Taming of the Gods: Religion & Democracy

[Michael]

Taming of the Gods: Religion & Democracy

Taming of the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents, by Ian Buruma, Princeton University Press, 144 pages, $19.95

Three years ago, Ian Buruma published Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerence, an analysis of the shocking public slaying by an Islamist extremist of a Dutch filmmaker who, working with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, self-declared atheist and fugitive from Islam, had provocatively attacked Muslim attitudes toward women. The book stirred more than a little controversy, partly because Buruma suggested that the truth about Muslim immigration to Europe and jihadi violence was more complicated than many people, on both the right and left, thought.

Those issues continue to loom in the background of Taming the Gods. But now Buruma has pulled back his camera and panned across three continents, centuries of history, and a wide range of questions about religion and democracy.

...

The crucial thing is simply that citizens observe the law and "the basic rules of democratic society" -- free speech and expression, free elections, independent judiciaries. Buruma disagrees with those conservatives insisting that this social commitment to the rules of democracy will collapse without a renewed sense of the continent's religious heritage -- and also with their counterparts on the left calling for a cultural immersion in one form or another of "Enlightenment values." (Buruma is mischievous enough to remind readers that "the Enlightenment consisted of many things," the Marquis de Sade as well as Spinoza.)

...

Buruma is surely right in claiming that religion "is not the only moral glue available to hold a society together," but does it follow that "shared values are not essential for a democracy to function, as long as citizens abide by the laws"? What if they obey the law and play by his barebones rules of the liberal democratic game only out of convenience or as an unavoidable evil? No, "there has to be a common view that those rules are not only just but worth defending." (To his procedural rules of free speech, free elections, and so on, many of us would add substantive rights to privacy, basic education, and equal treatment, among other things.) When he urges respect for religious sensibilities without recourse to the law, he appeals to the natural restraint of "people in civilized societies." Isn't he looking to something culturally "thicker" than merely obeying the law and following democratic procedures?

Likewise, despite his sound injunction against states ambitiously trying to answer the deeper questions of life or impose metaphysical beliefs, one of the inescapable dilemmas that liberal democracies face is deciding profound moral questions without imposing the tenets of one religion on all of society. When, if ever, is killing -- or torture -- justified to save lives or preserve society? Are all members of the species equally deserving of protection even at great burden to others? The disabled? The comatose? The unborn? At how great a burden to others? What sacrifices can be required of our children for the good of our great-great-grandchildren? For the good of nonhuman species? If these questions are not metaphysical, they are something very much like it.

...



Source/Article (http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=demoracys_faith_base_troubles)

The linked article is a book review. It is a good review of what looks like a very interesting book - which is why I've (selectively) quoted from the review at length.

I shall of course tip my hat :hatoff: to Buruma for the comment about the Enlightenment including both Spinoza and the Marquis de Sade! That is brilliant wit and disturbingly true.

But most of all, it is the questions of the last quoted paragraph that interest me. I certainly agree that religion is not the only 'moral glue' available to hold society together, but what other 'glues' are avialable to be used to answer the various questions that do not admit of simple and authorative answers?

In other words, how can society/government address moral questions (killing, torture, abortion, suicide, assisted suicide, etc.) without assuming some religious-based morality - for lack of any other available and mutually agreeable alternative? Or how can a mutually agreeable alternative be recognized/established?

As a sidenote, I debated where to put this thread - in 'politics' or 'religion' - and that's why it ended up here in 'philosophy/political-theory'. :lol:

[SMadsen]

As far as I'm concerned, religious-based morality is not an alternative to morality; morality is just that, morality, whether it's based on religion, political ideology, philosophy, cultural traditions, force majeure or simple pragmatic experience. Whenever something is held as a standard of right and wrong conduct it is morality, regardless of whichever arbitrary label happens to fall upon it.

[Michael]

As far as I'm concerned, religious-based morality is not an alternative to morality; morality is just that, morality, whether it's based on religion, political ideology, philosophy, cultural traditions, force majeure or simple pragmatic experience. Whenever something is held as a standard of right and wrong conduct it is morality, regardless of whichever arbitrary label happens to fall upon it.

Sure, I have no argument with any of what you say here.

But that doesn't really address the question though. The question is, how can these types of 'moral' issues be addressed by civil society in a way that is not arbitrary or biased?

The nature of democracy requires a public policy response to some human-moral issues. This is a given. The question is how to answer it in a world without any recognizable moral authorities.

[andrewl]

Taming of the Gods: Religion & Democracy



Source/Article (http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=demoracys_faith_base_troubles)

The linked article is a book review. It is a good review of what looks like a very interesting book - which is why I've (selectively) quoted from the review at length.

I shall of course tip my hat :hatoff: to Buruma for the comment about the Enlightenment including both Spinoza and the Marquis de Sade! That is brilliant wit and disturbingly true.

But most of all, it is the questions of the last quoted paragraph that interest me. I certainly agree that religion is not the only 'moral glue' available to hold society together, but what other 'glues' are avialable to be used to answer the various questions that do not admit of simple and authorative answers?

In other words, how can society/government address moral questions (killing, torture, abortion, suicide, assisted suicide, etc.) without assuming some religious-based morality - for lack of any other available and mutually agreeable alternative? Or how can a mutually agreeable alternative be recognized/established?

As a sidenote, I debated where to put this thread - in 'politics' or 'religion' - and that's why it ended up here in 'philosophy/political-theory'. :lol:

I think we have to accept that there can be scientific objectivity in determining morality. For example: Does the beating and humiliation of children into obedience make for caring, empathetic, and mentally healthy adults? I think its possible to give a scientifically objective answer to that question and say with moral certainty that such a method is on balance an immoral way to rear children based on the type of adults they are observed to become.

Andrew

[dilettante]

I think we have to accept that there can be scientific objectivity in determining morality. For example: Does the beating and humiliation of children into obedience make for caring, empathetic, and mentally healthy adults? I think its possible to give a scientifically objective answer to that question and say with moral certainty that such a method is on balance an immoral way to rear children based on the type of adults they are observed to become.

Andrew

Only if you begin with the premise that caring and empathetic adults are somehow morally preferable to cold, emotionally stunted adults. In which case that's your morality, there from the beginning. Science might tell you that child abuse --> abusive, emotionally stunted adults. But it doesn't tell you whether that's a moral good or a moral evil.

A Spartan-like culture in which men were primarily meant to be warriors might find caring, empathetic adults problematic (and might define their sentimentality as an immoral weakness that threatened the fabric of society). Slave-owners might also have seen making their slaves "mentally healthy" (by your definition) as a dangerously irresponsible act of cruelty.

[Michael]

I think we have to accept that there can be scientific objectivity in determining morality. For example: Does the beating and humiliation of children into obedience make for caring, empathetic, and mentally healthy adults? I think its possible to give a scientifically objective answer to that question and say with moral certainty that such a method is on balance an immoral way to rear children based on the type of adults they are observed to become.

Andrew
I think this policy is a sure-fire way to get rid of all those pesky poets, artists and philosophers.

Nice, caring and empathetic child-rearing tends to create a world where mediocrity is the rule.

Most of the best artists and thinkers of all time have come from quite ugly family backgrounds. I'm certainly the product of a 'harsh' parental regime (military like) where physical beatings and humilitations were common occurances. There are no 'wall-flowers' in my family - a couple of political activists though. :shrug:

[Zarquon]

I think this policy is a sure-fire way to get rid of all those pesky poets, artists and philosophers.

Nice, caring and empathetic child-rearing tends to create a world where mediocrity is the rule.

Most of the best artists and thinkers of all time have come from quite ugly family backgrounds. I'm certainly the product of a 'harsh' parental regime (military like) where physical beatings and humilitations were common occurances. There are no 'wall-flowers' in my family - a couple of political activists though. :shrug:
Any empirical data to back this wild assertion?
Public Policy should only be guided by modern/relevant ethics, which would preclude most so-called morality which is basically a contextual set of ethics applied out of context, and thus wrongly.

[andrewl]

I think this policy is a sure-fire way to get rid of all those pesky poets, artists and philosophers.

Nice, caring and empathetic child-rearing tends to create a world where mediocrity is the rule.

Most of the best artists and thinkers of all time have come from quite ugly family backgrounds. I'm certainly the product of a 'harsh' parental regime (military like) where physical beatings and humilitations were common occurances. There are no 'wall-flowers' in my family - a couple of political activists though. :shrug:

But there are also examples to the contrary, like Mozart. Creativity is not dependent on suffering. Its just as likely to destroy someone as it is to inspire them.

Andrew

[andrewl]

Only if you begin with the premise that caring and empathetic adults are somehow morally preferable to cold, emotionally stunted adults. In which case that's your morality, there from the beginning. Science might tell you that child abuse --> abusive, emotionally stunted adults. But it doesn't tell you whether that's a moral good or a moral evil.

That can also be a premise arrived at objectively if we observe that caring and empathetic adults are also healthier from a physical perspective and more satisfied with life.

A Spartan-like culture in which men were primarily meant to be warriors might find caring, empathetic adults problematic (and might define their sentimentality as an immoral weakness that threatened the fabric of society). Slave-owners might also have seen making their slaves "mentally healthy" (by your definition) as a dangerously irresponsible act of cruelty.Right but a warrior society would necessarily result in more war and suffering for everybody, which is objectively a bad thing.

Slavery is also objectively a bad thing since it is measurable that slaves don't want to be slaves and hence are not happy.

Andrew

[dilettante]

That can also be a premise arrived at objectively if we observe that caring and empathetic adults are also healthier from a physical perspective and more satisfied with life.

So what?
That is to say, you're beginning with the moral supposition that increasing the health and satisfaction of adults is itself morally good.


Slavery is also objectively a bad thing since it is measurable that slaves don't want to be slaves and hence are not happy.

Again, so what?
Unless I begin already believing that making another human unhappy is morally wrong, then your argument for the morality of slavery falls flat.

In general, you might be able to objectively determine that X->Y (empathy->health or slavery->unhappiness). But that tells you nothing about the morality of X unless you already know the morality of Y. You can't derive the moral from the purely amoral.
If you don't start off believing that certain things (suffering, death, unhealthiness, cheese...whatever) is [im]moral, you'll never be able to prove that anything else is.

[andrewl]

So what?
That is to say, you're beginning with the moral supposition that increasing the health and satisfaction of adults is itself morally good.

Yeah, isn't it?

Again, so what?
Unless I begin already believing that making another human unhappy is morally wrong, then your argument for the morality of slavery falls flat.

In general, you might be able to objectively determine that X->Y (empathy->health or slavery->unhappiness). But that tells you nothing about the morality of X unless you already know the morality of Y. You can't derive the moral from the purely amoral.
If you don't start off believing that certain things (suffering, death, unhealthiness, cheese...whatever) is [im]moral, you'll never be able to prove that anything else is.But are you not starting from the supposition that morality is somehow different from any other pursuit of human knowledge? In other words, you are putting morality in a position independent from human existence as if it would exist in the universe regardless of human thought. I guess what im trying to say is that with physics we can point to an equation and say it is good or valid and do so objectively, why can't we do the same with morality?

So i can say that slavery is bad because observations and measurements reveal that the slave is made unhappy by being a slave (or to put it another way, the salve is prevented from realizing his full potential as a human being and this is an injustice). Why can't this be a valid statement about morality arrived at using a scientifically objective method?

Andrew

[Michael]

Yeah, isn't it?
Plato famously dealt with this issue in The Republic.

That is to say, increasing the health and satisfaction of the citizenry might entail injustice and therefore isn't just.

[andrewl]

Plato famously dealt with this issue in The Republic.

That is to say, increasing the health and satisfaction of the citizenry might entail injustice and therefore isn't just.

That is conceivable, but that does not mean that preventing a person or group of people from achieving satisfaction and health (or directly causing dissatisfaction and un-health) is not immoral.

Andrew

[dilettante]

Yeah, isn't it?

I believe that it is. But I have no way to prove it except by appealing to other moral imperatives. I certainly can't derive its immorality scientifically.


But are you not starting from the supposition that morality is somehow different from any other pursuit of human knowledge? In other words, you are putting morality in a position independent from human existence as if it would exist in the universe regardless of human thought. I guess what im trying to say is that with physics we can point to an equation and say it is good or valid and do so objectively, why can't we do the same with morality?

So i can say that slavery is bad because observations and measurements reveal that the slave is made unhappy by being a slave (or to put it another way, the salve is prevented from realizing his full potential as a human being and this is an injustice). Why can't this be a valid statement about morality arrived at using a scientifically objective method?


But morality is, by definition, distinct from physics. A physics equation tells us how the world is. E.G. [a=f/m] tells us that acceleration given to an object is equal to the force applied to it divided by its mass.
Morality, on the other hand, tells us how the world should be.

And no amount of learning about how the world is will ever tell us anything about how it should be, unless we have with notion of 'should' to begin with. E.G. Learning that slavery is a cause of unhappiness can only tell us that we should not enslave IF we already believe we should not make people unhappy.

Consider how it would be to begin with no moral imperatives: no givens about what was good or evil. It would be impossible to derive them logically. Slavery leads to unhappiness, but if unhappiness is not initially defined as evil then it cannot make slavery evil.

There are, IMO, only two ways to arrive at a moral system. One is to appeal to authority (God usually): the authority says that X is [im]moral and we take His/its word for it and base our morality on that premise. The other option is to assume that humans have some sort of "moral sense" and that this sense is reliable: I perceive X to be [im]moral and I trust my perceptions. Of course one could also use a combination of the two. But in either case, there must be some innate moral source, either God or ourselves; you can never logically derive the moral from strictly amoral.

[Zarquon]

There are, IMO, only two ways to arrive at a moral system. One is to appeal to authority (God usually): the authority says that X is [im]moral and we take His/its word for it and base our morality on that premise. The other option is to assume that humans have some sort of "moral sense" and that this sense is reliable: I perceive X to be [im]moral and I trust my perceptions. Of course one could also use a combination of the two. But in either case, there must be some innate moral source, either God or ourselves; you can never logically derive the moral from strictly amoral.
Not at all, morality can be seen, and I'd assert is, as a consequence of millennia of social interaction and development amongst a social species of mammals- us.
And if we were to suddenly cease to exist, so would it; as it is a conceptual and cultural entity, contingent on thinking and sociable human beings for its "existence"; i.e. we organise and recognise morality, like we organise and recognise the govt or any other human institution, and human institutions need human beings to exist and function.

[SMadsen]

Sure, I have no argument with any of what you say here.

But that doesn't really address the question though. The question is, how can these types of 'moral' issues be addressed by civil society in a way that is not arbitrary or biased?

The nature of democracy requires a public policy response to some human-moral issues. This is a given. The question is how to answer it in a world without any recognizable moral authorities.
Where is there a world without recognizable moral authority? As far as I can tell, such notions are reflected by the way we arrange ourselves in societies.

In ideal democracy, for example, the individual is ideally recognized as the moral authority (in practice, of course, carried out by representation). Under ideal Communism (i.e., the Marxist version), the proletariat is ideally recognized as the moral authority. In oligarchy, autocracy and theocracy, well, it's not hard to spot it there, either. I don't think worlds exist without recognizable moral authorities, - hence all the labels I referred to.

[SMadsen]

Not at all, morality can be seen, and I'd assert is, as a consequence of millennia of social interaction and development amongst a social species of mammals- us.
And if we were to suddenly cease to exist, so would it; as it is a conceptual and cultural entity, contingent on thinking and sociable human beings for its "existence"; i.e. we organise and recognise morality, like we organise and recognise the govt or any other human institution, and human institutions need human beings to exist and function.
Cool. I swear I didn't see this post before I posted just now. Although I may have put it differently, what you wrote here is pretty much what I was thinking of.

[SMadsen]

There are, IMO, only two ways to arrive at a moral system. One is to appeal to authority (God usually): the authority says that X is [im]moral and we take His/its word for it and base our morality on that premise. The other option is to assume that humans have some sort of "moral sense" and that this sense is reliable: I perceive X to be [im]moral and I trust my perceptions. Of course one could also use a combination of the two. But in either case, there must be some innate moral source, either God or ourselves; you can never logically derive the moral from strictly amoral.
It doesn't really matter what the source of morality is. That's merely a mental exercise now that we happen to have this ability to quarrel with ourselves. The need to approach other humans safely and, thus, to live together in large social groups is the source of morality, regardless of what we with our constantly imposing egos may imagine the source to be. Morality simply exists due to social interdependency among a species with a well developed self-awareness.

[dilettante]

Not at all, morality can be seen, and I'd assert is, as a consequence of millennia of social interaction and development amongst a social species of mammals- us.
And if we were to suddenly cease to exist, so would it; as it is a conceptual and cultural entity, contingent on thinking and sociable human beings for its "existence"; i.e. we organise and recognise morality, like we organise and recognise the govt or any other human institution, and human institutions need human beings to exist and function.

You're talking about the history of moral thinking, and I don't necessarily disagree with you. But I was talking about the logical foundations of any moral belief system.
Saying that existing moral systems are "a consequence of millennia of social interaction and development amongst a social species of mammals" doesn't help tell us what we should and shouldn't do.

It doesn't really matter what the source of morality is. That's merely a mental exercise now that we happen to have this ability to quarrel with ourselves. The need to approach other humans safely and, thus, to live together in large social groups is the source of morality, regardless of what we with our constantly imposing egos may imagine the source to be. Morality simply exists due to social interdependency among a species with a well developed self-awareness.

A very amoral conclusion. But again, not terribly helpful if one is actually trying to determine their moral beliefs. There's a gap between "killing people makes living together in social groups difficult" and "it is morally wrong to kill people".

----

Again, I'm not necessarily disagreeing with either of your historic origins comments, just pointing out that the question of "why did society develop its current moral system?" is fundamentally different from "what is right and what is wrong?" And I think the OP refers more to the latter.

[SMadsen]

A very amoral conclusion.
I presume this is said in jest but just in case it's not, what's amoral? To bid in on how morality arises?

But again, not terribly helpful if one is actually trying to determine their moral beliefs.
I agree. To determine the moral beliefs of people, it helps to study them or, quicker yet, ask them.

There's a gap between "killing people makes living together in social groups difficult" and "it is morally wrong to kill people".
I don't see the gap. It is indeed morally wrong to kill people without socially approved causes because it shifts the balance that interdependency rests upon.

[dilettante]

I presume this is said in jest but just in case it's not, what's amoral? To bid in on how morality arises?

I agree. To determine the moral beliefs of people, it helps to study them or, quicker yet, ask them.

'Amoral' as in avoiding any sort of moral statement or evaluation.

E.G. "The 911 bombers believed that killing Americans was morally righteous" is an amoral statement of fact; it conveys information but makes no moral evaluation. "What the 911 bombers did was morally wrong" would be a moral statement.

Determining the moral systems of other people can easily be an amoral enterprise since its entirely based on factual indicatives: 'People X have morality system Y.' Logically determining one's own moral system (if any), on the other hand, requires more than purely factual data.


I don't see the gap. It is indeed morally wrong to kill people without socially approved causes because it shifts the balance that interdependency rests upon.


Indicative/amoral statement of fact: 'Killing people without socially approved causes shifts the balance that interdependency rests upon.'

Moral statement: 'Shifting the balance that interdependency rests upon is morally wrong.'

Moral conclusion: 'It is morally wrong to kill people without socially approved causes [because it shifts the balance that interdependency rests upon].

Without the moral statement (which is here presented as a given), there's a logical "gap" between the statement of fact and the moral conclusion. The latter doesn't logically follow from the former unless some related moral statement is already accepted. That's the problem with trying to 'scientifically' derive one's morality; if you only start with statements of facts, there's no way to reach any moral conclusion.

[andrewl]

I believe that it is. But I have no way to prove it except by appealing to other moral imperatives. I certainly can't derive its immorality scientifically.

Human suffering, unhappiness, and misery physically manifests itself in the universe like any other natural phenomenon and is observable and measurable. In fact humans have the sensory equipment specifically attuned to recognizing this. This is a physical reality, known to us objectively. I don't need to appeal to any other moral imperative to know that the proposition misery = bad is valid objectively.


But morality is, by definition, distinct from physics. A physics equation tells us how the world is. E.G. [a=f/m] tells us that acceleration given to an object is equal to the force applied to it divided by its mass.
Morality, on the other hand, tells us how the world should be. Morality can guide our behavior, but ideology tells us how the world should be. However, it is very conceivable that mathematical equations and physical laws can also explain suffering and its negative consequences for human well-being (we are just another physical component of the univers after all). But for me this is probably just superfluous, i trust my humanness to tell me these things.

And no amount of learning about how the world is will ever tell us anything about how it should be, unless we have with notion of 'should' to begin with. E.G. Learning that slavery is a cause of unhappiness can only tell us that we should not enslave IF we already believe we should not make people unhappy.Agreed, but i separate ideology from morality.

We are born with moral capacities regardless of how anybody thinks the world should be. It takes the systematic denial of human status to even consider slavery. This is not our natural condition, we don't have to learn that slavery is a cause of unhappiness (all people know this instinctively), we have to learn that slaves are not humans and cannot experience human happiness. (this is ideology).


Consider how it would be to begin with no moral imperatives: no givens about what was good or evil. It would be impossible to derive them logically. Slavery leads to unhappiness, but if unhappiness is not initially defined as evil then it cannot make slavery evil.Its a good thing that we derive them physically then.

There are, IMO, only two ways to arrive at a moral system. One is to appeal to authority (God usually): the authority says that X is [im]moral and we take His/its word for it and base our morality on that premise. The other option is to assume that humans have some sort of "moral sense" and that this sense is reliable: I perceive X to be [im]moral and I trust my perceptions. Of course one could also use a combination of the two. But in either case, there must be some innate moral source, either God or ourselves; you can never logically derive the moral from strictly amoral.I think that we do have a moral sense and it absolutely should be trusted. To me this is no different than my sense that my hand is on fire and i should do something to extinguish the fire, or the sense that my belly is empty and i should do something to fill it, or im thirsty, or horny, or whatever...

To appeal to any other authority is to pervert the natural moral process with ideology.

Andrew

[dilettante]

I think that we do have a moral sense and it absolutely should be trusted. To me this is no different than my sense that my hand is on fire and i should do something to extinguish the fire, or the sense that my belly is empty and i should do something to fill it, or im thirsty, or horny, or whatever...

To appeal to any other authority is to pervert the natural moral process with ideology.

Andrew

Truth be told, I'm don't strongly disagree with you, except perhaps to argue that accepting human moral perceptions as valid and superior to other claims of moral authority is, itself, ideological. I'm inclined the accept that humanity has an innate moral sense, though perhaps an imperfect one, not entirely unlike its other senses.

There's an interesting quote by Thomas Jefferson on this which you might (or might not) like:
"Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality...The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given to them in a greater or lesser degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense."
Thomas Jefferson (letter to his nephew, Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787). (emphasis mine)

[andrewl]

Truth be told, I'm don't strongly disagree with you, except perhaps to argue that accepting human moral perceptions as valid and superior to other claims of moral authority is, itself, ideological. I'm inclined the accept that humanity has an innate moral sense, though perhaps an imperfect one, not entirely unlike its other senses.

There's an interesting quote by Thomas Jefferson on this which you might (or might not) like:
(emphasis mine)


Thanks for that quote. Jefferson was a man i probably should read more of.

It also struck me how the texas board of education replaced jefferson with calvin recently. Going by what i wrote above this would be precisely what i termed the perversion of a natural moral process with ideology. No different than perverting geology with creationism.

Andrew

[Michael]

There's an interesting quote by Thomas Jefferson on this which you might (or might not) like:
(emphasis mine)
That's pure deism - exactly the same baseless assertion that is found in the Delcaration of Independence (that all are born equal and endowed with rights from a creator).

Indeed, the Declaration even emphatically asserts that this is an article of faith.

[andrewl]

That's pure deism - exactly the same baseless assertion that is found in the Delcaration of Independence (that all are born equal and endowed with rights from a creator).

Indeed, the Declaration even emphatically asserts that this is an article of faith.

I don't know enough about Jefferson's personal philosophy to say if he was a deist or not but reading that quote words like "destiny" or "given to man" do not necessarily have to mean "by god or the creator" - we could also be destined by evolution to have an objective moral sense relative to society.

Andrew

[Michael]

I don't know enough about Jefferson's personal philosophy to say if he was a deist or not but reading that quote words like "destiny" or "given to man" do not necessarily have to mean "by god or the creator" - we could also be destined by evolution to have an objective moral sense relative to society.

Andrew

The term "endowed" is very explicit. Endowments require someone to do the endowing. :shrug:

And Jefferson uses the same term in the quoted passage as is found in the Declaration (which he is the reputed author of).

[andrewl]

The term "endowed" is very explicit. Endowments require someone to do the endowing. :shrug:

And Jefferson uses the same term in the quoted passage as is found in the Declaration (which he is the reputed author of).

Im sure jefferson was referring to a god or creator, im just saying that subscribing to the rationalist or humanist philosophy of jefferson does not require one to be a deist (although I think deism is pretty harmless anyway).

Andrew

[SMadsen]

To appeal to any other authority is to pervert the natural moral process with ideology.
You do not pervert the natural process by appealing to authority. It's still the natural process as it always was and always will be. What you do when appealing to authority is simple liability handling.

Since morality is based on a priori, i.e., something is morally good simply because it is, it comes with liability issues that are virtually impossible to address unless all moral standards involved in addressing liability are completely uniform. So by attributing the source of morality to some external entity, say, a god, liability is shifted.

For example, if all moral standards conformed to those of Scott Roeder (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8600339.stm), then he would most probably go free after having killed Dr. Tiller. He doesn't only believe his actions were morally right but he also shifts liability because it's not that he says it's right to kill an abortion doctor (if so then it would only be right because he says it's right and that's not acceptable), it's right because he is able to appeal to an external source.

[SMadsen]

'Amoral' as in avoiding ...

... is already accepted. That's the problem with trying to 'scientifically' derive one's morality; if you only start with statements of facts, there's no way to reach any moral conclusion.
Dilettante, I think we are talking about completely different things, you and I.

I will, however, tie a comment to the last sentence that I quoted in its entirety above.

A moral stance is not justified by anything else than itself. If it's morally wrong to kill then the wrongness of killing is justified by it being morally wrong. That's it. Morality is solely a priori and cannot be resolved a posteriori lest it stops being morality and turns into theory of conduct, aka. ethics. None of this, however, prevents us from investigating the nature of morality and that's what I'm talking about while you're apparently talking about right and wrong.

[andrewl]

You do not pervert the natural process by appealing to authority. It's still the natural process as it always was and always will be. What you do when appealing to authority is simple liability handling.

Since morality is based on a priori, i.e., something is morally good simply because it is, it comes with liability issues that are virtually impossible to address unless all moral standards involved in addressing liability are completely uniform. So by attributing the source of morality to some external entity, say, a god, liability is shifted.

For example, if all moral standards conformed to those of Scott Roeder (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8600339.stm), then he would most probably go free after having killed Dr. Tiller. He doesn't only believe his actions were morally right but he also shifts liability because it's not that he says it's right to kill an abortion doctor (if so then it would only be right because he says it's right and that's not acceptable), it's right because he is able to appeal to an external source.

That's an interesting way of seeing it. But its also a two way street. Once you have shifted the liability to something external like a god or a religious text that authority then feeds back into the moral system. So its not just Scott shifting the liability to God, it is also God telling Scott to kill abortion doctors.

Andrew

[Non Sequitur]

That's an interesting way of seeing it. But its also a two way street. Once you have shifted the liability to something external like a god or a religious text that authority then feeds back into the moral system. So its not just Scott shifting the liability to God, it is also God telling Scott to kill abortion doctors.

Andrew

On a side note, this is why there is an official Holy text, a system of creeds, and theology with right (orthodox) and wrong (heterodox) interpretations. So when Scott Roeder tells people killing him was right because of some higher moral authority people can say "no you're wrong" based on that system. There will be significant variations (and their should be), but there are at least some basic principles and moral guidelines people can agree upon.

[andrewl]

On a side note, this is why there is an official Holy text with right (orthodox) and wrong (heterodox) interpretations. So when Scott Roeder tells people killing him was right because of some higher moral authority people can say "no you're wrong" based on some system.

I agree. But still, interpretations of religious holy texts are subjective and prone to ideology and far too rigidly fixed to one cultural moment in time.

Andrew

[dilettante]

Dilettante, I think we are talking about completely different things, you and I.

I will, however, tie a comment to the last sentence that I quoted in its entirety above.

A moral stance is not justified by anything else than itself. If it's morally wrong to kill then the wrongness of killing is justified by it being morally wrong. That's it. Morality is solely a priori and cannot be resolved a posteriori lest it stops being morality and turns into theory of conduct, aka. ethics. None of this, however, prevents us from investigating the nature of morality and that's what I'm talking about while you're apparently talking about right and wrong.


I agree, though I think it might be that we're talking about the same thing, but approaching it from different directions and asking different questions.
I think you've been looking at morality from the 'outside' as an observer, focusing on how it evolved and what its effects were. I've been looking at the question as an 'insider' or participant, as it were, focusing on the question of how should society/government address moral questions.

And I also agree that moral stances can only be justified either by themselves or by other, more basic, moral stances.

[SMadsen]

That's an interesting way of seeing it. But its also a two way street. Once you have shifted the liability to something external like a god or a religious text that authority then feeds back into the moral system. So its not just Scott shifting the liability to God, it is also God telling Scott to kill abortion doctors.

Andrew
Not necessarily. For the show to work the best, the authority must only be held indirectly liable by justifying the action, not actually cause it or dictate it. If it's the cause then it can be judged on the same terms as the actor, who will then be reduced to a mere puppet, and that'll jeopardize the authority's authority.

This is of course not terrible important with appeal to authority of a purely conceptual nature. The claim that "God made me do it" will make the actor look wacko a million times faster than make the god loose authority.

[Michael]

You do not pervert the natural process by appealing to authority. It's still the natural process as it always was and always will be. What you do when appealing to authority is simple liability handling.

Since morality is based on a priori, i.e., something is morally good simply because it is, it comes with liability issues that are virtually impossible to address unless all moral standards involved in addressing liability are completely uniform. So by attributing the source of morality to some external entity, say, a god, liability is shifted.

For example, if all moral standards conformed to those of Scott Roeder (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8600339.stm), then he would most probably go free after having killed Dr. Tiller. He doesn't only believe his actions were morally right but he also shifts liability because it's not that he says it's right to kill an abortion doctor (if so then it would only be right because he says it's right and that's not acceptable), it's right because he is able to appeal to an external source.
Excellent point SMadsen. :thumbsup:

Morality seems to be subjectively very weak (since very few will take responsibility for it themselves) and tends to rely upon external sources of authority.

This appears to be a distinctive characteristic of human morality.

Btw, this in particular shows why Nietzsche is so radical and dangerous to society (since Nietzsche places the locus of morality with the subjective individual alone).

[Non Sequitur]

Btw, this in particular shows why Nietzsche is so radical and dangerous to society (since Nietzsche places the locus of morality with the subjective individual alone).
this is also why Christian types like myself usually don't get along with Nietzsche so well.

[Michael]

this is also why Christian types like myself usually don't get along with Nietzsche so well.

Yes, and it also explains why Nietzsche is so dangerous for atheists. I recoil in horror at the thought of acknowleging the validity of purely subjective morality!

Yet at the same time, I'm faced with the prospect of trying the answer the question of, what is the alternative? (ignoring the God-answer of course!).

That's why the topic of morality interests me. I think it is a social construct, and if it is, then there is an answer/alternative to Nietzsche. :)

[Non Sequitur]

Yes, and it also explains why Nietzsche is so dangerous for atheists. I recoil in horror at the thought of acknowleging the validity of purely subjective morality!

Yet at the same time, I'm faced with the prospect of trying the answer the question of, what is the alternative? (ignoring the God-answer of course!).

That's why the topic of morality interests me. I think it is a social construct, and if it is, then there is an answer/alternative to Nietzsche. :)

But isn't morality subjective then anyway? Society doesn't seem to be anymore of a permanent basis than the individual.

I will repeat my common comment in morality discussions however: My theological outlook makes morality discussions a secondary concern.

[Michael]

But isn't morality subjective then anyway? Society doesn't seem to be anymore of a permanent basis than the individual.

Only if you demand that morality be a permanent thing I guess.

I don't have that kind of bias. I have no problem with morality changing over time (as it clearly can and does do).

Ergo, the impermanency is not a viable critique.

I do consider society as a better or more effective basis for morality than the subjective individual (who can and often is a little monster).

I will repeat my common comment in morality discussions however: My theological outlook makes morality discussions a secondary concern.
No kidding. God is God. ;)

Once you buy into that, everything else is secondary.

[Non Sequitur]

Only if you demand that morality be a permanent thing I guess.

I don't have that kind of bias. I have no problem with morality changing over time (as it clearly can and does do).

Ergo, the impermanency is not a viable critique.

I do consider society as a better or more effective basis for morality than the subjective individual (who can and often is a little monster).

I could probably agree with that up to a certain extant. Their would be a few things I would say were permanent, but they more stem for faith assertions.


No kidding. God is God. ;)

Once you buy into that, everything else is secondary.

Yep, and as the good book says "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free." Christ's death frees us from the Law.

[Michael]

I could probably agree with that up to a certain extant. Their would be a few things I would say were permanent, but they more stem for faith assertions.
Well then, what do you think of my assertion that the 'law' is little more than codified morality?

Yep, and as the good book says "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free." Christ's death frees us from the Law.
This isn't the place to discuss this, but I've never quite grasped this concept of Christ's [alleged] sacrifice freeing anybody from anything. It does seem like magic. If Christ was the 'son of God' then I'm not buying the flesh and blood sacrifice as being anything but symbolic theater, since he was in on the game by definition (by being the 'son of God'). So how can an act of 'symbolic theater' make souls free?

Please don't reply here. Such a discussion would rail-road this one entirely. :)

[Non Sequitur]

Well then, what do you think of my assertion that the 'law' is little more than codified morality?

Well, I have a tough time with that one. On the one hand I would agree because it just seems obvious to me that the law equals societies codified morality. That's why it's the law.

However, I have trouble with the concept in other ways because I am uncomfortable with the law being the arbiter of right and wrong.


This isn't the place to discuss this, but I've never quite grasped this concept of Christ's [alleged] sacrifice freeing anybody from anything. It does seem like magic. If Christ was the 'son of God' then I'm not buying the flesh and blood sacrifice as being anything but symbolic theater, since he was in on the game by definition (by being the 'son of God'). So how can an act of 'symbolic theater' make souls free?

Please don't reply here. Such a discussion would rail-road this one entirely. :)

I promise to answer this question later and in another thread. It's dealing with one of the most difficult theologies in all of Christianity. There will be an answer though! :D

[Non Sequitur]

This isn't the place to discuss this, but I've never quite grasped this concept of Christ's [alleged] sacrifice freeing anybody from anything. It does seem like magic. If Christ was the 'son of God' then I'm not buying the flesh and blood sacrifice as being anything but symbolic theater, since he was in on the game by definition (by being the 'son of God'). So how can an act of 'symbolic theater' make souls free?

Please don't reply here. Such a discussion would rail-road this one entirely.

Your wish is my command. Here (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1333) is the thread that starts a long discussion on this question.

[Michael]

Well, I have a tough time with that one. On the one hand I would agree because it just seems obvious to me that the law equals societies codified morality. That's why it's the law.

However, I have trouble with the concept in other ways because I am uncomfortable with the law being the arbiter of right and wrong.
But the law itself doesn't determine actual right or wrong - that is a specifically human process. And laws are written/modified/executed by humans every step of the way.

Ergo, humans themselves, in a political majority, are the ultimate arbitrators of right and wrong. The law merely codifies this fact (and makes it so).

I promise to answer this question later and in another thread. It's dealing with one of the most difficult theologies in all of Christianity. There will be an answer though! :D
No doubt - and indeed, I see the thread posted already. Alas, my brain is too tired today to wrestle with that deep and complex issue. :D

I certainly will reply to that thread within the next day or two. :)

[Non Sequitur]

But the law itself doesn't determine actual right or wrong - that is a specifically human process. And laws are written/modified/executed by humans every step of the way.

Ergo, humans themselves, in a political majority, are the ultimate arbitrators of right and wrong. The law merely codifies this fact (and makes it so).


Well that doesn't really alleviate my worries. Fundamentally there are some things that I am uncomfortable having any human institution be the "ultimate arbitrators" for.

But as I said, I'm willing to go along with it to a certain point. Some things, like the homosexuality issue, I can only conceive being morally wrong according to societal conventions. Tradition is valid source of authority.