Chance

[Donkey]

My maternal Grandmother lives in a small town about an hour and a half outside of Toronto. We visit her relatively frequently (though less so in recent years for various reasons). One of my most vivid memories, for some reason, of a visit many years ago is the ancient version of monopoly that she had on her computer. I remember one of my older cousins saying that the rolling of the dice was a "really early random number generator." I found the idea that people could create a randomness like that rather impressive at that age (maybe eight years old).

Anyway, the other day I was pondering free will in the context of an omnipotent and omniscient God. In (some) Christian thought, it is accepted that Free Will and omniscience are not incompatible, and the apparent contradictions are chalked up to divine mystery. So, assuming that free will and omniscience are both true, I was wondering if God could, or might be inclined to create a sort of perfect randomness. While God can probably predict the outcome, the point would be, much like with will, that God does not control or influence the outcome. The difference, of course, is that unlike free will, there is no conscious agent determining the outcome, just the proverbial cosmic dice.

And after this, are there any theological implications of this?

This is not a very thought-out idea, just something that occurred to me. :erm:

[dilettante]

An interesting thing to ponder.

I think that the nature of any "perfect randomness" God would create depends on who's point of view you're talking about. From an omniscient point of view, I'm not sure "randomness" is very distinguishable from non-randomness. E.G. Lets say God creates a truly "random" number generator, but since he is omniscient, he knows it will generate the number 3. How is that different, from his perspective, than simply creating a "number 3" generator?
On the other hand, from the perspective of the non-omniscient observer, the key quality of randomness is that the future outcome is not determined by present circumstances. Thus, a dice roll is not perfectly random since the result is (believed to be) entirely determined by physical characteristics of the dice and the surface the impact, air currents, gravity...etc. If one had perfect knowledge of the moment the dice were in the air, one could perfectly predict what number would be rolled in the future. But a perfectly random number generator would be quite different, since no amount of knowledge of the present would allow one to predict what number it would generate next.

[Michael]

I've always held that "omniscient" God and "free will" together eliminate the "God is Good" assertion.

Its all about that eternal damnation that God forces upon people who actually use that free will thing.

If omniscience is granted, that means God already knows who is going to be banished for eternity and that free will is thus a farce (from God's perspective) and that eternal damnation is what God likes to do.

[Greendruid]

... eternal damnation is what God likes to do.

Does this make God a sadist Michael :lol:

[Michael]

Does this make God a sadist Michael :lol:
That is precisely the logic of my critique against the combination of "omniscient God" plus "free will" - it nullifies the "God is good" assertion.

[drgoodtrips]

I've always thought the same. This is why, as a believer in God, I've always found the concept of hell to be preposterous.

[Michael]

I've always thought the same. This is why, as a believer in God, I've always found the concept of hell to be preposterous.
Yes, something has to give in order to maintain logical consistency.

Either God's omniscience, God's gift of free will, God's goodness or eternal hell. One of the four has to go.

[SMadsen]

Yes, something has to give in order to maintain logical consistency.
Either God's omniscience, God's gift of free will, God's goodness or eternal hell. One of the four has to go.
I can think of a 5th thing to discard in order to get rid of logical inconsistencies alltogether :)

Anyhow, I must agree that there can't be but a contradiction since free will always has the potential to prove the omniscient entity wrong, thus rendering its omniscience meaningless.

A classical argument is of course that the omniscient entity exists outside of time. "I know what you did last summer" does not mean that you were devoid of free will last summer and your actions were deterministic. It means that I can only know it because you already did it.
The argument is simply that existing outside of time allows the observer to see what actions have been made before they are made without imposing on the observer a deterministic quality.

Of course, existing outside of time and/or outside of the natural world makes no difference as to the nature of supernaturality, which basically is that anything goes. It is, as the prefix super- indicates, beyond :)

[dilettante]

I'm inclined to think that "free will," at least as its generally used, is a hollow concept that, if pressed, turns out to be meaningless.

"Free will" implies that one has a choice, but then one only need ask why any given choice was made. Either there was a reason for making that particular choice, in which case the "choice" was strictly determined by existing conditions (i.e. the reason(s)), or there was not a reason and therefore the "choice" was an utterly random and inexplicable occurrence. Or, I suppose, it could be a combination of the two, in which existing conditions strictly determined the boundaries of random selection.
In any event, all options deduce down to determinism or randomness, both of which are generally thought to be the antitheses of "free will."

A more useful conception of "free will" might be formulated such that it was not inherently in conflict with determinism, but that's probably going too far off topic for this thread...

[Michael]

I can think of a 5th thing to discard in order to get rid of logical inconsistencies alltogether :)
No surprise there. ;)

Anyhow, I must agree that there can't be but a contradiction since free will always has the potential to prove the omniscient entity wrong, thus rendering its omniscience meaningless.

A classical argument is of course that the omniscient entity exists outside of time. "I know what you did last summer" does not mean that you were devoid of free will last summer and your actions were deterministic. It means that I can only know it because you already did it.
The argument is simply that existing outside of time allows the observer to see what actions have been made before they are made without imposing on the observer a deterministic quality.

Of course, existing outside of time and/or outside of the natural world makes no difference as to the nature of supernaturality, which basically is that anything goes. It is, as the prefix super- indicates, beyond :)
That form of 'omniscience' makes sense and is useful for reconcilliation with 'free will', but it still doesn't get out of the four-part logical inconsistency mentioned above.

[Michael]

I'm inclined to think that "free will," at least as its generally used, is a hollow concept that, if pressed, turns out to be meaningless.

"Free will" implies that one has a choice, but then one only need ask why any given choice was made. Either there was a reason for making that particular choice, in which case the "choice" was strictly determined by existing conditions (i.e. the reason(s)), or there was not a reason and therefore the "choice" was an utterly random and inexplicable occurrence. Or, I suppose, it could be a combination of the two, in which existing conditions strictly determined the boundaries of random selection.
In any event, all options deduce down to determinism or randomness, both of which are generally thought to be the antitheses of "free will."
What about subconscious subjectivity? One might not be aware of it and thus it only 'looks' random.

Or perhaps brain-chemical determinism...

A more useful conception of "free will" might be formulated such that it was not inherently in conflict with determinism, but that's probably going too far off topic for this thread...
I should think this is specifically relevant to the topic of this thread... (Donkey will please correct me if I'm wrong).

[SMadsen]

That form of 'omniscience' makes sense and is useful for reconcilliation with 'free will', but it still doesn't get out of the four-part logical inconsistency mentioned above.
True.

When played out correctly, which I'm not sure my phrasing lived up to, the argument allows for a fair trial ("fair" being within the context of the dogma, of course) and a punishment matching the actions made under the influence of free will. This allows for non-predestined tickets to a place of vengeance.

Even if the argument works within the limits of the subject, I'll agree that it doesn't resolve the goodness of the deity. But then nothing really does, logically speaking, since goodness doesn't exist without evil and, providing the deity is a creator deity, nothing exists without the deity. So logic never crosses the treshold of religiousness to begin with.

Unlike the concept of defense that is based on argumentation, apologetics is based on appeal to forgiveness. It doesn't need logic. Fortunately :)

[dilettante]

What about subconscious subjectivity? One might not be aware of it and thus it only 'looks' random.

Or perhaps brain-chemical determinism...

Either way, I don't see how it would offer an alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy. If your actions/choices are a result of subconscious activity or of chemicals floating around in your brain, then they are determined by those things.


I should think this is specifically relevant to the topic of this thread... (Donkey will please correct me if I'm wrong).

Perhaps, though it seems to me that Donkey's OP is primarily about the theological implications of randomness; free will is merely mentioned as an explanatory device. Besides, I thought you were in need of more threads here? :)

[SMadsen]

Either way, I don't see how it would offer an alternative to the determinism/randomness dichotomy. If your actions/choices are a result of subconscious activity or of chemicals floating around in your brain, then they are determined by those things.
The ability to demonstrate an elimination of perceived randomness (things we either want to be random, aren't aware of aren't random or understand to such a small degree that we think of them as random) begs the question if there really is a dichotomy.

[dilettante]

The ability to demonstrate an elimination of perceived randomness (things we either want to be random, aren't aware of aren't random or understand to such a small degree that we think of them as random) begs the question if there really is a dichotomy.

I'm not sure I understand what you're saying here.

As I conceive it, randomness is the (only) alternative to determinism. Laws of cause-and-effect are followed or else they are not, there is a reason something happened or else it happened for no reason, an event was determined by conditions or else it happened randomly.

The problem with "free will," as it is commonly used, is that it attempts to provide a third alternative where none exists. If a "free choice" is neither determined by conditions nor random, then it isn't anything and the phrase itself is essentially nonsensical.

EDIT: Actually, upon reflection, "probability" might qualify as a third alternative. Or it might just be considered a sort of randomness whose constraints are determined by conditions. I'll have to think about that some more. Either way, it doesn't seem to be the alternative that "free will" is usually trying to describe.

[SMadsen]

EDIT: Actually, upon reflection, "probability" might qualify as a third alternative. Or it might just be considered a sort of randomness whose constraints are determined by conditions.
A sort of determined randomness is what I was getting at. If you can demonstrate cases where "randomness" is determined (or "determinism" is random) then a determinism/randomness dichotomy may not even exist.

Either way, it doesn't seem to be the alternative that "free will" is usually trying to describe.
I don't think free will is describing anything. We on the other hand are trying to describe something with free will.

That's pedantic, I know (and I have the badge to prove it :) ) - but what it really means is that free will is merely a solution to an idea, - it's not an idea by itself.

[dilettante]

A sort of determined randomness is what I was getting at. If you can demonstrate cases where "randomness" is determined (or "determinism" is random) then a determinism/randomness dichotomy may not even exist.

What would "determined randomness" look like? How would it relate to causation?
I'm still trying to wrap my head around this.

[SMadsen]

What would "determined randomness" look like? How would it relate to causation?
I'm still trying to wrap my head around this.
I'm merely questioning a black and white distinction between determinism and randomness. There might not be as clear a border as we'd like. Or there might not be a border at all.

Determinism is defined (at least in one of various ways) as a fixed line of events given a fixed set of conditions. This is usually pretty black and white when it comes to studying natural sciences; the explanatory power of scientific theory is proportional with the proper identification of deterministic conditions (in this case, aka natural laws).

It means, however, that not only does there have to be deterministic conditions but we also have to be able to identify them. Only then can we ascribe an event to a cause and obtain a predictability. If not, we are somewhat in a habit of tossing it into the large bin of randomness but it doesn't mean that deterministic conditions don't exist. They may just be too complex for us to discern. Or even to care to discern.

Of course, this also leaves us open to another habit; to take it out of the bin and with our own imagination invent a proper identification - even call it by name, for instance, Zeus or God or whatever - and create for ourselves the illusion of predictability. But that's another story. Ok, so it's actually the on-topic one :)

[dilettante]

I'm merely questioning a black and white distinction between determinism and randomness. There might not be as clear a border as we'd like. Or there might not be a border at all.

Determinism is defined (at least in one of various ways) as a fixed line of events given a fixed set of conditions. This is usually pretty black and white when it comes to studying natural sciences; the explanatory power of scientific theory is proportional with the proper identification of deterministic conditions (in this case, aka natural laws).

It means, however, that not only does there have to be deterministic conditions but we also have to be able to identify them. Only then can we ascribe an event to a cause and obtain a predictability. If not, we are somewhat in a habit of tossing it into the large bin of randomness but it doesn't mean that deterministic conditions don't exist. They may just be too complex for us to discern. Or even to care to discern.


Well for my purposes, our ability to distinguish between determinism and randomness is less relevant than establishing that they are the two (the only two?) essential explanations for any event. Either there was causation, or there was not. They are more or less defined as mutually exclusive.

That said, I'm still not sure what to make of probability. Let's say there's a chance of something happening when I push a button, but only a chance. The something doesn't happen randomly, because it only happens after I push the button, and not when I don't. But it doesn't always happen when I push the button, even if the conditions are identical to a time when it did happen, so its happening isn't strictly deterministic either. I'm not quite sure how to relate such a scenario to causation.

[Michael]

Well for my purposes, our ability to distinguish between determinism and randomness is less relevant than establishing that they are the two (the only two?) essential explanations for any event. Either there was causation, or there was not. They are more or less defined as mutually exclusive.
What about "unknown"?

I consider the choice between "determinism and randomness" to be a false ditchotomy as it ignores the entirely reasonable 'explanation' of 'unknown'.

Assigning all 'unknown' into the category of 'random' seems to be problematic.

That said, I'm still not sure what to make of probability. Let's say there's a chance of something happening when I push a button, but only a chance. The something doesn't happen randomly, because it only happens after I push the button, and not when I don't. But it doesn't always happen when I push the button, even if the conditions are identical to a time when it did happen, so its happening isn't strictly deterministic either. I'm not quite sure how to relate such a scenario to causation.
Conditions may not in fact be identical given the partial oxidization (or rusting) of the circuit contacts inside the button mechanism. This could account for the 'randomness' that is apparent to you, but from a truly technical perspective, might not be entirely random.

[dilettante]

What about "unknown"?

I consider the choice between "determinism and randomness" to be a false ditchotomy as it ignores the entirely reasonable 'explanation' of 'unknown'.

Assigning all 'unknown' into the category of 'random' seems to be problematic.

But "known"/"unknown" is an entirely different sort of classification; it's about the knowledge of the observer, not the nature of event. It's not an alternative to determinism or randomness.
Again, the event either had a cause or it didn't, our ability to determine which was the case doesn't change the fact that it must logically have been one or the other.


Conditions may not in fact be identical given the partial oxidization (or rusting) of the circuit contacts inside the button mechanism. This could account for the 'randomness' that is apparent to you, but from a truly technical perspective, might not be entirely random.

Well, I don't actually have button like this. It was just a hypothetical to illustrate the philosophical issue.

[SMadsen]

But "known"/"unknown" is an entirely different sort of classification; it's about the knowledge of the observer, not the nature of event. It's not an alternative to determinism or randomness.
Again, the event either had a cause or it didn't, our ability to determine which was the case doesn't change the fact that it must logically have been one or the other.
I must say that I find it rather uninteresting whether or not randomness can be classified in (I almost said 'by') an objective reality. It's merely a concept we invent in order to classify events that either don't need any explanation as far as cause or occurrence is concerned or that we presently can't know the cause or occurrence of but that simply need to be quantified for one purpose or another.

For example, in order for us to deal with half-life we only need to know that half of all nuclei will have broken down in a certain amount of time. We don't need to know which nucleus will break down next.

[andrewl]

My maternal Grandmother lives in a small town about an hour and a half outside of Toronto. We visit her relatively frequently (though less so in recent years for various reasons). One of my most vivid memories, for some reason, of a visit many years ago is the ancient version of monopoly that she had on her computer. I remember one of my older cousins saying that the rolling of the dice was a "really early random number generator." I found the idea that people could create a randomness like that rather impressive at that age (maybe eight years old).

Anyway, the other day I was pondering free will in the context of an omnipotent and omniscient God. In (some) Christian thought, it is accepted that Free Will and omniscience are not incompatible, and the apparent contradictions are chalked up to divine mystery. So, assuming that free will and omniscience are both true, I was wondering if God could, or might be inclined to create a sort of perfect randomness. While God can probably predict the outcome, the point would be, much like with will, that God does not control or influence the outcome. The difference, of course, is that unlike free will, there is no conscious agent determining the outcome, just the proverbial cosmic dice.

And after this, are there any theological implications of this?

This is not a very thought-out idea, just something that occurred to me. :erm:

Yes. Why would god be so superfluous as to bother if he already knew the outcome, regardless if god did not interfere in the outcome.

I used to play the older versions of SimCity. One time I took infinite cash, a totally flat map and laid out an entire city while the game was paused. Once i had zoned the entire map, placed roads, hospitals, etc... i allowed the game to resume unimpeded by me from that point on. Pretty much the result was as i expected. Afterward i realized there was no value in my exercise. The ersult was predictable, unsurprising, and totally unsastifying.

I can't imagine why God would have a need to do this.

Andrew

[Michael]

I can't imagine why God would have a need to do this.
Nothing personal, but your lack of imagination is not a pursuasive argument against God. ;)

Your taste in computer games though is excellent. SC3K rocks! :D

[Michael]

Yes. Why would god be so superfluous as to bother if he already knew the outcome, regardless if god did not interfere in the outcome.
This is a pretty good point. If God is omniscient, then freewill seems like an absurd fiction.

[Non Sequitur]

I've always held that "omniscient" God and "free will" together eliminate the "God is Good" assertion.

Its all about that eternal damnation that God forces upon people who actually use that free will thing.

If omniscience is granted, that means God already knows who is going to be banished for eternity and that free will is thus a farce (from God's perspective) and that eternal damnation is what God likes to do.

Depends on what kind of free will we are talking about. There are a couple of ideas that we need to get out of the way. First we need not assume that the foreknowledge of God equals the will of God. Just because someone knows something does not mean that they will it. I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow, or that I have my religion class tomorrow, but that does mean that I will either (in fact sometimes i wish my religion class was canceled). In the same way, God knows we will sin in life (a give in if we accept Original Sin) but he does not will it. In my opinion then, God can "know" who is going to Heaven and who is going to Hell and still not will it. Second, the Christian understanding of freedom and free will has always been different to say the least. Luther says a Christian is "perfectly free. Slave to none, but servant to all." True and perfect freedom in Christian theology is not doing what we want, but serving our neighbor in all things.

Certain well respected realms of Christian theology make the distinction between God's kingdom and the earthly kingdom. While God governs both, he governs them in different ways. This can be found in Augustine's City of God and Earthy city found in the City of God or in Luther's Kingdom on the Right (City of God) and the Kingdom on the Left (earthly city) distinction. In the earthly realm, free will obviously exists. We can vote for who we want, choose to eat what we want, live where we want. In the heavenly realm though, free will does not exist in the same way. Luther says that, when we talk about salvation, the will is "bound to evil." Free will exists "in name only" because we are bound by sin and will always choose evil if left to our own devices. If we accept Original Sin (the belief that humans have an unwavering tendency to sin) and the bondage of the will we are then bound by sin and left to our own "free will" we would be damned. Thus God is, in fact, good because he does not leave us to our own devices and intervenes (in the person of Christ). If we accept this distinction free will does not have to be a farce and disprove God's goodness

As for eternal damnation, I always say this but outside of the Bible C.S. Lewis' book the Great Divorce has probably been the most important book for me when it comes to heaven and hell. In the book C.S. Lewis says something like "in the end there are only two kinds of people, those who say my will be done, and those who say THY will be done." God will give us what we want in the end. Some will give in to God in everything and some will want their way. God will give both kinds of people what they want.

There are, however, other well respected realms of Christian theology that say God does not in fact have foreknowledge and that the omniscience is a description for God that was adopted from Greek philosophy, not from a purely Biblical understanding. While I don't agree, I thought it would be good to point out.

[SMadsen]

Depends on what kind of free will we are talking about. There are a couple of ideas that we need to get out of the way. First we need not assume that the foreknowledge of God equals the will of God. Just because someone knows something does not mean that they will it. I know that the Sun will rise tomorrow, or that I have my religion class tomorrow, but that does mean that I will either (in fact sometimes i wish my religion class was canceled). In the same way, God knows we will sin in life (a give in if we accept Original Sin) but he does not will it. In my opinion then, God can "know" who is going to Heaven and who is going to Hell and still not will it. Second, the Christian understanding of freedom and free will has always been different to say the least. Luther says a Christian is "perfectly free. Slave to none, but servant to all." True and perfect freedom in Christian theology is not doing what we want, but serving our neighbor in all things.
I mean no offense with the following, Non Sequitur, I just don't know how to put it differently but the assessment you seem to describe is quite useless. There is no point in hoping (as I believe it's called when having more than a hunch that something will happen but wanting that it won't) for something that you absolutely know will not happen. Hope hasn't got an ounce of meaning to the concept of omniscience.

So either your supernatural entity is omniscient and knows everything, even including its own will it can be argued quite easily by simply defining or redefining the range of omniscience, or it's not omniscient and is therefore able to express the will and hope that can only follow from non-omniscience.

Certain well respected realms of Christian theology make the distinction between God's kingdom and the earthly kingdom. While God governs both, he governs them in different ways. This can be found in Augustine's City of God and Earthy city found in the City of God or in Luther's Kingdom on the Right (City of God) and the Kingdom on the Left (earthly city) distinction. In the earthly realm, free will obviously exists. We can vote for who we want, choose to eat what we want, live where we want. In the heavenly realm though, free will does not exist in the same way. Luther says that, when we talk about salvation, the will is "bound to evil." Free will exists "in name only" because we are bound by sin and will always choose evil if left to our own devices. If we accept Original Sin (the belief that humans have an unwavering tendency to sin) and the bondage of the will we are then bound by sin and left to our own "free will" we would be damned. Thus God is, in fact, good because he does not leave us to our own devices and intervenes (in the person of Christ). If we accept this distinction free will does not have to be a farce and disprove God's goodness.
I respectfully disagree. This doesn't free free will from the paradox of itself and omniscience. Omniscience alone makes it utterly pointless to intervene. Simply put, the god can intervene or not intervene, it makes no difference as long as the god is omniscient.

You can eliminate omniscience and give free will a chance to stand on its own but together it'll capsize (within the boundary of apologetics, of course. If kept within the boundary of the irrationality of belief, it'll only capsize when the religion that professes it capsizes).

[dilettante]

...If God is omniscient, then freewill seems like an absurd fiction.

Why so?
I don't see how God's knowledge of what will happen would conflict with my free will in the future than my knowledge of what has happened conflicts with people's free will in the past. That I know what they chose doesn't make their choice any less real.

[Non Sequitur]

I respectfully disagree. [SIZE=2]This doesn't free free will from the paradox of itself and omniscience. Omniscience alone makes it utterly pointless to intervene. Simply put, the god can intervene or not intervene, it makes no difference as long as the god is omniscient.

You can eliminate omniscience and give free will a chance to stand on its own but together it'll capsize (within the boundary of apologetics, of course. If kept within the boundary of the irrationality of belief, it'll only capsize when the religion that professes it capsizes).

oh well, I never meant to free it from the paradox, just make the paradox more tolerable. I just think it's helpful to make the distinction between free will in this world and free will when it comes to salvation. We can be Biblically sound and say God doesn't predestine all our everyday choices for us and still rest in comfort that God will and does intervene in salvation. To a certain extant all theology must take some acceptance of paradox. God is capable of logical paradoxes because he is all powerful. There are lots of logical paradoxes in theology because we are using earthly terms to describe a transcendent being. All terms fall short. It can be very unsatisfying, but Augustine is right when he says "if you think you understand, you have failed."

I mean no offense with the following, Non Sequitur, I just don't know how to put it differently but the assessment you seem to describe is quite useless. There is no point in hoping (as I believe it's called when having more than a hunch that something will happen but wanting that it won't) for something that you absolutely know will not happen. Hope hasn't got an ounce of meaning to the concept of omniscience.

So either your supernatural entity is omniscient and knows everything, even including its own will it can be argued quite easily by simply defining or redefining the range of omniscience, or it's not omniscient and is therefore able to express the will and hope that can only follow from non-.

no offense, i'll rephrase to get my point across because i think i wrote that badly last night. My point was this: God know's we will sin in life, but does not will it. In that sense, free will exists. God gives us the ability and lets us use it.

[SMadsen]

oh well, I never meant to free it from the paradox, just make the paradox more tolerable. I just think it's helpful to make the distinction between free will in this world and free will when it comes to salvation. We can be Biblically sound and say God doesn't predestine all our everyday choices for us and still rest in comfort that God will and does intervene in salvation. To a certain extant all theology must take some acceptance of paradox. God is capable of logical paradoxes because he is all powerful. There are lots of logical paradoxes in theology because we are using earthly terms to describe a transcendent being. All terms fall short. It can be very unsatisfying, but Augustine is right when he says "if you think you understand, you have failed."
Yes, I can only agree. Transcendence is a ticket to anything imaginable.

no offense, i'll rephrase to get my point across because i think i wrote that badly last night. My point was this: God know's we will sin in life, but does not will it. In that sense, free will exists. God gives us the ability and lets us use it.
The abilities of the creation matters but with omniscience, the destination of the creation matters not. In other words, with abilities you're able to do and with an omniscient creator you're only able to do what is already known. I can only see that it renders the "lets us use it" part useless when it comes to will.

[JHC]

My maternal Grandmother lives in a small town about an hour and a half outside of Toronto. We visit her relatively frequently (though less so in recent years for various reasons). One of my most vivid memories, for some reason, of a visit many years ago is the ancient version of monopoly that she had on her computer. I remember one of my older cousins saying that the rolling of the dice was a "really early random number generator." I found the idea that people could create a randomness like that rather impressive at that age (maybe eight years old).

Anyway, the other day I was pondering free will in the context of an omnipotent and omniscient God. In (some) Christian thought, it is accepted that Free Will and omniscience are not incompatible, and the apparent contradictions are chalked up to divine mystery. So, assuming that free will and omniscience are both true, I was wondering if God could, or might be inclined to create a sort of perfect randomness. While God can probably predict the outcome, the point would be, much like with will, that God does not control or influence the outcome. The difference, of course, is that unlike free will, there is no conscious agent determining the outcome, just the proverbial cosmic dice.

And after this, are there any theological implications of this?

This is not a very thought-out idea, just something that occurred to me. :erm:
Randomness is already relative. If a god could create perfect randomness, the creation itself is not random and thus neither is the result. Randomness is a product of our own intellectual limitations.
I'm cheating, I posted this a long time ago somewhere else:

It is our nature to look for patterns. This is how we learn. It is, in fact, how all adaptive systems learn. So it is not difficult to understand why chaos and randomness are awkward concepts.

But what is random? A really good study of randomness can be had by investigating cryptology - even a little. It is incredibly difficult (if not impossible), to come up with true randomness. For instance, say you are trying to come up with 26 random numbers as a key to code a top secret message. How would you do it? How many numbers would you need to use since the number line is infinite and the more you use the better your code? Think about that. Once you've decided how to come up with truly random numbers, tell me how you would prove that they are truly random.

Random seems to imply that there is no pattern; no rhyme or reason. But how do you know that there is no pattern? What if you just haven't understood it yet? What if you have a seemingly random string of numbers (or letters, or whatever) that actually repeats itself after the 372,088,953,222nd time and it takes 4 years to create each string? What if the pattern is the shape of the space between the numbers and you just hadn't noticed?

Point is, randomness is relative. Now then, is it conceivable that the origins of life may appear to be random (chance), but were just a single event determined by preceding events?

I fell off my bike yesterday. What are the chances? Well, pretty good considering the bike is too big, I'm no spring chicken and my depth perception is terrible. It wasn't bad luck, it wasn't random, it was a culmination of events all determined by prior events. Happens every single day on micro scales and macro scales - you stub your toe, stars explode.

Which brings me to Chaos Theory. Doesn't chaos imply randomness? Yes and no. Chaos Theory describes the behavior of certain dynamical systems (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL0R5bmFtaW NhbF9zeXN0ZW1fKGRlZmluaXRpb24p) – that is, systems whose state evolves with time – that may exhibit dynamics that are highly sensitive to initial conditions (popularly referred to as the butterfly effect (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL0J1dHRlcm ZseV9lZmZlY3Q=)). As a result of this sensitivity, which manifests itself as an exponential growth of perturbations in the initial conditions, the behavior of chaotic systems appears to be random (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL1JhbmRvbW 5lc3M=). (from wikipedia).

Thats a sort of formal way to describe things that change over time and those changes are highly sensitive to conditions. The beginning conditions had to be just so and every change in between then and now had to be just so in order that the thing is what you see today and not one of a gazillion other things it could have been.

Compare this to a dichotomous key (from greek meaning split in two). Each change is a yes or a no, a one or a zero, a true or a false. Like the game 20 questions. A picture would look like a long, long tree with only one node and branch on each node and branch.

Chaos (although it is actually deterministic), would result in an explosion of possible variations with the very first change. I picture fireworks. And each one of the resulting sparks would create another explosion of possible avenues and more sparks. The branching is determined but looks chaotic.

[SMadsen]

Chaos (although it is actually deterministic), would result in an explosion of possible variations with the very first change. I picture fireworks. And each one of the resulting sparks would create another explosion of possible avenues and more sparks. The branching is determined but looks chaotic.
Cool to see you here, JHC :banana:


Funny thing, the IFS generators that create predictable patterns like the Sierpinski triangle and things like "fern" leaves make use of random number generators. The more random the numbers, the more predictable the patterns get :)

[SMadsen]

Why so?
I don't see how God's knowledge of what will happen would conflict with my free will in the future than my knowledge of what has happened conflicts with people's free will in the past. That I know what they chose doesn't make their choice any less real.
No, but it makes their choice predestined in accordance with your knowledge.

[Michael]

Randomness is already relative. If a god could create perfect randomness, the creation itself is not random and thus neither is the result. Randomness is a product of our own intellectual limitations.
I'm cheating, I posted this a long time ago somewhere else:

It is our nature to look for patterns. This is how we learn. It is, in fact, how all adaptive systems learn. So it is not difficult to understand why chaos and randomness are awkward concepts.

But what is random? A really good study of randomness can be had by investigating cryptology - even a little. It is incredibly difficult (if not impossible), to come up with true randomness. For instance, say you are trying to come up with 26 random numbers as a key to code a top secret message. How would you do it? How many numbers would you need to use since the number line is infinite and the more you use the better your code? Think about that. Once you've decided how to come up with truly random numbers, tell me how you would prove that they are truly random.

Random seems to imply that there is no pattern; no rhyme or reason. But how do you know that there is no pattern? What if you just haven't understood it yet? What if you have a seemingly random string of numbers (or letters, or whatever) that actually repeats itself after the 372,088,953,222nd time and it takes 4 years to create each string? What if the pattern is the shape of the space between the numbers and you just hadn't noticed?

Point is, randomness is relative. Now then, is it conceivable that the origins of life may appear to be random (chance), but were just a single event determined by preceding events?

I fell off my bike yesterday. What are the chances? Well, pretty good considering the bike is too big, I'm no spring chicken and my depth perception is terrible. It wasn't bad luck, it wasn't random, it was a culmination of events all determined by prior events. Happens every single day on micro scales and macro scales - you stub your toe, stars explode.

Which brings me to Chaos Theory. Doesn't chaos imply randomness? Yes and no. Chaos Theory describes the behavior of certain dynamical systems (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL0R5bmFtaW NhbF9zeXN0ZW1fKGRlZmluaXRpb24p) – that is, systems whose state evolves with time – that may exhibit dynamics that are highly sensitive to initial conditions (popularly referred to as the butterfly effect (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL0J1dHRlcm ZseV9lZmZlY3Q=)). As a result of this sensitivity, which manifests itself as an exponential growth of perturbations in the initial conditions, the behavior of chaotic systems appears to be random (http://www.msplinks.com/MDFodHRwOi8vZW4ud2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZy93aWtpL1JhbmRvbW 5lc3M=). (from wikipedia).

Thats a sort of formal way to describe things that change over time and those changes are highly sensitive to conditions. The beginning conditions had to be just so and every change in between then and now had to be just so in order that the thing is what you see today and not one of a gazillion other things it could have been.

Compare this to a dichotomous key (from greek meaning split in two). Each change is a yes or a no, a one or a zero, a true or a false. Like the game 20 questions. A picture would look like a long, long tree with only one node and branch on each node and branch.

Chaos (although it is actually deterministic), would result in an explosion of possible variations with the very first change. I picture fireworks. And each one of the resulting sparks would create another explosion of possible avenues and more sparks. The branching is determined but looks chaotic.
Excellent post JHC. I think that's a very good reply to Donkey's OP. :)

[dilettante]

Originally Posted by dilettante http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/images/buttons/green/viewpost.gif (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=1115#post1115)
Why so?
I don't see how God's knowledge of what will happen would conflict with my free will in the future any more than my knowledge of what has happened conflicts with people's free will in the past. That I know what they chose doesn't make their choice any less real.
No, but it makes their choice predestined in accordance with your knowledge.

Then predestination (if that's how we're using the term) does not conflict with free will. Unless my knowledge of what people did choose is considered sufficient to negate their free will in making past choices, then I don't see how God's knowledge of what people will choose negates their free will in making future choices.

[JHC]

Cool to see you here, JHC :banana:


Funny thing, the IFS generators that create predictable patterns like the Sierpinski triangle and things like "fern" leaves make use of random number generators. The more random the numbers, the more predictable the patterns get :)
Thanks for the welcome.

That is sooooo cool. I am definitely going to read up on that.

[SMadsen]

Then predestination (if that's how we're using the term) does not conflict with free will.
Dilettante, I have to apologize for not having read your post properly. I read "choose" instead of "chose". Your knowledge of what people did in the past has of course nothing to do with predestination of their acts. I'm sorry.

Unless my knowledge of what people did choose is considered sufficient to negate their free will in making past choices, then I don't see how God's knowledge of what people will choose negates their free will in making future choices.
This, however, I don't understand even though I'm quite certain to have read it right this time.

Why don't you see that the circumstance that knowledge can be obtained of how free will is exercised in the future negates the notion of a free will?

[dilettante]

...
Why don't you see that the circumstance that knowledge can be obtained of how free will is exercised in the future negates the notion of a free will?


Because it simply isn't true :)

Knowledge of what will be chosen doesn't necessarily impact the freedom of the choice. I can say with 99.9% certainty that if my wife were given the choice between spending a weekend seeing shows and parties in New York or spending a weekend curled up at home with a good book, all else being equal, she would choose the latter. But that doesn't mean her will is only .01% free in making that choice. She would be no more free in choosing if I were a completely stranger and had no clue what she would choose, and no less free in choosing if I were God and knew with 100% certainty.

[SMadsen]

Because it simply isn't true :)

Knowledge of what will be chosen doesn't necessarily impact the freedom of the choice. I can say with 99.9% certainty that if my wife were given the choice between spending a weekend seeing shows and parties in New York or spending a weekend curled up at home with a good book, all else being equal, she would choose the latter. But that doesn't mean her will is only .01% free in making that choice. She would be no more free in choosing if I were a completely stranger and had no clue what she would choose, and no less free in choosing if I were God and knew with 100% certainty.
Who knows what is indifferent to the issue. It doesn't matter if a stranger, you or a deity knows what your wife will choose. And with "knows" I mean absolutely knows, - not some exercise in probability. It only matters whether or not knowledge (again, absolute knowledge) can be obtained.

If an outcome can be absolutely known then it doesn't depend on a more or less qualified guess but must (absolutely) be predestined.

[dilettante]

If an outcome can be absolutely known then it doesn't depend on a more or less qualified guess but must (absolutely) be predestined.

To quote myself: "Then predestination (if that's how we're using the term) does not conflict with free will."

What can "free will" mean, except that you are free to make choices based on your own feelings, preferences, knowledge and whimsy; in short, that you are free to choose based on who you are?

If I know (completely) who you are, then I can also know (absolutely) what you will choose. But that doesn't make your choice any less free. It merely means I know what you will freely choose.

[SMadsen]

To quote myself: "Then predestination (if that's how we're using the term) does not conflict with free will."

What can "free will" mean, except that you are free to make choices based on your own feelings, preferences, knowledge and whimsy; in short, that you are free to choose based on who you are?

If I know (completely) who you are, then I can also know (absolutely) what you will choose. But that doesn't make your choice any less free. It merely means I know what you will freely choose.
Dilettante, you can't even absolutely know if the person exists.

There is a reason that absolute knowledge is projected unto deities ;)

[SMadsen]

Anyhow, even if you can absolutely know, which, I must admit, is actually the premise in your post, then it doesn't matter how you know. For instance, that you absolutely know the person only means that, external factors not withstanding, you absolutely know what leads to a given choice. That's just part of your omniscience. It doesn't mean that the choice isn't predestined. Which again doesn't mean that there's actually a free choice.

In fact, if you add to that omnipotency of whom or what is considered to be omniscient, it makes the notion of free will even more grotesque to say that absolute knowledge of who a person is gives absolute knowledge of the persons choices.

[Helene]

I've always held that "omniscient" God and "free will" together eliminate the "God is Good" assertion.

Its all about that eternal damnation that God forces upon people who actually use that free will thing.

If omniscience is granted, that means God already knows who is going to be banished for eternity and that free will is thus a farce (from God's perspective) and that eternal damnation is what God likes to do.

I think you don't need the concept of "free will" to invalidate "God is Good'. Just "omniscient" will do just fine.

In fact, wtihout "free will" god is slightly less good than he could potentially be with "free will".

To put the two options side by side:

With free will:
1. God creates a river, God creates a person. God throws the person in the river. God offers his hand. The person can come out, if he chooses to accept God's hand and give his soul to God for eternity. Otherwise, he will drown. God knows what the person will pick before he's created.

Without free will:
1. God creates a river, God creates a person. God throws the person in the river. God offers his hand. The person cannot come out, as the person cannot choose to accept God's hand. God knows this person cannot choose to accept God's hand. The person will necessarily drown. God knows the person will drown before he's created.

[SMadsen]

But in 1. why even offer his hand if he knows that the person will not choose it and drown instead? That's like totally bummed out, man :)

Let-alone, of course, throw the poor bastard in an eternal bonfire for not choosing it, well knowing what the choice would be to begin with. That may be a technicality but, damn, it's evil :)

[Helene]

But in 1. why even offer his hand if he knows that the person will not choose it and drown instead? That's like totally bummed out, man :)

Because then God invalidates the free will. If there is no choice, there is no free will. In fact, God is the one who has no free will in this matter, as he cannot choose to not make someone because the person will make the choice to burn in hell. If he only makes people who will choose to take his hand, there is no free will.

Let-alone, of course, throw the poor bastard in an eternal bonfire for not choosing it, well knowing what the choice would be to begin with. That may be a technicality but, damn, it's evil :)

Oh, yes. Free will doesn't make God any better, but he doesn't need it to be just as or perhaps even slightly more evil.

[SMadsen]

Oh, yes. Free will doesn't make God any better, but he doesn't need it to be just as or perhaps even slightly more evil.
Well, creating the illusion of free will does add a little spice to divine vengeance :)

[dilettante]

Anyhow, even if you can absolutely know, which, I must admit, is actually the premise in your post, then it doesn't matter how you know. For instance, that you absolutely know the person only means that, external factors not withstanding, you absolutely know what leads to a given choice. That's just part of your omniscience. It doesn't mean that the choice isn't predestined. Which again doesn't mean that there's actually a free choice.

But as I said before, there's no necessary conflict between predestination (or, "determinism") and free choice.

Your free will acts in accordance with (i.e. is determined by) who you are: your personal, intellectual, emotional, genetic and spiritual (if any) make-up. But the fact that what you choose is determined by who you are hardly makes your choice less free. Indeed, the alternative, that your choices are either determined entirely by external factors or are simply random, causeless effects, would imply the very opposite of free will.

Omniscience may lead necessarily to predestination (especially if the omniscient one is also the creator), but neither omniscience or predestination conflict free will.

[SMadsen]

But as I said before, there's no necessary conflict between predestination (or, "determinism") and free choice.
I'm sorry, Dilettante, but I feel I have yet to see the argument that predestination will not absolutely and totally wreck free will. Nor have I seen any argument that knowing the outcome of an event before the event happens is not a result of predestination, regardless, of course, of who or what foreordained it.

Do you have examples that could perhaps illustrate your points?

Your free will acts in accordance with (i.e. is determined by) who you are: your personal, intellectual, emotional, genetic and spiritual (if any) make-up. But the fact that what you choose is determined by who you are hardly makes your choice less free.
I still don't see that it matters who or what we are. I could be a timid, yet loving giraffe with a tenure as a professor in physics, a belief in Marsian mythology and a sexual preference for mature wild boars and any of my choices will still be a predestined choice if (and only if) the choice can be absolutely known beforehand.

Again, the only thing that matters if whether or not foreknowledge can exist.

Indeed, the alternative, that your choices are either determined entirely by external factors or are simply random, causeless effects, would imply the very opposite of free will.
Well, if my choices are predetermined by whatever factors, externally, random or causeless or whatever, then it is certainly the opposite of free will.

However, if my choices are merely determined by whatever factors, the above included, then we may still discuss a degree of free will. In fact, I'd claim that a choice is the result of evaluating a sufficient amount of factors composing a given situation, including external factors and even such factors that may be seen as random and causeless (subjective terms as they are, the evaluating person may see it as causal and cause-worthy).

Omniscience may lead necessarily to predestination (especially if the omniscient one is also the creator), but neither omniscience or predestination conflict free will.
I respectfully diagree. Omniscience does not lead to predestination. Omniscience is a sign of predestination. It's predestination that conflicts with free will.

Throw omnipotency into the mix and you have the chain where omnipotency leads to predestination which allows omniscience. And that's what I referred to as grotesque as far as free will is concerned. It's pretty much the final stab :)

[dilettante]

I respectfully diagree. Omniscience does not lead to predestination. Omniscience is a sign of predestination. It's predestination that conflicts with free will.


Where is the necessary conflict between predestination and free will?

I am "predestined" to choose in the next moment whatever someone exactly like me would choose in conditions exactly like those that will exist in the next moment. Those are the "constraints" that predestination (or determinism) necessarily places upon me; I am predestined to be myself, in my circumstances and cannot be someone else in other circumstances. But how could I possibly be less constrained?

[SMadsen]

Where is the necessary conflict between predestination and free will?
I don't see how there can be inevitability and choice at the same time.

A simple down-to-earth example of gobbling up free will is the predestination *) of death. Admitted, there are alot of choices that can be made regarding the span of a life time but not one involving infinity (not yet, at least).


*) Not predestination as in fate or some other ethereal concept, and certainly not in relation to omniscience, but as an empirical fact.

I am "predestined" to choose in the next moment whatever someone exactly like me would choose in conditions exactly like those that will exist in the next moment. Those are the "constraints" that predestination (or determinism) necessarily places upon me; I am predestined to be myself, in my circumstances and cannot be someone else in other circumstances. But how could I possibly be less constrained?
I'm not advocating the existence of free will. I'm only saying that omniscience is one thing that contradicts the notion of free will.

[dilettante]

I don't see how there can be inevitability and choice at the same time.

Why does inevitability conflict with free choice?
And what is the alternative to inevitability that preserves choice?

Consider:
You will inevitably be yourself. But "yourself" is a specific organism with certain attributes that responds to the world in certain way. Those attributes and responses are what make you yourself and not someone else. Those attributes and responses determine what choices you make; your will is constrained by who you are, and not free to be someone you are not. But how could your will conceivably be free than that?

The only alternative (that I can see) is that our choices are somehow entirely independent of who we are, that our make-up and circumstances have no bearing on what choices we make, that there is no rhyme or reason to what we do. And even if this was how the universe worked, how would that result in any more free will?


A simple down-to-earth example of gobbling up free will is the predestination *) of death. Admitted, there are alot of choices that can be made regarding the span of a life time but not one involving infinity (not yet, at least).

*) Not predestination as in fate or some other ethereal concept, and certainly not in relation to omniscience, but as an empirical fact.

I don't see how the fact that we will (probably) die one day is relevant here. It proves that we are not omnipotent - that we may will not to die but die anyway - but we can will not to die all the same.[/quote]



I'm not advocating the existence of free will. I'm only saying that omniscience is one thing that contradicts the notion of free will.

It occurs to me that we might not be talking about quite the same thing here. What do you mean by "free will" in this context? What does it look like?

[SMadsen]

Why does inevitability conflict with free choice?
Because inevitability reduces the amount of possible outcomes to one and the amount of possible choices to zero.
And what is the alternative to inevitability that preserves choice?
Optional. Faculty. Multiple choice.

Consider:
You will inevitably be yourself. But "yourself" is a specific organism with certain attributes that responds to the world in certain way. Those attributes and responses are what make you yourself and not someone else. Those attributes and responses determine what choices you make; your will is constrained by who you are, and not free to be someone you are not. But how could your will conceivably be free than that?

The only alternative (that I can see) is that our choices are somehow entirely independent of who we are, that our make-up and circumstances have no bearing on what choices we make, that there is no rhyme or reason to what we do. And even if this was how the universe worked, how would that result in any more free will?
I find it void of substance to say that we choose according to who we are. It corresponds to answering every question with a similarly empty phrase:

- "How tall are you?"
- "I'm as tall as I am"

- "Is Georg W. Bush a bad President?"
- "He is what he is"
- "And what do you think he is?"
- "What I must think he is because I am who I am and he is what he is"
- "And what is that?"
- "What I think he is"
.. and so on :)

I would rather go with something with more detail and substance such as experience, level of understanding, needs, current situation and other circumstances when trying to figure out the multitude of choices :)

Anyhow, you seem to be advocating some kind of hardcore determinism. That's fine. But as you said in the last part, we might not be talking about the same thing. It's the incompability between omniscience and free will I tried to argue, - not (and please correct me here if I'm wrong because I can't quite follow the whole "we are what we are" thing) an incompability between who we are and free will.

I don't see how the fact that we will (probably) die one day is relevant here. It proves that we are not omnipotent - that we may will not to die but die anyway - but we can will not to die all the same.
Are you saying that death does not classify as a predestinated event?

It occurs to me that we might not be talking about quite the same thing here. What do you mean by "free will" in this context? What does it look like?
Yes, I also got the feeling that we might not be talking about the same.

Free will? Hmm, I think I would define it in very simple terms, such as the ability to do the conscious act of making one decision out of many possible. Whether that be picking a lollipop in a bunch or committing a premeditated murder.

[dilettante]

Yes, I also got the feeling that we might not be talking about the same.

Free will? Hmm, I think I would define it in very simple terms, such as the ability to do the conscious act of making one decision out of many possible. Whether that be picking a lollipop in a bunch or committing a premeditated murder.
(emphasis mine)

That definition seems fair enough to begin with.

I think the key word, as far as our apparent disagreement goes, is "possible." What is possible and what is not?

Consider three scenarios:
(1) A man sits at a table. On the table are three pieces of colored paper, one red, one yellow, and one blue. He is told to point to one of the pieces of paper. He points to the red one. Could he possibly have pointed to the blue one instead?

(2) A robot is positioned in front of the same table. It is designed such that, when a button is pressed, it points to one of the colored pieces of paper. The button is pressed and it points to the red one. Could it have possibly pointed to the blue one?

(3) An arrow is strategically positioned over the same table, such that it hangs directly above the red piece of paper. When the arrow is released it falls and hits the red paper. Could it possibly have hit the blue piece instead?


The answer to all three questions could be "yes" depending on how one defines "possible" and whether or not one is allowed to change the original conditions when considering alternative "possibilities". For example:
The arrow could have hit the blue piece of paper...IF it had been positioned in a different place.
The robot could have pointed to the blue piece of paper...IF its programming had been different.
The man could have decided that this whole scenario was stupid and just walked away without pointing to any of the pieces of paper...IF he had been so inclined.
Most broadly, any number of different things could have happened…IF something had been different to being with.

In all cases, possibilities only exist if we exclude some condition (be it the position of the arrow, the programming of the robot, the inclinations of the man, or something else) from consideration. But if we consider all the conditions, we must acknowledge that the man was not so inclined, the robot was programmed to point to the red piece of paper, and the arrow was positioned directly over the red piece; in short, all conditions were just what they needed to be for the red piece of paper to be chosen. And, given those conditions, the choice of the red piece of paper was inevitable.

But let be get back to the issue at hand: Did the man have free will? Did he freely choose the red piece of paper? If the definition of “free will” requires that multiple possibilities exist even when every condition is taken into account, then the answer is no. The man was definitely going to point to red. All other possibilities would require an "If X were different" phrase and, since we are taking every condition into account, we can exclude them by pointing out that X was not, in fact, different.

BUT, if the definition of “free will” allows us to exclude the subject (in this case, the man) from consideration, then the answer is yes: multiple possibilities exist because the nature of man is a determining factor. IF the man really likes blue, he might have pointed to blue. IF he had wanted to point to yellow, he could have pointed to yellow. The outcome is still predetermined; but it is predetermined by the nature of the man (among other things) rather than in spite of the nature of the man, and since we are excluding the nature of the man from our consideration of the conditions, all of those IF-statements are valid. In that sense, the man has “free will.”

This difference could be highlighted by a fourth example in which a bunch of thugs break into the room and forcibly grab the man’s finger and make him point to the red piece of paper. In this case, excluding the man from consideration doesn’t add any additional possibilities. It doesn’t matter whether he likes blue or wants to point to yellow; he ends up pointing to red in spite of (or, at least, regardless of) his nature, rather than because of it. In this case, the man has no free will.

All of this wraps around to my definition of free will which, I think, won't conflict with yours. You can correct me on that if I'm wrong:

One has “will free” to the extent that one’s choices or actions are determined by oneself, as opposed to external factors.

[Helene]

One has “will free” to the extent that one’s choices or actions are determined by oneself, as opposed to external factors.

But since, in this hypothesis, God has created both that nature, and knows beforehand which piece of paper will be chosen (due to that nature)... Is that still free will? God could have created another nature that would have picked blue, but instead he created a nature that picked red.

How is that different from programming a robot, or even, positioning an arrow above the red paper?

[dilettante]

Anyhow, you seem to be advocating some kind of hardcore determinism. That's fine. But as you said in the last part, we might not be talking about the same thing. It's the incompability between omniscience and free will I tried to argue, - not (and please correct me here if I'm wrong because I can't quite follow the whole "we are what we are" thing) an incompability between who we are and free will.

Yes, as best I can tell there's no getting around determinism. But my main point is that determinism is not in conflict with free will, and that attempts to separate the two merely make "free will" an empty concept devoid of any positive meaning.

The very notion that what we choose is determined by who we are is, perhaps, the simplest example. In it determinism and choice are combined harmoniously. But if I attempt to separate the two and claim that my choices are independent of who I am, then I make "my choices" a nonsensical concept, since how can the choices be mine except that they are based on who I am?

[dilettante]

But since, in this hypothesis, God has created both that nature, and knows beforehand which piece of paper will be chosen (due to that nature)...

True.


Is that still free will?


Most certainly. The man can choose whichever piece he desires for reasons entirely his own. How could his will be more free?

He did not, of course, get to choose his own nature and desires, but how could he have? To look for that kind of freedom is to enter into nonsense. How could one choose one's own nature and desires in except accordance to one's own desires? You can't choose your own nature because "you" are defined by your nature. Trying to push free will this far, to separate it entirely from determinism, is to turn it into just such a meaningless, empty circle.

Whether created by God or merely randomly and spontaneously generated in front of the table, the man cannot be free from who who he is. But in the sense that "free will" actually means anything, the man has it either way.


God could have created another nature that would have picked blue, but instead he created a nature that picked red.

How is that different from programming a robot, or even, positioning an arrow above the red paper?

For God the creative process may not be very different at all (I'm hesitant to ever describe what something must be like for a deity).

[SMadsen]

Yes, as best I can tell there's no getting around determinism.
Just to get a feeling of what you mean, am I correct in saying that you treat determinism as a synonym to causality?

[dilettante]

Just to get a feeling of what you mean, am I correct in saying that you treat determinism as a synonym to causality?

Possibly. But rather than define one uncertain term with another, here's a definition I found online that, I think, more or less captures my meaning.


Determinism
n.
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.