrality along with the Swedes and Russians. When the British appealed to the Austrians for help, they were outrightfully offended (but the Austrians were also offended when the French asked them for help because the French refused to honor their alliance in the War of Bavarian Succession despite how Joseph the 2nd was willing to exchange the Southern Netherlands in order to acquire Bavaria). Britain spent a lot of money to balance the powers of Europe, but the debt incurred had to be paid off. Taxing the American colonists to the point of revolt just went to show how ineffective its war subsidies and colonial raiding had been.

Why do you think Britain's relationship with Austria was important? As far as I'm concerned, the Brits had many damn good reasons to hate the Habsburgs and only favored them as a counter-balance against the French.

As such, the Brits were always lukewarm in support of Austria. For the Brits, Austria was only just a temporary foreign policy tool that was sometimes useful - never an actual ally.

I also fail to see any significance to Britain with all this about Poland and Sweden. Britain has always 'stirred the pot' in Europe, jumping from one alliance to another in order to keep up some kind of balance - Britain had been doing that for centuries (for obviously beneficial reasons).

I don't see how that was a 'flaw' in British policy. Looks more like a rather successful policy to me (from Britain's perspective).

[Michael]

A few notes. In addition to taxation, the British also restricted American colonist privilieges towards Native Americans which was hypocritical because the one of the motives for invading New France was interior expansion, particularly into the Ohio Country.

Also, despite Britain's wavering position on Poland and it's neglect towards Prussia, Prussia picked up the opportunity to negotiate with Poland right away following the first partition, establishing an alliance with them in the process to contest Russia. The Prussians also sought out relations with the Swedes and Ottomans to keep pressure on Russia, and its loyalty to the coalition and high performance in the Napoleonic wars resulted in its acquisition of the Rhineland, Westphalia, Saxony, Swedish Pommerania, and the Posen.

Britain, in contrast, lost its, by then, age old Duchy of Hanover as it became an independent Kingdom.

Sure the Brits lost in America in 1776. That's about thier only major or significant failure.

And throughout the 19th century, Britain was acknowledged as the world's most powerful hegemon.

That doesn't exactly look like weakness - especially compared with Poland or Russia at that time. :shrug:

In other words, I'm not sure what your whole argument here adds up to. Britain lost Hannover yet gained India. Seems like a net gain for the Brits there.

[Daktoria]

How can you say Britain failed to support the Dutch? The Brits were remarkably steadfast in their several century-long support for the Dutch Protestants against the Habsburgs.

I say remarkable because the Dutch were a primary commercial competitor to the Brits, yet the Brits expended lots of blood and treasure to defend the Netherlands (from both Habsburgs and France).

The Brits abandoned the Dutch first in the War of Austrian Succession in overreaction to the Stuart pretender, Charles; second in preparation for the 7 Years War when deciding that Prussia was more important since both France and Austria could have invaded the Dutch; and third in the 4th Anglo-Dutch War.

Later, the Brits would also betray the Dutch in taking over their colonies in the Congress of Vienna and supporting the establishment of Belgium.

[Daktoria]

Why do you think Britain's relationship with Austria was important? As far as I'm concerned, the Brits had many damn good reasons to hate the Habsburgs and only favored them as a counter-balance against the French.

As such, the Brits were always lukewarm in support of Austria. For the Brits, Austria was only just a temporary foreign policy tool that was sometimes useful - never an actual ally.

I also fail to see any significance to Britain with all this about Poland and Sweden. Britain has always 'stirred the pot' in Europe, jumping from one alliance to another in order to keep up some kind of balance - Britain had been doing that for centuries (for obviously beneficial reasons).

I don't see how that was a 'flaw' in British policy. Looks more like a rather successful policy to me (from Britain's perspective).

I see Britain in the 18th as gaining from the division and conflict of Europe instead of pursuing peace. My "thesis":

It's a bit late to be useful, but I've viewed the 18th as an infection of British identity. Rather than trying to unify Europe a la Pax Romana, Pax Britannia depended upon maintaining the even keel by stirring the European pot while expanding the empire elsewhere. It's also during this century that British free trade shifted more and more towards mercantilism, and it was Protestantism, unlike Roman Catholicism, which gave birth to Britain's rise in the Glorious Revolution through William.

If anything, Britain got just as lucky as France in betraying the rest of Western Europe from the Ottomans' internal falters just like the Huns and Mongols of centuries past. It was the Hapsburgs/Germans who suffered the brunt of collateral damage from both the British's and French's pursuits.

British strategy may have been profitable, but it was profitable as a matter of luck, not skill, and it came at an unjustified cost (as a matter of quality, not quantity even though the quantity was substantial in itself).

Besides religion (which is rather politically obsolete by the 18th), what are the reasons you see that the British shouldn't have liked the Austrians? The significance of Poland is its neglect destroyed the Anglo-Austrian relationship. Likewise, Sweden's significance is it could have been an ally to complement Britain and Austria as well as convert Poland to become more friendly by installing Stanislaw Leszczynski, but instead, Russia's interests won out.

[Daktoria]

Sure the Brits lost in America in 1776. That's about thier only major or significant failure.

And throughout the 19th century, Britain was acknowledged as the world's most powerful hegemon.

That doesn't exactly look like weakness - especially compared with Poland or Russia at that time. :shrug:

In other words, I'm not sure what your whole argument here adds up to. Britain lost Hannover yet gained India. Seems like a net gain for the Brits there.

The loss of America signifies how poor their diplomatic strategy on the continent was after the Diplomatic Revolution. Gaining Prussia at the cost of Austria cost them so much money that they lost their most lucrative colonies abroad.

Also, the United States developed far beyond India (which Britain already had half of the colonies in (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SevenYearsWar.png)), even within the 19th, nevermind the 20th, century.

[Daktoria]

Also, British India cost lots of (military, political, and economic) resources and capital in line with the Great Game.

I still find it mindboggling that Russia was supported in the Congress of Berlin despite opposition in the Crimean. If WW1 and WW2 aren't examples of the destruction encouraged by Britain's balance of power games, what are?

[Michael]

The Brits abandoned the Dutch first in the War of Austrian Succession in overreaction to the Stuart pretender, Charles; second in preparation for the 7 Years War when deciding that Prussia was more important since both France and Austria could have invaded the Dutch; and third in the 4th Anglo-Dutch War.
With regard to the Stuart pretender, Britain had every right to consider a direct invasion of its own territory as a greater immediate threat than a potential invasion of Dutch territory.

That the Jacobins turned out to be incompetent idiots is beside the point. One couldn't know that before the battle was fought.

Later, the Brits would also betray the Dutch in taking over their colonies in the Congress of Vienna and supporting the establishment of Belgium.
19th century is a different time period. At that time, Britain was supreme/hegemon and didn't need Dutch independence to ensure Britain's survival.

I see no evidence of any British inconsistency or perfidity here vis-a-vis the Dutch. The Brits spent lots of blood and treasure to defend the Dutch for over two centuries and several wars (from the time of Luther to the death of Louis XIV).

That Britain would make war on the Dutch after that time period is perfectly understandable in terms of Dutch actions (material support for British enemies in war).

I see no reason why the British-Dutch alliance (16th and 17th centuries) must be continued unconditionally into the 18th and 19th century without any of the political imparatives that created the alliance still present. Time change and so do alliances.

[Michael]

I see Britain in the 18th as gaining from the division and conflict of Europe instead of pursuing peace. My "thesis":
I don't see any grounds for disagreeing with this.

Historically speaking, gaining from the division and conflict of others has been the primary diplomatic strategy of most European countries for the last thousand years.

British strategy may have been profitable, but it was profitable as a matter of luck, not skill, and it came at an unjustified cost (as a matter of quality, not quantity even though the quantity was substantial in itself).
I certainly agree that much of Britain's success throughout history came from good luck and circumstances rather than clever strategies and/or brilliant leadership. Indeed, I've made that argument many times.

Besides religion (which is rather politically obsolete by the 18th), what are the reasons you see that the British shouldn't have liked the Austrians? The significance of Poland is its neglect destroyed the Anglo-Austrian relationship. Likewise, Sweden's significance is it could have been an ally to complement Britain and Austria as well as convert Poland to become more friendly by installing Stanislaw Leszczynski, but instead, Russia's interests won out.
First of all, religion (i.e. hatred of Roman Catholicism) was anything but "politically obsolete" in Britain in the 18th century. The linkage between the Roman Catholic religion and political treason in Britain is a long one that is not easily forgotten - especially during the 18th century Jacobin treason.

Secondly, apart from France, no other country has made a more determined effort to conquer Britain more than the Habsburgs (Austrian or Spanish makes no difference).

Thirdly, there was NOTHING about Austria that Britain should want to ally with. Austria's utility to Britain was merely as a counterbalance to France or Russia or Prussia or whatever was needed at any given moment. There was zero common purpose or common interest between Britain and Austria - only temporary political expediency.

Fourthly, the English have LONG memories for enemies. I doubt the Empire was ever forgiven for the indignities they served upon Richard Lionheart (who is arguably the most popular English monarch of all time).

[Daktoria]

Westphalia recognized that wars of religion would no longer happen, and the War of Spanish Succession split the Hapburgs into Spanish and Austrian branches which the British immediately recognized in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. The Spanish armada seemed to be identified with the Spanish.

Also, Austria respected the electoral process of the HRE, something which British parliamentary reforms likewise respected. In particular with the Georgian era is how King George inherited the electorate of Hanover and (along with the Tories and Patriot Whigs) wanted to participate in continental affairs.

[Daktoria]

There's also the matter of how Great Britain was established under William of Orange, and the Dutch had seceded from the Spanish while the Spanish Netherlands had been ceded to the Austrians.

A complex relationship, but a relationship nonetheless. The Austrians were uninterested in the Scottish Jacobites, and their neighbors, the Dutch, usurped them.

[Michael]

Westphalia recognized that wars of religion would no longer happen, and the War of Spanish Succession split the Hapburgs into Spanish and Austrian branches which the British immediately recognized in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. The Spanish armada seemed to be identified with the Spanish.

Also, Austria respected the electoral process of the HRE, something which British parliamentary reforms likewise respected. In particular with the Georgian era is how King George inherited the electorate of Hanover and (along with the Tories and Patriot Whigs) wanted to participate in continental affairs.

There's also the matter of how Great Britain was established under William of Orange, and the Dutch had seceded from the Spanish while the Spanish Netherlands had been ceded to the Austrians.

A complex relationship, but a relationship nonetheless. The Austrians were uninterested in the Scottish Jacobites, and their neighbors, the Dutch, usurped them.
None of this shows why Britain ought to be friends with Austria ruled by the hated Catholics.

Britain and Austria had nothing in common except the occasional enemy. They had several historical reasons for enmity.

Bottom line is that Britain could never truly ally with any Catholic nation - way too much bad blood on that score. Britain's cultural hatred of all things "Roman Catholic" trumps just about everything in popular terms.

As for the petty Hanover princelings (i.e. The Georges), they are all idiots and thankfully Britain had moved mostly beyond direct rule by the monarch by that time.

Btw, if there is ever a good reason for me to be an anti-monarchist, it would be because of the insult of those petty German princelings from Hanover. I would rather that Britain became a republic at that time rather than import some petty German princes that weren't fit to polish the boots of the glorious English Crown. There are no British monarchs worthy of the name after William III - just a long parade of ugly mediocrities and halfwits. Thankfully the present idiot Charles married above his station and the bloodline of the House of Windsor has now been restored with a healthy dose of Spencer blood (with more English royal blood than the whole House of Hanover added together).

[Daktoria]

I don't know why you're not giving more credit to Westphalia because 1) it was very explicit and the Hapsburgs upheld it as nearly hereditary emperors of the HRE, and 2) the alliance established against them during the 30 Years War was connected to the Stuarts who had been removed.

[Daktoria]

Also, you may want Britain to have become a republic earlier (which I sympathized with earlier in saying it could have been formed under William) and might believe that the Georgian era was idiotic, but this is a question of British attitudes, and the political support was there, not exactly favoring Walpole as previously described.

[Michael]

I don't know why you're not giving more credit to Westphalia because 1) it was very explicit and the Hapsburgs upheld it as nearly hereditary emperors of the HRE, and 2) the alliance established against them during the 30 Years War was connected to the Stuarts who had been removed.

Credit to Westphalia for what? :shrug:

[Michael]

Also, you may want Britain to have become a republic earlier (which I sympathized with earlier in saying it could have been formed under William) and might believe that the Georgian era was idiotic, but this is a question of British attitudes, and the political support was there, not exactly favoring Walpole as previously described.

My passion for a British Republic has everything to do with the fact that I hold ZERO respect for the Stuart or the Hanover dynasties. I consider both to have reduced the dignity of the British Crown to nothingness. Indeed, I'm a huge fan of Oliver Cromwell and his leadership during the Commonwealth.

As for William III, I consider him as obnoxiously dislikeable as any Hanover (and he was intensely hated in England at the time for good reasons - he was pig-headed and a Dutch nationalist - whose only claim was to be married to a god-damned Stuart and being a non-Catholic).

Either way, I'm having a real hard time trying to figure out what is your main argument about Britain in the 18th century. :shrug:

I see lots of small points to quibble with, but I don't see any over-arching argument being made.

[Daktoria]

Westphalia is the treaty which defined state affairs as distinct from religious ones. It was accepted at the end of the 30 Year War.

My thesis is... what I said before and you agreed with.

I have a larger belief that the Britain's realignment towards France away from Austria encouraged pan-Slavism, the Balkans Wars and Ottoman contention, and ultimately the World Wars, but this thread focuses on the 18th century.

The thread a while back where Donkey and I argued about Britain's "promises" to the Arabs might remind you about it.

[Michael]

Westphalia is the treaty which defined state affairs as distinct from religious ones. It was accepted at the end of the 30 Year War.
I strongly dispute this interpretation. Westphalia enshrined in principle the right of the state to rule over all religion within its territory. It also asserted that the religion of the prince was the rightful religion of the state/people.

Regardless of how obnoxious that is, it is at the very least an assertion of Church=State unity. That's anything but the principle of separation.

My thesis is... what I said before and you agreed with.
Like I said, I'm not sure what that was. I tend to agree with particular points of fact, but that doesn't mean I agree with your conclusion. Like I said, I'm confused here about what that conclusion is.

I have a larger belief that the Britain's realignment towards France away from Austria encouraged pan-Slavism, the Balkans Wars and Ottoman contention, and ultimately the World Wars, but this thread focuses on the 18th century.
I'd reject this on the basis that WW1 did not originate in the Balkans or have anything to do with the Balkans.

WW1 originated in the 'great power ego rivalries' of France, Britain, Germany, Russia and Austria. The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand was merely the 'trigger' event, not the cause.

The thread a while back where Donkey and I argued about Britain's "promises" to the Arabs might remind you about it.
I don't recall that thread (I have a terrible memory from smoking too much pot! :lol:).

I'll certainly agree that Britain's dealings with Arabs (and Jews) in the late 19th and first half of the 20th century are entirely indefensible by any standard. There is nothing worse than an imperial power that can't be bothered to address its own imperialist responsibilities, but all that is post 18th century and therefore outside the realm of this thread topic.

[Daktoria]

I strongly dispute this interpretation. Westphalia enshrined in principle the right of the state to rule over all religion within its territory. It also asserted that the religion of the prince was the rightful religion of the state/people.

Regardless of how obnoxious that is, it is at the very least an assertion of Church=State unity. That's anything but the principle of separation.

The wars of religion were over, so I don't see what you're getting at. King George, the Tories, and the Patriot Whigs seemed willing enough to overlook religious differences. PM Walpole and his friendship with Cardinal Fleury were the primary obstacles, and Walpole's cost in political capital was his ministery later on as Britain was willing to participate in the War of Austrian Succession.

[Michael]

The wars of religion were over, so I don't see what you're getting at. King George, the Tories, and the Patriot Whigs seemed willing enough to overlook religious differences. PM Walpole and his friendship with Cardinal Fleury were the primary obstacles, and Walpole's cost in political capital was his ministery later on as Britain was willing to participate in the War of Austrian Succession.

That religion ceased to be so bloody and obsessive in the 18th century was not due to Westphalia and its acceptance of State=Church.

Btw, I consider Westphalia (and the 30 Years War) to be as driven by politics (anti-imperialism) as much as religion. Religion was merely the convenient excuse for the war. The protestants alone weren't strong enough to oppose the Holy Roman Emperor. That they succeeded was a monument to a political movement, not a religious one. In support of this, I have previously asserted that the 'protestant/catholic' split in Europe can be easily determined/predicted by looking at the political relationship between the 'baronage' and the 'crown' in each state at the time prior to Luther. In states where the 'baronage' was in opposition to the crown, you ended up with protestantism - in those states where the 'baronage' was in alliance with the crown, you ended up with catholicism.

And Westphalia can't be held up as an example of as the definition of separation of 'church and state' as you asserted above...

Westphalia is the treaty which defined state affairs as distinct from religious ones. It was accepted at the end of the 30 Year War.

Westphalia is the treaty which defined state=church. That's the categorial opposite to what you asserted here. That's why I objected to that statement.

[Daktoria]

That religion ceased to be so bloody and obsessive in the 18th century was not due to Westphalia and its acceptance of State=Church.

Btw, I consider Westphalia (and the 30 Years War) to be as driven by politics (anti-imperialism) as much as religion. Religion was merely the convenient excuse for the war. The protestants alone weren't strong enough to oppose the Holy Roman Emperor. That they succeeded was a monument to a political movement, not a religious one. In support of this, I have previously asserted that the 'protestant/catholic' split in Europe can be easily determined/predicted by looking at the political relationship between the 'baronage' and the 'crown' in each state at the time prior to Luther. In states where the 'baronage' was in opposition to the crown, you ended up with protestantism - in those states where the 'baronage' was in alliance with the crown, you ended up with catholicism.

And Westphalia can't be held up as an example of as the definition of separation of 'church and state' as you asserted above...

Westphalia is the treaty which defined state=church. That's the categorial opposite to what you asserted here. That's why I objected to that statement.

Freedom of religion, regardless of state officiation, is a very explicit point of Westphalia as particularly noted in sections 28, 49, and 123.

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp

When did Britain neglect this?

Again, Britain's participation in the War of Austrian Succession shows that it acknowledged (at least through those parties I mentioned) these clauses.

[Daktoria]

It's important to note that William's arrival in England occurred in awkward religious circumstances; James wanted to preserve Catholics under the guise of tolerance, William was a Protestant, but not an Anglican, not the best position to head the English church from; and he had to appease Catholic allies on the continent (else beware of a French invasion of the proper Dutch Provinces not to mention without as much support).

Religious tolerance was a prevailing theme as a matter of pragmatism if nothing else from the Glorious Revolution.

[Michael]

It's important to note that William's arrival in England occurred in awkward religious circumstances; James wanted to preserve Catholics under the guise of tolerance, William was a Protestant, but not an Anglican, not the best position to head the English church from; and he had to appease Catholic allies on the continent (else beware of a French invasion of the proper Dutch Provinces not to mention without as much support).

Religious tolerance was a prevailing theme as a matter of pragmatism if nothing else from the Glorious Revolution.

Religious toleration in England in the 18th century had everything to do with domestic British politics, not the Treaty of Westphalia.

Btw, I do find it amusing that you are claiming the 'Glorious Revolution' as a monument to religious tolerance given that the revolution consisted of a coup to get rid of a hated Catholic King and replace him with a Protestant!

That doesn't strike me as much of an example of religous toleration at all - quite the contrary - it marks the high water mark for British anti-catholicism.