Rationality

[Michael]

Are we more rational than our fellow animals?

We usually accept without argument the notion that man is at the top of the animal hierarchy. After all, only mammals have a neocortex – the most recently evolved part of the brain and the center of higher mental functions – and ours is the most advanced variation, so it makes sense that we’d be at a higher stage of development.

But is this true? Does the neocortex always make us more rational than other animals?

Most of the time, the answer is yes. For instance, it’s thanks to our neocortex that we are able to plan for the future, something that animals have a hard time doing. (They are even worse at saving than we are!)
Still, this isn’t always the case, as the following chimpanzee experiment suggests.

In the human version of this game, a “proposer” is handed some money, say $10, and must suggest a division of the sum for himself and another participant. This other person, the “responder,” can then either accept or reject the offer. If he chooses to accept the division, both participants receive their share; if he opts to reject it, neither gets compensated.
Now, if we were to go by the traditional economic model of man as a self-interested rational maximizer, we would suppose that the proposers would always suggest a division that maximized his self-interest (an $9/$1 division) and that the responders would always accept a nonzero offer ($1 may not be $9, but it’s still better than nothing).

Except, this is not what happens. Research has shown that we human beings not only consider how best to maximize our compensation, but we also factor in such notions as cooperation and fairness when we make our decisions. For example, responders in the ultimatum game will often reject a monetary division that is particularly unfair for them (such as a $8/$2 division) – even when this comes at their own cost (they lose the $2, after all). This behavior is of course wonderfully human — but it is not part of the standard rational model.

Chimpanzees, however, go about the ultimatum game (which involves divisions of raisins in their case) without giving fairness any thought. In this experiment, the researchers found that the chimp responders tended to accept any nonzero offer, however unfair. And conversely, the chimp proposers rarely suggested a fair division, choosing instead to maximize their own share.

In this case, then, animals are more rational than we are. Whereas we’re willing to lose a couple bucks so that the other guy gets punished for his inequitable offer, chimps only act according to what will guarantee them the most raisons.
Source (http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/post.aspx?bid=355&bpid=24018)

I suppose I could have posted this under the "intellectual drivel" thread since that's what you are reading. I should also admit that this particular piece of intellectual drivel is a rather common and extremely popular.

The fact of the matter is that this experiment doesn't actually show that chimps are more rational than humans. It shows nothing of the sort. What it does show is that chimps are selfish maximizers and humans are apparently not.

The intellectual drivel part comes into play when one automatically assumes that "selfish maximizing" is 100% rational behavior. I respectfully submit that is only true in Ayn Rand novels.

But why do researchers keep repeating this bit of propaganda from the apologists for capitalism in the economics departments?

There is nothing that is inherently rational about selfish maximizing, nor is there anything inherently irrational about non-maximizing behavior. These things only represent rationality if you define them as rational in the first place. Ergo, the study proves nothing except that the bias of the researchers conforms to the official propaganda of the economics department down the hall.

Btw, check out the bio on the author of this drivel: Dan Ariely is James B. Duke Professor of Behavioral Economics at Duke University and a visiting professor at MIT’s Media Laboratory. Obviously the 'Peter Principle' is alive and well in academia! :lol:

Anyway, the point of this thread is to determine the proper meaning of the word "rational". As it stands, the only thing that is conventionally understood to be purely rational is that which is 100% self-serving. I think this is pure propaganda (at best).

[dilettante]

Well, judging the rationality of a decision requires that one knows what the objectives of the decision-maker were. If the people's objective was to leave the room with the maximum amount of money, then they behaved irrationally in turning down the $9/$1. If their objective was to achieve as equal a distribution as possible, then they behaved quite rationally.

[Donkey]

Rejecting the assumed definition of rationality (which I'm totally ok with doing), what would we then be defining it as?

[Greendruid]

This is what happens when we wade into the dangerous area of calling psychology "science". Someone should check their correlation and causation cross-tabs! I can't tell you the number of times I've had to dispel similarly bad experiments by all walks of my colleagues. Yes, some anthropologists too! the problem lies at the root of not understanding the properties of an experiment and consistently getting wrong the part about isolating variables that are being tested. If they can't be isolated, they can't be experimented on and the study becomes anecdotal, not demonstrative.

[SMadsen]

Well, judging the rationality of a decision requires that one knows what the objectives of the decision-maker were. If the people's objective was to leave the room with the maximum amount of money, then they behaved irrationally in turning down the $9/$1. If their objective was to achieve as equal a distribution as possible, then they behaved quite rationally.
I fully concur with this. One cannot discuss rationality of particulars without knowing and understanding the premises. That's like starting with the conclusion and working the way back to the data. And that's irrational :) (incidentally, this is what is displayed in the quoted article by drawing a fixed conclusion beforehand, as excellently pointed out by Michael).

So one might be tempted to say that rationality is the ability to draw a conclusion that is understood when understanding all known premises. Consequently, one might also be tempted to say that irrationality is to draw a conclusion that may or may not befit a particular situation but is not understood regardless of understanding any or all of the known premises. I won't draw that conclusion at this time myself, though.

[Daktoria]

Why can't animals be rational? There's a difference between rationality and intelligence.

The thing with that game example is that it doesn't accommodate for how people have expectations of multiple rounds taking place in life. At the very least, a responder who has to deal with a selfish rational optimizer might believe that the optimizer isn't good for the distribution of resources in the future, so there's a kamikaze tactic taking place to sacrifice for the greater good. Same goes for the proposer who's trying to anticipate a viable equilibrium. I mean you could say that the optimal behavior is a $1/$9 split in order to maximize the odds of the responder accepting the offer given limited information on the culture at hand.

Why a chimp might seem more "rational" I believe is a lack of foresight. They want the raisins to satisfy their hunger in the here and now, so they ignore this kind of cultural anticipation.

[Michael]

Why can't animals be rational? There's a difference between rationality and intelligence.
Who said they can't be? The study cited in the OP concludes that the chimps were more rational than humans.

My objection has only to do with the aspect applied to humans was nonsense.

The thing with that game example is that it doesn't accommodate for how people have expectations of multiple rounds taking place in life. At the very least, a responder who has to deal with a selfish rational optimizer might believe that the optimizer isn't good for the distribution of resources in the future, so there's a kamikaze tactic taking place to sacrifice for the greater good. Same goes for the proposer who's trying to anticipate a viable equilibrium. I mean you could say that the optimal behavior is a $1/$9 split in order to maximize the odds of the responder accepting the offer given limited information on the culture at hand.
Who said any member of the test was to be apprised of others taking the test?

You appear to be assuming that as some integral portion of the test.

Bottom line is that the study cited in the OP asserts that "maximization" is assumed to be the sum totality of rationality and all participants are judged against this standard.

I've pointed out that this assumption is hogwash. What difference does it make if some participants play different games of non-maximization? According to the study's authors, they are all irrational if they don't seek absolute maximization.

Why a chimp might seem more "rational" I believe is a lack of foresight. They want the raisins to satisfy their hunger in the here and now, so they ignore this kind of cultural anticipation.
The study fails because it assumes that this type of behavior of the chimps is pure rationalism. That's nonsense. It might be rationalism, but we have no way of knowing one way or another.

[Daktoria]

Who said any member of the test was to be apprised of others taking the test?

You appear to be assuming that as some integral portion of the test.

Bottom line is that the study cited in the OP asserts that "maximization" is assumed to be the sum totality of rationality and all participants are judged against this standard.

I've pointed out that this assumption is hogwash. What difference does it make if some participants play different games of non-maximization? According to the study's authors, they are all irrational if they don't seek absolute maximization.

What I'm referring to are habits, rules of thumb, and ulterior motives that ruin the integrity of these kinds of experiments. Sometimes, test subjects behave irrationally in order to confuse experimenters for the sake of spreading values that make the test subjects' egos more comfortable (whether it's for power, pleasure, meaning, achievement, affiliation, etc.).

From a rationalist's perspective BTW, it's impossible to play a game not according to maximization. From a marginalist's perspective, it is, but there's a difference. The reason for this is because internal and external equilibriums take place, internal equilibriums being desired balances between values, external equilibriums being the resulting prices between opportunities. For example, you might not want to be the richest person in the world. Maybe you're comfortable with you're own quaint and little niche, so your equilibrium reduces the value assigned to growth and increases the value assigned to security and relaxation.

The only way to engage a rationalist on the total validity of this is via a discussion of thought experiments, preferably personally via game theory (and actually playing games). However, if this isn't doubled with a personal relationship, then the discussion loses its value because the rationalist doesn't know how much he can or should trust what you're saying. The rationalist can still behave professionally, but professionalism has its bounds with regards to how far it can endorse exploration since it impedes completely honest communication.

You should be careful though because there are two kinds of rationalists here. There's one sort that will exploit you for everything you are if you commit and will literally play games with your livelihood just to squeeze everything out of you for the sake of learning through experience. Then there's the other sort that understands self-control and the difference between reality and imagination. However, even within this other sort is another split where some believe that lessons can only be learned from power wielding since its only from direct injection that genuine risk taking is appreciated.

No rationalist really fits into any of these categories exclusively (and from a rationalist's perspective, everyone fits among them), but most definitely specialize in one area or another.

Who said they can't be? The study cited in the OP concludes that the chimps were more rational than humans.

My objection has only to do with the aspect applied to humans was nonsense....

...The study fails because it assumes that this type of behavior of the chimps is pure rationalism. That's nonsense. It might be rationalism, but we have no way of knowing one way or another.I like what you said at the end here about how there's "no way of knowing one way or another." Rationalists don't try to figure that out though. Rather normative ethics are applied to figure out what the "best" goals and methods are, so while it's possible that different people have different opinions and pursuits, the rationalist doesn't really care. Rather the rationalist realizes that his own personal values are the limits (and tools) of understanding, so the rationalist tries to interpret others through his own values. Mind however that rationalists can be flexible and understand how others might behave differently from themselves because flexibility can be one of these values.

Anyway, I thought your thread was "to determine the proper meaning of the word 'rational'," and I do believe I've explained this from what I've said so far.

[Daktoria]

Felt that the group subdivisions, about personal relationships with rationalists, were incomplete. This will be out of place now, but it should still be included.

There's another subdivision where some are willing to take individual initiative to gather mutual action and take risks in order to convince others to take risks with them, and it's this subdivision which I've been trying to explain in general because it's this subdivision which draws the line between entrepreneurs and the most charismatically ambitious bureaucrats. Prior of this line, charismatic ambition exists, but in weaker forms, and entrepreneurship doesn't exist at all although productivity does.

Then there's another subdivision that crosses both groups that splits between the naive and the balanced, and another subdivision that crosses these groups as well that splits between the short-term opportunistic and long term committed (and another subdivision that splits between those looking for organic synergies and those looking for pragmatic dividends). I've been trying to explain these further subdivisions in general as well, but it's been difficult because we can never get past the first one.

[Michael]

What I'm referring to are habits, rules of thumb, and ulterior motives that ruin the integrity of these kinds of experiments. Sometimes, test subjects behave irrationally in order to confuse experimenters for the sake of spreading values that make the test subjects' egos more comfortable (whether it's for power, pleasure, meaning, achievement, affiliation, etc.).
While I certainly agree that such experiments often do get affected by what you are mentioning here, I don't see how any of this has any bearing on the issue at hand - other than to reinforce my argument that a failure to seek self-profit maximization is not necessarily a definition of irrational. Some humans just like to play ego games. ;)

The study asserted that the chimps were more rational than humans were because the chimps always sought to achieve self-profit maximization and humans apparently did not. I think this is an absurd definition of rationalism.

From a rationalist's perspective BTW, it's impossible to play a game not according to maximization. From a marginalist's perspective, it is, but there's a difference. The reason for this is because internal and external equilibriums take place, internal equilibriums being desired balances between values, external equilibriums being the resulting prices between opportunities. For example, you might not want to be the richest person in the world. Maybe you're comfortable with you're own quaint and little niche, so your equilibrium reduces the value assigned to growth and increases the value assigned to security and relaxation.
You are apparently making the same erroneous assumption as the study authors that maximization is the definition of rationality.

The only way to engage a rationalist on the total validity of this is via a discussion of thought experiments, preferably personally via game theory (and actually playing games). However, if this isn't doubled with a personal relationship, then the discussion loses its value because the rationalist doesn't know how much he can or should trust what you're saying. The rationalist can still behave professionally, but professionalism has its bounds with regards to how far it can endorse exploration since it impedes completely honest communication.
I admit that a rationalist may seek maximization. The point is that rationalists are not required to seek maximization to be rational. That some of them may choose to do so is beside the point.

A rational altruist for example might seek to minimize their gains. A rational troublemaker might give random replies. Rationalism is always relative.

You should be careful though because there are two kinds of rationalists here. There's one sort that will exploit you for everything you are if you commit and will literally play games with your livelihood just to squeeze everything out of you for the sake of learning through experience. Then there's the other sort that understands self-control and the difference between reality and imagination. However, even within this other sort is another split where some believe that lessons can only be learned from power wielding since its only from direct injection that genuine risk taking is appreciated.
I respectfully submit that there are as many types of rationalists are there are people on this planet. As I noted above, rationalism is always relative and subjective.

No rationalist really fits into any of these categories exclusively (and from a rationalist's perspective, everyone fits among them), but most definitely specialize in one area or another.
You appear to be admitting that rationalism is relative and subjective here.

I like what you said at the end here about how there's "no way of knowing one way or another." Rationalists don't try to figure that out though. Rather normative ethics are applied to figure out what the "best" goals and methods are, so while it's possible that different people have different opinions and pursuits, the rationalist doesn't really care. Rather the rationalist realizes that his own personal values are the limits (and tools) of understanding, so the rationalist tries to interpret others through his own values. Mind however that rationalists can be flexible and understand how others might behave differently from themselves because flexibility can be one of these values.
The rationalist you describe here looks more like an egotist than anything else. There is more than one way to skin a rationalist I think. ;)

I think under some circumstances and goals, it is rational to be inflexible, yet under other circumstances and goals, it is rational to be flexible. It all depends on the circumstances and the desired goal (which is always subjective).

Btw, as for your first point, it is because I'm mostly a rationalist that I figured that out. Once again, your description of rationalism looks more like egotism - always or only focused on the self as the definition of everything. That's not a particularly normal definition of rationalism - though it certainly is a common definition of human beings! :D

Anyway, I thought your thread was "to determine the proper meaning of the word 'rational'," and I do believe I've explained this from what I've said so far.
It is and I certainly disagree.

This statement of yours (from one of the quotes above) is a perfect example of the problem with your 'definition' of rationalism...


You should be careful though because there are two kinds of rationalists here. There's one sort that will exploit you for everything you are if you commit and will literally play games with your livelihood just to squeeze everything out of you for the sake of learning through experience.


How do you know that this is the motive for the acts of 50% of all known rationalists?

I'll admit that this is certainly one type of person that one can encounter. And I'll even admit that this type of person might even be acting rationally in their exploitive games playing. But I don't accept that motive as the rule. That's just a self-serving justification with no substantial meaning outside the subjective - where the self acts as the 'judge, jury and sole witness' to the definition of their own motive (and rationally tends to project that motive onto others).

Your definition makes it sound like 'altruistic violence' is a core definition of rationalism. :ummm:

[Daktoria]

While I certainly agree that such experiments often do get affected by what you are mentioning here, I don't see how any of this has any bearing on the issue at hand - other than to reinforce my argument that a failure to seek self-profit maximization is not necessarily a definition of irrational. Some humans just like to play ego games.

The study asserted that the chimps were more rational than humans were because the chimps always sought to achieve self-profit maximization and humans apparently did not. I think this is an absurd definition of rationalism.

Why can't ego games be a form of profit maximization?

You are apparently making the same erroneous assumption as the study authors that maximization is the definition of rationality.


Why is this erroneous?

I admit that a rationalist may seek maximization. The point is that rationalists are not required to seek maximization to be rational. That some of them may choose to do so is beside the point.

A rational altruist for example might seek to minimize their gains. A rational troublemaker might give random replies. Rationalism is always relative.

Personally, I don't like troublemakers, but why can't exhibiting randomness be a form of maximization? Likewise, what else besides maximization can qualify as rational?

I respectfully submit that there are as many types of rationalists are there are people on this planet. As I noted above, rationalism is always relative and subjective.

You appear to be admitting that rationalism is relative and subjective here.


What I'm saying is that there are an infinite amount of goals which people can be rational about.

The rationalist you describe here looks more like an egotist than anything else. There is more than one way to skin a rationalist I think.

I think under some circumstances and goals, it is rational to be inflexible, yet under other circumstances and goals, it is rational to be flexible. It all depends on the circumstances and the desired goal (which is always subjective).

Btw, as for your first point, it is because I'm mostly a rationalist that I figured that out. Once again, your description of rationalism looks more like egotism - always or only focused on the self as the definition of everything. That's not a particularly normal definition of rationalism - though it certainly is a common definition of human beings!

I've been pondering the egoism/rationalism dichotomy for a while now because as physical beings, we have to pay attention to pragmatism at some level in order to accomplish goals pertaining to the adjustment of reality.

Suffice to say that egoism recognizes the ego as an end unto itself, so if a rational actor is willing to endure conditions such as frustration and aggravation in order to pursue a goal, then it's possible for rationality to not be equal to egoism.

It is and I certainly disagree.

This statement of yours (from one of the quotes above) is a perfect example of the problem with your 'definition' of rationalism...

You should be careful though because there are two kinds of rationalists here. There's one sort that will exploit you for everything you are if you commit and will literally play games with your livelihood just to squeeze everything out of you for the sake of learning through experience.
How do you know that this is the motive for the acts of 50% of all known rationalists?

I'll admit that this is certainly one type of person that one can encounter. And I'll even admit that this type of person might even be acting rationally in their exploitive games playing. But I don't accept that motive as the rule. That's just a self-serving justification with no substantial meaning outside the subjective - where the self acts as the 'judge, jury and sole witness' to the definition of their own motive (and rationally tends to project that motive onto others).

Your definition makes it sound like 'altruistic violence' is a core definition of rationalism.

It's not necessarily a 50-50 split. I'm only describing a basic split in rationalist personalities. Likewise, those who fit in this category are not altruists at all.

[Daktoria]

I found this essay which I feel clarifies the "rational irrationality" I was describing in clearer detail:

http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://economics.gmu.edu/bcaplan/ratirnew.doc

Coincidentally, it was written by the guy who wrote this book:

http://books.google.com/books?id=qLEbLIAovFkC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

[Michael]

Why can't ego games be a form of profit maximization?
I didn't say they couldn't be. I'm just noting the fact that they usually aren't.

Ego-games are usually played by those who are emotionally immature, seeking emotional goals. Immaturity is not a good predictive marker for profit-maximizing success in such enterprises. Just my opinion of course. ;)

Why is this erroneous?
Because it leads to absurd results such as the the result cited in the OP.

It is incorrect because sometimes it is perfectly rational for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons. Humans are complex animals.

Personally, I don't like troublemakers, but why can't exhibiting randomness be a form of maximization?
I suppose under some specific circumstances, with a specific goal in mind, exhibiting randomness might be an optimal strategy for maximization of a particular goal.

And that and a buck might buy you a cup of coffee. What's the point?

Any type of behavior, under some specific circumstances, with a specified goal, might be deemed to be rational under those circumstances, with that goal. Anything is always possible. But I see no point here.

Likewise, what else besides maximization can qualify as rational?
Depends on your perspective. As I've said many times, there are as many types of rational as there are humans on this planet.

Indeed, if one considers 'profit maximization' to have the same meaning as 'poverty maximization', one may come to different conclusions about rationality from looking at the same process, data or situation. :shrug:

What I'm saying is that there are an infinite amount of goals which people can be rational about.
That does come as a surprise, but I will certainly agree since that just confirms my assertion that rationality is a term that is entirely subjective and relative all the time.

I've been pondering the egoism/rationalism dichotomy for a while now because as physical beings, we have to pay attention to pragmatism at some level in order to accomplish goals pertaining to the adjustment of reality.
And that probably explains why you like game theory. :D

I'd like to watch some real economists play real game theory as real prisoners sitting in real cell blocks with real consequences - live or die. That's just me though. ;)

I suspect some of the real data coming out might not match up with the artificial game theory predictions prior to the event (made by the same economists).

Suffice to say that egoism recognizes the ego as an end unto itself, so if a rational actor is willing to endure conditions such as frustration and aggravation in order to pursue a goal, then it's possible for rationality to not be equal to egoism.
No shit Sherlock! :lol:

That's been my argument all along. One cannot trust the subjective and emotional ego - it trumps over rational decision-making almost every time and will try to lie pretty damn consistently about it to deny it - even to one's self, let alone all others.

It's not necessarily a 50-50 split. I'm only describing a basic split in rationalist personalities. Likewise, those who fit in this category are not altruists at all.
It doesn't matter if the split is 99 to 1.

My critique was against the arbitrary and artificial dichotomy of just two possible types of "rationalist personalities" for six billion people on the planet. That strikes me as entirely arbitrary and unsubstantiated nonsense - independent of any comment about the merits of the particular duopoly in question.

There is zero justification for just assuming that there are only two types of anything. The limits of one's own imagination can not be rationally defined as the limits of rational possibility for all other human beings. That's not rational. ;)

[Daktoria]

I didn't say they couldn't be. I'm just noting the fact that they usually aren't.

Ego-games are usually played by those who are emotionally immature, seeking emotional goals. Immaturity is not a good predictive marker for profit-maximizing success in such enterprises. Just my opinion of course....

...Because it leads to absurd results such as the the result cited in the OP.

It is incorrect because sometimes it is perfectly rational for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons. Humans are complex animals....

...I suppose under some specific circumstances, with a specific goal in mind, exhibiting randomness might be an optimal strategy for maximization of a particular goal.

And that and a buck might buy you a cup of coffee. What's the point?

Any type of behavior, under some specific circumstances, with a specified goal, might be deemed to be rational under those circumstances, with that goal. Anything is always possible. But I see no point here....

...Depends on your perspective. As I've said many times, there are as many types of rational as there are humans on this planet.

Indeed, if one considers 'profit maximization' to have the same meaning as 'poverty maximization', one may come to different conclusions about rationality from looking at the same process, data or situation....

...That does come as a surprise, but I will certainly agree since that just confirms my assertion that rationality is a term that is entirely subjective and relative all the time.

I think you're starting to get it now, but to fully resolve the line of thought, it isn't rationality itself that's subjective, but the application, and interpretation, of rationality towards goals that's subjective and it is subjective both from the participant's and observer's perspectives. The participant always acts rationally, but what he's acting rational towards is disputable.

And that probably explains why you like game theory.

I'd like to watch some real economists play real game theory as real prisoners sitting in real cell blocks with real consequences - live or die. That's just me though.

I suspect some of the real data coming out might not match up with the artificial game theory predictions prior to the event (made by the same economists).

Eh? That's a little sick, no?

Personally, I've found that economic thinkers are the most enjoyable people to play games with because economists can communicate the objectives of the game most clearly, and I don't say this just as a matter of personal bias. I say this as both an insider and outsider because, like everyone, I've watched other people play games whether in sports, carnivals, board games, card games, or whathaveyou. Frustration happens most often when game players can't agree on a cap for higher or lower objectives because players take advantage of that disequilibrium to sabotage each other. Economic thinkers (regardless of being economists or not) explicitly communicate this cap.

It's common sense really. When everyone's on the same page, a sense of camaraderie is developed which encourages evolutionary learning because game players enjoy each others' company. The result is diverse experimentation with balanced focus since the game players respect each others' personalities and are willing to play each others' games for mutual exploration.

Like Gauthier who I mentioned in the corrupt stock market thread, another philosopher you might be interested in looking into is the world renowned Jurgen Habermas since discourse ethics is his area of expertise, connecting rational communication to human action (and opposing deconstruction :) ).

No shit Sherlock!

That's been my argument all along. One cannot trust the subjective and emotional ego - it trumps over rational decision-making almost every time and will try to lie pretty damn consistently about it to deny it - even to one's self, let alone all others.

:rolleyes:

Keep digging Watson. You're contradicting yourself now because your previous admissions in this response about the diversity of rational goals show that you acknowledge that the ego isn't the ultimate guide of decision making behavior. Furthermore, I'm claiming here that it's feasible to subordinate the ego by enduring frustration and aggravation.

It doesn't matter if the split is 99 to 1.

My critique was against the arbitrary and artificial dichotomy of just two possible types of "rationalist personalities" for six billion people on the planet. That strikes me as entirely arbitrary and unsubstantiated nonsense - independent of any comment about the merits of the particular duopoly in question.

There is zero justification for just assuming that there are only two types of anything. The limits of one's own imagination can not be rationally defined as the limits of rational possibility for all other human beings. That's not rational.

Well first, I didn't claim there were only two types of people.

Second, as a matter of being practical, we use sets to organize our paradigms. Even a continuous spectrum of personalities needs to have its parameters qualified.

[Michael]

I think you're starting to get it now, but to fully resolve the line of thought, it isn't rationality itself that's subjective, but the application, and interpretation, of rationality towards goals that's subjective and it is subjective both from the participant's and observer's perspectives. The participant always acts rationally, but what he's acting rational towards is disputable.
If rationality is entirely dependent upon goals and goals are entirely relative and subjective, that makes rationality entirely relative and subjective.

Eh? That's a little sick, no?

Personally, I've found that economic thinkers are the most enjoyable people to play games with because economists can communicate the objectives of the game most clearly, and I don't say this just as a matter of personal bias. I say this as both an insider and outsider because, like everyone, I've watched other people play games whether in sports, carnivals, board games, card games, or whathaveyou. Frustration happens most often when game players can't agree on a cap for higher or lower objectives because players take advantage of that disequilibrium to sabotage each other. Economic thinkers (regardless of being economists or not) explicitly communicate this cap.

It's common sense really. When everyone's on the same page, a sense of camaraderie is developed which encourages evolutionary learning because game players enjoy each others' company. The result is diverse experimentation with balanced focus since the game players respect each others' personalities and are willing to play each others' games for mutual exploration.

Like Gauthier who I mentioned in the corrupt stock market thread, another philosopher you might be interested in looking into is the world renowned Jurgen Habermas since discourse ethics is his area of expertise, connecting rational communication to human action (and opposing deconstruction :) ).

I'm quite familiar with Habermas - a great thinker, but I lose respect for him when he goes off with all that supernatural 'univeralism' stuff. As an aside, why do so many people need to appeal to imagininary things to justify their views? Why can't people just justify their own theories on their own merits? Why does supernaturalism always have to be brought in?

And I certainly disagree about games playing. Most people don't like playing games at all because they only like to win and games do produce a winner AND a loser. If games produced only winners, I suspect they'd be much more popular.

As for economists, they are the ones I'd avoid games play with as they are the least likely to play games for the sake of playing games. For them, every game must have a purpose (profit) and a winner otherwise it is useless. I disagree with games taken too seriously. That's a sign of obsession, not pleasure.

:rolleyes:

Keep digging Watson. You're contradicting yourself now because your previous admissions in this response about the diversity of rational goals show that you acknowledge that the ego isn't the ultimate guide of decision making behavior. Furthermore, I'm claiming here that it's feasible to subordinate the ego by enduring frustration and aggravation.
Huh?

You've lost me here asserting that I've excused ego. Ego is by far the greatest barrier to rationalism (in any pseudo-objective sense of the term).

Btw, enduring frustration and aggravation for the sake of ego is a victory for ego, not a subordination of it.

Well first, I didn't claim there were only two types of people.
You specifically stated that there are only two kinds of rationalists. That's the dichotomy I objected to.

Second, as a matter of being practical, we use sets to organize our paradigms. Even a continuous spectrum of personalities needs to have its parameters qualified.
You've lost me here. What is a "continuous spectrum of personalities"?

And I'd aver that most people don't organize their paradigms at all. Most people don't even realize they have one, let alone more than one.

[Daktoria]

If rationality is entirely dependent upon goals and goals are entirely relative and subjective, that makes rationality entirely relative and subjective.

The essence of rationality is universal, but the direction that rationality is exercised towards is subjective. Physical reflexes exist, but reflexes are not reminiscent of cognition because reflexes, by definition, do not have self-control.

I'm quite familiar with Habermas - a great thinker, but I lose respect for him when he goes off with all that supernatural 'univeralism' stuff. As an aside, why do so many people need to appeal to imagininary things to justify their views? Why can't people just justify their own theories on their own merits? Why does supernaturalism always have to be brought in?

Merits are based on imagination since actions require interpretation in order to have value; Habermas' "universal pragmatics" acknowledge this for the sake of reliable and important communication.

Why do you believe universalism is supernatural (from Habermas' perspective)?

And I certainly disagree about games playing. Most people don't like playing games at all because they only like to win and games do produce a winner AND a loser. If games produced only winners, I suspect they'd be much more popular.

As for economists, they are the ones I'd avoid games play with as they are the least likely to play games for the sake of playing games. For them, every game must have a purpose (profit) and a winner otherwise it is useless. I disagree with games taken too seriously. That's a sign of obsession, not pleasure.


I'm not sure if you understand what I'm saying.

When I said, "Frustration happens most often when game players can't agree on a cap for higher or lower objectives because players take advantage of that disequilibrium to sabotage each other. Economic thinkers (regardless of being economists or not) explicitly communicate this cap," what did you come away with?

Huh?

You've lost me here asserting that I've excused ego. Ego is by far the greatest barrier to rationalism (in any pseudo-objective sense of the term).

Your transition of ego's definition is a long problem, but bear with me. Following is a list of your statements:


my argument that a failure to seek self-profit maximization is not necessarily a definition of irrational. Some humans just like to play ego games.
Ego-games are usually played by those who are emotionally immature... ...Immaturity is not a good predictive marker for profit-maximizing
sometimes it is perfectly rational for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons.
Any type of behavior, under some specific circumstances, with a specified goal, might be deemed to be rational under those circumstances, with that goal.


From #4 to #3, if any goal and behavior are possible, how can non-maximizing behavior or non-rational reasons exist?

From #3 to #2, if it's rational "for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons", how can ego-games not just be another form of rationality?

From #2 to #1, how can nonprofit maximizing behavior be rational when ego games are distinct from rationality and when (immature) ego games are not good predictors of profit maximization?

Btw, enduring frustration and aggravation for the sake of ego is a victory for ego, not a subordination of it.

I think this depends on the definition of the ego. Traditionally, the word "egotistical" actually refers to the id's selfish pursuit of pleasure versus pain (usually via superiority and supremacy). However, if you're taking a stricter Freudian definition, then I can see where you're coming from here, but defense mechanisms and the reality principle are reminiscent of rationality such that there wouldn't otherwise be a distinction between rationality and the ego. This would in turn, again, mean that it's impossible to behave irrationally.

You specifically stated that there are only two kinds of rationalists. That's the dichotomy I objected to....

...You've lost me here. What is a "continuous spectrum of personalities"?

And I'd aver that most people don't organize their paradigms at all. Most people don't even realize they have one, let alone more than one.

I'm sorry if you missed it, but the post afterwards (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=21731#post21731) functioned as an appendix for the subdivision of rational personalities. Also, there is considerable potential for overlap between those subdivisions, and I'm granting the benefit of the doubt towards the possibility of there being an infinite amount of rational personalities (since indeed, every individual is unique). However, generalizations are made in order to simplify the identification process similarly to how we classify organisms into species, genus, family, etc. up to kingdom.

The paradigm note was supplementary to show where my pragmatism is coming from, but in any case, the question isn't a matter of whether or not people do or don't organize our paradigms. Rather it is, "How much?" Function is impossible without focus.

[Michael]

I just read a 'game theory' analysis of healthcare reform in Congress. Seems like a bad joke.

The essential flaw of game theory is that it is predicated on 100% rational actors. Since humans are not 100% rational, garbage in, garbage out (GIGO). Just like political analysis!

According to this application of game theory, there's no way in hell a healthcare reform bill could get passed in either the House or Senate - except that it did. And people wonder why I ridicule 'game theory'. :lol:

[Michael]

The essence of rationality is universal, but the direction that rationality is exercised towards is subjective.

I don't think this is tenable. You are apparently asserting that if the goal is common to all, then there is ONLY ONE RATIONAL policy. I think this is rather simplistic to say the least.

Btw, and any time anyone asserts a "universal", I start looking for the 'God in the machine' since that's what "universal" is the magic code word for hiding.

That's why all these magic universals aways make me suspicious. They just seem to pop up very conveniently to support hard-core conservative ideology. There is no proof or evidential basis or anything to support the assertion (just the usual subjective "faith").

Merits are based on imagination since actions require interpretation in order to have value; Habermas' "universal pragmatics" acknowledge this for the sake of reliable and important communication.

Why do you believe universalism is supernatural (from Habermas' perspective)?
I said I object to universalism on principle, I didn't accuse Habermas of specifically asserting that. Indeed, most of these supernatural worshippers go to great lengths to hide or deny their god, but this god always seems to drive the process and is not some innocent outcome from some rational process.

As for Habermas and universalism, I'd critique Habermas' argument if he actually made one. But you see, when it comes to assertions of 'universalism', one is just expected to agree because no evidence and no proof is ever offered. Universalism, when it appears, is just assumed to be.

If Habermas ever offered any justification for his assertion that rationalism follows universal rules, then we could talk. But one can't argue what isn't there.

I'm not sure if you understand what I'm saying.

When I said, "Frustration happens most often when game players can't agree on a cap for higher or lower objectives because players take advantage of that disequilibrium to sabotage each other. Economic thinkers (regardless of being economists or not) explicitly communicate this cap," what did you come away with?
I always get suspicious when you assert motives to entire classes of people without any proof or evidence offered.

Your transition of ego's definition is a long problem, but bear with me. Following is a list of your statements:


my argument that a failure to seek self-profit maximization is not necessarily a definition of irrational. Some humans just like to play ego games.
Ego-games are usually played by those who are emotionally immature... ...Immaturity is not a good predictive marker for profit-maximizing
sometimes it is perfectly rational for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons.
Any type of behavior, under some specific circumstances, with a specified goal, might be deemed to be rational under those circumstances, with that goal.


Yes, these are my statements. :)

From #4 to #3, if any goal and behavior are possible, how can non-maximizing behavior or non-rational reasons exist?
Sounds like your argument is predicated on semantics here.

For example, I might always choose "tails" in any flipping of the coin because my grandfather always wore a foxtail hat. That's not maximizing behavior, and it isn't rational.

From #3 to #2, if it's rational "for humans to engage in non-maximizing behavior for non-rational reasons", how can ego-games not just be another form of rationality?
I never said ego-games can't be rational. Indeed, I've already acknowledged that ego-games might, under certain circumstances, be considered rational. But that's entirely inconsequential to the issue here since the topic is rationality, not 'ego-games'.

Side question, why are you so wrapped up in defending the propriety of ego-games? Seems like you have a real issue here the way you are all over this point (which I consider inconsequential to the issue under discussion).

Please note: when I am intellectually contemptuous of something (like egos, or ego-games) then you can be sure that I will keep kicking at it just for sport. :D



From #2 to #1, how can nonprofit maximizing behavior be rational when ego games are distinct from rationality and when (immature) ego games are not good predictors of profit maximization?
I don't know. You tell me since you are the one asserting it.

I'm not asserting that "maximizing" behavior is always rational. Indeed, irrational people aren't likely to maximize anything except the frustration factor, but that's none of my concern.

And since you are still going on about 'ego-games', how can you go from "some people just like to play ego-games" to an assertion that ego-games are distinct from rationality? That's a curious jump you are making there - looks like a 'projection' since it has nothing to do with what I've said.

Ego-games are just ego-games. They might be rational, they might be irrational, they might be just spiteful or they might have no motive at all beyond the ego itself. Who the fuck cares about ego-games? And why are you going on and on about ego-games? The concept contributes absolutely nothing to this discussion except make it boring and repetitive. :shrug:

Btw, every word spoken on this issue of "ego-games" seems like a repeat, which is why I'm getting more and more contemptuous of the issue when you bring it up.

I think this depends on the definition of the ego. Traditionally, the word "egotistical" actually refers to the id's selfish pursuit of pleasure versus pain (usually via superiority and supremacy). However, if you're taking a stricter Freudian definition, then I can see where you're coming from here, but defense mechanisms and the reality principle are reminiscent of rationality such that there wouldn't otherwise be a distinction between rationality and the ego. This would in turn, again, mean that it's impossible to behave irrationally.
Sorry, I don't worship at the altar of Freud. His pyscho-babble doesn't impress me at all and I consider most of his work to be hogwash.

I'm not going to play along with anything Freud says. It just doesn't make any sense at all, the theory has no general basis in reality, has no proof and no evidence. Ergo, Freud's theory is not scientific and thus not worthy of my consideration.


I'm sorry if you missed it, but the post afterwards (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=21731#post21731) functioned as an appendix for the subdivision of rational personalities. Also, there is considerable potential for overlap between those subdivisions, and I'm granting the benefit of the doubt towards the possibility of there being an infinite amount of rational personalities (since indeed, every individual is unique). However, generalizations are made in order to simplify the identification process similarly to how we classify organisms into species, genus, family, etc. up to kingdom.
Then I apologize for accusing you of imposing an articifial dichotomy, though I really don't see how your comments about additional "sub-divisions" can be interpreted as anything but 'sub-divisions of your previously asserted dichotomy' - that's a formula that supports your dichotomy and does not negate it.

Either way, the point is moot. I just don't really care if you will permit just two or two billion subdivisions of rational actors. Such categorizations of quantity don't seem very helpful for analysis of quality. My critique of your argument was entirely predicated upon dismissing the attempt to assert a dichotomy where proof one does not exist.

The paradigm note was supplementary to show where my pragmatism is coming from, but in any case, the question isn't a matter of whether or not people do or don't organize our paradigms. Rather it is, "How much?" Function is impossible without focus.

Function is quite possible without focus. Many good little consumers function very well without any focus, understanding or even awareness of their function as consumers.

Cogs in a machine also manage to function quite well without any 'focus'.

[Daktoria]

I don't think this is tenable. You are apparently asserting that if the goal is common to all, then there is ONLY ONE RATIONAL policy. I think this is rather simplistic to say the least.

Btw, and any time anyone asserts a "universal", I start looking for the 'God in the machine' since that's what "universal" is the magic code word for hiding.

That's why all these magic universals aways make me suspicious. They just seem to pop up very conveniently to support hard-core conservative ideology. There is no proof or evidential basis or anything to support the assertion (just the usual subjective "faith").

Rationality doesn't necessarily coexist with marginalism since goals, actions, intentions, strategies, etc. can be subdivided ad infinitum.

I said I object to universalism on principle, I didn't accuse Habermas of specifically asserting that. Indeed, most of these supernatural worshippers go to great lengths to hide or deny their god, but this god always seems to drive the process and is not some innocent outcome from some rational process.

As for Habermas and universalism, I'd critique Habermas' argument if he actually made one. But you see, when it comes to assertions of 'universalism', one is just expected to agree because no evidence and no proof is ever offered. Universalism, when it appears, is just assumed to be.

If Habermas ever offered any justification for his assertion that rationalism follows universal rules, then we could talk. But one can't argue what isn't there.

I don't know if you're interpreting Habermas properly then. For starters, this is because it's quite widely recognized that his discourse ethics are compatible with pluralism. Similarly, his theory of rational reconstruction aims at the essence of truth, so while there are many ways to realize truth, truth in and of itself is not a concept in perpetual flux.

I mean we could say that even the material and metaphysical are chaotically political, but that makes everything absurd. Even the default pursuits of power and pleasure become totally nonsensical.

I always get suspicious when you assert motives to entire classes of people without any proof or evidence offered.

When I say "economic thinkers" I'm not referring to a class, but a culture. It doesn't matter what status a person holds, anyone can be economical.

Sounds like your argument is predicated on semantics here.

For example, I might always choose "tails" in any flipping of the coin because my grandfather always wore a foxtail hat. That's not maximizing behavior, and it isn't rational.

You're making a subjective (and inductive) value judgment here. Granted that I personally sympathize with your opposition to such decision making, but perhaps your grandfather always wearing a foxtail hat instills a certain level and flavor in confidence in your personality which you believe applies to the side a coin will land.

Irrationality =/= stupidity. This point is not about knowledge. It's about reconciling dissonance at multiple levels compatibly with who we are.

I never said ego-games can't be rational. Indeed, I've already acknowledged that ego-games might, under certain circumstances, be considered rational. But that's entirely inconsequential to the issue here since the topic is rationality, not 'ego-games'.

Side question, why are you so wrapped up in defending the propriety of ego-games? Seems like you have a real issue here the way you are all over this point (which I consider inconsequential to the issue under discussion).

Please note: when I am intellectually contemptuous of something (like egos, or ego-games) then you can be sure that I will keep kicking at it just for sport....

...I don't know. You tell me since you are the one asserting it.

I'm not asserting that "maximizing" behavior is always rational. Indeed, irrational people aren't likely to maximize anything except the frustration factor, but that's none of my concern.

And since you are still going on about 'ego-games', how can you go from "some people just like to play ego-games" to an assertion that ego-games are distinct from rationality? That's a curious jump you are making there - looks like a 'projection' since it has nothing to do with what I've said.

Ego-games are just ego-games. They might be rational, they might be irrational, they might be just spiteful or they might have no motive at all beyond the ego itself. Who the fuck cares about ego-games? And why are you going on and on about ego-games? The concept contributes absolutely nothing to this discussion except make it boring and repetitive.

Btw, every word spoken on this issue of "ego-games" seems like a repeat, which is why I'm getting more and more contemptuous of the issue when you bring it up.

Heh. Just a reminder, you were the one who first brought up ego games (http://www.discussionworldforum.com/forum/showthread.php?p=22244#post22244). The reason I keep referring to it though is because I've been waiting for these two responses to happen right next to each other.

With regards to profit maximization, you've effectively been claiming recourse in the law of excluded middle by saying there's something else besides maximization that can be claimed as rational. However, by saying "I don't know" with regards to alternatives, you're effectively conceding that no such middle exists. Even if you're willing to claim that there are alternatives out there which you can't think of, you haven't even defined (or described) the tolerable characteristics of those alternatives.

About distinction between rationality and ego games, I haven't exactly claimed that, and I've been careful not to cross the line because I don't personally believe there really is a distinction. On one hand, ego games are a subset of rational action. On the other hand, ego games are the spark plug for rationality. Trying to distinguish is like asking, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?"

However, note the following two statements I made earlier (with respect to what I've been saying about how rationality doesn't always coexist with marginalism and the reconciliation of dissonance):

Why can't animals be rational? There's a difference between rationality and intelligence.

Suffice to say that egoism recognizes the ego as an end unto itself, so if a rational actor is willing to endure conditions such as frustration and aggravation in order to pursue a goal, then it's possible for rationality to not be equal to egoism.

It's important to note that the very identifying and experiencing of "frustration" and "aggravation" are rational actions in themselves. Otherwise, material predeterminism rules all since feelings would just result from natural influences. The same goes for giving these processes the benefit of the doubt of being (at least catalytically) controlled by intelligence.

To be honest, this could all be abbreviated by acknowledging "cogito" or the is-ought problem, but it doesn't seem as though you're satisfied with "cogito" (or is-ought) because you want to avoid getting pinned down. Pinned down by what, I don't know, but whatever. In any case, to remain a living person, you can't take refuge in (logical) positivism.

Sorry, I don't worship at the altar of Freud. His pyscho-babble doesn't impress me at all and I consider most of his work to be hogwash.

I'm not going to play along with anything Freud says. It just doesn't make any sense at all, the theory has no general basis in reality, has no proof and no evidence. Ergo, Freud's theory is not scientific and thus not worthy of my consideration.

What do the words "ego" and "egotistical" mean to you then?

Then I apologize for accusing you of imposing an articifial dichotomy, though I really don't see how your comments about additional "sub-divisions" can be interpreted as anything but 'sub-divisions of your previously asserted dichotomy' - that's a formula that supports your dichotomy and does not negate it.

Either way, the point is moot. I just don't really care if you will permit just two or two billion subdivisions of rational actors. Such categorizations of quantity don't seem very helpful for analysis of quality. My critique of your argument was entirely predicated upon dismissing the attempt to assert a dichotomy where proof one does not exist.

I thought your critique was about the organizational qualities of altruism since my elaboration on the types of rational actors was about games alternative to maximization. Nonetheless, I've already explained how there doesn't seem to be an excluded middle, nor does it doesn't really seem as though you're describing altruism's essence. I believe in altruism, but I can only speculate on your own opinions.

An aside, you did say:

A rational altruist for example might seek to minimize their gains.

Again, I'm going to refer you to David Gauthier because his version of contractarianism emphasizes constrained maximization as a manner of looking beyond the margin to achieve greater good (however that's defined).

Coincidentally, you might like him because he provides an alternative to the Rawls/ Nozick dichotomy of (libertarian) social contract values.

Function is quite possible without focus. Many good little consumers function very well without any focus, understanding or even awareness of their function as consumers.

Cogs in a machine also manage to function quite well without any 'focus'.

Small is beautiful, heh.

Function can't take place without purpose. Otherwise, we'd just have a world of faux complexity where chaos "rules" all. There is no such thing as natural function.

You should like this too because it's the bedrock of how to oppose the teleological proof of God.

[Michael]

For anyone interested:

http://www.rmm-journal.de/downloads/004_albert.pdf

The title of the paper is "Why Bayesian Rationality Is Empty, Perfect Rationality Doesn't Exist, Ecological Rationality Is Too Simple and Critical Rationality Does The Job".

Curiously enough, every word in the title - except "and" - is capitalized! :lol: